[Pramāṇa](https://indike.org/pramana/) › [Indian literature](https://indike.org/pramana/in) › [Buddhist Literature](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha) › [Taishō Tripiṭaka (Chinese Buddhist canon)](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho) › [維摩經義疏](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1781) › 5.3.1 # 維摩經義疏 5.3.1 維摩經義疏 5.3.1 - **Language:** Classical Chinese ### [5.3.1](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1781.5.3.1) 大明經意，凡有二門：一者能化、二者所化。 〈不思議品〉辨能化教門，〈觀眾生品〉次明所化。 又〈不思議品〉多明權慧，故有無方妙用； 〈觀眾生品〉多明實慧，謂眾生畢竟空。 二智是經之大宗，故諸品盛談斯法。 又上〈問疾品〉云「從癡有愛則我病生」，此明能化所化義之根本也。 若不識眾生則不識眾生病，若不識眾生病亦未達菩薩病，是故須善識眾生，則具了二義，釋曳前品意也。 所言觀眾生者，觀是達生之名。 五陰之法名為眾也，會以成人故云生也。 又眾處受生，名為眾生。 但釋眾生，有內外之異。 外道謂實有眾生，凡有四說。 僧佉云：眾生與陰一。 衛世師言：眾生與陰異。 勒沙婆言：眾生與陰亦一亦異。 若提子言：眾生與陰非一非異一。 佛法內學，凡有三師。 犢子部言：實有眾生。 薩婆多部明無眾生。 訶梨所辨，世諦故有、真諦則無。 而成實論師用訶梨義，次有三說：如招提寺談公等，明眾生有體有用有名。 如開善智藏云「眾生無體，但有名用。 」光宅法雲師云「無體無用，唯有假名。 」今此品觀眾生，並巽此義，可同犢子實有，亦異薩婆多都無，具如文說，故以目品。 品開二章：第一淨名與文殊論於眾生、第二天女與身子次論眾生。 初文有兩：第一明化他行、次明自行。 化他行內，前觀眾生、次明四等。 初文：前問、次答。 「爾時文殊師利問維摩詰言：菩薩云何觀於眾生」。 文殊所以問者，上不思議無方妙用，蓋是化眾生之法。 聽者謂有眾生之可化，是故今明若實有眾生則不思議事不成，而眾生亦不可化。 今欲成能化所化，故問觀眾生。 「維摩詰言：譬如幻師，見所幻人。 菩薩觀眾生為若此」。 第二淨名答也。 眾生有二種：若外道橫計，則如十三入乃至無烟之火，畢竟無此眾生。 二者因緣假名眾生，非真實有，雖有非有、非有而有，故舉幻師觀幻之譬，如幻有非有、非有而有也。 問：亦得觀假名眾生如十三入畢竟空耶？ 答：假名雖有而畢竟非有，非有義邊亦得以此為喻。 然眾生雖畢竟非有、宛然而有，十三入喻則不得類然，故非全譬也。 此品觀眾生既如幻，上不思議乃至菩薩之疾並皆如幻。 「如智者見水中月、如鏡中見其面像、如熱時炎、如呼聲嚮、如空中雲、如水聚沫、如水上泡、如芭蕉堅、如電久住、如第五大、如第六陰、如第七情、如十三入、如十九界，菩薩觀眾生為若此」。 如鏡內像，不自不他，非無因有； 若是自有，應不待鏡； 若從他有，則不藉面生； 如其無因，則不假鏡面。 若謂都無，而宛然有像。 眾生之相，類於此也。 「如無色界色、如燋穀芽、如須陀洹身見、如阿那含入胎、如阿羅漢三毒、如得忍菩薩貪恚毀禁、如佛煩惱習、如盲者見色、如入滅定出入息、如空中鳥跡、如石女兒、如化人煩惱、如夢所見已寤、如滅度者受身、如無烟之火，菩薩觀眾生為若此」。 此等諸譬，皆是一類明空； 但滯有者多，故備舉之耳。 如無色界色者，大乘無色界有色，而言無色者，借小乘義為喻。 又大乘明上界無有麁色，借無麁為喻，故言無色耳。 依毘曇義，如那含入胎者，那含雖有暫退，必無經生，故無入欲界胎也。 如得忍菩薩貪恚毀禁者，貪恚毀禁，蓋是麁重煩惱。 《智度論》云「菩薩得無生忍，煩惱清淨，唯有餘習。 」令借無正使為喻也。 如入滅定出入息者，心馳動於內、息出入于外，心想既滅故息無出入也。 「文殊師利言：若菩薩作是觀者，云何行慈」。 此第二次明四等。 前觀眾生空，即是智慧； 今明四等，所謂功德。 又上是波若，今明大悲，即空悲二道。 《大品》云「菩薩住二法，魔不能壞。 一知諸法空、二不捨眾生」也。 就明四等，即為四段：今前辨慈，初問、次答。 問意云：慈本與眾生樂，若無眾生，慈心何所緣也？ 又既無眾生，亦無菩薩。 > In broad terms, to clarify the intent of the sūtra, there are generally two gates: first, the one who transforms; second, those who are transformed. The chapter "Inconceivable Liberation" discusses the teaching gate of the one who transforms; the chapter "Contemplating Sentient Beings" next clarifies those who are transformed. Furthermore, the chapter "Inconceivable Liberation" mostly clarifies provisional wisdom, and hence there is boundless wondrous function; the chapter "Contemplating Sentient Beings" mostly clarifies real wisdom, meaning that sentient beings are ultimately empty. These two wisdoms are the great cardinal principle of the sūtra, and therefore the various chapters extensively discuss these teachings. Moreover, the preceding chapter "Inquiring after Illness" states: "Because of ignorance there is craving, and thus my illness arises." This clarifies the root of the meaning of the transformer and the transformed. If one does not recognise sentient beings, one does not recognise the illness of sentient beings; if one does not recognise the illness of sentient beings, one also has not comprehended the illness of bodhisattvas. Therefore, one must properly recognise sentient beings, and then one fully understands both meanings; this explicates and develops the intent of the preceding chapter. As for what is called "contemplating sentient beings": "contemplation" is the name for discerning \[the nature of\] living beings. The phenomena of the five aggregates are called "multitude" (zhòng); they assemble to form a person, hence called "living/being" (shēng). Furthermore, receiving rebirth in multiple places is called "sentient being" (zhòngshēng). However, in explaining sentient beings, there is a difference between inner \[Buddhist\] and outer \[non-Buddhist traditions\]. Non-Buddhists maintain that sentient beings truly exist, and there are four views in all. The Sāṃkhyas say: "Sentient beings are identical with the aggregates." The Vaiśeṣikas say: "Sentient beings are different from the aggregates." The Nirgranthas say: "Sentient beings are both identical with and different from the aggregates." The Jñātīputras say: "Sentient beings are neither identical with nor different from the aggregates." Within Buddhist scholarship, there are three masters in all. The Vātsīputrīya school says: "Sentient beings truly exist." The Sarvāstivāda school clarifies that there are no sentient beings. Harivarman's distinction is that they exist in conventional truth, but do not exist in ultimate truth. The Tattvasiddhi-śāstra masters, adopting Harivarman's meaning, next hold three views: for example, Master Tan of Zhaoti Temple and others clarify that sentient beings have substance, have function, and have name. As Kaishan Zhizang states: "Sentient beings have no substance; they only have name and function." Master Guangzhai Fayun says: "They have neither substance nor function; there is only provisional designation." Now, in this chapter's contemplation of sentient beings, both \[extremes\] are avoided in this meaning: it may agree with the Vātsīputrīyas on real existence, yet also differ from the Sarvāstivādins on total nonexistence, fully as spoken in the text; hence it names the chapter. The chapter opens into two sections: first, Jingming and Mañjuśrī discuss sentient beings; second, the Devī and Śāriputra next discuss sentient beings. The first text has two parts: first, clarifying practice for transforming others; next, clarifying one's own practice. Within the practice for transforming others, first he contemplates sentient beings, and next clarifies the four immeasurables. In the first text: first is the question, next the answer. "At that time Mañjuśrī asked Vimalakīrti: 'How does a bodhisattva contemplate sentient beings?'" As for why Mañjuśrī asked: the preceding inconceivable, boundless wondrous function was merely the method for transforming sentient beings. Listeners might assume there are sentient beings who can be transformed; therefore it is now clarified that if sentient beings truly existed, the inconceivable matter would not be accomplished, and sentient beings also could not be transformed. Now, wishing to establish the transformer and the transformed, he asks about contemplating sentient beings. "Vimalakīrti said: 'Just as a magician sees the person created by magic, so does the bodhisattva contemplate sentient beings.'" This is the second \[part\], Jingming's answer. There are two kinds of sentient beings: if it is the arbitrary imputation of non-Buddhists, then like a thirteenth sense base or a fire without smoke, such sentient beings are ultimately nonexistent. Second are the conventionally designated sentient beings of causes and conditions; they are not truly existent: though existing, they do not exist; not existing, yet they exist. Therefore he brings up the simile of the magician observing a magical illusion: like an illusion, it exists yet does not exist, does not exist yet exists. Question: May one also contemplate conventionally designated sentient beings as ultimately empty like the thirteenth sense base? Answer: Although conventional designations exist, they are ultimately nonexistent; in terms of the meaning of nonexistence, one may also use this as an analogy. However, although sentient beings are ultimately nonexistent, they appear vividly as existent, whereas the simile of the thirteenth sense base cannot be categorized in that way; therefore it is not a complete simile. Since in this chapter the contemplation of sentient beings is like a magical illusion, the preceding inconceivable matters down to the bodhisattva's illness are all likewise like a magical illusion. "'Like a wise person seeing the moon in water; like seeing the reflection of one's face in a mirror; like a mirage in the heat; like the echo of a shout; like clouds in the sky; like foam gathered on water; like bubbles upon water; like the firmness of a plantain tree; like a flash of lightning abiding long; like a fifth great element; like a sixth aggregate; like a seventh sense faculty; like a thirteenth sense base; like a nineteenth realm—so does the bodhisattva contemplate sentient beings.'" Like the image in a mirror, it is neither from itself nor from another, nor does it exist without a cause: if it existed from itself, it should not depend on the mirror; if it existed from another, it would not arise relying on the face; if it were without a cause, it would not rely on mirror or face. If one says it does not exist at all, yet the image appears vividly. The marks of sentient beings are analogous to this. "'Like matter in the formless realm; like the sprout of scorched grain; like the view of self of a srotāpanna; like an anāgāmin entering the womb; like the three poisons of an arhat; like the greed, anger, and violation of precepts of a bodhisattva who has attained forbearance; like the residual defilements of a Buddha; like a blind person seeing sights; like inhalation and exhalation in the absorption of cessation; like the tracks of a bird in the sky; like the child of a barren woman; like the defilements of an emanated person; like that which was seen in a dream after having awakened; like receiving a body after having passed into extinction; like a fire without smoke—so does the bodhisattva contemplate sentient beings.'" These various similes are all of one kind, clarifying emptiness; but because those who cling to existence are numerous, he enumerates them exhaustively. As for "like matter in the formless realm": in the Mahāyāna, the formless realm does have matter, but to speak of "formless" borrows the Hīnayāna meaning as a simile. Moreover, the Mahāyāna clarifies that in the higher realms there is no coarse matter, and borrows the absence of coarse matter as a simile; hence it merely speaks of "formless". According to the Abhidharma, as for "like an anāgāmin entering the womb": although an anāgāmin may experience a temporary regression, they definitely do not pass through rebirth \[in the desire realm\], and therefore do not enter a womb of the desire realm. As for "like the greed, anger, and violation of precepts of a bodhisattva who has attained forbearance": greed, anger, and violation of precepts are coarse and heavy defilements. The Da zhidu lun states: "When a bodhisattva attains the forbearance of the non-arising of dharmas, their defilements are purified, and there are only residual traces." Now this borrows the absence of active defilements as a simile. As for "like inhalation and exhalation in the absorption of cessation": the mind races and stirs within, and the breath exhales and inhales without; since mental ideation is ceased, the breath has neither exhalation nor inhalation. "Mañjuśrī said: 'If the bodhisattva makes such a contemplation, how is loving-kindness to be practiced?'" This is the second \[part\], next clarifying the four immeasurables. Earlier, contemplating that sentient beings are empty is wisdom; now, clarifying the four immeasurables is what is called merit. Moreover, the preceding was prajñā, while now he clarifies great compassion: these are the two paths of emptiness and compassion. The Pañcaviṃśatisāhasrikā Prajñāpāramitā states: "When a bodhisattva abides in two dharmas, Māra cannot destroy them: first, knowing that all dharmas are empty; second, not abandoning sentient beings." With regard to clarifying the four immeasurables, there are four sections: now first he distinguishes loving-kindness, first questioning, then answering. The intent of the question says: loving-kindness originally gives joy to sentient beings; if there are no sentient beings, on what is the mind of loving-kindness conditioned? Furthermore, since there are no sentient beings, there is also no bodhisattva. > — English (machine translation) (machine translation) - [Previous: 5.2](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1781.5.2) - [Next: 5.3.2](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1781.5.3.2) - [Up: 5.3](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1781.5.3) ## Translations (1) - [English (machine translation)](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1781~en-mt.5.3.1) — English, machine translation ## Linked texts (1) - [維摩詰所說經](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.sanskrit.mahayanasutra.vimalakirtinirdesa*zh-kumarajiva.2.57) — Classical Chinese --- Source: [https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1781.5.3.1](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1781.5.3.1) · Pramāṇa