[Pramāṇa](https://indike.org/pramana/) › [Indian literature](https://indike.org/pramana/in) › [Buddhist Literature](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha) › [Taishō Tripiṭaka (Chinese Buddhist canon)](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho) › [維摩經略疏垂裕記](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1779) › 4.33 # 維摩經略疏垂裕記 4.33 維摩經略疏垂裕記 4.33 - **Language:** Classical Chinese ### [4.33](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1779.4.33) 二、略釋方便義，二：初、列章。二、隨釋，二：初、釋五章，五：初、略釋名。荊溪云：《法華疏》中為顯實故，分為三釋，謂法用及門并祕妙也。今此廢二但取法用者，門論趣入、祕妙開權，今未開權，故闕後釋。不取門者，菩薩可入、二乘闕之，於菩薩中且約當分；復置傳入，故且不云。據理亦合用門一義，以當分入與法用同，故且唯用法用一意。又通祕教，亦可具足用彼三義，方是智所詣之偏。法者，今文且指三偏之法。彼《法華疏》俱指四教並名法故，以未融故，乃屬今經方便，不同彼中乃約四教。二、約教同異。荊溪云：次約四教辨不同者，即是經論所出不同。前文皆但列於有無二門而已、闕三四者，若了一二則曉三四，雙用為三、雙非為四，是故不復列三四也。又復後教望於前，若實若權、說教說證、若他若自，自他相對皆名權者，既非當教之所行用，望從說邊故皆是權。又當教中自他相對，皆以前教若證若說皆為權者，以互奪故，奪前之實成後之權。當教亦得名為實者，為欲對辨一雙，故立自他。如《大經》云「世人所見」等也。文為四：初、藏。荊溪云：如毘曇至實智者，問此中既云無常事理，事可無常，理何故爾？答：照理所無亦名無常，故使《成論》以有門中事理俱權，以有門理不即事故。「法障」者，界內塵沙也。二、通。荊溪云：亦可引《大品》「若有法過涅槃者」證於實智亦名幻也。「佛及八地」者，所證已齊，但少留殘習耳。三、別。「照藏理」者，即但中理為惑所覆，如雲外月、礦中金等。四圓。荊溪云：是故文殊等者，此正引證自行實也。亦應通引三十二人各各自說，以證化他，門門不同即是權也，門門不二化他實也。亦可文殊以證自他，以有說故名為化他，說於無說得名自行。 > Second, briefly explaining the meaning of expedient means, in two parts: first, listing the sections; second, explaining sequentially, in two parts: first, explaining the five sections, in five parts: first, briefly explaining the name. Jingxi says: In the \*Commentary on the Lotus Sūtra\*, to reveal the real, it is divided into three explanations, namely dharma-use, the gate, and the secret and subtle. Now, discarding two and taking only dharma-use: the gate concerns entry, and the secret and subtle concerns opening the provisional; since the provisional is not yet opened here, the latter explanations are omitted. Not taking the gate is because bodhisattvas can enter while the two vehicles lack it; among bodhisattvas, it is temporarily treated in terms of their own capacity; and setting aside sequential entry, it is therefore temporarily not mentioned. According to principle, it should also use the single meaning of the gate, but because entry according to one's own capacity is identical with dharma-use, it temporarily uses only the single meaning of dharma-use. Furthermore, extending to secret teachings, one could also fully use those three meanings; only then is it the bias toward what knowledge arrives at. 'Dharma' in the present text temporarily points to the dharmas of the three biases. Because that \*Commentary on the Lotus Sūtra\* refers to all four teachings collectively as dharma, since it is not yet blended, it belongs to the expedient means of the present sūtra, unlike that text which is formulated in terms of the four teachings. Second, the identity and difference according to the teachings. Jingxi says: Next, distinguishing differences according to the four teachings refers to differences presented in the sūtras and treatises. The previous text merely listed the two gates of existence and non-existence and omitted the third and fourth; if one understands the first two, one comprehends the third and fourth, since using both is the third and negating both is the fourth; therefore the third and fourth are not listed again. Furthermore, looking from a later teaching toward a prior one, whether real or provisional, whether spoken doctrine or realized attainment, whether for other or for self—when self and other are contrasted, all are termed provisional; since they are not what is practiced and applied in the teaching itself, looking from the side of preaching, they are all provisional. Furthermore, within a teaching itself, when self and other are contrasted, all previous teachings, whether realization or exposition, are provisional because they mutually supersede: superseding the prior real constitutes the later provisional. What belongs to the teaching itself may also be termed real; in order to contrast and distinguish a pair, self and other are established. It is like the \*Mahāparinirvāṇa Sūtra\* saying 'what worldly people see' and so forth. The text has four parts: first, the Pitaka teaching. Jingxi says: From 'like the Abhidharma' up to 'real knowledge': question—since this mentions the impermanence of phenomena and principle, phenomena may be impermanent, but why is principle so? Answer: Illumination of what is absent in principle is also called impermanent; hence the \*Satyasiddhi-śāstra\* takes both phenomena and principle within the gate of existence to be provisional, because the principle in the gate of existence is not identical with phenomena. 'Obstacle of dharmas' refers to the dust-and-sand \[defilements\] within the realms. Second, the Common teaching. Jingxi says: One may also cite the \*Aṣṭasāhasrikā Prajñāpāramitā\*, 'If there were any dharma surpassing nirvāṇa...', to verify that real knowledge is also called an illusion. Regarding 'the Buddha and the eighth ground': what they realize is already equal, only that a slight remnant of habit-energies is retained. Third, the Distinct teaching. Regarding 'illuminating the hidden principle': that is, the principle of the mere middle being covered by afflictions, like the moon behind clouds, or gold in ore. Fourth, the Perfect teaching. Jingxi says: Regarding 'Therefore Mañjuśrī...' and so forth: this directly cites proof of the real of one's own practice. One should also universally cite the thirty-two individuals each speaking for themselves, to prove transforming others: each distinct gate is provisional, while each gate being non-dual is the real of transforming others. One may also take Mañjuśrī to prove self and other: having speech is called transforming others, while speaking of the unspeakable can be called one's own practice. > — English (machine translation) (machine translation) - [Previous: 4.32](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1779.4.32) - [Next: 4.34](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1779.4.34) - [Up: 4](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1779.4) ## Translations (1) - [English (machine translation)](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1779~en-mt.4.33) — English, machine translation --- Source: [https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1779.4.33](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1779.4.33) · Pramāṇa