[Pramāṇa](https://indike.org/pramana/) › [Indian literature](https://indike.org/pramana/in) › [Buddhist Literature](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha) › [Taishō Tripiṭaka (Chinese Buddhist canon)](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho) › [淨名玄論](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1780) › 3.19 # 淨名玄論 3.19 淨名玄論 3.19 - **Language:** Classical Chinese ### [3.19](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1780.3.19) 初、明俗境不思議者，《成實論》云「乃至小草，思惟觀察尚不可知，況一切法。身子子不知一鳥始末，況一切眾生。」故知俗境不思議，今且據大小容入一義作之。問：巨細殊形，復無增減，云何得相容入？答：南方舊云：既稱不可思議，唯聖境界，二乘不測，凡夫豈有解耶？故置而不釋。今請問之，巨細容入者，蓋是不思議之跡耳。六度四等、權實兩智、不二法門，謂不思議之本。本跡雖殊，不思議一。而既能解本不思議，云何不達其跡耶？又跡為近事、本為遠理，尚通理本，何不解於事迹耶？北土地論師云：大無大相，故大得入少；少無少相，故少得容大。今請問之，既大無大相，是則無大，誰入小耶？小無小相，是即無小，誰容大耶？若云有無相之大、無相之小故得容入者，今重考之。無相之大，為猶有大、為無大耶？若有大，即猶有相；如其無相，則無有大。若言大無相而有大者，亦應無大而有相耶？雖有此言，未見其理，故並不用之。今先開得失以示其相。所言失者，若有大可大，則有小可小。有大可大，不由小故大；有小可小，不由大故小。不由小故大，大是自大；不由大故小，小是自小。大是自大，大非小大；小是自小，小非大小。大非小大，大決定住大；小非大小，小決定住小。大小既爾，容不容亦然。小既本不容大，不容決定不容，不可令容，大本不入於小，不入決定不入，不可令入。故如此大小，無容入義。又無如此自性大小，論何物容入耶？又無自性容入，論何物大小？問：何處云決定大小無容入義？又何處云無自性大小耶？答：龍樹云「若先來不見，於今云何見？」以其性定故，集先來不斷，不斷定不斷，不斷云何斷？四諦既爾，萬義例之。故知不容定不容，不得容也。又云「執有自性，則無世間出世間法。」故知無有自性大小，何所容入耶？次、對失辨得者，今明無小可小，則無大可大，由小故大、由大故小。小不自小、大不自大，大名小大、小名大小，大小則非小、小大則非大，非大非小假名大小，故大小義始成。以大小得成，方有容入。以小是大小故，小得容大；大是小大故，得大入小。大小既爾，容入亦然。容是不容故容、不容是容不容，以不容是容不容，故小不容是容不容而得容矣、大不入是入不入而得入矣。問：何故就大小明定不定，復約容入明定不定耶？答：有所得義，有二種決定，一大小體定、二容入用定，故無大小之體及容入之用。對此二定，還明因緣體用。一者大小體是因緣故，大小始成。二容入之用是因緣容入故，大小之用即立。故須兩明。問：但大小是俗境，容入之用則應是權智用，云何言大小之體及容入之用皆是俗境？答：俗諦之中具有體用，但要須權智運之方能容入，故具有境智也。問：今辨俗諦境不思議，云何乃明權智用耶？答：此中具境智兩義。若明大小之體及容入之用，此是俗境。若以權智運令容入，即是權智用也。 > First, regarding the explanation of the conventional object as inconceivable: The Tattvasiddhi-śāstra states: "Even a small blade of grass cannot be comprehended through thinking and observation, not to mention all dharmas. Śāriputra does not know the beginning and end of a single bird, not to mention all sentient beings." Hence we know that the conventional object is inconceivable. For now, let us treat it based on the single meaning of the mutual containment of large and small. Question: Vast and minute have different forms, and moreover have neither increase nor decrease; how can they contain one another? Answer: The old masters of the South said: Since it is called inconceivable, it is exclusively the realm of the noble ones, beyond the reckoning of the two vehicles—how could ordinary persons understand it? Thus they set it aside without explaining it. We now question them: The mutual containment of vast and minute is merely the trace of the inconceivable. The six pāramitās and the four immeasurables, the two cognitions of provisional and real, and the Dharma gate of nonduality are called the root of the inconceivable. Although root and trace are different, their inconceivability is one. If one can already understand the root of the inconceivable, why does one not penetrate its traces? Furthermore, traces are immediate phenomena, while the root is the remote principle; if one still penetrates the root of principle, why not understand the traces of phenomena? The Dilun masters of the North said: The large has no mark of largeness, so the large can enter the small; the small has no mark of smallness, so the small can contain the large. We now question them: Since the large has no mark of largeness, then there is no large—what enters the small? The small has no mark of smallness, then there is no small—what contains the large? If they say that there are a markless large and a markless small and therefore they can contain each other, we now examine this again: Does the markless large still possess largeness, or is there no largeness? If there is largeness, then there is still a mark; if it is markless, then there is no largeness. If they say the large is markless yet largeness exists, should there also be marklessness without largeness? Although such words exist, we do not see their rationale, and so we reject both of them. We now first open up the defects and merits to show their characteristics. As for the defects: If there is a large that can be large, then there is a small that can be small. If there is a large that can be large, it is not large by reason of the small; if there is a small that can be small, it is not small by reason of the large. Not being large by reason of the small, the large is an intrinsic large; not being small by reason of the large, the small is an intrinsic small. The large being an intrinsic large, the large is not the large of the small; the small being an intrinsic small, the small is not the small of the large. The large not being the large of the small, the large determinately abides as large; the small not being the small of the large, the small determinately abides as small. Large and small being like this, containing and not containing are also like this. Since the small originally does not contain the large, not containing determinately does not contain and cannot be made to contain; the large originally does not enter the small, not entering determinately does not enter and cannot be made to enter. Therefore, for large and small such as these, there is no meaning of mutual containment. Furthermore, without such intrinsic large and small, of what thing could containment be discussed? And without intrinsic containment, of what thing could large and small be discussed? Question: Where is it stated that determinate large and small have no meaning of mutual containment? And where is it stated that there are no intrinsic large and small? Answer: Nāgārjuna states: "If one did not see before, how can one see now?" Because their nature is determinate, if the origin \[of suffering\] was originally unsevered, being unsevered it is determinately unsevered; being unsevered, how could it be severed? The four noble truths being like this, the myriad doctrines follow by analogy. Hence we know that not containing is determinately not containing and cannot contain. It is also stated: "If one grasps that there is an intrinsic nature, then there are no worldly or transworldly dharmas." Hence we know that there are no intrinsic large and small; what could contain or enter? Next, in contrast to the defect, to distinguish the merit: We now explain that when there is no small that can be small, then there is no large that can be large; it is large by reason of the small, and small by reason of the large. The small is not intrinsically small; the large is not intrinsically large. The large is called the large of the small; the small is called the small of the large. The large of the small is not small; the small of the large is not large. Being neither large nor small, they are provisionally called large and small, and thus the meaning of large and small is only then established. Because large and small are established, only then is there mutual containment. Because the small is the small of the large, the small can contain the large; because the large is the large of the small, the large can enter the small. Large and small being like this, containment is also like this. Containing is not containing, therefore it contains; not containing is the not containing of containing. Because not containing is the not containing of containing, the small's not containing is the not containing of containing and thus it can contain; the large's not entering is the not entering of entering and thus it can enter. Question: Why do you explain determinate and indeterminate in terms of large and small, and then again explain determinate and indeterminate in terms of containing and entering? Answer: In doctrines with apprehension, there are two kinds of determinateness: first, the essence of large and small is determinate; second, the function of containing and entering is determinate; hence there is neither essence of large and small nor function of containing and entering. In contrast to these two determinacies, we conversely explain dependent origination in essence and function. First, because the essence of large and small is dependently originated, large and small are only then established. Second, because the function of containing and entering is dependently originated containment, the function of large and small is immediately established. Therefore, both must be explained. Question: But large and small are conventional objects, whereas the function of containing and entering should be the function of provisional cognition; why do you say that both the essence of large and small and the function of containing and entering are conventional objects? Answer: Within conventional truth, essence and function are both fully present, but it definitely requires provisional cognition to operate them so that they can contain and enter; thus both object and cognition are fully present. Question: Now you are analyzing the inconceivability of the object of conventional truth; why do you then explain the function of provisional cognition? Answer: Both senses of object and cognition are present here. If one explains the essence of large and small and the function of containing and entering, these are conventional objects. If one operates them with provisional cognition to make them contain and enter, this is the function of provisional cognition. > — English (machine translation) (machine translation) - [Previous: 3.18](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1780.3.18) - [Next: 3.20](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1780.3.20) - [Up: 3](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1780.3) ## Translations (1) - [English (machine translation)](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1780~en-mt.3.19) — English, machine translation --- Source: [https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1780.3.19](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1780.3.19) · Pramāṇa