[Pramāṇa](https://indike.org/pramana/) › [Indian literature](https://indike.org/pramana/in) › [Buddhist Literature](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha) › [Taishō Tripiṭaka (Chinese Buddhist canon)](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho) › [俱舍論記](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1821) › 6.134 # 俱舍論記 6.134 俱舍論記 6.134 - **Language:** Classical Chinese ### [6.134](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1821.6.134) 「有時二蘊至及彼生等」者，身、語業是色蘊，四相是行蘊。問：欲界身、語業，能感命根、眾同分不？答：不能感。故《正理》十六云「此異熟因總說有二：一能牽引、二能圓滿。且眾同分及與命根，非不相應行獨所能牽引。云何知然？契經說故。如契經說業為生因等。又云非心隨轉身、語二業，定不能引命、眾同分。不爾，便違契經正理，經言劣界思所引故。此說欲有命、眾同分，唯意業感，非身、語業。身、語表業眾多極微一心所起，於中唯一引眾同分及與命根。餘無此能，不應理故。若許同時共感一果，則應更互為俱有因。有對造色為俱有因，非宗所許，此非展轉力所生故。又非次第一一極微牽引命根及眾同分，一心起故。非一心起無異功能別引生後而無過失，非為滿業亦有斯過。於一生中，各別能取色、香、味等圓滿果故。依此無表亦同此釋，多遠離體一心起故，不許互為俱有因故。若無對造色有非俱有因，說有對言便為無用。顯有對造色皆非俱有因。故作是說：有無對造色得為俱有因，不可同彼。若欲界繫身、語二業不能牽引，便違契經。如說殺生，若修、若習、若多修習，生那落迦。乃至廣說。又違本論，如說於此三惡行中何罪最大？謂能隨順僧破妄語。此業能取無間獄中劫壽異熟，壽定說為所牽引果。此說所起，顯能起思，麁易了故。無相違失（已上論文）。」以此故知，身、語二業不能感命、眾同分。問：此論同《正理》不？解云：此論文無別說，意同《正理》。問：若言唯意業能感命、眾同分，何故〈業品〉云「四善容俱作，引同分唯三。」准彼論文，俱時能感生、後、不定眾同分三，不可說言一剎那意業能感三生眾同分，復不可言剎那中起三意業感三眾同分，復不可言過去三因等起思感三眾同分，以異熟因必現取果。解云：彼文但顯四業中生、後、不定，容感同分，現不能感，不言一剎那一時能感三種同分。故下論云「幾業能引眾同分耶？能引唯三，除順現受，現身同分先業引故。」又問：若言欲身、語業不能感命、眾同分，何故此論下文言「二無心定得，不能引餘通。」既言餘通，明知欲界身、語二業亦能感命、同分。解云：言通感者，容通感彼，不言一切皆悉能感。若隨轉身、語業即能感，若欲界身、語業即不能感。又解：此論不同《正理》，欲界身、語業亦能感命、眾同分。於其業中，眾多極微隨其所應，或有唯感引果，或有唯感滿果，或有一分感引一分感滿。若言同一心起，不許感引果滿果。同一心起，何者感色，何者感香等。雖同一心起，即有感色等不同；何妨同一心起，感引、滿前後別。若作此解，與《正理》論異。 > Regarding "Sometimes two skandhas... up to... and their arising, and so forth": bodily and vocal karma are the form skandha, and the four characteristics are the conditioning-forces skandha. Question: Can bodily and vocal karma of the desire realm project the vital faculty and generic similarity, or not? Answer: They cannot project them. Therefore, fascicle sixteen of the \*Nyāyānusāra\* says: "This ripening cause, generally speaking, is of two kinds: first, capable of projecting; second, capable of completing. Now, generic similarity and the vital faculty cannot be projected solely by conditioning forces not associated \[with the mind\]. How is this known to be so? Because it is stated in the sūtra. As the sūtra says: 'karma is the cause of rebirth', and so forth. Furthermore, it says: bodily and vocal karma that do not conform to the mind definitely cannot project the vital \[faculty\] and generic similarity. Were it not so, it would contradict both sūtra and valid reasoning; for the sūtra states that \[the lifespan and similarity\] in the inferior realm are projected by volition (cetanā). This means that the vital \[faculty\] and generic similarity of the desire-existence are brought about solely by mental karma, not by bodily or vocal karma. Bodily and vocal informative karma consist of numerous atoms arising from a single mind; if among them only one were to project generic similarity and the vital faculty while the rest lacked this capability, that would not be reasonable. If one allows that they simultaneously bring about a single fruit together, then they should be coexistent causes (sahabhū-hetu) for each other. But that secondary matter possessing resistance (sapratigha-upādāya-rūpa) could be coexistent causes is not admitted by our school, because they are not produced by reciprocal efficacy. Furthermore, it is not that the individual atoms successively project the vital faculty and generic similarity, because they arise from a single mind. It is not possible that things arising from a single mind, without distinct capacities, could separately project subsequent births without fault; nor does this fault apply to completing karma, for within a single lifetime, they each separately take completing fruits such as visible forms, odors, tastes, and so on. Based on this, non-informative \[karma\] is explained in the same way, because multiple entities of abstention arise from a single mind, and they are not admitted to be coexistent causes for each other. If there were non-resistant secondary matter that was not a coexistent cause, specifying 'possessing resistance' would be useless. It indicates that all secondary matter possessing resistance is not a coexistent cause. Hence it is said: secondary matter that is non-resistant can be a coexistent cause, and cannot be equated with that \[resistant matter\]. If bodily and vocal karma bound to the desire realm could not project, that would contradict the sūtra. As it says: 'If killing living beings is cultivated, practiced, and repeatedly practiced, one is born in the hells (naraka),' and so forth in detail. It also contradicts the fundamental treatises, such as where it says: 'Among these three evil actions, which offense is greatest? It is false speech conforming to schism in the Saṅgha. This karma takes ripening for an eon of life in the Avīci hell.' Lifespan is definitely stated to be a projected fruit. Here, mentioning what is initiated serves to reveal the volition that initiates it, because it is gross and easy to understand. There is no error of contradiction (end of quotation from the treatise)." From this we know that bodily and vocal karma cannot bring about the vital \[faculty\] and generic similarity. Question: Does this treatise agree with the \*Nyāyānusāra\*, or not? Explanation: This treatise text has no differing explanation; its intention agrees with the \*Nyāyānusāra\*. Question: If one says that only mental karma can bring about the vital \[faculty\] and generic similarity, why does the "Karma-nirdeśa" state: "Four kinds of good \[karma\] may occur together, but those projecting generic similarity are only three"? According to that text, they can simultaneously bring about three kinds of generic similarity—in the present life, the next life, and indefinite; one cannot say that mental karma of a single moment can bring about generic similarity for three lives, nor can one say that within one moment three mental karmas arise to bring about three generic similarities, nor can one say that the volition originating from three past causes brings about three generic similarities, because a ripening cause must take its fruit in the present. Explanation: That text merely shows that among the four kinds of karma, those to be experienced in the next life, subsequent lives, and indefinite can bring about generic similarity, while that to be experienced in the present cannot; it does not say that in a single moment one can simultaneously bring about three kinds of generic similarity. Therefore the treatise below says: "How many karmas can project generic similarity? Those capable of projecting are only three, excluding that to be experienced in the present, because generic similarity of the present body has already been projected by previous karma." Another question: If one says that desire-realm bodily and vocal karma cannot bring about the vital \[faculty\] and generic similarity, why does this treatise later say: "The attainments of the two mindless absorptions cannot project; the rest are unrestricted"? Since it says "the rest are unrestricted", we clearly know that bodily and vocal karma of the desire realm can also bring about the vital \[faculty\] and generic similarity. Explanation: The statement that they are unrestricted in bringing about \[fruits\] means they can permissibly bring them about; it does not say that all of them can do so without exception. If it is bodily and vocal karma conforming \[to the mind\], then it can bring them about; if it is bodily and vocal karma of the desire realm, then it cannot. Another explanation: This treatise does not agree with the \*Nyāyānusāra\*; bodily and vocal karma of the desire realm can also bring about the vital faculty and generic similarity. Among such karma, the numerous atoms, according to their appropriateness, may either only bring about a projecting fruit, or only bring about a completing fruit, or one portion brings about the projecting and one portion brings about the completing. If one says that because they arise from a single mind they are not permitted to bring about projecting and completing fruits—then arising from a single mind, which brings about visible forms, and which brings about odors and the rest? Although they arise from a single mind, there are differences in bringing about visible forms and the rest; what prevents things arising from a single mind from having differences between projecting and completing, earlier and later? If one makes this interpretation, it differs from the \*Nyāyānusāra\*. > — English (machine translation) (machine translation) - [Previous: 6.133](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1821.6.133) - [Next: 6.135](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1821.6.135) - [Up: 6](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1821.6) ## Translations (1) - [English (machine translation)](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1821~en-mt.6.134) — English, machine translation ## Linked texts (2) - [阿毘達磨順正理論](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.sanskrit.darsana.abhidharma.abhidharmakosa!nyayanusara*zh-xuanzang.16.12) — Classical Chinese - [阿毘達磨藏顯宗論](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.sanskrit.darsana.abhidharma.abhidharmakosa!abhidharmakosasastrakarikabhasya*zh-xuanzang.9.18) — Classical Chinese --- Source: [https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1821.6.134](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1821.6.134) · Pramāṇa