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# 淨名玄論 1.45

淨名玄論 1.45

- **Language:** Classical Chinese

### [1.45](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1780.1.45)

五、明重複四句。總上來四句，皆名為有。所以然者，有有、有無、有亦有無、有非有非無，故皆名為有。如龍樹云：無法中有心生，即名為有。次絕此四句，名之為無。亦有四句亦絕四句，為亦有亦無。非有四句非無四句，為非有非無。次明絕此四句，非有四句、非無四句、非亦有四句亦無四句、非非有四句非非無四句，故名絕四句也。問：何故明此四句義也？答：異部眾師立大乘之宗者，但在複四句中有無二句之義耳，尚不得預四句之宗，安有絕四之旨。何以知然？南方真諦之境、北方摩羅之心，皆明絕於有無四句，故墮第二句中。世諦之與八識，皆在四句之中，即為有門所攝，故知皆墮二句之內，無絕四句之言也。又重複四句者，所上單複四句之有為有句，上單複四句之無為無句，乃至亦有亦無、非有非無，如此絕四，其致淵遠。眾師之宗都不預斯四句內義，況有絕四之言耶？

> Fifth, explaining the compounded catuṣkoṭi. All of the above catuṣkoṭis are named 'existence.' Why is this? Because there is existence, there is nonexistence, there is both existence and nonexistence, and there is neither existence nor nonexistence; hence all are termed 'existence.' As Nāgārjuna said, 'When thought arises within non-existent phenomena, it is termed existence.' Next, transcending this catuṣkoṭi is named 'nonexistence.' Both having the catuṣkoṭi and transcending the catuṣkoṭi is 'both existence and nonexistence.' Neither having the catuṣkoṭi nor having no catuṣkoṭi is 'neither existence nor nonexistence.' Next, explaining the transcendence of this catuṣkoṭi: not having the catuṣkoṭi, not being without the catuṣkoṭi, not being both having the catuṣkoṭi and without the catuṣkoṭi, and not being neither having the catuṣkoṭi nor without the catuṣkoṭi—hence it is named transcending the catuṣkoṭi. Question: Why explain the meaning of this catuṣkoṭi? Answer: When the masters of the various sects establish the tenets of the Mahāyāna, they are merely within the meaning of the two propositions of existence and nonexistence among the double catuṣkoṭi; they do not even qualify for the tenet of the \[compounded\] catuṣkoṭi, so how could they possess the principle of transcending the catuṣkoṭi? How is this known? The southern \[view of the\] object of paramārtha-satya and the northern \[view of the\] amala\[-vijñāna\] mind both explain transcendence over the catuṣkoṭi of existence and nonexistence, and thus fall into the second proposition. Saṃvṛti-satya and the eight consciousnesses are both within the catuṣkoṭi, which is subsumed under the gate of existence. Therefore we know they both fall within two propositions and lack any discourse on transcending the catuṣkoṭi. Furthermore, as for the compounded catuṣkoṭi, taking the existence of the above single and double catuṣkoṭis as the proposition of existence, the nonexistence of the above single and double catuṣkoṭis as the proposition of nonexistence, up to both existence and nonexistence, and neither existence nor nonexistence—such transcendence of the catuṣkoṭi has an unfathomably profound significance. The tenets of the various masters do not even participate in the meaning within this catuṣkoṭi, so how could they have words transcending the catuṣkoṭi?  
> — English (machine translation) (machine translation)

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## Translations (1)

- [English (machine translation)](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1780~en-mt.1.45) — English, machine translation

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Source: [https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1780.1.45](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1780.1.45) · Pramāṇa
