[Pramāṇa](https://indike.org/pramana/) › [Indian literature](https://indike.org/pramana/in) › [Buddhist Literature](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha) › [Taishō Tripiṭaka (Chinese Buddhist canon)](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho) › [大般涅槃經疏](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1767) › 29.13 # 大般涅槃經疏 29.13 大般涅槃經疏 29.13 - **Language:** Classical Chinese ### [29.13](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1767.29.13) 「如我所說十二部」下，第三約諸法廣明中道。亦云明用。為三：一依理起教用、二明修因趣果用、三習解除惑用。初教用中又二：先標、次釋。釋中又二：初通明三語、次別明自意語。初又兩：一就昔教明三語、次就今教明三語。初昔教中具解三語，為三文。初隨自者，如諸比丘各說身因，佛亦自說，即隨自意語。如長者稱幻，佛隨其說幻，即隨他意語。隨自他意可知（云云）。「善男子如我」下，二就今教明三語。文亦自三，如文。「善男子如來或時」下，次別明隨自意，為三：初廣略隨自意、次明七種隨自意、三明有無隨自意。初文者，就一法即略，就無量法即廣。次七種又二：先列、次釋。釋中自為七文。初因中說果者，行善見天人、行惡見地獄是也。次果中說因者，見貧知慳、見富知施是也。餘五如文。三「如來復有」下，明有無隨自意，為三：一正明有無、二明眾生不解、三作四句分別。就有無又二：初就如來佛性有無、二明闡提佛性有無。初明如來又二：初明有無、次類例釋。初又二：初明無所有、次明有所無。初文者，十力無畏等並是無有而有。次明有所無者，不善無記一切煩惱等並是昔有今無。次「如有無善不善」下，舉二十二雙法，雙類前二事。有漏無漏者，有漏類有所無，無漏類無所有。世間類有所無，非世間類無所有。下去皆爾。次「一闡提佛性」下，是明闡提佛性有無，皆悉反上如來有無。如來有善，闡提即無；如來無惡，闡提即有（云云）。「我雖說」下，次明眾生不解如來是語，又二：初正出不解、次引昔證。初文有二：初不解、次舉深況淺。深行菩薩尚自不了，況復淺人？次「我往一時」下，引證。佛說世諦聲聞不解者，二解：一云世諦種別，事關業行，因果深隱故難解。二云應身為世諦，故二乘不了。問：佛於何處說世諦，五百不解？一云：華嚴中說，五百聾啞。二云：外國經多，度此者少（云云）。天台大師解此，別有所關（云云）。「或有佛性」下，第三四句分別，此為二：先正約四句、次勸分別。舊解者，闡提人有，有於惡邪境界性。善根人有，有萬善了因亦名緣因。二人俱有，併有正性或眾生性。俱無者，無果果果性。河西云：闡提有，有惡五陰不善性。善根人有，有善五陰善性。二人俱有者，俱有無記五陰性。俱無者，俱無妙絕涅槃果性。此與舊語異意同。興皇釋此，從一句至七句：一句只是中道。二句是如來闡提佛性，若有若無。三句是三種語，佛自語闡提有性，他語闡提無性，自他語亦有亦無。四句是此中四句。七句是七眾生，前二人是惡，後五人是善。復作三種釋：一總就諸義、二就理內外、三單就理內通。就諸義者，理非善惡而有善惡二用，善根人有有善用，闡提人有有惡用。俱有者，各有一邊。俱無者，各無一邊。次就理內外者，佛性本非得無得，約緣故有得無得。理外闡提是有得，理內是無得。善根人有無得之性，闡提有有得之性，俱有俱無如上說。次單約理內，闡提即是善星，善根人即是羅云，此是順逆二化。闡提有逆化不善之性，善根人有順化善法之性，俱有俱無如上說。謂此為能解難解之說。今明欲依此文作四句者，闡提人有，但有於沒。善根人有，但有於出。二人俱有，俱在恒河。二人俱無，俱不到岸。欲思作者，亦應無量，略出如此（云云）。又約三諦者，闡提人有者，世諦惡因。善根人有者，出世善因。二人俱有，俱有世諦果報之身。二人俱無，俱無中道因果。次「我諸」下，勸分別，如文。 > From "As I have preached the twelve divisions \[of scripture\]" onwards is the third part: extensively explaining the middle way in reference to all phenomena. It is also said to explain its function. This comprises three sections: first, the function of setting up teaching in dependence upon principle; second, the function of cultivating causes to advance toward the fruit; third, the function of practicing understanding to eradicate delusions. Within the first, teaching function, there are again two parts: first, a general indication; next, the explanation. Within the explanation there are again two: first, generally explaining the three kinds of speech; next, specifically explaining speech according to one's own intention. The first again has two: first, explaining the three kinds of speech with respect to past teachings; next, explaining the three kinds of speech with respect to the present teaching. First, within the past teachings, fully explaining the three kinds of speech constitutes three passages of text. First, speech according to oneself: as when the various bhikṣus each spoke of the causes of the body and the Buddha also spoke of his own, which is speech according to his own intention. As when the elder called it an illusion and the Buddha spoke of illusion following him, which is speech according to the other's intention. Speech according to both self and other can be known accordingly. From "Good son, as I..." onwards is the second: explaining the three kinds of speech with respect to the present teaching. The text also naturally has three, as written. From "Good son, the Tathāgata at times..." onwards next specifically explains \[speech\] according to one's own intention, in three sections: first, broad and brief \[speech\] according to one's own intention; next, explaining the seven types of \[speech\] according to one's own intention; third, explaining existence and non-existence \[spoken\] according to one's own intention. Regarding the first passage: in reference to a single phenomenon it is brief, and in reference to immeasurable phenomena it is broad. Next, the seven types also have two parts: first, listing them; next, explaining them. Within the explanation it naturally forms seven passages. First, speaking of the fruit within the cause: practicing goodness and seeing gods and humans, or practicing evil and seeing the hells, is this. Next, speaking of the cause within the fruit: seeing poverty and knowing stinginess, or seeing wealth and knowing generosity, is this. The remaining five are as in the text. Third, from "The Tathāgata furthermore has..." onwards explains existence and non-existence according to one's own intention, in three sections: first, directly explaining existence and non-existence; second, explaining sentient beings' failure to understand; third, making a four-phrase analysis. Regarding existence and non-existence, there are again two parts: first, regarding the existence and non-existence of the Tathāgata's buddhadhātu; second, explaining the existence and non-existence of the icchantika's buddhadhātu. First, explaining the Tathāgata also has two: first, explaining existence and non-existence; next, analogous explanation. The first again has two: first, explaining being absent of what exists; next, explaining being devoid of what exists. In the first passage: the ten powers, fearlessnesses, and so forth are all what originally did not exist and now exist. Next, explaining being devoid of what exists: unwholesomeness, indeterminate states, and all afflictions and so forth are all what once existed and now do not exist. Next, from "Just as existence, non-existence, wholesome, unwholesome..." onwards brings forward twenty-two pairs of dharmas, analogously pairing them with the preceding two matters. Contaminated and uncontaminated: contaminated is analogous to being devoid of what exists; uncontaminated is analogous to being absent of what exists. Mundane is analogous to being devoid of what exists; supra-mundane is analogous to being absent of what exists. And so forth below. Next, from "The icchantika's buddhadhātu..." onwards explains the existence and non-existence of the icchantika's buddhadhātu, which is entirely the inverse of the Tathāgata's existence and non-existence above: the Tathāgata has goodness, so the icchantika lacks it; the Tathāgata lacks evil, so the icchantika has it. From "Although I have preached..." onwards next explains sentient beings' failure to understand such speech of the Tathāgata, also in two parts: first, directly pointing out the lack of understanding; next, citing past cases as proof. The first text has two: first, the lack of understanding; next, citing the profound to illustrate the shallow. If even bodhisattvas of profound practice still do not understand on their own, how much less those of shallow capacity? Next, from "Once, at one time, I..." onwards cites proof. As for the Buddha preaching conventional truth and the śrāvakas failing to understand, there are two interpretations: one says that varieties of conventional truth involve karmic actions, and because cause and effect are profound and hidden, it is difficult to understand. The second says that the response body is conventional truth, hence the two vehicles do not understand it. Question: Where did the Buddha preach conventional truth such that five hundred \[hearers\] did not understand? One \[master\] says: Preached in the Avataṃsaka, where five hundred were deaf and mute. Another says: In foreign lands scriptures are many, but few have crossed over \[to China\]. The Great Master of Tiāntái explained this as having another reference. From "Or there is buddhadhātu..." onwards is the third: the four-phrase analysis, which has two parts: first, directly applying the four phrases; next, exhorting discrimination. As for old interpretations: the icchantika has it—having the nature of evil and deviant sensory realms. Persons of good roots have it—having the revealing causes of myriad virtues, also called conditional causes. Both persons have it—jointly having the direct nature, or the nature of sentient beings. Both lack it—lacking the fruit-of-the-fruit nature. Héxī says: The icchantika has it—having the evil five aggregates and unwholesome nature. Persons of good roots have it—having the wholesome five aggregates and wholesome nature. Both persons have it—both having the nature of the indeterminate five aggregates. Both lack it—both lacking the wondrous, transcendent nirvāṇa fruit-nature. This differs in words from the old ones, but the meaning is the same. \[Master\] Xīnghuáng explained this sequentially from one phrase to seven phrases: One phrase is simply the middle way. Two phrases are the Tathāgata's and the icchantika's buddhadhātu, as either existing or non-existing. Three phrases are the three kinds of speech: the Buddha's own speech that the icchantika has the nature, speech for others that the icchantika lacks the nature, and speech for both self and other that it both exists and does not exist. Four phrases are the four phrases here. Seven phrases are the seven kinds of sentient beings: the first two persons are evil, and the latter five persons are good. He also offered three interpretations: first, generally regarding various meanings; second, regarding inside and outside the principle; third, solely regarding within the principle. Generally regarding various meanings: the principle is neither wholesome nor unwholesome, yet has both wholesome and unwholesome functions; persons of good roots have it, having the wholesome function; the icchantika has it, having the unwholesome function. Both having it: each has one side. Both lacking it: each lacks one side. Next, regarding inside and outside the principle: buddhadhātu originally is neither attained nor unattained, but is called attained or unattained in reference to conditions. Outside the principle, the icchantika is 'having attainment'; inside the principle is 'non-attainment'. Persons of good roots have the nature of non-attainment; the icchantika has the nature of having attainment; both having it and both lacking it are as stated above. Next, solely regarding within the principle: the icchantika is Sunakṣatra, and the person of good roots is Rāhula; these are the two conversions, compliant and adverse. The icchantika has the nature of adverse conversion into unwholesome dharmas; the person of good roots has the nature of compliant conversion into wholesome dharmas; both having it and both lacking it are as stated above. This is held to be an explanation capable of untying what is difficult to explain. Now we clarify that if one wishes to construct the four phrases relying on this text: the icchantika has it, but has only sinking. The person of good roots has it, but has only emerging. Both persons have it: both are in the Ganges River. Both persons lack it: neither reaches the shore. If one wishes to formulate other interpretations, they would also be immeasurable; they are briefly set forth like this. Furthermore, regarding the three truths: the icchantika having it is the unwholesome causes of conventional truth. The person of good roots having it is the wholesome causes of transcendence. Both persons having it: both possess the retributive bodies of conventional truth. Both persons lacking it: both lack the causes and fruits of the middle way. Next, from "My various..." onwards exhorts discrimination, as in the text. > — English (machine translation) (machine translation) - [Previous: 29.12](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1767.29.12) - [Next: 29.14](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1767.29.14) - [Up: 29](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1767.29) ## Translations (1) - [English (machine translation)](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1767~en-mt.29.13) — English, machine translation --- Source: [https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1767.29.13](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1767.29.13) · Pramāṇa