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# 大般涅槃經疏 32.9

大般涅槃經疏 32.9

- **Language:** Classical Chinese

### [32.9](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1767.32.9)

「婆私吒」下，第二人，此是優樓僧佉學徒。文亦有二：初論義、後明歸伏。論義有四番，前二文各有問答，可尋。然問佛涅槃常耶？佛亦答言如是。至論涅槃何曾定常，復問無煩惱為涅槃耶？佛亦答如是。佛何曾云無煩惱為涅槃耶？前文不云已斷煩惱為涅槃，但以不生煩惱為涅槃。今對此外道宜作此說，為其是計斷見之人。但第三番所舉四無，意以滅無為難。若法滅無，云何復有常樂？未生即是未來之無，滅無即是過去之無。佛答云同於互無，此亦對於外道故說。若論正理，非全互無。所以然者，本以牛馬互無名為互無，今明生死之中本有涅槃，是故正理非全互無。其中第四番，彼仍復難：若是互無，亦應無常。雖牛中無馬而言有馬，馬中無牛亦爾，牛馬終是本無今有。涅槃亦爾，涅槃中無生死而有涅槃者，即是本無今有，亦是無常。佛今若之，雖同互無而復不同，為異無中有三種無：一是互無、二是先無後有、三已有還無。當知涅槃同是異無，即無此三事，是故常樂。文中有三：此先法說、次舉三病三藥為譬、三舉譬明果。次文中云「蜜能治冷」，依醫者說，蜜性乃冷。是土宜異，不必皆爾。又譬中云三種病中無三種藥、三種藥中無三種病者，舊以此文證無同體。若使慧中得有無明，藥乃有病，乖於此說。然莊嚴舊解，明無漏中實有有無之惑，此言無者但無取相等惑。若招提解：以真無漏實不得報，無勞說於無明以入解體。而《勝鬘》中說無明住地緣無漏業為因者，此說相似無漏及被導無漏，不言真無漏。「婆私吒言如來為我說常無常」下，第二歸伏。其文云色是無常解脫色常者，有二解：一者色既無常，我解脫色則無復色，故所以常。二云解脫即色，色即是常。故前文云「獲得解脫常住之色」。後解為勝。此中寄陳如懺悔文。言禰瞿曇姓者，舊為禰音，謂彼呼汝為禰，故言禰瞿曇姓。今依冶城西房，從法師說為苨音。但翻此在北，北人多云苨，亦云禰我之音。《大集經》中亦用此字，彼經即是人旁作爾。文云瞿曇姓者，若佛弟子稱佛為瞿曇，如前〈現病品〉偈中云「瞿曇大聖德，願起演說法」者，此謂稱歎之詞。明佛雖復七世已來釋種王世，而其本族起自瞿曇大姓，世胄殊遠非始今日。若外道意稱瞿曇者，此不論德，直以姓為言，此是經略之謂。如世人言不呼人位但呼姓者，遂為輕略。又云我亦不能久住毒身今欲入滅者，謂本有神通即得聖果，用邊際智故入涅槃。前文云得阿羅漢施三衣者，準理得羅漢已具足衣鉢，今言無者，若善來羅漢，即有三衣。既自得羅漢，是故須衣。又此人本是出家外道，不俟剃髮。何以知之？前文闍提云婆羅門，今婆私吒但言梵志，梵志即是出家外道，所以更須施其應器。

> From "Vāsiṣṭha" onwards is the second person; this is a disciple of Ulūka Sāṃkhya. The text also has two parts: first, debating the meaning; and second, explaining his conversion and submission. The debate on the meaning has four rounds. The first two parts each have questions and answers, which can be examined. However, when he asked the Buddha, "Is nirvāṇa permanent?" the Buddha also answered, saying, "It is so." When it comes to the ultimate discussion of nirvāṇa, how could it ever be definitively permanent? He further asked, "Is the absence of afflictions nirvāṇa?" The Buddha also answered, "It is so." When did the Buddha ever say that the absence of afflictions is nirvāṇa? The earlier text did not say that having severed afflictions is nirvāṇa, but only that the non-arising of afflictions is nirvāṇa. Now, in addressing this non-Buddhist, it was appropriate to make this statement, because he was someone who harbored the view of annihilationism. However, regarding the four kinds of non-existence raised in the third round, his intention was to pose a challenge based on non-existence through destruction: if phenomena are non-existent through destruction, how could there still be permanence and bliss? What has not yet arisen is non-existence in the future; non-existence through destruction is non-existence in the past. The Buddha answered that it is the same as mutual non-existence; this was also spoken to address the non-Buddhist. If we discuss the correct principle, it is not completely mutual non-existence. Why is this? Originally, the mutual absence of an ox and a horse is termed "mutual non-existence"; now, explaining that within saṃsāra there is originally nirvāṇa, the correct principle is therefore not completely mutual non-existence. In the fourth round, he still raised another challenge: "If it is mutual non-existence, it should also be impermanent. Although within an ox there is no horse, one says there is a horse \[elsewhere\], and within a horse there is no ox likewise; an ox and a horse are ultimately non-existent originally and existent now. Nirvāṇa is also like this: if within nirvāṇa there is no saṃsāra and yet there is nirvāṇa, then it is non-existent originally and existent now, and is also impermanent." Now, the Buddha broke this down: although it is the same as mutual non-existence, it is also different, because within distinct non-existence there are three kinds of non-existence: first is mutual non-existence, second is non-existence prior and existence later, and third is returning to non-existence after already existing. One should know that nirvāṇa, while being distinct non-existence, lacks these three things; therefore it is permanent and blissful. In the text there are three parts: first, this explanation through doctrine; next, citing three illnesses and three medicines as an analogy; and third, citing an analogy to clarify the fruition. Next, the text says, "Honey can treat cold \[illnesses\]"; according to what physicians say, the nature of honey is actually cold. This is due to differences in local appropriateness; it is not necessarily always so. Furthermore, the analogy says that within the three kinds of illness there are not the three kinds of medicine, and within the three kinds of medicine there are not the three kinds of illness; previously, this text was used to prove that they do not share the same essence. If within wisdom there could be ignorance, then the medicine would possess the illness, which contradicts this statement. However, according to the old explanation of Zhuāngyán, it explains that within the uncontaminated there really is the delusion of existence and non-existence; what is said to be "non-existent" here is merely the delusion of grasping marks and the like. According to the explanation of Zhāotí: because the true uncontaminated really does not receive retribution, there is no need to speak of ignorance entering the essence of understanding. And when the Śrīmālādevī Sūtra speaks of "the ground of the entrenchment of ignorance being conditioned by uncontaminated karma as a cause," this speaks of resembling uncontaminatedness and guided uncontaminatedness; it does not speak of true uncontaminatedness. From "Vāsiṣṭha said, 'The Tathāgata has explained for me permanence and impermanence'" onwards is the second part, his conversion and submission. His text says, "Form is impermanent; the form of liberation is permanent." There are two explanations: first, since form is impermanent, my form of liberation then has no further form, and therefore it is permanent. The second says that liberation is itself form, and form is itself permanent; thus the earlier text says, "attaining the permanent form of liberation." The latter explanation is superior. Here, through Kauṇḍinya, the text of repentance is presented. Regarding the words "nǐ / mí Gautama clan": formerly it was read with the sound nǐ, meaning that he called you nǐ, hence saying "nǐ Gautama clan." Now, relying on the Western Chamber of Yěchéng, according to the Dharma Master, it should be read with the sound nǐ (苨). However, the translation of this was in the north, and northerners mostly say nǐ (苨), or also the sound of nǐ / wǒ. In the Mahāsaṃnipāta Sūtra this character is also used, where in that sūtra it is written with the person radical beside ěr (你). The text says "Gautama clan": if disciples of the Buddha address the Buddha as Gautama—as in the verse in the previous "Chapter on Manifesting Illness," which says, "Gautama of great holy virtue, we pray you arise and expound the Dharma"—this is an expression of praise. It clarifies that although for seven generations the Buddha belonged to the royal lineage of the Śākya clan, his original family arose from the great Gautama clan, whose lineage was exceedingly distant and did not begin today. If non-Buddhists intend to address him as Gautama, this does not consider his virtue, but merely speaks of his clan name; this is what is called slighting and disrespecting. Just as in worldly speech, when one does not address a person by rank but merely by clan name, it becomes slighting and disrespectful. It also says, "I also cannot long remain in this poisonous body; I now wish to enter extinction": this means that having original supernormal powers, he immediately attained the holy fruition; using the knowledge of the ultimate limit (prāntakoṭijñāna), he therefore entered nirvāṇa. The earlier text says that upon attaining arhatship, he was bestowed the three robes; by principle, having attained arhatship, one is already fully equipped with robes and bowl. Now, when it says he lacked them: if one is an "ehi" arhat, then one immediately has the three robes; since he attained arhatship on his own, he therefore required robes. Furthermore, this person was originally a renounced non-Buddhist, so he did not wait to have his hair shaved. How is this known? The earlier text said Jāti was a brāhmaṇa, whereas now Vāsiṣṭha is merely called a brahmacārin (fan-zhi); a brahmacārin is a renounced non-Buddhist, which is why it was further necessary to bestow the vessel of response (alms bowl) upon him.  
> — English (machine translation) (machine translation)

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## Translations (1)

- [English (machine translation)](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1767~en-mt.32.9) — English, machine translation

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Source: [https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1767.32.9](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1767.32.9) · Pramāṇa
