[Pramāṇa](https://indike.org/pramana/) › [Indian literature](https://indike.org/pramana/in) › [Buddhist Literature](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha) › [Taishō Tripiṭaka (Chinese Buddhist canon)](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho) › [俱舍論記](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1821) › 19.167 # 俱舍論記 19.167 俱舍論記 19.167 - **Language:** Classical Chinese ### [19.167](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1821.19.167) 「身邊二見至他有情故」者，釋第二、第三句。欲身、邊見及相應癡亦無記性。所以者何？與善相違名為不善，此我、常見與彼施等不相違故。執我、常者，恐此常、我當來受苦，為此常、我於當來世受人、天樂，現在勤修布施、持戒及靜慮等，執斷邊見隨順涅槃，能斷滅故。故世尊說於諸外道諸見趣中此斷見最勝。趣，謂趣求。謂我不有，我所亦不有。執我、我所現在已無，以於身中求之不得，謂為已斷。我當不有、我所當不有，執我、我所死後方無。又解：前之二句執我、我所，與現在身死時俱斷。後之二句執我、我所，於未來世畢竟不生。由順涅槃，故非不善。又身、邊二見迷自事故、非欲逼害他有情故，其過是輕，故是無記。 > As for "The two views of self and extreme ... other sentient beings": This explains the second and third lines. The view of self, the view of extreme, and their associated delusion in the desire realm are also of the indeterminate nature. Why is this? That which is contrary to the wholesome is called unwholesome, and these views of self and permanence are not contrary to giving and the like. Those who hold to a self and permanence fear that this permanent self will suffer pain in the future, and for the sake of this permanent self experiencing human and heavenly bliss in future lives, they diligently cultivate giving, observing precepts, dhyāna, and so on in the present; those holding to the extreme view of annihilation accord with nirvāṇa because it is an eradication. Therefore, the World-Honoured One said that among all the view-destinations of non-Buddhists, this annihilationist view is the foremost. "Destination" means what is sought after. That is: 'I do not exist, and mine does not exist.' One holds that the self and what belongs to the self are already non-existent in the present, because seeking them within the body they cannot be found, and one considers them already eradicated. 'I shall not exist, and mine shall not exist'—one holds that the self and what belongs to the self will only be non-existent after death. Another explanation: The first two phrases hold that the self and what belongs to the self are both eradicated at the time the present body dies. The latter two phrases hold that the self and what belongs to the self will definitely not arise in future lives. Because it accords with nirvāṇa, it is not unwholesome. Furthermore, the two views of self and extreme are confused only about one's own affairs and do not seek to torment other sentient beings; their fault is light, and therefore they are indeterminate. > — English (machine translation) (machine translation) - [Previous: 19.166](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1821.19.166) - [Next: 19.168](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1821.19.168) - [Up: 19](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1821.19) ## Translations (1) - [English (machine translation)](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1821~en-mt.19.167) — English, machine translation --- Source: [https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1821.19.167](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1821.19.167) · Pramāṇa