[Pramāṇa](https://indike.org/pramana/) › [Indian literature](https://indike.org/pramana/in) › [Buddhist Literature](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha) › [Taishō Tripiṭaka (Chinese Buddhist canon)](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho) › [淨名玄論](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1780) › 8.26 # 淨名玄論 8.26 淨名玄論 8.26 - **Language:** Classical Chinese ### [8.26](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1780.8.26) 習《成實論》者云「土是世諦，非無一質。但即真空，故無質耳。」晚習《唯識》、《攝大乘論》者云「如虛空，天見之為寶宮、鬼見之為猛火、鳥見之為好路、人見之為虛空。並無四質，悉是心變異故見此四耳。」犢子部云「人成、結成、事成。事成者，即六塵等事，此明實有一質。」薩婆多云「人不成、結成、事成，亦有一質。」譬喻部云「人不成、事不成，但有結成耳。如一色，貪人見之為淨、不淨觀人謂不淨、餘人見之為非淨不淨，故無有定質，但有結使之心。」尋譬喻之計，似唯識之宗。今先問唯識宗，若無境有心者，夫論因必有果、有果必酬因，心是方化之因，故云三界皆一心造。既計能造之心因，豈無所造之境果？若無境有心，則是無果有因。問：心變異故，見有外境。但外境猶是心，心外無有境，故有因亦有果。答：如外種子為因，生外物之果。而有因有果者，今以心為因，變異生三界五道，何故言無別果耶？若言心橫謂故見萬物，實無萬物，如眼病見空華，實無空華。若爾，實無萬物，亦無妄謂之心。而於妄謂之者有妄謂之心，亦於妄謂之人有妄謂之境。若言心境俱是妄謂，終因心故有境者，此乃是妄謂之心為本、妄謂之境為末，不得言本有而末無。又眾生心變異故見眾生土，諸佛菩薩應土誰所作耶？若言亦是眾生心變異故見應土者，佛則無應土。若爾，但有法報兩身，應無化佛。又但有他心，無天眼耳。問：佛有權實二智，實智則見真如，不見識不識、塵不塵；權智則知世諦等境。就世諦智中，復有權實二智。唯有心，此是實智；若知有色，此是權智。故佛以權智隨順眾生，亦有化身應土。答：佛隨順眾生故者，為見眾生色故順、為不見故隨？如其不見，何得隨？若其見者，既其無色，何所見耶？又佛若見色，則是倒見。次問有定質義。答：若有定質者，如一水兩見，鬼見成火，則有色觸；人見為水，便是三塵。定是何質？色於不得通者為礙，於得通者不礙，寧言色定是質礙？於有見人為有、於觀空人為空，色豈定是空有耶？以此推之，不得定言有一質，亦不得定言無一質。問：何故經論之中說有一質、說無一質耶？答：天親論主為眾生於五塵中起煩惱業、招生死報，是故論云實無外境，皆是心之所作。本有外境可起貪瞋，既無外境，於何處起煩惱耶？外境既無，則心亦不有，則不心不境，便悟入實相。是故說無境有心，此是對治悉檀，非第一義。學人不體其旨，便謂無境有心。問：何故復明有心有境？答：於顛倒眾生，既有倒心，即是倒境。但要因倒心，故有倒境。倒心為本，倒境為末。是故經中說有心境。諸部不知隨順眾生說有此事，便謂心境二俱實有。問：若有心境，何故於空中見火，復於水見火？答：經云「五不思議中，眾生業行不思議。」自有空中無火，以惡業故見空成火；自有於人中報水變而成火。問：若爾，即是無境，云何言非？答：於眾生有心，即見有境，云何言無？問？若爾，即成有境，云何言非？答：於鬼見火，人實不見，云何言有也？ > Those who study the Tattvasiddhi-śāstra say: "The land is saṃvṛti-satya; it is not without a material substance. But since it is identical with true emptiness, it is therefore without substance." Those who later studied Vijñaptimātratā and the Mahāyānasaṃgraha say: "Just as with empty space, the gods see it as a jeweled palace, hungry ghosts see it as raging fire, birds see it as a fine road, and humans see it as empty space; in all of these there are not four substances, but all are seen as these four merely because of transformations of the mind." The Vātsīputrīya says: "There are the establishment of persons, the establishment of saṃyojanas, and the establishment of entities. 'Establishment of entities' refers to the six sense objects and other such entities; this clarifies that there truly is a material substance." The Sarvāstivāda says: "Persons are not established, but saṃyojanas are established and entities are established; there is also a material substance." The Dārṣṭāntika says: "Persons are not established and entities are not established; there is only the establishment of saṃyojanas. For instance, with a single form: a lustful person sees it as pure, a person meditating on impurity considers it impure, and other people see it as neither pure nor impure. Therefore, there is no fixed substance, but only the mind of the saṃyojanas." Examining the proposition of the Dārṣṭāntika, it resembles the tenet of Vijñaptimātratā. Now we first question the Vijñaptimātratā school: If there is mind without objects, then in any discussion of causes there must be effects, and if there is an effect it must requite a cause. The mind is the cause of all transformative manifestations; hence it is said that the triple world is made entirely by the one mind. Since you posit an active cause in the mind that is capable of creating, how could there not be an effect in the objects that are created? If there are no objects and only mind, then that would be to have a cause without an effect. Question: Because the mind transforms, an external object is seen to exist. But the external object is still the mind itself; outside the mind there is no object. Therefore there is a cause and there is also an effect. Answer: Just as an external seed serves as a cause and produces the effect of an external thing, and thus there are cause and effect, now taking the mind as the cause, which transforms and produces the triple world and the five destinies, why do you say that there is no separate effect? If you say that because the mind falsely assumes it, it sees the myriad things, while in reality there are no myriad things—just as an eye disease causes one to see flowers in the sky when in reality there are no flowers in the sky—if that were so, then since in reality there are no myriad things, there would also be no mind of false assumption. Yet for one who falsely assumes, there is a mind of false assumption; likewise, for a person who falsely assumes, there is an object of false assumption. If you say that mind and object are both false assumptions, but ultimately an object exists because of the mind, then this means that the mind of false assumption is the root and the object of false assumption is the branch; one cannot say that the root exists while the branch does not. Furthermore, sentient beings see sentient beings' lands because their minds transform; then who creates the manifested lands of the Buddhas and bodhisattvas? If you say that sentient beings also see manifested lands because their own minds transform, then the Buddha would have no manifested land. If so, there would only be the two bodies of dharmakāya and saṃbhogakāya, and there should be no nirmāṇakāya Buddha. Moreover, there would only be the knowledge of others' minds and no divine eye. Question: The Buddha possesses the two cognitions, provisional and real. Real cognition sees tathatā, seeing neither consciousness nor non-consciousness, neither dust-objects nor non-dust-objects; provisional cognition knows objects such as saṃvṛti-satya. Within the cognition of saṃvṛti-satya, there are again two cognitions, provisional and real: that there is only mind is real cognition; if one knows there is form, this is provisional cognition. Therefore, the Buddha accords with sentient beings through provisional cognition, and there are also nirmāṇakāyas and manifested lands. Answer: As for the Buddha according with sentient beings, does he accord because he sees the forms of sentient beings, or does he accord because he does not see them? If he does not see them, how can he accord? If he sees them, since there is no form, what is there to see? Furthermore, if the Buddha were to see form, that would be inverted seeing. Next we examine the doctrine that there is a fixed substance. Answer: If there were a fixed substance, then as in the two viewings of one water, where the hungry ghost sees it as fire, it possesses form and touch; when a human sees it as water, it comprises three sense fields. What fixed substance is it? Form presents an obstruction to one who has not attained unimpeded passage, but does not present an obstruction to one who has attained unimpeded passage; how could one say that form is definitely of an obstructive substance? For a person who holds the view of existence, it is existent; for a person who contemplates emptiness, it is empty. How could form be definitely empty or existent? Deducing from this, one cannot definitely say that there is a material substance, nor can one definitely say that there is no material substance. Question: Why do the sūtras and treatises teach that there is a material substance, and teach that there is no material substance? Answer: Because sentient beings give rise to afflicted karma in the midst of the five sense fields and incur the retribution of birth and death, Master Vasubandhu therefore stated in his treatise that in reality there are no external objects, but all are the creations of the mind. Originally, when there were external objects, greed and anger could arise; since there are no external objects, where could afflictions arise from? Once external objects are absent, the mind also does not exist; thus being neither mind nor object, one then awakens to and enters dharmatā. Therefore, teaching that there are no objects and only mind is a remedial siddhānta, not the ultimate truth. Students fail to comprehend its intent and straightaway claim that there are no objects and only mind. Question: Why is it also explained that there are both mind and objects? Answer: For inverted sentient beings, since there is an inverted mind, there is precisely an inverted object. But it must be because of the inverted mind that there is an inverted object; the inverted mind is the root, and the inverted object is the branch. Therefore, the sūtras teach that there are mind and objects. The various sects, not understanding that this was stated in accordance with sentient beings, then claimed that both mind and objects are truly real. Question: If there are mind and objects, why does one see fire in empty space, and again see fire in water? Answer: A sūtra says: 'Among the five inconceivables, the karmic activity of sentient beings is inconceivable.' There are instances where there is no fire in empty space, but due to evil karma one sees the space as fire; there are instances where for humans the retributive water transforms and becomes fire. Question: If so, that is precisely the absence of objects; how can you say it is not? Answer: For sentient beings, when there is mind, they then see that there are objects; how can you say they are absent? Question: If so, that establishes that there are objects; how can you say it is not? Answer: When the hungry ghost sees fire, a human truly does not see it; how can you say it is present? > — English (machine translation) (machine translation) - [Previous: 8.25](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1780.8.25) - [Next: 8.27](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1780.8.27) - [Up: 8](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1780.8) ## Translations (1) - [English (machine translation)](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1780~en-mt.8.26) — English, machine translation --- Source: [https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1780.8.26](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1780.8.26) · Pramāṇa