[Pramāṇa](https://indike.org/pramana/) › [Indian literature](https://indike.org/pramana/in) › [Buddhist Literature](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha) › [Taishō Tripiṭaka (Chinese Buddhist canon)](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho) › [四分比丘戒本疏](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1807) › 1.28 # 四分比丘戒本疏 1.28 四分比丘戒本疏 1.28 - **Language:** Classical Chinese ### [1.28](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1807.1.28) 第三、殺人戒，文有七句：一、容犯人。二、「故」者，發業心，即是殺心也，簡誤殺者無發業心而全無罪。三、「自手斷」，辨所發業方便究竟也。四、「人命」者，所損之境，唯是人趣。就報勝中，酸楚捨命為障尤深；諸天捨命非極酸楚，又以希故不犯重罪。五、「持刀」已下，所發業中差別門也。前辨自殺義不盡故，故須別明。就中有兩：一持刀與人。此有兩義：一者知他病人自厭身命，以愚教心自謂行慈，持刀與之令其自殺。以此例知，與匪宜樂及飲食等，及非病人知來往處迮路之中安坑塪等，一切皆犯。二者持刀與所使人往殺某甲。以此例知，與墮胎藥等，一切悉犯。二、「歎舉死快勸死乃至寧死不生」者，勸他自厭令其自殺。三、「作如是心乃至勸死」者，總結殺心起異方便。方便多種，不可具陳，故云種種。此戒即是別緣具五：一、所損境，即第四句人命是也。《五分律》云「若人若似人」。似人者，入胎四十九日，自是已後盡名為人。《四分律》云「人者，從初識至後識，而斷其命。」初識即是創入胎識，後識即是命終時識。二、緣所損境，即是人想。但作人想，無問張王男女差別。其成罪境即所損境，緣成罪境即是人想，無別境想。三、發業心，是即第二句殺心。四、方便業，五、究竟業，即第三第五句，謂命根已斷。對此廣明殺母、殺父、殺阿羅漢得逆及夷，殺非人變畜得蘭等，無暇繁敘。「殺畜得提」下別有戒，不須此明。第六結罪、第七永驅，可知。對此戒中略辨境想，總詳律文。境想有三：一者、殺戒境想，如律文云「人作人想，殺，波羅夷。人，疑，偷蘭遮。人，非人想，殺，偷蘭遮。非人，人想，殺，偷蘭遮。非人，疑，偷蘭遮。」二者、婬酒境想，五句准前。然第二疑句、第三想句，並結究竟，以深防制，不隨心輕也。三者、盜戒境想，但有四句：一者、有主，有主想，五錢過五錢，波羅夷。二、有主，疑，偷蘭。三、無主，有主想，蘭。四、無主，疑，蘭。准前殺戒闕第三句。何以然者？解云：一切境想總有二類。一者、輕重相對。如殺五句，上三對人是重犯境，隨心差別遂成夷蘭；下二非人是輕犯境，亦隨心別故成蘭罪。即是約境重輕相對。二者、犯不犯相對。如盜戒中有主即犯，無主不犯，兩相對也。就此二類辨句多少者，若據盡理，二類悉應具足五句。今據別理，故有多少。謂若殺戒無第三者，恐漏有犯。若其盜戒有第三者，濫治無犯也。且如殺戒恐漏有犯者，以第三句人非人想，有其兩義：一者、方便殺人。本起人相，臨殺之時方乃轉為非人想殺。其未轉前人邊蘭罪，便是殺人戒宗所收，得因蘭罪，故文即結偷蘭遮罪。轉想之後作非人想，非人之上應得吉羅，非殺人宗，故隱不說。二者、欲殺非人，被人來替，緣於人境作非人想。此雖亦名人非人想，乃是非人被人境差，唯非人上得因吉羅。此罪唯是殺非人宗，望殺人宗全無此句。今兩義中，若從後義闕第三者，即漏前義殺人宗罪，故從前義立第三句不漏其罪。次明盜戒恐治無犯故闕第三者，謂若第三云有主作無主想者，亦有兩義：一者、本擬盜有主物，先時進趣作有主想，臨離處時方乃轉為無主物想。其未轉前主邊蘭罪，即是盜宗，轉想之後即全無罪。二者、本來發意欲取無主之物，乃被主物來替其處，緣此以作無主物想，此雖亦名有主作無主想，此義唯是不犯宗收。今兩義中，若從前義立第三者，即恐濫治後義不犯，故不立也。若據盡理，應從前義立第三句，如房戒中處分作不處分想者，是盡理也。故盡理說，二類諸戒悉應具五。然此二類，如殺戒中人與非人重輕相對，亦得更就有情無情犯不犯對。於盜戒中有主無主，亦得更就人主非人主重輕相對也。若處分不處分對等定，更不得轉就重輕也。一切諸戒隨准應知，極為盡理。 > Third, the precept against killing human beings: the text has seven phrases. First, the person capable of committing the offence. Second, 'intentionally' is the volition initiating the act (cetanā), which is the intention to kill; this excludes someone who kills by mistake, who lacks this initiating volition and is entirely free of offence. Third, 'with his own hands terminating' distinguishes the preparatory and consummatory acts initiated. Fourth, 'human life' is the object of harm, which is strictly the human realm. Among the superior states of rebirth, giving up life in agony and grief creates an especially grave obstruction \[to the Path\]; gods giving up life do not experience extreme agony and grief, and because this is rare, \[killing them\] does not constitute a grave offence. Fifth, from 'taking a sword' onward presents distinctions among the initiated acts. Because the preceding explanation of killing by oneself was not exhaustive, a separate clarification is required. Within this there are two: First, taking a sword and giving it to someone else. This has two meanings: (1) Knowing that another sick person loathes their own physical life, out of a foolish and misguided intention one considers oneself to be practicing compassion and gives them a sword to let them commit suicide. By this analogy, one should know that giving unsuitable medicine, food, or drink, or placing pits and traps in narrow roads where non-sick persons are known to pass—all such acts incur an offence. (2) Giving a sword to an emissary to go kill so-and-so. By this analogy, one should know that giving abortifacient drugs, etc., are all offences. Second, 'praising the delight of death, inciting death, up to \[saying\] it is better to die than to live' means inciting the other to loathe themselves and commit suicide. Third, 'having such a mind, up to inciting death' summarizes the killer's intention in undertaking various preparatory means. The preparatory means are of many kinds and cannot be described in full; hence it says 'various'. In this precept, the specific conditions are five: 1. The object of harm, namely human life in the fourth phrase. The Mahīśāsaka-vinaya says: 'A human or a human-like creature.' A human-like creature means from the forty-ninth day after entering the womb; from then on all are called humans. The Dharmaguptaka-vinaya says: 'A human being is one from the first consciousness to the last consciousness whose life is terminated.' The first consciousness is the consciousness upon initial entry into the womb; the last consciousness is the consciousness at the time of death. 2. The mental state regarding the object of harm, which is the perception of a human being. So long as one forms the perception of a human being, it does not matter whether it is Zhang or Wang, male or female. The object constituting the offence is identical to the object of harm, and the mental state regarding the object constituting the offence is the perception of a human being, with no other object or perception. 3. The volition initiating the act, namely the intention to kill in the second phrase. 4. The preparatory act. 5. The consummatory act, namely the third and fifth phrases, meaning the life-faculty has already been severed. In contrast to this, the extensive explanations of killing one's mother, killing one's father, or killing an arhat incurring \[an offence of\] immediate retribution (ānantarya) as well as a pārājika, or killing a non-human or a transformed animal incurring a sthūlātyaya, etc., are omitted here to avoid prolixity. 'Killing an animal incurs a prāyaścittika' is treated in a separate precept below, and need not be clarified here. The sixth \[phrase\], the determination of the offence, and the seventh, permanent expulsion, are understandable. In relation to this precept, let us briefly distinguish object and perception (saṃjñā), examining the Vinaya text as a whole. There are three kinds of object-perception paradigms: First, the object-perception paradigm for the precept against killing. As the Vinaya text says: 'A human being, perceiving them to be a human being, kills them: pārājika. A human being, doubtful: sthūlātyaya. A human being, perceiving them to be a non-human, kills them: sthūlātyaya. A non-human, perceiving them to be a human being, kills them: sthūlātyaya. A non-human, doubtful: sthūlātyaya.' Second, the object-perception paradigm for sexual misconduct and alcohol: the five phrases correspond to the above. However, both the second clause on doubt and the third clause on \[mistaken\] perception are judged as consummated \[offences\], in order to strictly guard against and prohibit them, without lightening \[the penalty\] according to \[the state of\] mind. Third, the object-perception paradigm for the precept against theft has only four phrases: 1. Having an owner, perceiving it to have an owner, five coins or exceeding five coins: pārājika. 2. Having an owner, doubtful: sthūlātyaya. 3. Having no owner, perceiving it to have an owner: sthūlātyaya. 4. Having no owner, doubtful: sthūlātyaya. Compared with the preceding killing precept, it lacks the third phrase. Why is this so? The explanation is: All object-perception paradigms fall into two general types. The first is the opposition between grave and light. As in the five phrases of killing, the upper three concerning human beings are objects of grave offences, where depending on the difference in mental state they result in pārājika or sthūlātyaya; the lower two concerning non-humans are objects of light offences, where also depending on the difference in mental state they result in sthūlātyaya offences. This is the opposition between grave and light with respect to the object. The second is the opposition between offence and non-offence. As in the theft precept, having an owner constitutes an offence, while having no owner does not constitute an offence; these two stand in opposition. Distinguishing the number of clauses within these two types: according to the ultimate principle, both types should possess the full five clauses. Here, based on a specific rationale, there are more or fewer. That is to say, if the precept against killing lacked the third clause, it would risk overlooking an offence. If the precept against theft included the third clause, it would mistakenly penalize what is not an offence. For example, regarding the precept against killing risking the omission of an offence: the third clause, 'a human being, perceiving them to be a non-human', has two meanings: (1) Undertaking preparatory means to kill a human. Originally forming the perception of a human, only at the moment of killing does one turn to the perception of a non-human and kill. The sthūlātyaya offence regarding the human before the shift in perception falls under the primary purview of the precept against killing, resulting in a preparatory sthūlātyaya offence; therefore, the text records it as a sthūlātyaya offence. After the shift in perception, regarding the non-human one ought to incur a duṣkṛta, but because that does not fall under the primary purview of killing human beings, it is suppressed and not mentioned. (2) Wishing to kill a non-human, but a human takes their place, so that regarding the human object one forms the perception of a non-human. Although this is also called 'a human being, perceiving them to be a non-human', it is actually that the non-human was displaced by a human object, so that one incurs only a preparatory duṣkṛta regarding the non-human. This offence belongs solely to the purview of killing non-humans; regarding the purview of killing humans, this clause does not apply at all. Now, between these two meanings, if one were to omit the third clause following the latter meaning, one would overlook the primary offence of killing humans in the former meaning; therefore, following the former meaning, the third clause is established so as not to overlook the offence. Next, explaining why the precept against theft omits the third clause to avoid penalizing what is not an offence: if the third clause were to say 'having an owner, perceiving it to have no owner', it also has two meanings: (1) Originally intending to steal property with an owner, initially proceeding with the perception of it having an owner, only at the moment of removal from its place does one turn to perceiving it as property without an owner. The sthūlātyaya offence regarding the owner prior to the shift in perception belongs to the purview of theft; after the shift in perception, there is entirely no offence. (2) Originally intending to take property without an owner, but property with an owner took its place, so that regarding it one formed the perception of property without an owner. Although this is also called 'having an owner, perceiving it to have no owner', this case falls strictly under the purview of non-offence. Now, between these two meanings, if one established the third clause following the former meaning, one would risk mistakenly penalizing the latter meaning of non-offence; therefore, it is not established. If speaking according to the ultimate principle, one should establish the third clause following the former meaning, just as in the lodging precept where 'designated, perceiving it as not designated' reflects the ultimate principle. Therefore, speaking according to the ultimate principle, all precepts under both types should possess the five clauses. However, regarding these two types, just as in the killing precept 'human and non-human' represent the opposition between grave and light, it can also be treated as the opposition between sentient and insentient, or offence and non-offence. In the theft precept, 'having an owner and lacking an owner' can also be treated as the opposition between grave and light regarding human owners versus non-human owners. If the opposition between 'designated and non-designated' is fixed, it cannot be shifted to grave versus light. All precepts should be understood by analogy with this, which is extremely thorough. > — English (machine translation) (machine translation) - [Previous: 1.27](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1807.1.27) - [Next: 1.29](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1807.1.29) - [Up: 1](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1807.1) ## Translations (1) - [English (machine translation)](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1807~en-mt.1.28) — English, machine translation --- Source: [https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1807.1.28](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1807.1.28) · Pramāṇa