[Pramāṇa](https://indike.org/pramana/) › [Indian literature](https://indike.org/pramana/in) › [Buddhist Literature](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha) › [Taishō Tripiṭaka (Chinese Buddhist canon)](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho) › [金剛般若論會釋](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1816) › 3.60 # 金剛般若論會釋 3.60 金剛般若論會釋 3.60 - **Language:** Classical Chinese ### [3.60](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1816.3.60) 無著論初解如何不分別中，初、問起指答，次、正解經文。解經文中有三，初、牒經配屬，次、問答正解，後、如是觀察下，結通方便，以何方便，亦通用此問答故。問答正解中，初、問意言，云何顯示如所不分別？寧佛雖說凡夫有我、人等見，知諸見體空，不應如佛所說起執有分別，若爾，何故佛說凡夫有我、人見等？論釋云，「如外道說我，如來說為我見，故安置人無我」。故經云，「如愚所分別，外境實皆無，習氣擾濁心，故似彼而轉」。佛為破凡夫、外道說有我故，佛說凡夫但有執我妄見，實無有我，即《厚嚴經》云，為對遣愚夫所執實我、法故，於識所變假說我、法名。今顯佛說所執我無，但假說有彼我見故，與彼義同。佛說凡夫有我見者，且為成立人無我理，內凡、二乘聞佛說凡夫有我、人等見，復執佛說有我、人等見，此是法執。佛今於此般若經中，總破凡夫、二乘諸見分別，顯諸見體空，故問善現。論釋此問意云，佛為凡夫、二乘，說有我見，欲明我見體空，顯法無我，故作此問。《成唯識》云，為入我空，說六二法。復《唯識論二十》云，依此教能入數取趣無我；所執法無我，復依餘教入法空。如是等文皆同此說。答文有三，初、直答，次、却徵，後、引佛說釋。佛前於施設大利中，說我想即非我相故，彼執佛說我見，非正語也。何故佛說我見等即非見者，論云，「若有彼我見，是見所攝」，言若執有我見，還是法執見攝，障入相應三昧故，佛教觀我見等即非見也。故世親論云，「見我即不見，無實虛妄見，此是微細障，見真如遠離」，此顯執我之見本不見我，以無實體，但妄見故，我見無體。然法見亦爾，以證如時不見二我，此微細障便得遠離，故知此二見說名不見。彼論之意，舉生類法，說即非見，故配此文，讀者應悉。論第三文，結通方便意云，先以聞、思、修慧，推我見體本空，不起諸見分別，始得入相應三昧，故云即此觀察為入方便。 > In Asaṅga's treatise, in the initial explanation of how there is non-conceptualisation, first questions are raised to point to the answers, and next the sūtra text is properly explained. Within the explanation of the sūtra text there are three parts: first, citing the sūtra and assigning its references; second, the proper explanation through questions and answers; and afterward, from "observing in this manner" onward, concluding with the shared expedient means, because whichever expedient means \[is used\], it also applies through these questions and answers. Within the proper explanation through questions and answers, first, the meaning of the question says: how does one reveal non-conceptualising in accordance with reality? Why is it that, although the Buddha said ordinary beings have views of a self, a person, and so forth, knowing that the essence of all views is empty, one should not give rise to grasping and conceptualisation according to what the Buddha said? If so, why did the Buddha say that ordinary beings have views of a self, a person, and so forth? The treatise explains: "Just as non-Buddhists speak of a self, the Tathāgata speaks of the view of a self, and thereby establishes the selflessness of persons." Hence a sūtra says: "Just as fools conceptualise, / external objects are in reality entirely absent; / latent tendencies agitate the defiled mind, / which therefore operates resembling them." Because the Buddha wished to refute ordinary beings and non-Buddhists who speak of having a self, the Buddha said that ordinary beings merely have the false view of grasping a self, while in reality there is no self. This is just as the Ghanavyūha-sūtra says: in order to counteract and dispel the real self and dharmas grasped by foolish beings, names of self and dharmas are conventionally designated for what is transformed by consciousness. Here it reveals that the grasped self spoken of by the Buddha does not exist, and he merely conventionally speaks of having that view of a self; thus it accords with that meaning. The Buddha's stating that ordinary beings have a view of a self is temporarily to establish the principle of the selflessness of persons; when internal ordinary beings and the two vehicles hear the Buddha say that ordinary beings have views of a self, a person, and so forth, they again grasp that the Buddha spoke of having views of a self, a person, and so forth, which is grasping at dharmas. The Buddha now, in this Prajñāpāramitā Sūtra, comprehensively refutes all conceptualisations of views by ordinary beings and the two vehicles, revealing that the essence of all views is empty, and therefore questions Subhūti. The treatise explains the intention of this question, saying: the Buddha spoke of having a view of a self for the sake of ordinary beings and the two vehicles; wishing to clarify that the essence of the view of a self is empty and to reveal the selflessness of phenomena, he therefore raised this question. The Cheng weishi lun says: in order to enter into the emptiness of self, the twelve bases are taught. Furthermore, the Treatise in Twenty Verses on Consciousness-Only says: relying on this teaching, one can enter into the selflessness of the pudgala; relying on other teachings, one enters into the selflessness of dharmas and the emptiness of dharmas regarding grasped dharmas. Passages such as these are all identical to this explanation. There are three parts to the answer: first, a direct answer; second, an interrogation in return; and later, citing the Buddha's words to explain. Because the Buddha previously, in "establishing great benefit", stated that the mark of a self is precisely no mark of a self, their grasping that the Buddha spoke of a view of a self is not correct speech. Why does the Buddha say that the view of a self and so forth are precisely not views? The treatise says: "If there were that view of a self, it would be subsumed under views." This means that if one grasps that there is a view of a self, it is still subsumed under views of grasping at dharmas, which obstructs entry into the concordant samādhi; therefore the Buddha teaches one to contemplate that the view of a self and so forth are precisely not views. Hence Vasubandhu's treatise says: "Seeing a self is precisely not seeing; / it is an unreal, false seeing. / This is a subtle obstruction; / seeing suchness, it is far removed." This reveals that the view grasping a self fundamentally does not see a self, because it lacks a real entity and is merely a false seeing; thus the view of a self lacks an entity. The view of dharmas is also like this: because when realizing suchness one does not see the two selves, this subtle obstruction is then far removed; therefore one knows that these two views are called "not seeing". The intention of that treatise is to bring up classes of phenomena and say that they are precisely not views; thus it matches this text, which readers should understand. The third text of the treatise concludes with the shared expedient means, meaning: first, through the wisdoms of hearing, reflection, and cultivation, one deduces that the essence of the view of a self is fundamentally empty, and does not give rise to conceptualisations of any views; only then can one enter into the concordant samādhi. Therefore it says, "precisely this observation serves as the expedient means of entry." > — English (machine translation) (machine translation) - [Previous: 3.59](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1816.3.59) - [Next: 3.61](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1816.3.61) - [Up: 3](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1816.3) ## Translations (1) - [English (machine translation)](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1816~en-mt.3.60) — English, machine translation ## Linked texts (3) - [金剛般若經旨贊](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.2735.2.241) — Classical Chinese - [御注金剛般若波羅蜜經宣演](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.2733.2.217) — Classical Chinese - [金剛般若波羅蜜經論](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.sanskrit.prajnaparamita.vajracchedika!vajracchedikaprajnaparamitasutrasastra*zh-bodhiruci.3.68) — Classical Chinese --- Source: [https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1816.3.60](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1816.3.60) · Pramāṇa