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# 維摩經略疏垂裕記 6.45

維摩經略疏垂裕記 6.45

- **Language:** Classical Chinese

### [6.45](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1779.6.45)

二、「事八」下，約事理各明，結被訶所以，二：初、約事理各明。事難指前。「今明」下，明理難。荊溪云：釋出內外而分事理，是即善吉不識界外理難而能障於中道。「有師」去破古者，今但破小。既大小三乘共有三空，是故不得三空為釋。又三空位在見道前，猶能發心，故亦不用。今明見等三道是已死故，於義便故，故引正位即見道也。見道尚爾，何況修道。又從實說，入三道者猶可得發，入無餘者準小乘教無有發理，餘國之言亦從實教。「菩薩」下，明二乘心尚是惡道中之極重，豈不名為三惡道耶？「如大論」等者，二乘之人為菩薩怨。怨家豈過惡道之因、證惡道也。暹云：《大論》三十云「譬如空靜有樹名奢摩黎，枝觚廣大眾鳥集宿。一鴿後至，住一枝上，枝觚即時為之而折。澤神問言：『雕鷲皆能住持，何至小鳥便不自勝？』樹神答云：『此鳥從我怨家樹來，食彼尼俱類樹子，來棲我上或當放糞。子墮地者，惡樹復生，為害必大。是故懷憂，寧捨一枝所全大者。』菩薩亦爾，於諸魔外諸使惡業無如是畏。二乘於菩薩邊亦如彼鳥，壞敗大乘心、永滅佛乘心。」論中以大斥小，故對二乘心，正當界外惡道難也。「四諦中滅」等者，荊溪云：此取《法華．譬喻品》意，彼品東西馳走，視父而已。彼疏釋云「東西者，苦集也。南北者，滅道也。」故以此對滅用證滅諦。若入無餘，八六四二如定壽也。縱現有餘，定入無餘，故亦得名定。故《俱舍》云「北洲定千年，西東半半減。」西東亦定。今取極長自謂永滅，長豈過斯？「佛前佛後」等者，俗後真前俱不見性。何者？真諦之後應須見中而便照俗，義同在後。又約諦論，亦可名為俗前真後。「外道不見真理」等者，見慧即是一切智外道，故神通韋陀多皆先修一切智也。故小乘謂真，於大猶俗，俗故名世。真俗二諦俱不見中，但成世智，所以屬難。「瘖癋」者，瘖亦瘂也，不能言也。有作「喑」，《字林》「喑，唶也。唶，子夜反。」「瘂」有作「啞」，《字林》「乙白反，笑聲也。《易》云『笑言啞啞』是也。」非今字體。

> Second, from "eight phenomenal \[difficulties\]" onward, explaining phenomenal and noumenal \[difficulties\] respectively and concluding with the reasons for being reproached, \[which falls into\] two \[parts\]: first, explaining phenomenal and noumenal \[difficulties\] respectively. Phenomenal difficulties refer to the preceding text. From "Now explaining" onward explains noumenal difficulties. Jingxi says: "Explaining the internal and external and thereby distinguishing phenomena and principle means that Subhūti did not recognize the noumenal difficulties outside the realm, which are able to obstruct the Middle Way." The phrase "Certain masters..." onwards refutes ancient commentators; here it merely refutes the Hinayāna. Since the three vehicles of both Mahāyāna and Hīnayāna share the three emptinesses, one cannot use the three emptinesses for the explanation. Moreover, the stage of the three emptinesses is before the path of seeing, where one is still able to generate the mind \[of awakening\]; therefore it is not used either. Now it is explained that the three paths, such as the path of seeing, are already dead \[to the Mahāyāna\], which suits the meaning; therefore the true stage is cited, which is the path of seeing. If this is so for the path of seeing, how much more so for the path of cultivation. Furthermore, speaking from the definitive reality, those who have entered the three paths may still generate the mind; but according to the Hīnayāna teachings, for those who have entered \[nirvāṇa\] without remainder, there is no principle of generating the mind. The statement regarding 'other lands' also follows the definitive teaching. From "Bodhisattva" onward explains that the mind of the two vehicles is still an exceedingly grave state among the evil destinies; how could it not be called the three evil destinies? Regarding "As the Dàzhìdù Lùn says" and so forth: persons of the two vehicles are the enemies of bodhisattvas. Could an enemy surpass the cause of the evil destinies and the realization of the evil destinies? Daoxian says: "Fascicle thirty of the Dàzhìdù Lùn states: 'For example, in a quiet, empty place there was a tree named Śālmali, whose branches and trunk were immense, where numerous birds flocked to roost. Later, a pigeon arrived and perched upon one branch, and the branch immediately broke on its account. The marsh spirit asked: "Vultures and eagles could all be supported; why could it not bear such a tiny bird?" The tree spirit answered: "This bird came from my enemy tree, having eaten the seeds of that Nyagrodha tree. It came to roost upon me and might discharge feces. If the seeds fall to the ground, the evil tree will grow again, and the harm will certainly be immense. Therefore I harbored worry, and would rather lose one branch to preserve the greater whole." Bodhisattvas are likewise: they do not fear Māras, non-Buddhists, the defilements, or evil karma in this way. The two vehicles toward a bodhisattva are just like that bird: they destroy and ruin the Mahāyāna mind and permanently extinguish the Buddha-vehicle mind.' In the treatise, the Mahāyāna is used to reproach the Hīnayāna, so confronting the mind of the two vehicles precisely corresponds to the difficulty of the evil destinies outside the realm. Regarding "Cessation among the four truths" and so forth: Jingxi says: "This adopts the intent of the 'Simile' chapter of the Lotus Sūtra, where \[the children\] run east and west, merely looking at their father. The commentary on that explains: 'East and west are suffering and origination; south and north are cessation and the path.' Therefore this matches cessation, using it to substantiate the truth of cessation. If entering \[nirvāṇa\] without remainder, the eight, six, four, and two \[thousand kalpas\] are like fixed lifespans. Even though they presently abide in \[nirvāṇa\] with remainder, they are certain to enter \[nirvāṇa\] without remainder; hence it can also be termed fixed. Thus the Kośa says: 'In the northern continent \[lifespans are\] fixed at a thousand years; in the west and east they decrease by halves.' The west and east are also fixed. Here, taking the extreme length, they consider themselves permanently extinguished; how could any length exceed this?" Regarding "Before the Buddha and after the Buddha" and so forth: after the conventional and before the ultimate, neither sees the \[Buddha-\]nature. Why? After the truth of the ultimate, one ought to see the Middle, yet one instead illuminates the conventional, the meaning being identical to being 'after.' Moreover, discussing it in terms of the truths, it can also be called 'before the conventional and after the ultimate.' Regarding "Non-Buddhists do not see the true principle" and so forth: seeing-wisdom is non-Buddhists \[who possess\] all-knowledge; hence those with supernormal powers and knowledge of the Vedas mostly cultivate all-knowledge first. Thus what the Hīnayāna calls the ultimate is still conventional to the Mahāyāna; being conventional, it is called worldly. With both the ultimate and conventional truths, neither sees the Middle; it merely constitutes worldly wisdom, which is why it belongs to the difficulties. Regarding 'dumb and deaf' (yīn lóng): yīn also means mute (yǎ), unable to speak. Some write it as yīnyǎ (喑); the Zìlín says: '喑 means to groan or shout (cè); cè is pronounced zǐ-yè.' For yǎ (瘂), some write yǎ (啞); the Zìlín says: 'Pronounced yǐ-bái; the sound of laughter. The Yìjīng says: "Laughing and talking merrily (yǎyǎ)," which is this.' It is not the standard character form used here.  
> — English (machine translation) (machine translation)

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## Translations (1)

- [English (machine translation)](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1779~en-mt.6.45) — English, machine translation

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Source: [https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1779.6.45](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1779.6.45) · Pramāṇa
