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# 請觀音經疏闡義鈔 1.58

請觀音經疏闡義鈔 1.58

- **Language:** Classical Chinese

### [1.58](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1801.1.58)

「中論所破」者，論云「諸法不自生，亦不從他生，不共不無因，是故說無生。」龍樹既破，那得如前四種執一？為是餘妄語乎？六十二見，謂我大色小、色大我小，即色是我、離色是我，四陰亦爾，三世五陰，總成六十。不離有無，故六十二，皆邊見攝。今於境智起四見者，實八十八使具起，略言邊見及三受耳。若具論者，隨執一句謂我知解此法，法中計我即身見，執初三二句墮有邊，執二四二句墮無邊，乃六十二見所攝，即邊見也。如此妄執不當道理，即邪見。執此是實計為涅槃，即見取。果盜謂此為道，依之進行，即戒取。因盜有三苦者，樂受有壞苦、苦受有苦苦、不苦不樂受有行苦。「樂受則愛」等者，謂執一種境智為是，若他讚歎，心則愛著生喜而心樂，即貪使。苦受者，若他違逆，則忿怒生瞋而心苦，即瞋使。不苦不樂，即不為毀讚，則在癡使等分，亦在三使中收。又我解此境智、他所不解，以其所執矜傲於人，即慢使。既執此為是，今雖不疑，後當大疑，即疑使。是則十使宛然，皆從所執境智上起。將此歷三界四諦，則有八十八使。就思惟歷三界，則有九十八使。今於五利略舉邊見、五鈍略明四分者，從要而言，以四句境智皆墮一邊，依此所執皆生三受，其相易見，故且明之。如向細論，備九十八，故下文云「知句句中九十八使，名識病也。」

> "That which is refuted in the Madhyamakaśāstra": the treatise states, "Dharmas do not arise from themselves, nor do they arise from another, neither from both nor without a cause; therefore they are said to be unarisen." Since Nāgārjuna has already refuted them, how could one hold to one of the four kinds of attachments as before? Would it be other false speech? The sixty-two views mean: the self is great and form is small; form is great and the self is small; form is the self; the self is apart from form. The four aggregates are also like this; across the five aggregates in the three time periods, they total sixty. Not departing from existence and non-existence, hence there are sixty-two, all subsumed under extreme views. Now, generating the four views regarding object and wisdom actually means the full arising of the eighty-eight entangling proclivities; they are stated briefly as extreme views and the three feelings. If fully discussed: whenever one clings to any proposition, claiming "I know and understand this dharma," reckoning a self within dharmas is the view of a self; clinging to the first and third propositions falls into the extreme of existence; clinging to the second and fourth propositions falls into the extreme of non-existence; they are subsumed under the sixty-two views, which are extreme views. Clinging falsely like this without conforming to correct principle is wrong view. Clinging to this as real and reckoning it to be nirvāṇa is clinging to views. Grasping at the result, claiming this to be the path and practicing according to it, is clinging to rules and vows. Grasping at the cause has three sufferings: pleasant feeling has the suffering of decay; painful feeling has the suffering of suffering itself; neither-painful-nor-pleasant feeling has the suffering of conditioning. "Pleasant feeling then brings craving" and so forth means that when clinging to one kind of object and wisdom as correct, if another praises it, the mind becomes attached, generating joy and delight; this is the proclivity of greed. Painful feeling: if another opposes it, one becomes indignant and generates anger, so the mind suffers; this is the proclivity of anger. Neither painful nor pleasant: that is, when neither criticized nor praised, it is in the proclivity of delusion and the equal portions, which are also included within the three proclivities. Furthermore, "I understand this object and wisdom, others do not understand it"—feeling arrogant toward others based on what one clings to is the proclivity of conceit. Having clung to this as correct, though one does not doubt now, one will have great doubt later; this is the proclivity of doubt. Thus the ten proclivities are distinctly present, all arising from the clung-to object and wisdom. Applying these across the three realms and four noble truths yields the eighty-eight proclivities. In terms of contemplation applied across the three realms, there are ninety-eight proclivities. Now, among the five sharp ones, briefly citing extreme views, and among the five dull ones, briefly elucidating the four divisions, is speaking from the essentials: because the object and wisdom of the four propositions all fall to one extreme, and based on this clinging all three feelings arise, their marks are easy to perceive, so they are provisionally elucidated. If examined in detail as above, they are fully ninety-eight; hence the text below states: "Knowing the ninety-eight proclivities in each and every proposition is called recognizing the sickness."  
> — English (machine translation) (machine translation)

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## Translations (1)

- [English (machine translation)](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1801~en-mt.1.58) — English, machine translation

## Linked texts (1)

- [觀音玄義](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1726.1.59) — Classical Chinese

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Source: [https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1801.1.58](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1801.1.58) · Pramāṇa
