[Pramāṇa](https://indike.org/pramana/) › [Indian literature](https://indike.org/pramana/in) › [Buddhist Literature](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha) › [Taishō Tripiṭaka (Chinese Buddhist canon)](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho) › [淨名玄論](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1780) › 1.43 # 淨名玄論 1.43 淨名玄論 1.43 - **Language:** Classical Chinese ### [1.43](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1780.1.43) 三、明即世所行塵識四句。一薩婆多部，不得法空，計有塵有識。二方廣道人，學毘佛略，執邪無之義，明無識無塵。三藏什未至之前，有心無之說，明有塵無識。如肇公《不真空論》云「無心者，無心於萬物，萬物未甞無」，肇公評之云「此得在於神靜，而失在物空也」。四計無塵有識，如執唯識無有境界。如此等說，皆墮四門，亦無絕四，故無不二之道。如上斥之。問：有塵有識，是毘曇執有之見；無塵無識，方廣邪無之宗；無識有塵，人師自心。此三可得非之。唯識之旨，蓋是方等之宏宗、菩薩之大論，何以排斥？答：考天親唯識之意者，蓋是借心以忘境、忘境不存心，肅然無寄，理自玄會；非謂塵為橫計、心是實有。未學不體其旨，故宜須斥之。故咎在門人，非和脩之過。至淨土中，具詳得失也。 > Third, explaining the catuṣkoṭi of objects and consciousness prevalent in the world: First, the Sarvāstivāda school, failing to attain the emptiness of dharmas, asserts that there are objects and there is consciousness. Second, the Vaitulyaka renunciants, studying the Vaipulya, cling to the erroneous doctrine of nonexistence, asserting that there is neither consciousness nor objects. Third, before the arrival of the Tripiṭaka master Kumārajīva, there was the theory of 'no-mind', which asserted that there are objects but no consciousness. As Master Sengzhao's Treatise on the Emptiness of the Non-Absolute states: 'Those who advocate no-mind mean having no mind toward the myriad things, but the myriad things have never been nonexistent.' Master Sengzhao evaluated it, saying: 'This succeeds in the stillness of the spirit, but fails in the emptiness of things.' Fourth, asserting that there are no objects but there is consciousness, such as clinging to Vijñaptimātratā without external spheres of cognition. Theories such as these all fall into the four gates and likewise do not transcend the four; therefore, they lack the Way of nonduality, and are refuted as above. Question: Having objects and having consciousness is the Sarvāstivāda view of clinging to existence; having neither objects nor consciousness is the Vaitulyaka tenet of erroneous nonexistence; having objects without consciousness is the personal idea of Chinese masters. These three can rightly be rejected. But the purport of Vijñaptimātratā is the grand tenet of the Vaipulya sūtras and the great treatise of the bodhisattva; why reject it? Answer: If one examines the intention of Vasubandhu's Vijñaptimātratā, it merely borrows the mind to forget the object, and once the object is forgotten, the mind does not remain; serenely without reliance, the principle naturally converges in profound mystery. It does not mean that the object is an arbitrary imputation while the mind is truly existent. Later students fail to comprehend his intent, so it is indeed necessary to refute them. Therefore, the fault lies with the disciples, not with Vasubandhu. In the section on the Pure Land, their merits and faults will be examined in detail. > — English (machine translation) (machine translation) - [Previous: 1.42](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1780.1.42) - [Next: 1.44](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1780.1.44) - [Up: 1](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1780.1) ## Translations (1) - [English (machine translation)](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1780~en-mt.1.43) — English, machine translation --- Source: [https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1780.1.43](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1780.1.43) · Pramāṇa