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# 菩薩戒義疏 2.4

菩薩戒義疏 2.4

- **Language:** Classical Chinese

### [2.4](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1811.2.4)

文為三別：先標人，謂「若佛子」；第二、序事，謂中間所列；三、結罪，名波羅夷。就序事有三：一、不應，二、應，三、結。就不應中三別：初六句明殺事，次有四句成業，後一句舉輕況重。初六者：一、自殺，謂自害他命，凡三種法：內色、外色、內外色，並皆犯也。二、教他，他亦是殺。《大論》云：口教是殺罪，非作瘡。律部分別，甚多條緒，教他、遣使等。三、方便殺者，即殺前方便，所謂束縛繫等。四、讚歎殺，亦得罪也。五、隨喜者，獎勸令命斷，亦犯也。六、呪殺，謂毘陀羅等，雖假餘緣，亦皆同犯。律中明殺十五種，謂優多、頭多、𣚦、弦、撥、毘陀羅等，如律部廣明云云。「殺業」已下三重中，第二、成業之相也。三業成殺：自動用者，正身業也；教他及呪，口業造身業；心念欲殺，鬼神自宣遂者，意業造身業也。三階於緣中造作，皆是業義。殺法，謂刀劍坑𣚦等，皆有法體，故稱為法。殺因殺緣者，親疎二塗，正因殺心為因，餘者助成故為緣。親者，造作來果為業。四者，一是眾生，二、眾生想，三、殺害，四、命斷。一是眾生者，眾生雖多，大為三品。一者上品，謂諸佛、聖人、父母、師僧，害則犯逆。三果人兩解，一云同逆，以聲聞害時，已是重中之重故。二云犯重，《大經》明三種殺，殺三果人，但入中殺，不在上殺，故知非逆。菩薩人，以取解行已上，《大經》云「畢定菩薩」，同上科。今取不作二乘，為畢定位，或取七心已上，皆可為斷也。養胎母，一云無逆，二云犯逆，大士之重，重於聲聞也。中品，即人天害心犯重。三、下品，四趣也。兩解，一云同重，大士防殺嚴重，故文云「一切有命不得殺」，即其證也。二云但犯輕垢，在重戒中兼制，以非道器故。文云「有命者」，舉輕況重耳。三、殺心有兩：一、自身殺心，二、教他殺心。自身殺心有二：一、通心，二、隔心。通心者，如漫作坑𣚦，漫燒煮等，通三性皆犯。若緣此為彼，於彼上起害心，皆屬通心。既自對境，又命不復續，雖所為不稱，悉皆正犯。隔心者，作坑止為此，無心在彼，彼死亦犯，彼邊不遂輕垢。若此路本是此道，眾人行往，今作坑止為此，而彼死亦重。以此殺具，體能通害，以具緣心，還屬通心也。若本斫東人，誤中西人，中西人上，都無殺心，此屬隔心。四、命根斷有兩時：一、此生，二、後生。此生有二句：一、有戒時犯重，二、無戒時斷，當戒去時，結不遂輕垢。命斷時，結罪同前。聲聞臨終時未結，聲聞捨具戒，作五戒等結也。後生為戒自復兩種：一、自憶，二、不自憶。自憶者，若任前勢、若更加方便，命斷坐重，以前後皆自憶故。不自憶者，若任勢死犯重，已死時有戒故。若加方便當知前瘡不死，後方便時不憶但犯輕垢也。而言命根者，數論別有非色心為命根，《成論》及大乘無別非色非心為命根也，秖取色心連持相續不斷為命耳。《大論》亦然，六入六識得相續生，假名為命。乃至「一切有命」下，第三、舉輕況重。「是菩薩」下，第二階明應，有三句：一、常住慈悲心。兩解：一云應學常住佛起慈悲，二云心恒應常住慈悲之地。二、孝順心，秉戒不惱他。三、方便救護，非直爾不惱，乃應涉事救解。「而恣心」下，第三、結，不應故成罪。亦三句：一、恣心，謂貪心殺；二、快意，謂瞋心殺；三、殺生，謂舉殺事。有此三故墮不如意罪。

> The text has three distinct parts: first, designating the person, namely “if a child of the Buddha”; second, narrating the matter, namely what is listed in between; third, determining the offense, designated as pārājika. Under narrating the matter there are three points: first, what one should not do; second, what one should do; third, the concluding determination. Under what one should not do, there are three subdivisions: the first six phrases clarify acts of killing; the next four phrases constitute the karma; the final phrase cites the minor to illustrate the grave. Regarding the first six: First, killing oneself, which means harming the life of another with one's own body. There are three kinds of dharmas: internal form, external form, and internal-external form; all incur the infraction. Second, instructing another: instructing another is also killing. The Dàzhìdù lùn states: “Verbal instruction is an offense of killing, not the inflicting of a wound.” The Vinaya section distinguishes very many lines of causation: instructing another, sending an emissary, and so forth. Third, killing by expedient means: that is, expedients prior to killing, such as binding, tying up, and the like. Fourth, praising killing: this also incurs an offense. Fifth, rejoicing along with \[killing\]: encouraging and urging so as to cause life to be severed; this also incurs an infraction. Sixth, killing by spells: namely vetāla, and so forth; although relying on other conditions, all equally incur the infraction. The Vinaya clarifies fifteen kinds of killing: ud-, doṣa-, pit, bowstring, bow, vetāla, and so on, as explained extensively in the Vinaya section, and so forth. From “karma of killing” onward is the second of the three strata, the characteristics of the constitution of karma. Three karmas constitute killing: moving and acting of oneself is properly bodily karma; instructing another and chanting spells are vocal karma producing bodily karma; intending in mind to kill, whereupon ghosts and spirits themselves proclaim and carry it out, is mental karma producing bodily karma. Acting across the three stages toward conditions is in all cases the meaning of karma. As for methods of killing, namely knives, swords, pits, stakes, and the like, all possess a phenomenal entity; hence they are called methods. As for the causes of killing and the conditions of killing, these are the two paths of direct and indirect: the primary cause is the intention to kill acting as cause; the others, which aid and accomplish it, are conditions. The direct is the action that produces the future fruit as karma. As for the four \[factors\]: first, it is a sentient being; second, the recognition of it as a sentient being; third, the act of killing; fourth, the severance of life. First, “it is a sentient being”: although sentient beings are many, they broadly fall into three grades. The first is the superior grade, namely Buddhas, sages, parents, and preceptors and teachers; harming them incurs an anantarya. Regarding persons of the three fruits, there are two interpretations: one says it is equivalent to an anantarya, because when a śrāvaka harms them, it is already the gravest among the grave; the second says it incurs a major offense, because the Mahāparinirvāṇa-sūtra clarifies three kinds of killing, and killing persons of the three fruits enters only medium killing, not superior killing, hence we know it is not an anantarya. As for bodhisattvas, taking those of the stage of understanding-and-practice and above, the Mahāparinirvāṇa-sūtra calls them “definitely determined bodhisattvas,” matching the superior category. Here, taking those who do not act as the two vehicles as the stage of definite determination, or taking those of the seventh mind and above, all may be determined as such. For a mother nursing an embryo: one says there is no anantarya; another says it incurs an anantarya, for the gravity of the mahāsattva is graver than that of the śrāvaka. The medium grade is humans and devas: harming them with harmful intent incurs a major offense. Third, the inferior grade is the four miserable destinies. There are two interpretations: one says it is equally a major offense, for the mahāsattva guards against killing with extreme gravity, hence the text says “all that possess life must not be killed,” which is the proof for this; the second says it only incurs a minor defilement infraction, being prohibited concurrently within the major precept because \[such creatures\] are not vessels of the path; when the text says “those possessing life,” it merely cites the minor to illustrate the grave. Third, the intention to kill is twofold: first, the intention to kill by oneself; second, the intention to kill by instructing another. The intention to kill by oneself is twofold: first, an inclusive intention; second, an exclusive intention. As for an inclusive intention: such as digging pits or setting stakes at random, or burning and boiling indiscriminately; extending across the three natures, all incur an infraction. If one targets this for the sake of that, and gives rise to a harmful intention regarding that, all belong to an inclusive intention. Since one has personally faced the object and life is not continued, even if the result did not correspond to what was undertaken, all properly incur the infraction. As for an exclusive intention: digging a pit solely for this one, with no intention regarding that one; if that one dies, it also incurs an infraction, but on that side, failing to fulfill the intention incurs a minor defilement infraction. If this road was originally a thoroughfare travelled by many people, and one now digs a pit solely for this person, yet that other person dies, it is also a major offense. Because this instrument of killing is by its nature capable of harming generally, by taking the instrument to condition the intention, it still belongs to an inclusive intention. If one originally struck at a person in the east but mistakenly hit a person in the west, having no intention to kill directed at the person in the west, this belongs to an exclusive intention. Fourth, the severance of the life faculty occurs at two times: first, in this life; second, in a future life. In this life, there are two propositions: first, committing a major offense when one possesses the precepts; second, life is severed when one lacks the precepts; when the precept is lost, it is determined as an unfulfilled minor defilement infraction; when life is severed, the offense determined is the same as before. In the case of a śrāvaka, at the point of death it is not yet determined; when the śrāvaka relinquishes the complete precepts, it is determined as the five precepts and so forth. In a future life, regarding the precepts, there are again two kinds: first, remembering oneself; second, not remembering oneself. As for remembering oneself: whether relying on the momentum of the previous act or adding further expedient means, if life is severed one sits in a major offense, because one remembers oneself before and after. As for not remembering oneself: if the person dies relying on the momentum \[of the first act\], one incurs a major offense, because at the time of death one possessed the precepts; if one added an expedient, one should know that the previous wound did not cause death, and since one did not remember at the time of the subsequent expedient, one only incurs a minor defilement infraction. As for what is called the life faculty: the Sarvāstivāda Abhidharma posits a distinct life faculty that is neither form nor mind; the \*Satyasiddhi-śāstra\* and the Mahāyāna have no distinct entity that is neither form nor mind as the life faculty, but merely take the continuous holding together and unbroken succession of form and mind to be life. The Dàzhìdù lùn is also like this: the six sense-bases and six consciousnesses being able to arise in succession is designated by the provisional name 'life'. Down to “all that possess life,” this is the third: citing the minor to illustrate the grave. From “this bodhisattva” downward is the second stage, clarifying what one should do, which has three phrases: first, a constantly abiding mind of loving-kindness and compassion. There are two interpretations: one says that one should emulate the constantly abiding Buddha in giving rise to loving-kindness and compassion; the second says that the mind must constantly abide on the ground of loving-kindness and compassion. Second, a mind of filial obedience, upholding the precepts without harassing others. Third, saving and protecting through expedient means: not merely abstaining from harassment, but actively engaging in affairs to rescue and liberate. From “yet with unrestrained mind” downward is the third part: the conclusion, where acting contrary to what one should constitutes the offense. It also has three phrases: first, “unrestrained mind,” meaning killing out of greed; second, “gratified will,” meaning killing out of anger; third, “killing living beings,” meaning citing the act of killing. Possessing these three causes one to fall into the offense of unpleasantness.  
> — English (machine translation) (machine translation)

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## Translations (1)

- [English (machine translation)](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1811~en-mt.2.4) — English, machine translation

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Source: [https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1811.2.4](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1811.2.4) · Pramāṇa
