[Pramāṇa](https://indike.org/pramana/) › [Indian literature](https://indike.org/pramana/in) › [Buddhist Literature](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha) › [Taishō Tripiṭaka (Chinese Buddhist canon)](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho) › [俱舍論記](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1821) › 19.60 # 俱舍論記 19.60 俱舍論記 19.60 - **Language:** Classical Chinese ### [19.60.1](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1821.19.60.1) 「有餘師說至諸見未斷」者，敘異說。 外道諸仙不能伏見所斷惑，修所斷惑但能暫伏而得上生。 故《婆沙》五十一云「謂譬喻者作如是說：異生不能斷諸煩惱。 」又《婆沙》九十云「或復有執：異生不能斷見所斷隨眠。 有餘復執：異生不能斷諸隨眠，唯能制伏。 」解云：見所斷惑不能伏不能斷，若修所斷伏而非斷。 如《大分別諸業契經》說：離欲修所斷貪，諸外道類有緣欲界邪見現行，故知不能伏斷見惑。 餘見所斷，准此邪見皆不能斷。 及《梵網經》亦說：離欲諸外道類，有緣欲界諸見現行，謂於前際分別論者，有執四全常、有執四一分常、有執諸法二無因生等。 彼經總說六十二見，以此故知，不能伏斷見所斷惑，非色界惑緣欲界生，於欲界境已離貪故，定是欲界諸見未斷。 問：六十二見名體云何？ 解云：如《婆沙》一百九十九及二百廣明，今略取意標顯彼論六十二見者。 又《梵網經》說：六十二諸惡見趣，皆有身見為本。 六十二見趣者，謂前際分別見有十八，後際分別見有四十四。 前際分別見有十八者，謂四遍常論，四一分常論，二無因生論，四有邊等論，四不死矯亂論。 後際分別見有四十四者，謂十六有想論，八無想論，八非有想非無想論，七斷滅論，五現法涅槃論。 此中依過去起分別見名前際分別見，依未來起分別見名後際分別見。 若依現在起分別見，此即不定，或名前際分別見、或名後際分別見，以現在世是未來前、過去後故，或未來因、過去果故。 前際分別見中四遍常論者，一由憶劫，謂由能憶一成壞劫，或二或三乃至八、十，彼便執我及世間俱常。 二由憶生，謂由能憶一生，或二或三，乃至百、千生事，彼便執我及世間俱常。 前雖憶多，而於能憶諸生無間未得自在； 今雖憶少，而於能憶諸生無間已得自在。 三由死生，謂由天眼見諸有情死時、生時諸蘊相續，由斯便執我及世間俱是常住。 四由尋伺，謂由如是虛妄尋伺，執我、世間俱是常住。 如是四種執遍常故，名為遍常，常見為性。 四一分常論者，一由大梵，謂從梵世來生此間，由得宿住隨念通故，作如是執：我等皆是大梵天王之所化作，梵王能化在彼常住，我等所化故是無常。 二由大種或心，謂聞梵王說大種或心隨一是常，便作是執：我以大梵天王為定量，是故世間一分常住、一分無常。 三由戲忘念天，謂有先從戲忘大沒來生此間，由得宿住隨念通故，便作是執：彼天諸有不極遊戲忘失念者在彼常住，我等先由極遊戲忘念彼處沒故是無常。 四由意憤恚天，謂有先從意憤天沒來生此間，由得宿住隨念通故，即作是執：彼天諸有不極意憤角眼相視在彼常住，我等先由意極相憤角眼相視，從彼處沒故是無常。 有說：彼住妙高層級。 有說：彼是三十三天。 如是四種執一分常，名為一分，以常見為性。 二無因生論者，一由無想天，謂從無想有情沒來生此間，由得宿住隨念通故，雖能憶彼出無想心及後諸位，而不能憶出心已前所有諸位，便作是念：我於彼時本無而起，諸法如我亦應一切本無而生。 由斯便執我及世間皆無有因，自然生起。 二虛妄尋伺，謂由尋伺虛妄推求，今身所更既皆能憶，前身若有彼所更事，今此身中亦應能憶，既不能憶故知彼無。 由斯便執我及世間皆無因生，自然而有。 如是二種執無因生，名無因生論，以邪見為性。 四有邊等論者，一有邊，謂由天眼見下唯至無間地獄，見上唯至初靜慮天，執我於中悉皆遍滿。 彼作是念：過此若有我及世間我亦應見，既不能見故知非有。 由斯便執我及世間俱是有邊，即是二種有分限義。 二無邊，謂由依止勝分靜慮發淨天眼，傍見無邊，執我於中悉皆遍滿。 由斯便執我及世間俱是無邊，即是二種無分限義。 三亦有邊亦無邊，謂由天眼及神境通，由天眼通見下唯至無間地獄，見上唯至初靜慮天； > "Some other masters say \[...\] because the views are not yet abandoned" recounts a divergent theory. Non-Buddhist ṛṣis are incapable of subduing the defilements abandoned through seeing; they can only temporarily subdue the defilements abandoned through cultivation and thereby attain rebirth in higher realms. Therefore, the Mahāvibhāṣā, fascicle fifty-one, states: "Namely, the Dārṣṭāntikas speak thus: 'Ordinary persons cannot abandon the defilements.'" Furthermore, the Mahāvibhāṣā, fascicle ninety, states: "Or again, some maintain: 'Ordinary persons cannot abandon the anuśayas abandoned through seeing.' Still others maintain: 'Ordinary persons cannot abandon any anuśayas; they can only suppress and subdue them.'" The explanation states: the defilements abandoned through seeing can neither be subdued nor abandoned, whereas the defilements abandoned through cultivation are subdued but not abandoned. As the Mahāvibhaṅga-karma-sūtra states: "Even though they are free from desire \[for the realm of desire\] with respect to craving abandoned through cultivation, non-Buddhists still have active wrong views that take the desire realm as their object"; hence one knows that they can neither subdue nor abandon the defilements of view. The remaining defilements abandoned through seeing, by analogy with this wrong view, all cannot be abandoned. And the Brahmajāla-sūtra also states: "Non-Buddhists who are free from desire have active views that take the desire realm as their object," referring to those who theorize based on discrimination concerning the past: some maintain four kinds of universal permanence, some maintain four kinds of partial permanence, some maintain two kinds of causeless arising of dharmas, and so forth. That sūtra comprehensively speaks of sixty-two views. Based on this, it is known that they cannot subdue or abandon the defilements abandoned through seeing; for defilements of the form realm do not arise taking the desire realm as object, and since they are already free from craving toward the objects of the desire realm, it is definite that these views belonging to the desire realm have not yet been abandoned. Question: What are the names and essential natures of the sixty-two views? Explanation: As extensively clarified in fascicles 199 and 200 of the Mahāvibhāṣā, now we briefly take the general sense to clearly designate the sixty-two views of that treatise. Furthermore, the Brahmajāla-sūtra states: "The sixty-two destinations of evil views all have satkāyadṛṣṭi as their root." The sixty-two destinations of views are: eighteen views discriminating the past, and forty-four views discriminating the future. The eighteen views discriminating the past are: four doctrines of universal permanence, four doctrines of partial permanence, two doctrines of causeless arising, four doctrines of the finite and so forth, and four doctrines of eel-wriggling evasiveness. The forty-four views discriminating the future are: sixteen doctrines of conscious survival, eight doctrines of unconscious survival, eight doctrines of neither-conscious-nor-unconscious survival, seven doctrines of annihilation, and five doctrines of nirvāṇa in the present life. Here, discriminatory views arising based on the past are called views discriminating the past; discriminatory views arising based on the future are called views discriminating the future. If they arise based on the present, this is indeterminate: they are either called views discriminating the past or called views discriminating the future, because the present time is prior to the future and subsequent to the past, or because it is the cause of the future and the fruit of the past. Among the views discriminating the past, the four doctrines of universal permanence are: First, by recollecting aeons: that is, because one can recollect one aeon of evolution and dissolution, or two, or three, up to eight or ten, one then grasps that both the self and the world are permanent. Second, by recollecting births: that is, because one can recollect one birth, or two, or three, up to a hundred or a thousand births' events, one then grasps that both the self and the world are permanent. Although previously one recollected many \[aeons\], one had not yet attained mastery regarding the continuity between the recollected births; now, although one recollects few, one has already attained mastery regarding the continuity between the recollected births. Third, by death and rebirth: that is, through the divine eye, seeing the continuity of the skandhas of sentient beings at the time of death and at the time of rebirth, one consequently grasps that both the self and the world are permanent. Fourth, by reasoning and investigation: that is, through such false reasoning and investigation, one grasps that both the self and the world are permanent. Because these four kinds grasp universal permanence, they are called universal permanence, having the view of permanence as their nature. The four doctrines of partial permanence are: First, due to the Great Brahmā: that is, having died in the Brahmā world and come to be born here, because one has attained the supernormal power of recollection of past lives, one grasps thus: "We were all created by the Great Brahmā King; the Brahmā King, being able to create, resides there permanently, whereas we, being created, are therefore impermanent." Second, due to the primary elements or the mind: that is, hearing the Brahmā King say that either the primary elements or the mind—whichever one—is permanent, one then grasps: "I take the Great Brahmā King as the authoritative standard; therefore, one part of the world is permanent and one part is impermanent." Third, due to the gods corrupted by play: that is, there are those who previously died from the gods corrupted by play and came to be born here; because they have attained the supernormal power of recollection of past lives, they then grasp: "Those among the gods there who do not excessively play and lose mindfulness reside there permanently; we, having previously fallen from that realm because of excessive play and loss of mindfulness, are therefore impermanent." Fourth, due to the gods corrupted by malice: that is, there are those who previously died from the gods of malice and came to be born here; because they have attained the supernormal power of recollection of past lives, they immediately grasp: "Those among the gods there whose minds are not excessively angry, looking askance at one another, reside there permanently; we, having previously fallen from that realm because of our minds being excessively angry at one another and looking askance, are therefore impermanent." Some say: they dwell on the terraces of Mount Sumeru. Some say: they are the Trāyastriṃśa gods. Because these four kinds grasp partial permanence, they are called partial \[permanence\], having the view of permanence as their nature. The two doctrines of causeless arising are: First, due to the non-conceptual gods: that is, having died from the non-conceptual sentient beings and come to be born here, because one has attained the supernormal power of recollection of past lives, although one can recollect the mind emerging from non-conceptuality and the subsequent stages, one cannot recollect all the stages prior to the emerging mind; one then thinks: "At that time I arose from non-existence, and dharmas, like myself, must all likewise arise from non-existence." Consequently, one grasps that both the self and the world are without cause, arising spontaneously. Second, false reasoning and investigation: that is, through reasoning and investigation falsely inquiring, \[one thinks:\] "Since what is experienced in this present body can all be recollected, if there had been experiences in a previous body, one should also be able to recollect them in this present body; since one cannot recollect them, one knows they did not exist." Consequently, one grasps that both the self and the world arise without cause, existing spontaneously. Because these two kinds grasp causeless arising, they are called doctrines of causeless arising, having wrong view as their nature. The four doctrines of the finite and so forth are: First, the finite: that is, through the divine eye, seeing below only as far as the Avīci Hell and seeing above only as far as the First Dhyāna heaven, one grasps that the self fully pervades therein. One thinks: "If there were a self and a world beyond this, I should also see them; since I cannot see them, I know they do not exist." Consequently, one grasps that both the self and the world are finite, which is the meaning of the two kinds having limits. Second, the infinite: that is, depending on the superior dhyāna and developing the pure divine eye, seeing horizontally without limit, one grasps that the self fully pervades therein. Consequently, one grasps that both the self and the world are infinite, which is the meaning of the two kinds being limitless. Third, both finite and infinite: that is, through the divine eye and the supernormal power of psychic transformation; through the power of the divine eye, seeing below only as far as the Avīci Hell and seeing above only as far as the First Dhyāna heaven; > — English (machine translation) (machine translation) ### [19.60.2](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1821.19.60.2) 由神境通運身傍去不得邊際，遂於上、下起有邊想，於傍世界起無邊想，執我於中悉皆遍滿。 由斯便執我及世間亦有邊亦無邊，即是二種俱有分限無分限義。 四非有邊非無邊，即遮第三為此第四。 彼作是念：我及世間俱不可說定是有邊、定是無邊，然皆實有。 或有說者，彼見世間橫無邊故，執我、世間俱非有邊； 彼見世間竪有邊故，執我、世間俱非無邊。 雖無決定，而實有我。 復有說者，彼執我體或舒或卷不可定說，舒無邊故說非有邊，卷有邊故說非無邊。 問：如是四種既緣現在，云何說為前際分別？ 答：彼待未來，亦名前際。 廣如《婆沙》。 又云：有作是說，執有邊者即是斷見，執無邊者即是常見，執亦有邊亦無邊者即是一分斷見一分常見，執非有邊非無邊者即是唯起薩伽耶見。 解云：前說以我見為性，說執我言故； 後師以斷常我見為性。 四不死矯亂論者，計天常住名為不死，能無亂答得生彼天，不能實答恐不生天。 以言矯亂，名為矯亂。 一怖妄語。 我於諸法不如實知，他問我答便為妄語，怖妄語故恐不生天，便矯亂言：祕密義等不應皆說。 二怖邪見。 我於諸法不如實知，他問我撥便為邪見。 怖邪見故恐不生天，便矯亂言：祕密義等不應皆說。 三怖無知。 我於諸法不如實知，他問我印慮詰不知。 怖無知故恐不生天，便矯亂言：祕密義等不應皆說。 四怖愚鈍。 若違他意便不生天，諸有問我皆應返問，隨彼所欲我便印之。 又性愚癡，若違拒他彼便別我。 怖愚癡故恐不生天，以言矯亂。 此四雖於現在事轉，待未來故，立前際名。 如是四種計天不死，體皆常見。 計答他問為生天因，是戒禁取。 後際分別見中，十六有想論者，謂有色等四，有邊等四，一想等四，有樂等四。 有色等四者，一我有色死後有想，謂所執我以色為性故名有色，此有色我有彼想故名為有想。 彼作是念：此有色我死後有想。 二我無色死後有想，謂所執我無色為性故名無色，此無色我或想為性、或有想用說名有想、或有彼想說名有想。 彼作是念：此無色我死後有想。 三我亦有色亦無色死後有想，謂所執我以色、無色為性，故名亦有色亦無色。 我或以想為性、或有想用說名有想、或有彼想說名有想。 然作是念：此亦有色亦無色我死後有想。 四我非有色非無色死後有想，遮前第三無別依。 彼作是念：我雖實有而不可說定亦有色亦無色。 彼見實我定亦有色亦無色俱有過失，故作是說：此我非有色非無色死後有想。 有邊等四者，一我有邊死後有想，彼所執我體有分限名我有邊，此有邊我死後有想。 二執我無邊死後有想，彼所執我遍一切處名我無邊，此無邊我死後有想。 三執我亦有邊亦無邊死後有想，彼所執我或時有邊、或時無邊，計此我死後有想。 四執我非有邊非無邊死後有想，即遮第三為此第四。 一想等四者，一我有一想死後有想。 緣一境轉名為一想，我與彼合名有一想。 此下死後有想，皆准前釋。 二我有種種想死後有想。 緣異境起名種種想，我與彼合名有種種相。 三我有小想死後有想，依小身故、緣少境故說為小想，我與彼合名有小想。 若執小想蘊為我，有想用故名有少想。 下准此釋。 四我有無量想死後有想，依無量身故、緣無量境故名無量想，我與彼合名有無量想。 有樂等四者，一我純有樂死後有想，樂謂樂受或謂樂具，我與彼合名純有樂。 二我純有苦死後有想，苦謂苦受或謂苦具，我與彼合名純有苦。 三我有樂有苦死後有想，或苦樂雜受、或苦樂俱合，便作是念：我有苦樂。 四我無苦無樂死後有想，不受苦樂名無苦樂，或時暫受如容非有，便作是念：我無苦樂。 應知十六有想論雖皆有想，然初四色、無色差別，次四邊、無邊差別，次四約想差別，後四約受差別，此十六皆以常見為體。 八無想論者，謂有色等四、有邊等四。 > By supernormal power to move the physical body laterally, one fails to find an edge, and thus conceives a notion of having an edge with respect to above and below, and a notion of being boundless with respect to the lateral world, grasping the self as entirely pervading therein. Due to this, one grasps the self and the world as both having an edge and being boundless—that is, the sense that both have delimitations and are without delimitations. Fourth: \[the doctrine that\] it is neither with edge nor boundless, which negates the third to form this fourth. They formulate this thought: 'The self and the world are both ineffable as definitely having an edge or definitely being boundless, yet both are real entities.' Or, as some say: because they see that the world is laterally boundless, they grasp that the self and the world are both not with an edge; because they see that the world is vertically bounded, they grasp that the self and the world are both not boundless. Although there is no determinacy, the self really exists. Still others say: they grasp that the substance of the self either expands or contracts and cannot be definitively stated; because it is boundless when expanding, they say it is not with an edge, and because it has an edge when contracting, they say it is not boundless. Question: Since these four kinds take the present as their object, why are they called speculations regarding the prior limit? Answer: In relation to the future, they are also called the prior limit. \[This is\] elaborated in the \*Mahāvibhāṣā\*. It also says: 'Some say: one who grasps that it has an edge holds the view of annihilation; one who grasps that it is boundless holds the view of permanence; one who grasps that it both has an edge and is boundless holds a partly annihilationist and partly eternalist view; one who grasps that it is neither with an edge nor boundless only generates the view of personal identity (satkāyadṛṣṭi).' The explanation says: the former account takes the view of self as its nature, since it mentions 'grasping a self'; the latter masters take annihilationist, eternalist, and the view of self as its nature. The four evasive wrigglers (amarāvikkhepa): they consider heaven to be permanent, which is called 'immortal' (amara); if one can answer without confusion, one will be reborn in that heaven, whereas if one cannot answer truthfully, one fears not being reborn in heaven. Because one's speech is evasive and confusing, it is called wriggling (evasiveness). First: out of fear of false speech. 'I do not know all phenomena as they really are; if another asks and I answer, it would be false speech; fearing false speech, I fear not being reborn in heaven,' so one speaks evasively: 'Secret meanings and the like should not all be spoken.' Second: out of fear of wrong view. 'I do not know all phenomena as they really are; if another asks and I repudiate it, it would be wrong view; fearing wrong view, I fear not being reborn in heaven,' so one speaks evasively: 'Secret meanings and the like should not all be spoken.' Third: out of fear of ignorance. 'I do not know all phenomena as they really are; if another asks and I confirm it, I fear being interrogated and found not knowing; fearing ignorance, I fear not being reborn in heaven,' so one speaks evasively: 'Secret meanings and the like should not all be spoken.' Fourth: out of fear of dull-wittedness. 'If I oppose the other's mind, I will not be reborn in heaven; whoever asks me, I should ask back in turn, and according to what they desire, I then confirm it. Moreover, my nature is foolish; if I reject the other, they will examine me; fearing foolishness, I fear not being reborn in heaven,' thus speaking evasively. Although these four operate on present matters, in relation to the future they are given the name of the prior limit. Such four kinds conceive of the immortality of heaven; their substance is entirely eternalist view. Conceiving answering another's questions to be the cause of rebirth in heaven is attachment to vows and ascetic rules (śīlavrataparāmarśa). Among the speculations regarding the posterior limit, the sixteen doctrines of \[the self being\] percipient: namely, four regarding having form and the like; four regarding having an edge and the like; four regarding having a single perception and the like; four regarding having pleasure and the like. As for the four regarding having form and the like: First: 'My self has form and is percipient after death.' That is, the grasped self has form as its nature, so it is called 'having form'; because this self that has form possesses that perception, it is called 'percipient'. They formulate this thought: 'This self having form is percipient after death.' Second: 'My self is formless and is percipient after death.' That is, the grasped self has formlessness as its nature, so it is called 'formless'; this formless self either has perception as its nature, or is said to be percipient because it has the function of perception, or is said to be percipient because it possesses that perception. They formulate this thought: 'This formless self is percipient after death.' Third: 'My self both has form and is formless, and is percipient after death.' That is, the grasped self has both form and formlessness as its nature, so it is called 'both having form and formless'. The self either has perception as its nature, or is said to be percipient because it has the function of perception, or is said to be percipient because it possesses that perception. Thus they formulate this thought: 'This self that both has form and is formless is percipient after death.' Fourth: 'My self is neither with form nor formless, and is percipient after death.' This negates the third without a separate basis. They formulate this thought: 'Although the self really exists, it cannot be definitively stated as both having form and being formless.' Because they see that a real self being definitively both with form and formless both incur fault, they state: 'This self is neither with form nor formless, and is percipient after death.' As for the four regarding having an edge and the like: First: 'My self has an edge and is percipient after death.' The substance of their grasped self has delimitations, so it is called 'my self has an edge'; this self having an edge is percipient after death. Second: grasping 'My self is boundless and is percipient after death.' Their grasped self pervades all places, so it is called 'my self is boundless'; this boundless self is percipient after death. Third: grasping 'My self both has an edge and is boundless, and is percipient after death.' Their grasped self is at times with an edge and at times boundless; they conceive that this self is percipient after death. Fourth: grasping 'My self is neither with an edge nor boundless, and is percipient after death,' which negates the third to form this fourth. As for the four regarding having a single perception and the like: First: 'My self has a single perception and is percipient after death.' Operating with reference to a single object is called a single perception; the conjunction of the self with that is called having a single perception. Hereafter, 'percipient after death' is to be explained according to the preceding. Second: 'My self has various perceptions and is percipient after death.' Arising with reference to different objects is called various perceptions; the conjunction of the self with that is called having various perceptions. Third: 'My self has limited perception and is percipient after death.' Because of relying on a small body or taking a limited object, it is said to be a limited perception; the conjunction of the self with that is called having a limited perception. If one grasps the skandha of limited perception as the self, because it has the function of perception it is called having a limited perception. The rest below are explained accordingly. Fourth: 'My self has immeasurable perception and is percipient after death.' Because of relying on an immeasurable body or taking an immeasurable object, it is called immeasurable perception; the conjunction of the self with that is called having immeasurable perception. As for the four regarding having pleasure and the like: First: 'My self has solely pleasure and is percipient after death.' Pleasure means pleasant feeling or requisites of pleasure; the conjunction of the self with that is called having solely pleasure. Second: 'My self has solely suffering and is percipient after death.' Suffering means unpleasant feeling or requisites of suffering; the conjunction of the self with that is called having solely suffering. Third: 'My self has pleasure and has suffering, and is percipient after death.' Either suffering and pleasure are experienced mixed, or both suffering and pleasure are combined, so one formulates this thought: 'My self has suffering and pleasure.' Fourth: 'My self has neither suffering nor pleasure and is percipient after death.' Not experiencing suffering or pleasure is called having neither suffering nor pleasure; or experiencing it temporarily as if it did not exist, one formulates this thought: 'My self has neither suffering nor pleasure.' It should be known that although the sixteen doctrines of being percipient are all percipient, the first four are distinguished by form and formlessness, the next four by edge and boundlessness, the next four in terms of perception, and the latter four in terms of feeling; these sixteen all take eternalist view as their substance. The eight doctrines of being non-percipient: namely, four regarding having form and the like, and four regarding having an edge and the like. > — English (machine translation) (machine translation) ### [19.60.3](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1821.19.60.3) 有色等四者，一執我有色死後無想。 執色為我名我有色。 或當生無想、或當悶絕等，但有色身想不起故名為死後無想。 二執我無色死後無想。 執命為我名我無色。 當生無想天或當悶絕等，但有命根想不起故名死後無想。 或說受、行、識三為我，亦容執我無色死後無想。 三執我亦有色亦無色死後無想。 執色、命根名為我，亦有色亦無色。 當生無想天或當悶絕等，但有色、命想不起故名死後無想。 或說色、受、行、識四蘊為我，亦容執我亦有色亦無色死後無想。 四執我非有色非無色死後無想，即遮第三為此第四。 有邊等四者，一執我有邊死後無想。 執色或命為我自體，二俱有量邊名我有邊。 當生無想天或當悶絕等，但有色、命想不起故名死後無想。 准前應知。 二執我無邊死後無想。 執色或命為我自體，俱遍諸處名我無邊。 當生無想天或當悶絕等，但有色、命想不起故名死後無想。 三執我亦有邊亦無邊死後無想。 執色或命為我自性，隨身卷舒其量不定，名我亦有邊亦無邊。 當生無想天或當悶絕等，但有色、命想不起故名死後無想。 四執我非有邊非無邊死後無想，即遮第三為此第四。 如是八種雖俱無想，前四種色、無色差別故，後四種邊、無邊差別故。 此八皆以常見為性。 八非有想非無想論者，謂有色等四、有邊等四。 有色等四者，一執我有色死後非有想非無想，執色為我名我有色，非有想謂非有麁相，非無想謂非全無想，此顯不明了想也。 此有色我當有不明了想，名死後非有想非無想。 此而不明了想，或是有頂或通餘處，隨其所應，下皆准釋。 二執我無色死後非有想非無想，執無色為我，死後有不明了想。 三執我亦有色亦無色死後非有想非無想，執色、無色為我，死後有不明了想也。 四執我非有色非無色死後非有想非無想，即遮第三為此第四。 有邊等四者，一執我有邊死後非有想非無想，或執無色或亦執色為我自性，俱有邊量，死後當有不明了想。 二執我無邊死後非有想非無想，或執無色或兼色為我自性，俱無分限，死後當有不明了想。 三執我亦有邊亦無邊死後非有想非無想，或執無色或兼執色為我自性，其量不定，死後當有不明了想。 四執我非有邊非無邊死後非有想非無想，即遮第三為其第四。 此前八種，前四約有色、無色差別，後四約有邊、無邊差別。 此八皆以常見為性。 故前文云彼有想論、無想論、非有想非無想論，即此常見。 又問：何故無想論及非有想非無想論中，不說我有一想等八耶？ 答：若亦說者，一切皆應名有想論，以有想受者非無想等故。 如是一切有想等論說死後故，皆是後際分別見攝。 七斷滅論者，一作是念：此我有色麁四大種所造為性，死後斷滅。 彼作是念：我初受胎本無而有，若至死位有已還無，名善斷滅。 二作是念：此我欲界天死後斷滅。 彼作是念：我既不因產門而生本無而有，有已還無如彗星等，名善斷滅。 三作是念：此我色界天死後斷滅。 彼作是念：我既不因產門而生：本無而有，由等至力有已還無，名善斷滅。 廣如《婆沙》說。 四作是念：此我空無邊處天死後斷滅。 彼執空處為生死頂，死後斷滅。 五作是念：此我識無邊處天死後斷滅。 彼執識處為生死頂，死後斷滅。 六作是念：此我無所有處天死後斷滅。 彼執無所有處為生死頂，死後斷滅。 七作是念：此我非想非非想處天死後斷滅。 彼執有頂為生死頂，死後斷滅。 如是七種皆說死後，是後際分別見攝。 此七皆以斷見為性，故前文云彼斷滅論，即此斷見。 五現法涅槃論者，一受五欲樂。 初作是念：此我清淨解脫出離一切災橫，謂現受用妙五欲樂，爾時名得現法涅槃。 二住初靜慮，第二能見諸欲過失。 彼作是念：欲所生樂，眾苦所隨多諸怨害。 定所生樂，微妙寂靜無眾苦隨離諸怨害。 > Regarding the four beginning with possessing form: 1. Postulating that the self possesses form and is perceptionless after death. Postulating form to be the self is termed "the self possesses form." Since \[the self\] will either be born among the perceptionless \[gods\] or be in a swoon, etc., where there is merely a physical body and perceptions do not arise, it is termed "perceptionless after death." 2. Postulating that the self is formless and perceptionless after death. Postulating the vital faculty (jīvitendriya) to be the self is termed "the self is formless." When born in the heaven of the perceptionless \[beings\] or falling into a swoon, etc., there is merely the vital faculty and perceptions do not arise; hence it is termed "perceptionless after death." Or, if one maintains that the three \[aggregates of\] sensation, conditioning factors, and consciousness are the self, it also allows for postulating that the self is formless and perceptionless after death. 3. Postulating that the self both possesses form and is formless, and is perceptionless after death. Postulating that form and the vital faculty are the self, it both possesses form and is formless. When born in the heaven of the perceptionless \[beings\] or falling into a swoon, etc., there are merely form and life while perceptions do not arise; hence it is termed "perceptionless after death." Or, if one maintains that the four aggregates of form, sensation, conditioning factors, and consciousness are the self, it also allows for postulating that the self both possesses form and is formless, and is perceptionless after death. 4. Postulating that the self neither possesses form nor is formless, and is perceptionless after death; this fourth simply negates the third. Regarding the four beginning with finite: 1. Postulating that the self is finite and perceptionless after death. Postulating form or life to be the self's own substance, both being delimited by measure, it is termed "the self is finite." When born in the heaven of the perceptionless \[beings\] or falling into a swoon, etc., there are merely form and life while perceptions do not arise; hence it is termed "perceptionless after death." This should be understood in accordance with what precedes. 2. Postulating that the self is infinite and perceptionless after death. Postulating form or life to be the self's own substance, both being all-pervading, it is termed "the self is infinite." When born in the heaven of the perceptionless \[beings\] or falling into a swoon, etc., there are merely form and life while perceptions do not arise; hence it is termed "perceptionless after death." 3. Postulating that the self is both finite and infinite, and perceptionless after death. Postulating form or life to be the self's nature, its measure is indeterminate as it contracts and expands with the body; hence it is termed "the self is both finite and infinite." When born in the heaven of the perceptionless \[beings\] or falling into a swoon, etc., there are merely form and life while perceptions do not arise; hence it is termed "perceptionless after death." 4. Postulating that the self is neither finite nor infinite, and perceptionless after death; this fourth simply negates the third. Although these eight kinds are all alike in being perceptionless, the first four are differentiated by possessing form or being formless, and the latter four are differentiated by being finite or infinite. These eight all have the eternalist view (śāśvata-dṛṣṭi) as their intrinsic nature. The eight doctrines of neither percipient nor non-percipient comprise four beginning with possessing form and four beginning with finite. Regarding the four beginning with possessing form: 1. Postulating that the self possesses form and is neither percipient nor non-percipient after death. Postulating form to be the self is termed "the self possesses form." "Neither percipient" means having no coarse perceptions; "nor non-percipient" means not entirely lacking perception; this indicates obscure perception. When this self possessing form will have obscure perception, it is termed "neither percipient nor non-percipient after death." This obscure perception is either found in the peak of existence (bhavāgra) or extends to other planes; explain all below accordingly as appropriate. 2. Postulating that the self is formless and neither percipient nor non-percipient after death: postulating the formless to be the self, it has obscure perception after death. 3. Postulating that the self both possesses form and is formless, and is neither percipient nor non-percipient after death: postulating form and the formless to be the self, it has obscure perception after death. 4. Postulating that the self neither possesses form nor is formless, and is neither percipient nor non-percipient after death: this fourth simply negates the third. Regarding the four beginning with finite: 1. Postulating that the self is finite and neither percipient nor non-percipient after death: postulating either the formless or also form to be the self's nature, both possessing finite measure, it will have obscure perception after death. 2. Postulating that the self is infinite and neither percipient nor non-percipient after death: postulating either the formless or concurrently form to be the self's nature, both lacking delimitations, it will have obscure perception after death. 3. Postulating that the self is both finite and infinite, and neither percipient nor non-percipient after death: postulating either the formless or concurrently form to be the self's nature, its measure is indeterminate, and it will have obscure perception after death. 4. Postulating that the self is neither finite nor infinite, and neither percipient nor non-percipient after death: this fourth simply negates the third. Among these preceding eight kinds, the first four are based on the distinction of possessing form or being formless, and the latter four are based on the distinction of being finite or infinite. These eight all have the eternalist view as their intrinsic nature. Therefore, the earlier text says that those doctrines of percipient, perceptionless, and neither percipient nor non-percipient are just this eternalist view. It is asked again: Why, in the doctrines of the perceptionless and the doctrines of neither percipient nor non-percipient, are the eight \[doctrines\] of "the self has uniform perception," etc., not mentioned? Answer: If they were also mentioned, all of them would have to be termed doctrines of the percipient, because one who possesses perceptions and experiences is not perceptionless, etc. All such doctrines of the percipient and so forth, because they speak of "after death," are subsumed under views speculative of the future. The seven doctrines of annihilation: 1. One forms the thought: "This self of mine has form, having the nature of being composed of the coarse four great elements; after death it is annihilated." That person forms the thought: "My self, having originally been non-existent, came to exist when first entering the womb; once arriving at the state of death, having existed, it returns to non-existence; this is termed wholesome annihilation." 2. One forms the thought: "This self of mine is a god of the desire realm; after death it is annihilated." That person forms the thought: "Since my self was not born through a birth canal, having originally been non-existent, it came to exist; having existed, it returns to non-existence like a comet and the like; this is termed wholesome annihilation." 3. One forms the thought: "This self of mine is a god of the form realm; after death it is annihilated." That person forms the thought: "Since my self was not born through a birth canal, having originally been non-existent, it came to exist; through the power of meditative attainment (samāpatti), having existed, it returns to non-existence; this is termed wholesome annihilation." This is explained extensively as in the \*Mahāvibhāṣā\*. 4. One forms the thought: "This self of mine is a god of the sphere of boundless space (ākāśānantyāyatana); after death it is annihilated." That person posits the sphere of space to be the apex of saṃsāra, being annihilated after death. 5. One forms the thought: "This self of mine is a god of the sphere of boundless consciousness (vijñānānantyāyatana); after death it is annihilated." That person posits the sphere of consciousness to be the apex of saṃsāra, being annihilated after death. 6. One forms the thought: "This self of mine is a god of the sphere of nothingness (ākiṃcanyāyatana); after death it is annihilated." That person posits the sphere of nothingness to be the apex of saṃsāra, being annihilated after death. 7. One forms the thought: "This self of mine is a god of the sphere of neither perception nor non-perception (naivasaṃjñānāsaṃjñāyatana); after death it is annihilated." That person posits the peak of existence to be the apex of saṃsāra, being annihilated after death. All seven of these kinds speak of "after death" and are subsumed under views speculative of the future. These seven all have the annihilationist view (uccheda-dṛṣṭi) as their intrinsic nature; hence the earlier text states that those doctrines of annihilation are just this annihilationist view. The five doctrines of nirvāṇa in the present life (dṛṣṭadharmam-nirvāṇa): 1. Experiencing the pleasure of the five desires. The first forms this thought: "This self of mine is pure, liberated, and free from all adversities, namely by presently enjoying the exquisite pleasures of the five desires; at that time it is termed attaining nirvāṇa in the present life." 2. Abiding in the first dhyāna. The second is able to see the faults of desires. That person forms this thought: "The pleasure born of desires is pursued by manifold sufferings and abounds with many enmities and harms. The pleasure born of concentration is subtle, tranquil, not pursued by manifold sufferings, and free from all enmities and harms." > — English (machine translation) (machine translation) ### [19.60.4](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1821.19.60.4) 復作是念：此我清淨解脫出離一切災橫，謂現安住最初靜慮，爾時名得現法涅槃。 三住第二靜慮，第三能見諸欲、尋、伺俱有過失。 彼作是念：此我清淨解脫出離一切災橫，謂現安住第二靜慮，爾時名得現法涅槃也。 四住第三靜慮，第四能見諸欲、尋、伺及喜過失。 彼作是念：此我清淨解脫出離一切災橫，謂現安住第三靜慮，爾時名得現法涅槃。 五住第四靜慮，第五能見諸欲、尋、伺、喜、入出息皆有過失。 彼作是念：此我清淨解脫出離一切災橫，謂現安住第四靜慮，爾時名得現法涅槃。 問：云何此五現法涅槃論是後際分別見攝？ 答：此五雖緣現在，而待過去名後，是故說為後際分別。 廣如《婆沙》說。 言釋名者，若於現在我受安樂名得涅槃。 言出體者，以見取為體。 故前文言彼現法涅槃論，即此見取。 > They again form this thought: "This self of mine is pure, liberated, and free from all adversities, namely by presently abiding in the very first dhyāna; at that time it is termed attaining nirvāṇa in the present life." 3. Abiding in the second dhyāna. The third is able to see the faults of both desires and coarse-and-subtle examination (vitarka and vicāra). That person forms this thought: "This self of mine is pure, liberated, and free from all adversities, namely by presently abiding in the second dhyāna; at that time it is termed attaining nirvāṇa in the present life." 4. Abiding in the third dhyāna. The fourth is able to see the faults of desires, coarse-and-subtle examination, and joy (prīti). That person forms this thought: "This self of mine is pure, liberated, and free from all adversities, namely by presently abiding in the third dhyāna; at that time it is termed attaining nirvāṇa in the present life." 5. Abiding in the fourth dhyāna. The fifth is able to see that desires, coarse-and-subtle examination, joy, and inhalation and exhalation (ānāpāna) all have faults. That person forms this thought: "This self of mine is pure, liberated, and free from all adversities, namely by presently abiding in the fourth dhyāna; at that time it is termed attaining nirvāṇa in the present life." Question: Why are these five doctrines of nirvāṇa in the present life subsumed under views speculative of the future? Answer: Although these five take the present as their object, in relation to the past they are called "subsequent"; for this reason they are described as speculative of the future. This is explained extensively as in the \*Mahāvibhāṣā\*. Regarding the explanation of the name: if in the present the self experiences peace and joy, it is termed "attaining nirvāṇa." Regarding the demonstration of its intrinsic substance: it takes the clinging to views (dṛṣṭi-parāmarśa) as its intrinsic substance. Therefore, the earlier text says that those doctrines of nirvāṇa in the present life are just this clinging to views. > — English (machine translation) (machine translation) ## Translations (1) - [English (machine translation)](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1821~en-mt.19.60.1) — English, machine translation ## Linked texts (4) - [瑜伽師地論](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.sanskrit.darsana.yogacara.yogacarabhumi*zh-xuanzang.87.15) — Classical Chinese - [成唯識論述記](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1830.6.530) — Classical Chinese - [俱舍論疏](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1822.19.86) — Classical Chinese - [成唯識論演祕](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1833.5.443) — Classical Chinese --- Source: [https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1821.19.60](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1821.19.60) · Pramāṇa