[Pramāṇa](https://indike.org/pramana/) › [Indian literature](https://indike.org/pramana/in) › [Buddhist Literature](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha) › [Taishō Tripiṭaka (Chinese Buddhist canon)](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho) › [大般涅槃經疏](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1767) › 32.12 # 大般涅槃經疏 32.12 大般涅槃經疏 32.12 - **Language:** Classical Chinese ### [32.12](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1767.32.12) 「先尼言若無我者」下，第三論義。上佛句句破先尼義。邪義既除，今更與佛共論此義，為定有我、定無我耶？一者亦是難佛無有我義，二者復立我義難佛無我義。佛義不立，有我義顯。自有五番：此先尼第一問，若無我者誰能憶念？佛答：若以憶故知有我者，今以忘故知應無我。汝以有念證有我者，既有忘失證知無我。若暫時憶顯有我者，亦應暫忘顯無有我。我既自在，云何念惡而不念善？又云念所不念正在定中，應當思惟憶念定境，何故更緣其餘事耶？又云不念所念者，正作惡時復存善法，既其有我何得不定？「先尼誰見誰聞」下，第二問，若無我者誰能見聞？佛答意者，根塵和合故有見聞，實不由我而能見聞。自舉二譬。「先尼言若無我者」下，第三問意，以名責之，云何名為我見我聞？世人並云我見我聞、我苦樂憂喜等。佛答有二意：一者却反還之，言我見聞知有我者，如他作罪云不見聞，亦應無我。「次如四兵」下，復舉假名合我見聞。「先尼言如汝所說」下，第四更問，若內外和合者誰出聲耶？佛即答言：因無明者，即是因十二因緣和合成身，以有身故覺勸動風，風擊脣舌出聲說我。如《大論》云「風名阿優陀，觸臍而上去，至牙齒脣舌，鼓動故出聲。」風鈴熱鐵，亦復如是。「先尼言如瞿曇說」下，第五問，明若隨理者全無有我，如來何緣得有常樂？由有我故有常等法，若無我者何得此法？佛答意者，得常我者須滅身後爾乃得之，豈即此身得常我耶？ > From "Śreṇika said: 'If there is no self...'" downward is the third \[section\], the debate on doctrines. Above, the Buddha refuted Śreṇika's propositions phrase by phrase. Now that his false views have been cleared away, he further debates this doctrine with the Buddha: is there definitely a self, or is there definitely no self? First, it questions the Buddha's doctrine of no-self; second, it re-establishes the doctrine of a self to challenge the Buddha's doctrine of no-self. If the Buddha's doctrine cannot be established, the doctrine that there is a self will become evident. There are naturally five exchanges. Here, Śreṇika's first question is: if there is no self, who is able to remember? The Buddha replied: If by virtue of remembering you know that there is a self, then now by virtue of forgetting you should know that there is no self. You cite remembering as proof that there is a self, yet the occurrence of forgetting and loss proves that there is no self. If temporary remembering reveals the presence of a self, then temporary forgetting should also reveal the absence of a self. Since the self is supposed to be autonomous, why would it remember evil and not remember good? Furthermore, it says: remembering what is not to be remembered, when right in the midst of concentration (dhyāna), one ought to reflect on and remember the object of concentration; why then does one further conditions other matters? Furthermore, it says: not remembering what is to be remembered, when precisely performing evil one still retains good phenomena; since there is a self, how could it be unfixed? From "Śreṇika \[asked\]: 'Who sees, who hears...'" downward is the second question: If there is no self, who is able to see and hear? The gist of the Buddha's answer is: it is because of the combination of sense faculties and sense objects that there is seeing and hearing; it is truly not by relying on a self that one is able to see and hear. He himself puts forward two similes. From "Śreṇika said: 'If there is no self...'" downward is the import of the third question, which interrogates it based on nominal designations: Why is it called 'I see, I hear'? Worldly people all say 'I see, I hear', 'my pain, pleasure, sorrow, joy', and so forth. The Buddha's answer has two imports: First, he turns it back against him, saying that if by 'I see and hear' one knows there is a self, then when another person commits an offense and says 'I did not see or hear it', there should also be no self. From "Next, like the four kinds of troops..." downward, he again puts forward nominal designations to correspond to 'I see and hear'. From "Śreṇika said: 'According to what you say...'" downward is the fourth question, asking further: If inner and outer combine, who produces the sound? The Buddha then replied: 'Conditioned by ignorance' means that, conditioned by the twelve links of dependent origination, they combine to form a body; because there is a body, consciousness stirs the wind, and the wind strikes the lips and tongue to produce the sound that speaks of 'self'. As the \*Mahāprajñāpāramitā-śāstra\* says: "The wind is named \*ayuda\* (udāna); touching the navel, it goes upward, reaching the teeth, lips, and tongue, and by vibrating them produces sound." A wind chime or heated iron is also like this. From "Śreṇika said: 'As Gautama says...'" downward is the fifth question, which clarifies: If one follows this principle, there is completely no self; by what condition does the Tathāgata possess permanence and bliss? Because there is a self, there are phenomena such as permanence; if there is no self, how could one attain such phenomena? The gist of the Buddha's answer is: attaining the permanent self requires that it be attained only after the body has been extinguished; how could one attain the permanent self in this very body? > — English (machine translation) (machine translation) - [Previous: 32.11](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1767.32.11) - [Next: 32.13](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1767.32.13) - [Up: 32](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1767.32) ## Translations (1) - [English (machine translation)](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1767~en-mt.32.12) — English, machine translation --- Source: [https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1767.32.12](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1767.32.12) · Pramāṇa