[Pramāṇa](https://indike.org/pramana/) › [Indian literature](https://indike.org/pramana/in) › [Buddhist Literature](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha) › [Taishō Tripiṭaka (Chinese Buddhist canon)](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho) › [大般涅槃經疏](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1767) › 33.8 # 大般涅槃經疏 33.8 大般涅槃經疏 33.8 - **Language:** Classical Chinese ### [33.8](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1767.33.8) 「納衣梵志」下，第八外道。此亦出家外道，常服此納，因衣名人。此間亦有麻襦、杯度之流。文為二：初論義、後歸伏。論義又二：初執、後破。初執者，開善分初文為八復次：一據煩惱、二據五大、三據鐶釧、四據自性、五據五塵、六據五根、七據小兒、八據有無。招提分此文為二：初難正義、後立邪義。就初復二：一非業行、後難煩惱。觀師分為四：初一復次難因緣義、次三復次立自性義、三一復次重難正義、四三復次重立自性。但分文在人，孰是孰非，且依觀師。諸師多云：納衣正問眾生之始三界流來，弘廣問終咨決如來涅槃。問始是問流來，問終是問反出。觀師據三文推之：一陳如若弘廣，云若人來問常無常有始，佛常默然。若納衣問始，佛何故答。二其初難。眾生無量世中作善不善業，未來還得善不善報。此問行業因果，何關問始？三可中問於初流來者，佛答不去。何者？界外初起一念流來，此之流來復何處來？向前推之永不可得。知答不去，由不作此問，故如來解釋。納衣正問因緣，愛闡生義，惡因緣死見地獄時，反更生愛而生其中；善因緣死則見天堂，而生愛者則生其中。解此，數論不同。數人言：於生陰前起愛潤生，有身有惑，同在一時亦起愛心，即便得身。此即身先，煩惱在後。論人云：於死陰後起愛潤生，即煩惱在前，身乃在後。初難因緣又兩：初領旨而非、次難煩惱。文又為四：一領旨、二雙難、三別難、四總結。此下牒佛所說煩惱與身，故云領旨。「若因煩惱」下，第二雙難，又三：先兩定、次兩難、三兩結。初兩定可見。兩難者，初云若煩惱在先，全未有身，那得煩惱？煩惱何處住？煩惱因誰生？若煩惱復因煩惱，煩惱知不是先，故言不可。次難身在先者，則不從煩惱而得是身。身既不從煩惱，煩惱亦不因身，此俱不可。「若言一時」下，三別難。既言因果，不應一時。「先後一時」下，四是總結三義。三皆不可，故知諸法不從因緣。「復次瞿曇堅是地性」下，次立邪自性之義，有三復次。彼明地性堅乃至空性無閡，體性如此，非因緣成。五大既爾，一切亦然，即自性義。復次世間之法有定用處，證成前義。在額名鬘等者，如此土嚴具。故初舉工匠揆木為難，直者任床、曲者任機。復舉五道為難，乃言自性生地獄等。又舉陸龜生即入水，海裏蚶蛤，誰之刻畫？三舉貪欲一復次，更難因緣前非佛旨，後乃作難。難有四意：一難貪不對塵，如人睡時亦不對塵而生欲貪。二難小兒初生無所分別，亦復生貪。三難賢聖在於山林，雖離五塵，亦復生貪。四難自有對塵貪、對塵不貪，並是自性。第四有三復次，重立邪義。初明五根不具而多財、五根雖具而少祿。根若不具則過去作惡，今生何以多財？若根具者過去行善，今生何以貧窮？並是性爾，不關因緣。第二復次，可見。第三復次，舉有無難。彼以虛空為有、兔角為無，誰作虛空之有？誰使兔角令無？二事既然，一切亦爾，皆是自性。「佛言」下答。以答望問，略有三異：一有無、二鄭重、三不次第。言有無者，前有四難為八復次，今但七復次。何故爾？佛答七難竟，其即領解，是故不答第八難也。鄭重者，重答第二難。何故爾？性是其宗，故再破之。不次第者，第一答第二，第二答第三，第三答第四，第四答第一，第五重答第二，第六答第五，第七答第六，第八答第七。初答第二破立自性義者，彼以五大不從緣生，例一切法亦不從緣。佛逐破之。汝立五大不從緣生，是故名常，例一切法不從緣生亦應是常。「汝言用處」下，是第二答第三，破其證義。彼云鐶釧無有因緣。佛破云：皆從因緣得名，亦從因緣得義。名鬘名纓，此是從因得名；匠為箭槊，此從因得義。若性是箭，無假工匠；況本是鐶，今打為釧，改釧為鐶。向是曲者任機，熨機直為床；向時直者為床，今熨床曲為機。皆是因緣，何性之有？「汝言如龜陸生」下，第三破彼第四復次，中有七事。為破七事。此即初事。何不入火𡂡角，正反彼宗。「若言諸法悉有自性」下，第二事，其上復次中全無此語，但言誰有教者，而今有此破者。既云利是性爾，鈍亦如之，豈有教而長耶？「若一切法有自性」下，第三事，明婆羅門不應祠祀。「世間語法有三」下，第四事，明皆有造作之語，寧是自然？「若言諸法悉有自性」下，第五事，縱則應定。「若一切法有定性」下，第六事，明既其無定，則應從緣。「汝說一切法」下，第七事，明說喻故，故知無性。若使解則性解，何勞為說？若不解者，性自不解，雖復說喻無所成益。「善男子汝言身為在先」下，第四追破彼第一復次。但前難本有四：一領旨、二雙難、三別難、四總結。今答不一一相對，但總答之。而此四意，但正難中本來有三：一者難身在先、二難煩惱在先、三煩惱與身一時，別難中即無，結難中有之。今亦答三：初答身在先難、次答一時之難、後答煩惱在先難。初又二：先雙非、次正答三難。此下第一答身在先。然佛之本義說煩惱為身因，則彼應正難煩惱在先所以。又難身在先者，相對而來，非其本意。今欲答，正先發遣旁，故先云我無此說。汝義亦然，何忽難此？本欲難我，還成我義。「善男子一切眾生」下，第二答一時之難。就文為三：初明一時、次明前後、第三更取意答。初言一時者，除彼所計之一時。若是其所解言一時者，此則不可。今言一時，此是前後而一時，亦是一時而前後（云云）。第二文中言其前後者，此是一時中之前後，無前後異一時，亦無一時異前後。今只於一時義中說有前後，即煩惱為前、身屬於後。煩惱是因，身即是果，豈非因前果後？若如《中論》所明緣成由果，此有別意（云云）。私謂：諸大乘經云無始者，不獨云身、不獨煩惱，若一在前，一則有始。今經從於對治化機以說，故云要因煩惱故而得有身，仍帶理說，故云雖無前後。雖是不盡之詞，不盡是有餘之說，故知實理却是權道之有餘。實而言之，非但過去言無先後，只於現在煩惱為身，而作因時亦無先後。何以故？因果無二、色心體一，三道三德一念無乖、五陰五脫剎那理等。貴在衲衣執破，破已了性同空，空無前後內外誰施？三十六軸唯從涅槃、五十二眾咸成佛性，至此不了，終歸結緣。此兩段只有二行，餘經文是釋疑之要也。「從汝意若謂如人二眼」下，第三更取意破。若言煩惱與身是一時者，不應前後。如牛二角，左不因右、右不因左。是事不爾，如炷與明是一時有，而要因炷有明，終不因明有炷。煩惱與身亦然，但炷是燈器，因燈有明。而云炷者，但齊火燒者名炷，未燒之時不得名炷（云云），明佛此義正是一時因果。舊說多謂此明眾生之始是一時因果，今謂不然，此不明眾生之始，但明眾生用業得身必由煩惱。自有二種：一者潤業、二者潤生。若潤業者，身果為奢，今之所明正取潤生。若依數解，正以生陰之初有染污識為潤生惑，即結一期果報，是為煩惱與身一時而有。於義為便，但今依後解。若靈味法師亦用生陰，云初起潤生愛，極似數義。其餘師並云死陰之中起潤生愛，得言一時因果者，此前迦葉章中云由愛無明二因緣故得住壽命，《十地經》云「有漏有取，心生熱惱，種子漸備。」經云有漏有取心生有漏種子，潤生之惑雖在前起，而正由識是有漏故潤生之愛，所以結之是為取識。有漏已有，即是一時因果之義，故此義意微采靈味之說。彼前難云若言一時義亦不可，今答一時而有此義，殊堪反於邪難故也。故云汝意若謂如人二眼下，正取彼意破之。明雖俱是同時，實有相因之義，如炷之有明，一時而有而復相因。「汝意若謂身不在先」下，第三答煩惱在前難，又二：此先牒彼難、「何以故」下正破。但此中文有兩家讀之，一云：若以身先，無因緣故名為無者，此是牒於難。汝不應說者，即是非之。汝不應作如此說一切皆有因緣者，還明一切法實有因緣。然不須如此分句，直云汝不應說一切法有因緣也。然彼是自然之義，無有因緣，而言汝不應說一切法有因緣者。然此三師外道云有二十五諦，皆悉相生，即因緣義，而與佛因緣義異。佛法據過去為因、現在得果，彼家直據現在一世相生以為因緣。又如勒叉婆有依諦、主諦，如五大造五根，五大是主諦、五根是依諦，並是因緣。如火大造眼令能見色，色是火家之求那。亦如空大造耳可能聞聲，聲是耳家之求那（云云）。「若言不見」下，復取彼意破之。汝若言不見身因故不說者，今現見缾從泥出，何故不說？見故不說乃是違心。「若見不見」下，此明誰論汝見與不見？但云現論諸法皆從因緣。「善男子若言一切諸法悉有自性」下，第五重破第二五大性難。先且破其地大，佛翻其義。酥蠟等物是彼家地，但酥蠟不定，或時為水、或時名地，是不定，後更破之。白蠟等物，舉為五大（云云）。不言三大四大寧非因緣耶，此中兩雙：前謂汝義說有五大，後說有香為地、有色為火，如論文香相品中明。衛世師義，不言香為水、色為地，寧非因緣耶？後雙者，前謂汝義云從泥出缾、從縷得衣，寧非因緣，後謂汝義濕是水大，假使由寒緣故凍，汝猶隨濕緣，是水不隨寒緣是地。又水凍時不名為地，故名為水。何故波動時不名為風者，此是芰角並難。若例難者，應言水本流性，凍時不流而尚名為水者；風本動性，應有物不動尚不名風。而今此文若作芰角並意者，水本流性，凍時不流尚為水者；風本動性，波既是動應名為風。波雖是動，不得名風；水既不流，不得名水。又解：此是例難。如水本流遇寒因緣凍而不流，而猶隨本為水；風本性動，遇水因緣激而成波，應猶隨本是風。若波動遂逐因緣成水，不名為風；凍時亦應逐因緣成地，地非是水，並意為水。本是流濕之性，凍時無流，守本濕性猶名為水者，風本動性，風激成波，猶自名水不名風者；水凍成氷應名為地，水凍成氷，守本濕性猶名水者，何異波動時守本動性應名為風？只為波動名水、凍時名凍，所以得並。動是風大，水為浪時雖藉風為緣，猶隨因屬水，不隨動為風。寧非因緣？「汝言非因五塵」下，第六破彼第五，明五塵但為外緣。復由覺觀內因善惡，覺觀即生貪瞋。「汝言具足諸根」下，第七破彼第六，明業因不同，致果報參差。「如汝所言世間小兒」下，第八破第七，明兒有啼笑則知有緣。又不破第八者，二解。開善舊云：第八是二種，無法無不從緣，則無勞破。二冶城云：此破七竟，彼便領解，是故不破。 > From "The patched-robe brahmacārin" onward is the eighth non-Buddhist. He was also a renunciant non-Buddhist who always wore such patched robes; he was named after his garment. In this land as well there are those like Hemp Coat or Floating Cup. The text has two parts: first, the debate; later, his submission. The debate also has two parts: first, his dogmatic assertions; later, the refutation. Regarding the first, his assertions: \[Master\] Kāishàn divides the opening text into eight repetitions: first, based on afflictions; second, based on the five great elements; third, based on bangles and bracelets; fourth, based on intrinsic nature; fifth, based on the five sense objects; sixth, based on the five sense faculties; seventh, based on small children; eighth, based on existence and non-existence. \[Master\] Zhāotí divides this text into two: first, objecting to the orthodox view; later, establishing the heterodox view. Under the first, there are again two: first, denying karmic action; later, objecting regarding afflictions. Master Guān divides it into four: first, one repetition objecting to the doctrine of cause and condition; next, three repetitions establishing the doctrine of intrinsic nature; third, one repetition re-objecting to the orthodox view; fourth, three repetitions re-establishing intrinsic nature. But dividing the text depends on each master; as to who is right and who is wrong, for now we follow Master Guān. Many masters say: The patched-robe \[brahmacārin\] specifically asked about the origin of sentient beings and how they drift along in the three realms; Hóngguǎng asked about the end, inquiring and resolving about the Tathāgata's nirvāṇa. Asking about the origin is asking about the drifting along; asking about the end is asking about turning around and leaving. Master Guān deduces this based on three passages: First, Kauṇḍinya, like Hóngguǎng, said that if someone comes and asks about permanence, impermanence, and having a beginning, the Buddha remains silent. If the patched-robe \[brahmacārin\] had asked about the beginning, why did the Buddha answer? Second, his initial objection: Sentient beings in immeasurable lives perform good and unwholesome karma, and in the future receive good and unwholesome retribution in return. This asks about the causes and effects of karmic action—what does it have to do with asking about the beginning? Third, if he had asked about the first drifting along, the Buddha would not have been able to answer. Why? Outside the realms, the very first thought arose and drifted along; where did this drifting along come from in turn? Tracing it forward, it can never be found. Knowing it cannot be answered, because he did not pose this question, the Tathāgata explained it. The patched-robe \[brahmacārin\] specifically asked about causes and conditions, with craving setting forth the meaning of rebirth: when dying through evil causes and conditions and seeing hell, sentient beings conversely generate craving again and are born therein; when dying through good causes and conditions and seeing the heavens, those who generate craving are born therein. To explain this, the Sarvāstivāda and the Treatise masters differ. The Sarvāstivāda masters say: Before the birth skandha, craving arises and moistens rebirth; possessing a body and possessing defilement, craving arises at the very same time, and one immediately acquires a body. This means the body comes first, and the afflictions follow. The Treatise masters say: After the death skandha, craving arises and moistens rebirth; thus the afflictions come first, and the body follows. The initial objection to causes and conditions also has two parts: first, grasping the point and rejecting it; later, objecting regarding afflictions. The text also has four parts: first, grasping the point; second, a dual objection; third, a distinct objection; fourth, a general conclusion. From here down, it cites what the Buddha said about afflictions and the body, hence it says "grasping the point." From "If because of afflictions" onward is the second part, the dual objection, which also has three parts: first, two determinations; next, two objections; third, two conclusions. The first two determinations are clear. As for the two objections: first it says, if afflictions come first, and as yet there is no body at all, how could there be afflictions? Where would afflictions abide? On what basis would afflictions arise? If afflictions are again caused by afflictions, one knows afflictions are not first, hence it is stated as impossible. Next, objecting to the body being first: then this body would not be obtained from afflictions. Since the body does not come from afflictions, neither do afflictions depend on the body; both of these are impossible. From "If you say at the same time" onward is the third part, the distinct objection. Since they are spoken of as cause and effect, they should not be simultaneous. From "Prior, posterior, and simultaneous" onward is the fourth part, the general conclusion of the three meanings. All three being impossible, therefore one knows that dharmas do not come from causes and conditions. From "Furthermore, Gautama, solidity is the nature of earth" onward is the establishment of the heterodox view of intrinsic nature, which has three repetitions. They explain that the nature of earth is solid, and so forth up to the nature of space being unobstructed; their essential natures being thus, they are not formed by causes and conditions. Since the five great elements are like this, all things are also like this; this is the doctrine of intrinsic nature. Furthermore, mundane things have fixed applications, which corroborates the previous meaning. Being on the forehead is called a garland, and so forth, just like ornaments in this land. Hence it first cites a craftsman measuring timber as an objection: what is straight is suitable for a bed, what is curved is suitable for a loom. It further cites the five destinies as an objection, asserting that one is born in hell and so forth by intrinsic nature. It also cites the land turtle entering the water as soon as it is born, and the clams and mussels in the sea—who carved and painted them? Third, citing greed as one repetition, it further objects to causes and conditions: first it rejects the Buddha's point, and then it raises the objection. The objection has four ideas: First, objecting that greed does not confront sense objects, as when a person is asleep, they also do not confront sense objects yet generate desire and greed. Second, objecting that a newborn infant makes no distinctions yet still generates greed. Third, objecting that worthy ones and sages dwelling in mountain forests, though separated from the five sense objects, still generate greed. Fourth, objecting that naturally there is greed when confronting sense objects and no greed when confronting sense objects, all of which is intrinsic nature. Fourth, there are three repetitions re-establishing the heterodox doctrine. First, it explains that those whose five sense faculties are incomplete have much wealth, while those whose five sense faculties are complete have little fortune. If the faculties are incomplete, they performed evil in the past; why are they wealthy in this life? If the faculties are complete, they practiced good in the past; why are they poor in this life? All this is by nature so, and does not concern causes and conditions. The second repetition is clear. The third repetition raises an objection based on existence and non-existence. They take space as existing and a hare's horn as non-existing: who made space to exist? Who caused the hare's horn not to exist? Since these two cases are so, all things are likewise; all are intrinsic nature. From "The Buddha said" onward is the reply. Comparing the reply to the questions, there are roughly three differences: first, presence and absence; second, repetition; third, lack of sequential order. Regarding presence and absence: previously there were four objections comprising eight repetitions, but now there are only seven repetitions. Why is this? Once the Buddha finished answering seven objections, \[the interlocutor\] immediately comprehended and understood; therefore, he did not answer the eighth objection. Regarding repetition: he re-answers the second objection. Why is this? Intrinsic nature is their fundamental thesis, therefore he refutes it twice. Regarding the lack of sequential order: the first replies to the second, the second replies to the third, the third replies to the fourth, the fourth replies to the first, the fifth re-replies to the second, the sixth replies to the fifth, the seventh replies to the sixth, and the eighth replies to the seventh. In the first reply to the second, refuting the establishment of the intrinsic nature doctrine: they took the five great elements as not arising from conditions, and by extension all dharmas as likewise not arising from conditions. The Buddha refutes this point by point: If you establish that the five great elements do not arise from conditions and are therefore called permanent, by extension all dharmas not arising from conditions should also be permanent. From "You say their applications" onward is the second reply to the third, refuting his corroborating meaning. He said that bangles and bracelets have no causes and conditions. The Buddha refutes him, saying: All derive their names from causes and conditions, and also derive their functions from causes and conditions. Being named a garland or a tassel—this is deriving a name from causes; a craftsman making arrows and lances—this is deriving a function from causes. If its nature were an arrow, there would be no need for a craftsman; moreover, what originally was a ring is now hammered into a bracelet, or a bracelet is altered into a ring. What previously was curved was suitable for a loom, but ironing the loom straight makes a bed; what previously was straight made a bed, but now ironing the bed into a curve makes a loom. All are causes and conditions; what intrinsic nature is there? From "You say that like a turtle born on land" onward is the third, refuting his fourth repetition, which contains seven points. It is meant to refute the seven points. This is the first point: Why does it not enter fire and ram its horn? This directly overturns their thesis. From "If you say that all dharmas have an intrinsic nature" onward is the second point; in the repetition above there were no such words at all, only saying 'who could have taught them,' yet now this refutation appears. Since it says sharpness is natural and dullness is likewise, how could there be teaching and development? From "If all dharmas have an intrinsic nature" onward is the third point, explaining that brahmacārins should not perform sacrificial rituals. From "Mundane speech has three aspects" onward is the fourth point, explaining that all involve conditioned speech; how could it be spontaneous? From "If you say that all dharmas have an intrinsic nature" onward is the fifth point: if granted, it would have to be fixed. From "If all dharmas have a fixed nature" onward is the sixth point, explaining that since it is not fixed, it must follow conditions. From "You speak of all dharmas" onward is the seventh point, explaining that because analogies are spoken, one knows there is no intrinsic nature. If understanding were natural, why labor to speak for them? If they do not understand, by nature they do not understand, so even speaking analogies would bring no benefit. From "Good son, you say whether the body comes first" onward is the fourth, refuting retroactively his first repetition. But the earlier objection originally had four parts: first, grasping the point; second, a dual objection; third, a distinct objection; fourth, a general conclusion. The present reply does not correspond one-by-one, but answers in general. And of these four meanings, the main objection originally had three: first, objecting to the body being first; second, objecting to afflictions being first; third, afflictions and body being simultaneous—which was absent in the distinct objection, but present in the concluding objection. Now he also answers three: first, answering the objection of the body being first; next, answering the objection of simultaneity; later, answering the objection of afflictions being first. The first also has two: first, denying both; next, properly answering the three objections. From here down is the first, answering that the body is first. However, the Buddha's original meaning said that afflictions are the cause of the body; then he should properly object to afflictions being first. The reason he also objected to the body being first was merely raised in opposition, not his original intent. Now, wishing to answer, he first dispatches the secondary point, so he first says: 'I made no such statement.' Your own doctrine is also like this; why suddenly object to this? Originally wishing to object to me, it ends up confirming my position. From "Good son, all sentient beings" onward is the second, answering the objection of simultaneity. In the text, there are three parts: first, explaining simultaneity; next, explaining before and after; third, further taking his meaning to reply. First, in speaking of simultaneity, it eliminates the simultaneity he conceptualized. If it were the simultaneity as understood by him, this would be unacceptable. Now, in speaking of simultaneity, this is before-and-after yet simultaneous, and also simultaneous yet before-and-after (and so forth). In the second passage, speaking of before and after, this is before-and-after within simultaneity; there is no before-and-after separate from simultaneity, nor simultaneity separate from before-and-after. Now, only within the meaning of simultaneity do we speak of there being before and after, namely afflictions being before and the body belonging to after. Afflictions are the cause, and the body is the effect; how is it not cause before and effect after? If it is as explained in the Mūlamadhyamakakārikā that conditioning is accomplished through the effect, this has a distinct meaning (and so forth). Privately I consider: When the Mahāyāna sūtras say 'beginningless,' they do not speak only of the body, nor only of afflictions; if one were before, the other would have a beginning. The present sūtra speaks in accordance with antidotes and capacities to be converted, hence it says that it is necessarily because of afflictions that there is a body, yet it still speaks with reference to the principle, hence saying 'although there is no before and after.' Although these are inexhaustive words, inexhaustiveness is an incomplete discourse; therefore we know that the real principle is precisely the remainder of the provisional path. Speaking truly, not only in the past is there no before and after, but even in the present when afflictions act as the cause for the body, there is likewise no before and after. Why? Cause and effect are not two; form and mind are of one substance; the three paths and the three virtues do not clash in a single thought; the five skandhas and the five liberations are equal in the principle of a single moment. What is valued is the shattering of the patched-robe \[brahmacārin\]'s attachment; once shattered, he realizes that their nature is identical with emptiness. In emptiness there is no before or after; where would inside and outside be posited? The thirty-six fascicles solely follow nirvāṇa; the fifty-two assemblies all accomplish buddhadhātu. If one does not comprehend this here, one will ultimately merely form a karmic connection. These two passages are only two lines, but the rest of the sūtra text is the essential resolution of doubts. From "If your mind thinks it is like a person's two eyes" onward is the third, further taking his meaning to refute it. If you say afflictions and the body are simultaneous, they should not have before and after, just as with a cow's two horns, the left does not depend on the right, and the right does not depend on the left. This matter is not so: just as a wick and light exist simultaneously, yet it is necessary to depend on the wick to have light, and never does a wick depend on light. Afflictions and the body are likewise. However, the wick is the lamp vessel; because of the lamp there is light. And speaking of the wick, only that which is burned by fire is called a wick; before being burned it cannot be called a wick (and so forth), showing that this meaning of the Buddha is precisely simultaneous cause and effect. Old commentaries mostly held that this explains the beginning of sentient beings as simultaneous cause and effect; now we say this is not so. This does not explain the beginning of sentient beings, but only explains that sentient beings using karma to obtain a body must depend on afflictions. Naturally there are two kinds: first, moistening karma; second, moistening rebirth. If it is moistening karma, the body's retribution is distant; what is explained now specifically refers to moistening rebirth. If according to the Sarvāstivāda explanation, precisely at the beginning of the birth skandha there is defiled consciousness as the delusion that moistens rebirth, which immediately binds a single period of fruition; this is afflictions and the body existing simultaneously. In terms of meaning this is convenient, but now we follow the later explanation. Master Língwèi also used the birth skandha, saying that craving that moistens rebirth arises first, which is very similar to the Sarvāstivāda meaning. All the other masters say that the craving that moistens rebirth arises within the death skandha; that it can be called simultaneous cause and effect is because earlier in the Kāśyapa chapter it says: 'Due to the two causes and conditions of craving and ignorance, one is able to maintain life.' The Daśabhūmika Sūtra says: 'With outflows and grasping, the mind generates feverish afflictions, and seeds are gradually prepared.' The sūtra says that with outflows and grasping, the mind generates outflow seeds; although the delusion that moistens rebirth arises earlier, precisely because consciousness has outflows, the craving that moistens rebirth binds it, which is the grasping consciousness. The existence of outflows already being present is precisely the meaning of simultaneous cause and effect; hence this meaning slightly adopts Master Língwèi's explanation. Earlier he objected that if you say simultaneous, the meaning is also unacceptable; now answering that it is simultaneous and yet possesses this meaning is especially capable of overturning his heterodox objection. Hence it says: 'If your mind thinks it is like a person's two eyes' onward, directly taking his meaning to refute it. It explains that although both are simultaneous, there is truly the meaning of mutual dependence, just as the wick having light is simultaneous and yet mutually dependent. From "If your mind thinks that the body is not before" onward is the third, answering the objection of afflictions coming first, which also has two: here it first cites his objection; from "Why?" onward it properly refutes it. But in this text, there are two traditions of reading it: One says: 'If because the body is before, having no cause and condition it is called non-existent'—this cites the objection. 'You should not say'—this rejects it. 'You should not make such a statement that all things have causes and conditions'—this in turn shows that all dharmas truly have causes and conditions. However, it is not necessary to divide the sentence like this; simply say, 'You should not say that all dharmas have causes and conditions.' Now, his is the doctrine of spontaneity, having no causes and conditions; yet it says, 'You should not say all dharmas have causes and conditions.' However, these three non-Buddhist masters say there are twenty-five principles that all generate one another, which is the meaning of cause and condition, yet it differs from the Buddhist meaning of cause and condition. The Buddhadharma takes the past as the cause and the present as obtaining the fruit; their school directly takes generation within the single present lifetime as cause and condition. Also, like the \*Lakṣaṇa\* (?), there are supported principles and primary principles: as the five great elements make the five sense faculties, the five great elements are primary principles and the five faculties are supported principles, all of which are causes and conditions. Just as the fire element makes the eye so it can see color, color is the quality (guṇa) belonging to fire; also as the space element makes the ear so it can hear sound, sound is the quality belonging to the ear (and so forth). From "If you say that not seeing" onward, it again takes his meaning to refute it: If you say that because you do not see the cause of the body you do not speak of it, now we presently see a pot coming from clay, so why do you not speak of it? Seeing it yet not speaking of it goes against your own mind. From "Whether seen or not seen" onward, this clarifies: who is discussing whether you see or do not see? It simply states that we are presently discussing that all dharmas come from causes and conditions. From "Good son, if you say that all dharmas possess an intrinsic nature" onward is the fifth, re-refuting the second objection on the nature of the five great elements. First it refutes his earth element; the Buddha overturns his meaning. Clarified butter, wax, and such substances are earth for their school, but clarified butter and wax are not fixed: at times they are water, and at times they are called earth; this is indefinite, and later he refutes it further. White wax and such things are cited for the five great elements (and so forth). Not speaking of three elements or four elements, how are they not causes and conditions? In this there are two pairs: the first refers to your doctrine speaking of five great elements, and later speaking of odor being earth and color being fire, as explained in the treatise's chapter on the characteristics of odor. In the Vaiśeṣika doctrine, it does not say odor is water or color is earth; how is this not causes and conditions? The second pair: the first refers to your doctrine saying that from clay comes a pot and from thread comes clothing; how is this not causes and conditions? The latter refers to your doctrine that moisture is the water element; even if through the condition of cold it freezes, you still follow the condition of moisture, taking it as water and not following the condition of cold as earth. Furthermore, when water freezes it is not called earth, hence it is called water. Why when waves move are they not called wind? This is a cross-corner parallel objection. If it were a typical analogical objection, one should say: water originally has the nature of flowing; when frozen it does not flow yet is still called water; wind originally has the nature of moving, so there should be something that does not move yet is still called wind. But now if this text is taken in the sense of a cross-corner parallel: water originally has the nature of flowing; when frozen it does not flow yet is still water; wind originally has the nature of moving, so since a wave is motion, it should be called wind. Although a wave is motion, it cannot be called wind; since water does not flow, it should not be called water. Another explanation: this is an analogical objection. Just as water originally flows, but meeting the condition of cold freezes and does not flow, yet still follows its origin as water; wind is originally of a moving nature, but meeting the condition of water is agitated into waves, so it should still follow its origin as wind. If moving water follows conditions and becomes water rather than being called wind, then when frozen it should also follow conditions and become earth, for earth is not water; yet parallel meaning takes it as water. Originally it is of a flowing and moist nature; when frozen there is no flowing, yet maintaining its original moist nature it is still called water. When wind is of a moving nature, and wind agitates into waves, it is still called water and not called wind; when water freezes into ice it should be called earth, yet water freezing into ice maintains its original moist nature and is still called water—how is this different from: when waves move, maintaining their original moving nature, they should be called wind? Precisely because moving water is called water, and when frozen it is called frozen, they can be paralleled. Motion is the wind element; when water forms waves, although relying on wind as a condition, it still follows its cause and belongs to water, not following motion to become wind. How is this not causes and conditions? From "You say that it is not due to the five sense objects" onward is the sixth, refuting his fifth, clarifying that the five sense objects are merely external conditions. Furthermore, due to internal causes of good and evil through initial and sustained application of thought (vitarka-vicāra), application of thought immediately generates greed and anger. From "You say having complete faculties" onward is the seventh, refuting his sixth, clarifying that different karmic causes lead to uneven karmic results. From "As you say, mundane small children" onward is the eighth, refuting the seventh, clarifying that because children weep and laugh, one knows there are conditions. As for why he does not refute the eighth, there are two explanations. Kāishàn previously said: the eighth consists of two kinds, non-existent dharmas; there are none that do not come from conditions, hence there was no need to refute it. Second, Yěchéng said: once these seven were refuted, he immediately understood, therefore he did not refute it. > — English (machine translation) (machine translation) - [Previous: 33.7](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1767.33.7) - [Next: 33.9](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1767.33.9) - [Up: 33](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1767.33) ## Translations (1) - [English (machine translation)](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1767~en-mt.33.8) — English, machine translation ## Linked texts (2) - [大般涅槃經](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.sanskrit.mahayanasutra.mahaparinirvana-mahayana*zh-t375.36.61) — Classical Chinese - [宗鏡錄](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.2016.99.46) — Classical Chinese --- Source: [https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1767.33.8](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1767.33.8) · Pramāṇa