[Pramāṇa](https://indike.org/pramana/) › [Indian literature](https://indike.org/pramana/in) › [Buddhist Literature](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha) › [Taishō Tripiṭaka (Chinese Buddhist canon)](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho) › [大般涅槃經疏](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1767) › 29.12 # 大般涅槃經疏 29.12 大般涅槃經疏 29.12 - **Language:** Classical Chinese ### [29.12](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1767.29.12) 「善男子若有人問」下，二廣破乖中之執，多寄譬文。文為三：初種子譬破、次乳酪譬破、三舉鹽鹹譬破。初種子中三：譬、合、結。私謂：合文為二，先示、次釋。初示中言眾生別有佛性，是義不然。次釋云，眾生即性、性即眾生，既非內外又亦內外，內外不二。亦可云色即佛性、佛性即色。故前第二復次以相好為外，力無畏等為內，若色等無，相好亦無。下三復次，準此可知。次乳酪譬中二：先正作乳譬、次更為乳作生識譬。初又三：先正定中道、次破偏執、三結就性理。初正定中，先問、次答。答中為三：初定、二結假說亦有亦無、三釋。「善男子」，二破偏執。亦應雙破有無，今但破有。文為三：初作因果同時互出難、次明因中有果例並難、三明果中有因例並難。初明乳酪既其同時，亦應酥醍醐等一時而出。以同時故，是故更責，若不時出，誰作次第？「善男子若有」下，第二因中有果難，又二：先作例並、次難不例。初例並者，乳是酪因而能出酪，水草乳因亦應生乳（云云）。次「何以故」下，不例。「善男子若言乳中」下，第三果中有因例並難。言例並者，乳為酪因，酪為乳果。乳為酪因因中有果者，酪為乳果果應有因。其中又二：先正難；次結難，於中二：先結本無、次結非有非無。「善男子是故如來」下，第三結性理，又二，先結離偏、後結中道。次「善男子四事和合」下，二舉生識譬為譬作譬，又二：先正舉生識譬；次「乳中酪性」下，還以乳酪合譬，又二：初正合、次破執。破執又二：先牒執、次正破。破中二：先兩章門、次釋章門。初一異因異果，是初章門。次非一因生一切果，非一切果從一因生，是第二章門。「如是四事」下，二釋兩章門。先釋後章。然眼識者但生眼證，即不能生耳鼻等識，豈是一因生一切果？乳能生酪亦復如是。必待眾緣，眾緣生者即是無。後釋前章門，初釋非一因生一切果，非一切果從一因生章門，如文。次「是故我於」下，追釋前異因異果章門。因生故計有、因滅故計無，有滅不滅即異因異果。「善男子如鹽」下，第三舉鹽鹹破，又二：初正舉譬、次更破執。破執為二：先牒執、次破執。初牒中凡牒二執：一牒鹽中有鹹執、二牒種子中有四大執。次「鹽性亦爾」下，正破二執，又二：先破不鹹中有鹹、次破四大。初破又二：先非；次「何以故」下正破，又二：先責難、次例餘物。正責難意者，若鹽置不鹹而鹹者，當知即無本性。本來無鹹而今鹹者，豈非本無，次並之。將一升鹽置多水中，失本鹹性，而水中又無鹹性。既兩處皆無，何有鹹性？次例一切皆爾。「若言外四大」下，二破四大，即破其後執，亦二：先破、後例（云云）。 > From "Good son, if someone asks..." downward is the second part, broadly refuting attachments that run contrary to the middle, mostly by drawing upon similes in the text. The text has three parts: first, refuting through the simile of the seed; next, refuting through the simile of milk and curd; and third, refuting through the simile of salt's saltiness. Within the first, the seed, there are three: simile, application, and conclusion. I personally note: the application text has two parts: first, indicating; next, explaining. In the first, indicating, it says that sentient beings have a separate buddhadhātu—this meaning is not correct. Next, the explanation says that sentient beings are the nature and the nature is sentient beings; since it is neither internal nor external, it is also both internal and external, internal and external being non-dual. One may also say that form is the buddhadhātu and the buddhadhātu is form. Hence the previous second further exposition took the physical marks and characteristics as external, and the powers, fearlessnesses, etc., as internal; if form and so forth do not exist, the marks and characteristics also do not exist. The three further expositions below may be understood by analogy to this. Next, within the simile of milk and curd, there are two parts: first, directly making the simile of milk; next, further making the simile of the arising of consciousness for the sake of milk. The first also has three: first, directly establishing the middle way; next, refuting biased attachments; and third, concluding in terms of the principle of the nature. Within directly establishing, there is first a question, and next an answer. The answer has three parts: first, establishing; second, concluding that it is provisionally said to be both existent and non-existent; and third, explaining. "Good son" is the second, refuting biased attachments. It should also doubly refute existence and non-existence, but now it only refutes existence. The text has three parts: first, making the objection of the simultaneous mutual production of cause and fruit; next, clarifying the objection from analogy regarding the fruit existing within the cause; and third, clarifying the objection from analogy regarding the cause existing within the fruit. The first clarifies that since milk and curd are simultaneous, butter, ghee, etc., should also emerge all at once. Because they are simultaneous, it therefore further questions: if they do not emerge simultaneously, what produces the sequence? From "Good son, if there is..." downward is the second objection regarding the fruit existing within the cause, which also has two parts: first, making an analogy; next, objecting to the lack of analogy. The first, making an analogy, is: milk is the cause of curd and can produce curd, so water and grass, which are causes of milk, should also produce milk (and so forth). Next, from "Why is that?" downward is the lack of analogy. From "Good son, if one says that within milk..." downward is the third, the objection from analogy regarding the cause existing within the fruit. As for speaking of the objection from analogy: milk is the cause of curd, and curd is the fruit of milk. If milk is the cause of curd and there is fruit within the cause, then curd is the fruit of milk and there should be cause within the fruit. Within this, there are also two parts: first, directly raising the objection; next, concluding the objection, wherein are two: first, concluding that it was originally absent; next, concluding that it is neither existent nor non-existent. From "Good son, therefore the Tathāgata..." downward is the third, concluding with the principle of the nature, which also has two: first, concluding by departing from bias; and later, concluding with the middle way. Next, from "Good son, when four things combine..." downward is the second, raising the simile of the arising of consciousness to serve as a simile for the simile, which also has two parts: first, directly raising the simile of the arising of consciousness; next, from "The nature of curd in milk..." downward, again applying the simile with milk and curd, which also has two parts: first, directly applying it; next, refuting attachments. Refuting attachments also has two parts: first, restating the attachment; next, directly refuting it. Within the refutation are two: first, two proposition headings; next, explaining the proposition headings. The first—different causes, different fruits—is the first proposition heading. Next—not that one cause produces all fruits, nor that all fruits arise from one cause—is the second proposition heading. From "These four things..." downward is the second, explaining the two proposition headings. First, it explains the latter heading. Now, visual consciousness only produces visual cognition, and cannot produce auditory, olfactory, or other consciousnesses; how could it be that one cause produces all fruits? Milk's ability to produce curd is also like this. It must rely on multiple conditions; that which is produced by multiple conditions is non-existent. Later it explains the former proposition heading. First, it explains the proposition heading: not that one cause produces all fruits, nor that all fruits arise from one cause, as in the text. Next, from "Therefore, I, in..." downward, it retrospectively explains the previous proposition heading of different causes and different fruits. Because causes arise, one presumes existence; because causes cease, one presumes non-existence. Existence, cessation, and non-cessation are simply different causes and different fruits. From "Good son, like salt..." downward is the third, refuting through salt's saltiness, which also has two parts: first, directly raising the simile; next, further refuting attachments. Refuting attachments has two parts: first, restating the attachment; next, refuting the attachment. In the first, restating, it generally restates two attachments: first, restating the attachment that salt contains saltiness; second, restating the attachment that the seed contains the four great elements. Next, from "The nature of salt is also like this" downward, it directly refutes the two attachments, which also has two parts: first, refuting that the non-salty contains saltiness; next, refuting the four great elements. The first refutation also has two: first, denying it; next, from "Why is that?" downward, directly refuting it, which also has two parts: first, raising an interrogation; next, analogizing to other things. The intention of directly raising an interrogation is: if salt is placed into what is not salty and it becomes salty, one should know that it lacks an intrinsic nature. If it was originally without saltiness and now becomes salty, is it not originally non-existent? Next, it sets up the analogy. If one puts a sheng of salt into much water, it loses its original salty nature, while in the water there is also no salty nature. Since it does not exist in either place, how can there be a salty nature? Next, it analogizes that all things are like this. From "If one says that the external four great elements..." downward is the second, refuting the four great elements, which refutes the latter attachment, also having two parts: first refuting, and later analogizing (and so forth). > — English (machine translation) (machine translation) - [Previous: 29.11](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1767.29.11) - [Next: 29.13](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1767.29.13) - [Up: 29](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1767.29) ## Translations (1) - [English (machine translation)](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1767~en-mt.29.12) — English, machine translation --- Source: [https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1767.29.12](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1767.29.12) · Pramāṇa