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# 維摩經略疏垂裕記 6.145

維摩經略疏垂裕記 6.145

- **Language:** Classical Chinese

### [6.145](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1779.6.145)

六、入真分判斷除，二：初、懸敘分科，二：初、懸敘三假，二：初、列三名。二、簡體析，二：初、正簡。荊溪云：假相者，假文具三，皆用幻等。「亦入圓真」者，既是體法能至圓中，以通屬，故云亦也。所以三釋之中前之二釋雖亦衍門，不及第三唯觀心性，故前兩釋多寄通真。「折假」者，三假之義既在《成論》，三藏豈無？但諸《阿含》名多不顯，所以三假之盛在弘教者，故廣在於《成論》。文中言折假者，非無其理。何者？如云因無常故緣亦無常，前念後念悉皆生滅，長不住故短亦不住。既俱無常，即破常倒，不假更用自他等名，故四句推唯在衍教，便令成於生即無生，故用衍門以破藏拙。「隨情」者，假非即理，故得情名。理即是空，順空隨理。二、「此即」下，結顯。

> Sixth, entering the truth, distinguishing, and severing, in two parts: first, preliminary layout and sectional division, in two parts: first, preliminary layout of the three provisionalities, in two parts: first, listing the three names; second, selecting substance and analysis, in two parts: first, direct selection. Jingxi says: "Regarding the marks of the provisional: the text on provisionality contains three, all using illusion and the like." Regarding "Also enters the perfect truth": since it embodies phenomena and can reach the perfect middle, being classified under the common \[teaching\], it therefore says 'also'. Hence among the three interpretations, although the former two interpretations are also Mahāyāna gates, they do not equal the third of solely contemplating mind-nature; thus the former two interpretations are mostly lodged in the common truth. Regarding "analyzing provisionality": since the doctrine of the three provisionalities is found in the Tattvasiddhi-śāstra, how could the Tripiṭaka lack it? However, the names are mostly not evident in the various Āgamas; the prominence of the three provisionalities lies in those who propagate the teaching, and so it is elaborated in the Tattvasiddhi-śāstra. When the text speaks of analyzing provisionality, it is not without its principle. Why? As it is said, because causes are impermanent, conditions are also impermanent; former thoughts and latter thoughts are all arising and ceasing; because the long does not abide, the short also does not abide. Since both are impermanent, they break the upside-down view of permanence, without needing to further employ names like self and other; therefore, investigation by the four clauses exists only in the Mahāyāna teaching, immediately causing one to realize that arising is precisely non-arising; hence the Mahāyāna gate is used to break the clumsiness of the Tripiṭaka. Regarding "according with sentiment": because the provisional is not identical to principle, it acquires the name 'sentiment'. Principle is emptiness; according with emptiness accords with principle. Second, from "This then" onward, concluding exposition.  
> — English (machine translation) (machine translation)

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## Translations (1)

- [English (machine translation)](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1779~en-mt.6.145) — English, machine translation

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Source: [https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1779.6.145](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1779.6.145) · Pramāṇa
