[Pramāṇa](https://indike.org/pramana/) › [Indian literature](https://indike.org/pramana/in) › [Buddhist Literature](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha) › [Taishō Tripiṭaka (Chinese Buddhist canon)](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho) › [淨名玄論](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1780) › 6.24 # 淨名玄論 6.24 淨名玄論 6.24 - **Language:** Classical Chinese ### [6.24](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1780.6.24) 問：於凡是有既失者，於聖是無亦是失不？答：一對凡夫明聖為得，若望教諦皆是失也。以色未曾有無，而作有無作解，豈非失也？問：經云「一切世諦，若於如來即是第一義諦」，亦是失？答：一往對凡之有為失，歎聖之空為得。若望教諦者，於諦非但不得表不二理，亦不得能表之教，但是謂情所見耳。然如來了色實未曾空有也。若識兩種二諦，則五難自𭤳。問：難有此通，猶未可見。今說色有無是教諦者，不說色有無教諦。答：以說為教者，佛不說則無教諦也。問：若爾者，唯恒有二於諦，則無因緣有無。答：一切法常是二於有無，亦恒是因緣有無。若於二緣，即是二於諦有無。諸佛菩薩了此色即是因緣有無，然於與教，未曾二於二緣則教成，於了悟即於成教。問：若於二緣即是二於有無，望佛菩薩即是因緣有無。此因緣有無，此因緣即是因緣境，云何言是教？答：因緣有無未曾有無，故雖是有無而不有不無。如此有無能開不二，即是教義。問：佛若不說，恒有因緣有無。因緣有無豈是教耶？答：非但取說義為教，經中明六塵皆是教。問：若爾，境教何異？答：此因緣有無，可兩望論之。發智即境，能開不有不無不二理，即是教也。此據佛不說，自有境教也。就說義明境教者，佛照有無，有無名境；佛說有無，有無是教。問：他亦云照有無，有無是境；說有無，有無亦是教。與今何異？答：他但得二於定性有無，此有無不得開不有不無，故非教也。又因緣有無是境耳，定性有無非境也。何者？有不自有，由無故有；無不自無，由有故無。由有故無，無是有無；由無故有，有是無有。了此因緣有無，能生二慧：識有是無有，生實方便慧；了無是有無，生方便實慧。既是定性有無，則生斷常二見，故不得名境也。 > Question: Since being existent with respect to ordinary beings is an error, is being non-existent with respect to noble ones also an error? > Answer: Provisionally speaking, with respect to ordinary beings, the noble \[perspective\] is clarified as correct; but when looked at from \[the standpoint of\] the teaching-satya, both are errors. Since form has never been existent or non-existent, yet one forms an understanding of existence or non-existence, how could that not be an error? > Question: The sūtra states: "All saṃvṛti-satya, if with respect to the Tathāgata, is indeed the supreme paramārtha-satya." Is this also an error? > Answer: Provisionally, in contrast to the existence of ordinary beings, it is an error, and the emptiness of the noble ones is praised as correct. But if considered from \[the standpoint of\] the teaching-satya, the satya with respect to \[subjects\] not only fails to express the principle of nonduality, it also fails to attain the teaching capable of expressing it; it is merely what is seen by conceptual attachment. However, the Tathāgata understands that form in reality has never been empty or existent. If one recognizes the two kinds of two truths, then the five objections naturally dissolve. > Question: Although the objection has this resolution, it is still not yet evident. Now, when you state that the existence and non-existence of form is the teaching-satya, when it is not spoken, is the existence and non-existence of form the teaching-satya? > Answer: Since speaking is taken as the teaching, when the Buddha does not speak, there is no teaching-satya. > Question: If that is so, then there are only ever the two satyas with respect to \[subjects\], and there would be no existence and non-existence of causes and conditions. > Answer: All phenomena are constantly the existence and non-existence with respect to the two \[classes of subjects\], and are also constantly the existence and non-existence of causes and conditions. If with respect to the two conditions, that is precisely the existence and non-existence of the two satyas with respect to \[subjects\]. The Buddhas and bodhisattvas understand that this form is precisely the existence and non-existence of causes and conditions. However, between "with respect to" and "teaching", there have never been two: with respect to the two conditions, then the teaching is established; in understanding and awakening, then "with respect to" becomes the teaching. > Question: If with respect to the two conditions it is precisely the existence and non-existence with respect to the two \[classes of subjects\], then from the perspective of Buddhas and bodhisattvas it is precisely the existence and non-existence of causes and conditions. If this existence and non-existence of causes and conditions is precisely the object of causes and conditions, how can it be said to be the teaching? > Answer: The existence and non-existence of causes and conditions has never been existent or non-existent; therefore, although it is existent and non-existent, it is neither existent nor non-existent. Such existence and non-existence is capable of revealing nonduality, which is precisely the meaning of the teaching. > Question: If the Buddha does not speak, there is constantly the existence and non-existence of causes and conditions. How could the existence and non-existence of causes and conditions be the teaching? > Answer: We do not only take the sense of speaking as the teaching; the sūtras explain that the six sense-objects are all teachings. > Question: If that is so, what is the difference between object and teaching? > Answer: This existence and non-existence of causes and conditions can be discussed from two perspectives. Giving rise to cognition is the object; being capable of revealing the principle of nonduality—neither existent nor non-existent—is the teaching. This is based on the Buddha's non-speaking, where object and teaching naturally exist. If explaining object and teaching based on the sense of speaking: the Buddha illuminates existence and non-existence, and existence and non-existence are called the object; the Buddha speaks of existence and non-existence, and existence and non-existence are the teaching. > Question: Others also say that illuminating existence and non-existence means existence and non-existence are the object, and speaking of existence and non-existence means existence and non-existence are the teaching. How does this differ from the present \[view\]? > Answer: Others only attain the existence and non-existence of fixed nature with respect to the two \[classes of subjects\]; this existence and non-existence cannot reveal neither-existence-nor-non-existence, hence it is not the teaching. Moreover, the existence and non-existence of causes and conditions is the object, whereas the existence and non-existence of fixed nature is not the object. Why? Existence does not exist from itself; it exists due to non-existence. Non-existence does not not-exist from itself; it is non-existent due to existence. Being non-existent due to existence, non-existence is the non-existence of existence; being existent due to non-existence, existence is the existence of non-existence. Understanding this existence and non-existence of causes and conditions can generate the two wisdoms: recognizing that existence is the existence of non-existence gives rise to real expedient wisdom; understanding that non-existence is the non-existence of existence gives rise to expedient real wisdom. If it were existence and non-existence of fixed nature, it would give rise to the two views of annihilation and permanence, and therefore cannot be called an object. > — English (machine translation) (machine translation) - [Previous: 6.23](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1780.6.23) - [Next: 6.25](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1780.6.25) - [Up: 6](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1780.6) ## Translations (1) - [English (machine translation)](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1780~en-mt.6.24) — English, machine translation --- Source: [https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1780.6.24](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1780.6.24) · Pramāṇa