[Pramāṇa](https://indike.org/pramana/) › [Indian literature](https://indike.org/pramana/in) › [Buddhist Literature](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha) › [Taishō Tripiṭaka (Chinese Buddhist canon)](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho) › [俱舍論記](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1821) › 19.60.1 # 俱舍論記 19.60.1 俱舍論記 19.60.1 - **Language:** Classical Chinese ### [19.60.1](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1821.19.60.1) 「有餘師說至諸見未斷」者，敘異說。 外道諸仙不能伏見所斷惑，修所斷惑但能暫伏而得上生。 故《婆沙》五十一云「謂譬喻者作如是說：異生不能斷諸煩惱。 」又《婆沙》九十云「或復有執：異生不能斷見所斷隨眠。 有餘復執：異生不能斷諸隨眠，唯能制伏。 」解云：見所斷惑不能伏不能斷，若修所斷伏而非斷。 如《大分別諸業契經》說：離欲修所斷貪，諸外道類有緣欲界邪見現行，故知不能伏斷見惑。 餘見所斷，准此邪見皆不能斷。 及《梵網經》亦說：離欲諸外道類，有緣欲界諸見現行，謂於前際分別論者，有執四全常、有執四一分常、有執諸法二無因生等。 彼經總說六十二見，以此故知，不能伏斷見所斷惑，非色界惑緣欲界生，於欲界境已離貪故，定是欲界諸見未斷。 問：六十二見名體云何？ 解云：如《婆沙》一百九十九及二百廣明，今略取意標顯彼論六十二見者。 又《梵網經》說：六十二諸惡見趣，皆有身見為本。 六十二見趣者，謂前際分別見有十八，後際分別見有四十四。 前際分別見有十八者，謂四遍常論，四一分常論，二無因生論，四有邊等論，四不死矯亂論。 後際分別見有四十四者，謂十六有想論，八無想論，八非有想非無想論，七斷滅論，五現法涅槃論。 此中依過去起分別見名前際分別見，依未來起分別見名後際分別見。 若依現在起分別見，此即不定，或名前際分別見、或名後際分別見，以現在世是未來前、過去後故，或未來因、過去果故。 前際分別見中四遍常論者，一由憶劫，謂由能憶一成壞劫，或二或三乃至八、十，彼便執我及世間俱常。 二由憶生，謂由能憶一生，或二或三，乃至百、千生事，彼便執我及世間俱常。 前雖憶多，而於能憶諸生無間未得自在； 今雖憶少，而於能憶諸生無間已得自在。 三由死生，謂由天眼見諸有情死時、生時諸蘊相續，由斯便執我及世間俱是常住。 四由尋伺，謂由如是虛妄尋伺，執我、世間俱是常住。 如是四種執遍常故，名為遍常，常見為性。 四一分常論者，一由大梵，謂從梵世來生此間，由得宿住隨念通故，作如是執：我等皆是大梵天王之所化作，梵王能化在彼常住，我等所化故是無常。 二由大種或心，謂聞梵王說大種或心隨一是常，便作是執：我以大梵天王為定量，是故世間一分常住、一分無常。 三由戲忘念天，謂有先從戲忘大沒來生此間，由得宿住隨念通故，便作是執：彼天諸有不極遊戲忘失念者在彼常住，我等先由極遊戲忘念彼處沒故是無常。 四由意憤恚天，謂有先從意憤天沒來生此間，由得宿住隨念通故，即作是執：彼天諸有不極意憤角眼相視在彼常住，我等先由意極相憤角眼相視，從彼處沒故是無常。 有說：彼住妙高層級。 有說：彼是三十三天。 如是四種執一分常，名為一分，以常見為性。 二無因生論者，一由無想天，謂從無想有情沒來生此間，由得宿住隨念通故，雖能憶彼出無想心及後諸位，而不能憶出心已前所有諸位，便作是念：我於彼時本無而起，諸法如我亦應一切本無而生。 由斯便執我及世間皆無有因，自然生起。 二虛妄尋伺，謂由尋伺虛妄推求，今身所更既皆能憶，前身若有彼所更事，今此身中亦應能憶，既不能憶故知彼無。 由斯便執我及世間皆無因生，自然而有。 如是二種執無因生，名無因生論，以邪見為性。 四有邊等論者，一有邊，謂由天眼見下唯至無間地獄，見上唯至初靜慮天，執我於中悉皆遍滿。 彼作是念：過此若有我及世間我亦應見，既不能見故知非有。 由斯便執我及世間俱是有邊，即是二種有分限義。 二無邊，謂由依止勝分靜慮發淨天眼，傍見無邊，執我於中悉皆遍滿。 由斯便執我及世間俱是無邊，即是二種無分限義。 三亦有邊亦無邊，謂由天眼及神境通，由天眼通見下唯至無間地獄，見上唯至初靜慮天； > "Some other masters say \[...\] because the views are not yet abandoned" recounts a divergent theory. Non-Buddhist ṛṣis are incapable of subduing the defilements abandoned through seeing; they can only temporarily subdue the defilements abandoned through cultivation and thereby attain rebirth in higher realms. Therefore, the Mahāvibhāṣā, fascicle fifty-one, states: "Namely, the Dārṣṭāntikas speak thus: 'Ordinary persons cannot abandon the defilements.'" Furthermore, the Mahāvibhāṣā, fascicle ninety, states: "Or again, some maintain: 'Ordinary persons cannot abandon the anuśayas abandoned through seeing.' Still others maintain: 'Ordinary persons cannot abandon any anuśayas; they can only suppress and subdue them.'" The explanation states: the defilements abandoned through seeing can neither be subdued nor abandoned, whereas the defilements abandoned through cultivation are subdued but not abandoned. As the Mahāvibhaṅga-karma-sūtra states: "Even though they are free from desire \[for the realm of desire\] with respect to craving abandoned through cultivation, non-Buddhists still have active wrong views that take the desire realm as their object"; hence one knows that they can neither subdue nor abandon the defilements of view. The remaining defilements abandoned through seeing, by analogy with this wrong view, all cannot be abandoned. And the Brahmajāla-sūtra also states: "Non-Buddhists who are free from desire have active views that take the desire realm as their object," referring to those who theorize based on discrimination concerning the past: some maintain four kinds of universal permanence, some maintain four kinds of partial permanence, some maintain two kinds of causeless arising of dharmas, and so forth. That sūtra comprehensively speaks of sixty-two views. Based on this, it is known that they cannot subdue or abandon the defilements abandoned through seeing; for defilements of the form realm do not arise taking the desire realm as object, and since they are already free from craving toward the objects of the desire realm, it is definite that these views belonging to the desire realm have not yet been abandoned. Question: What are the names and essential natures of the sixty-two views? Explanation: As extensively clarified in fascicles 199 and 200 of the Mahāvibhāṣā, now we briefly take the general sense to clearly designate the sixty-two views of that treatise. Furthermore, the Brahmajāla-sūtra states: "The sixty-two destinations of evil views all have satkāyadṛṣṭi as their root." The sixty-two destinations of views are: eighteen views discriminating the past, and forty-four views discriminating the future. The eighteen views discriminating the past are: four doctrines of universal permanence, four doctrines of partial permanence, two doctrines of causeless arising, four doctrines of the finite and so forth, and four doctrines of eel-wriggling evasiveness. The forty-four views discriminating the future are: sixteen doctrines of conscious survival, eight doctrines of unconscious survival, eight doctrines of neither-conscious-nor-unconscious survival, seven doctrines of annihilation, and five doctrines of nirvāṇa in the present life. Here, discriminatory views arising based on the past are called views discriminating the past; discriminatory views arising based on the future are called views discriminating the future. If they arise based on the present, this is indeterminate: they are either called views discriminating the past or called views discriminating the future, because the present time is prior to the future and subsequent to the past, or because it is the cause of the future and the fruit of the past. Among the views discriminating the past, the four doctrines of universal permanence are: First, by recollecting aeons: that is, because one can recollect one aeon of evolution and dissolution, or two, or three, up to eight or ten, one then grasps that both the self and the world are permanent. Second, by recollecting births: that is, because one can recollect one birth, or two, or three, up to a hundred or a thousand births' events, one then grasps that both the self and the world are permanent. Although previously one recollected many \[aeons\], one had not yet attained mastery regarding the continuity between the recollected births; now, although one recollects few, one has already attained mastery regarding the continuity between the recollected births. Third, by death and rebirth: that is, through the divine eye, seeing the continuity of the skandhas of sentient beings at the time of death and at the time of rebirth, one consequently grasps that both the self and the world are permanent. Fourth, by reasoning and investigation: that is, through such false reasoning and investigation, one grasps that both the self and the world are permanent. Because these four kinds grasp universal permanence, they are called universal permanence, having the view of permanence as their nature. The four doctrines of partial permanence are: First, due to the Great Brahmā: that is, having died in the Brahmā world and come to be born here, because one has attained the supernormal power of recollection of past lives, one grasps thus: "We were all created by the Great Brahmā King; the Brahmā King, being able to create, resides there permanently, whereas we, being created, are therefore impermanent." Second, due to the primary elements or the mind: that is, hearing the Brahmā King say that either the primary elements or the mind—whichever one—is permanent, one then grasps: "I take the Great Brahmā King as the authoritative standard; therefore, one part of the world is permanent and one part is impermanent." Third, due to the gods corrupted by play: that is, there are those who previously died from the gods corrupted by play and came to be born here; because they have attained the supernormal power of recollection of past lives, they then grasp: "Those among the gods there who do not excessively play and lose mindfulness reside there permanently; we, having previously fallen from that realm because of excessive play and loss of mindfulness, are therefore impermanent." Fourth, due to the gods corrupted by malice: that is, there are those who previously died from the gods of malice and came to be born here; because they have attained the supernormal power of recollection of past lives, they immediately grasp: "Those among the gods there whose minds are not excessively angry, looking askance at one another, reside there permanently; we, having previously fallen from that realm because of our minds being excessively angry at one another and looking askance, are therefore impermanent." Some say: they dwell on the terraces of Mount Sumeru. Some say: they are the Trāyastriṃśa gods. Because these four kinds grasp partial permanence, they are called partial \[permanence\], having the view of permanence as their nature. The two doctrines of causeless arising are: First, due to the non-conceptual gods: that is, having died from the non-conceptual sentient beings and come to be born here, because one has attained the supernormal power of recollection of past lives, although one can recollect the mind emerging from non-conceptuality and the subsequent stages, one cannot recollect all the stages prior to the emerging mind; one then thinks: "At that time I arose from non-existence, and dharmas, like myself, must all likewise arise from non-existence." Consequently, one grasps that both the self and the world are without cause, arising spontaneously. Second, false reasoning and investigation: that is, through reasoning and investigation falsely inquiring, \[one thinks:\] "Since what is experienced in this present body can all be recollected, if there had been experiences in a previous body, one should also be able to recollect them in this present body; since one cannot recollect them, one knows they did not exist." Consequently, one grasps that both the self and the world arise without cause, existing spontaneously. Because these two kinds grasp causeless arising, they are called doctrines of causeless arising, having wrong view as their nature. The four doctrines of the finite and so forth are: First, the finite: that is, through the divine eye, seeing below only as far as the Avīci Hell and seeing above only as far as the First Dhyāna heaven, one grasps that the self fully pervades therein. One thinks: "If there were a self and a world beyond this, I should also see them; since I cannot see them, I know they do not exist." Consequently, one grasps that both the self and the world are finite, which is the meaning of the two kinds having limits. Second, the infinite: that is, depending on the superior dhyāna and developing the pure divine eye, seeing horizontally without limit, one grasps that the self fully pervades therein. Consequently, one grasps that both the self and the world are infinite, which is the meaning of the two kinds being limitless. Third, both finite and infinite: that is, through the divine eye and the supernormal power of psychic transformation; through the power of the divine eye, seeing below only as far as the Avīci Hell and seeing above only as far as the First Dhyāna heaven; > — English (machine translation) (machine translation) - [Previous: 19.59](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1821.19.59) - [Next: 19.60.2](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1821.19.60.2) - [Up: 19.60](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1821.19.60) ## Translations (1) - [English (machine translation)](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1821~en-mt.19.60.1) — English, machine translation ## Linked texts (3) - [瑜伽師地論](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.sanskrit.darsana.yogacara.yogacarabhumi*zh-xuanzang.87.15) — Classical Chinese - [俱舍論疏](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1822.19.86) — Classical Chinese - [成唯識論演祕](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1833.5.443) — Classical Chinese --- Source: [https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1821.19.60.1](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1821.19.60.1) · Pramāṇa