[Pramāṇa](https://indike.org/pramana/) › [Indian literature](https://indike.org/pramana/in) › [Buddhist Literature](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha) › [Taishō Tripiṭaka (Chinese Buddhist canon)](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho) › [俱舍論記](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1821) › 7.37 # 俱舍論記 7.37 俱舍論記 7.37 - **Language:** Classical Chinese ### [7.37](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1821.7.37) 「若法與心至第四句」者，明第二四句。等無間者，如前釋。無心定無間者，謂若有法接無心定後起，名無心定無間。以心等無間對無心定無間四句分別。前第三句，謂初所起二定剎那，及有心位心、心所法，為今第一句，是心果故，是心等無間；非接無心定後起故，非是無心定無間。前第四句，謂第二念等二定剎那上生、住、異、滅，及無心定出心、心所上生、住、異、滅，為今第二句，接無心定後起故，是無心定無間；非是心果故，非心等無間。前第一句，謂無心定出心、心所，及第二念等二定剎那，為今第三句，是心果故，是心等無間；接無心定後起故，是無心定無間。前第二句，謂初所起二定剎那上生、住、異、滅，及有心位諸心、心所上生、住、異、滅，為今第四句，非心果故，非是心等無間；非接無心定後起故，非是無心定無間。又《婆沙》十一云「問：彼何故不說無想異熟耶？有說：應說而不說者，當知此義有餘。有說：二無心定有加行有勤勞而得，故彼說之；無想異熟與此相違，故彼不說。有說：二無心定是善故說，無想異熟無覆無記故不說之。有說：若由心力無間引起不雜亂者，可名為心等無間法；無想異熟是異熟因力所引起任運而轉，非入彼心勢力所引，故不名心等無間法。問：若爾，異熟心、心所法亦異熟因力所引起任運而轉，應不名心等無間法。答：自類相引有勝勢力，不同彼故。俱是相應有所依等，說名自類。問：何故二無心定是心等無間法，而非心等無間緣耶？答：彼由心加行功用勤勞所引得故，名心等無間法。與心相違，遮斷心故，非心等無間緣。有說：彼由心勢力所引起故，名心等無間法；不相應、無所依、無行相、無警覺、無所緣故，非心等無間緣。有說：彼由心勢力得增長有作用故，名心等無間法；損減心令不起作用，非心等無間緣。問：何故二無心定前後相似無亂續生，而前非後等無間緣？答：由入定心勢力所引，不由前念力所引生故，前非後等無間緣。問：若爾異熟心、心所法，由異熟因勢力引起任運而轉，前應非後等無間緣。答：心、心所法是相應，有所依故。有行相、有警覺，有所緣故。前念於後有勝勢力引發開避故，皆是後等無間緣；不相應行與此相違，不可為例（已上論文）。」問：入二定心，為等無間緣取果、與果，為復同時？為不同時？解云：此不決定。故《正理》十九云「謂入定心居現在位，頓取諸定及出心果，亦與最初剎那定果滅入過去。隨後諸定及出定心一一生時與果，非取先已取故。豈不一切等無間緣無有異時取果、與果？此責非理。取果必頓，與果有漸，故無有失。又一說云：諸作是說，入二定心滅入過去，方能漸取第二念等定及出心。」《正理》破云「彼入定心應非過去。夫取果者是牽果名，諸牽果能是行作用，依行作用立三世別。若有作用非現在者，豈不便壞世別所依？」又彼論意，定及出心雖俱心果，為求定故，故定先起。於諸定中頓起無用，起一足能遮心。問：《正理》既言頓取果，未知，所取之果定當生不？若言定生，未來法亂，所取既多如何定起？若言取一，何理非餘？若一先相屬未來成次第。若不定生便違所說等無間緣果被取已必定當生，無法為障令不生故。解云：果生不定，以所取多、生者少故。諸有說言定當生者，意顯此緣既取果已，於所取內定有果生，而非一切。以實而言，亦有不生。或約有心位而云必生。問：於有心位何不頓取、漸與？解云：有心前起、後心正生，有心定隔，故不總取；無心不爾，故頓取也。又解：入定心為等無間緣，取、與同時。若初念現在取、與；若第二念已去，過去漸取，漸與。故《婆沙》一百九十六解等無間緣中云「此中有說：若前法未至已生位，不與後法作等無間；若至便作。若爾者，有心位可爾，無心位云何可爾？答：此中說有心位，不說餘位。有說：設依無心位說，亦無有過。謂入定心現在前時，頓取諸定及出心果，亦與最初剎那定果。後諸剎那及出定心生時與果，非取先已取故。評曰：彼不應作是說。所以者何？無有等無間緣異時取果、異時與果。若此時取果，則此時與果故。」問：何故《正理》與《婆沙》評家義相違？解云：此乃正理師過，非關俱舍師事。或可論意各別，何必《正理》皆以《婆沙》評家為量。《正理》意約取果作用立現在世，若與果但是功能故，不說過去取果。若《婆沙》意，過去既得起與果用，何故不得起取果用？初取果者立現在世，後取果者過去亦起。今《俱舍論》意同《婆沙》評家，不同《正理》。 > Regarding the passage from "If a phenomenon is \[equal and immediate\] to mind" up to "the fourth alternative": this clarifies the second set of four alternatives. "Equal and immediate" is as explained before. "Immediate to the mindless absorptions" means that if there is a phenomenon that arises contiguous to the mindless absorptions, it is called "immediate to the mindless absorptions". This differentiates between "equal and immediate to mind" and "immediate to the mindless absorptions" via four alternatives. The previous third alternative—namely, the moments of the two absorptions as initially arisen, and the mind and mental factors in states with mind—becomes the present first alternative: because they are effects of the mind, they are "equal and immediate to mind"; because they do not arise contiguous to the mindless absorptions, they are not "immediate to the mindless absorptions". The previous fourth alternative—namely, the arising, abiding, decay, and cessation upon the moments of the two absorptions from the second moment onward, and the arising, abiding, decay, and cessation upon the mind and mental factors emerging from the mindless absorptions—becomes the present second alternative: because they arise contiguous to the mindless absorptions, they are "immediate to the mindless absorptions"; because they are not effects of the mind, they are not "equal and immediate to mind". The previous first alternative—namely, the mind and mental factors emerging from the mindless absorptions, and the moments of the two absorptions from the second moment onward—becomes the present third alternative: because they are effects of the mind, they are "equal and immediate to mind"; because they arise contiguous to the mindless absorptions, they are "immediate to the mindless absorptions". The previous second alternative—namely, the arising, abiding, decay, and cessation upon the moments of the two absorptions as initially arisen, and the arising, abiding, decay, and cessation upon mind and mental factors in states with mind—becomes the present fourth alternative: because they are not effects of the mind, they are not "equal and immediate to mind"; because they do not arise contiguous to the mindless absorptions, they are not "immediate to the mindless absorptions". Furthermore, the Vibhāṣā, fascicle eleven, says: "Question: Why does that \[text\] not speak of non-conceptual fruition (āsaṃjñika-vipāka)? Some say: It should have been spoken of, but was not spoken of; one should know that this meaning is incomplete. Some say: The two mindless absorptions are attained through exertion and effort, therefore that text speaks of them; non-conceptual fruition is contrary to this, therefore it does not speak of it. Some say: Because the two mindless absorptions are wholesome, they are spoken of; non-conceptual fruition is unobstructed neutral (anivṛtāvyākṛta), therefore it is not spoken of. Some say: If it is induced immediately by the power of the mind without confusion, it can be called a phenomenon equal and immediate to mind; non-conceptual fruition is induced by the force of the fruitional cause and operates spontaneously, not being induced by the force of the mind that enters into it, hence it is not called a phenomenon equal and immediate to mind. Question: If so, fruitional mind and mental factors are also induced by the force of the fruitional cause and operate spontaneously; they should also not be called phenomena equal and immediate to mind. Answer: Homogeneous series inducing one another have superior force, not being like that \[non-conceptual fruition\], because they are all associated, possess a support, and so forth, which is why they are called 'homogeneous'. Question: Why are the two mindless absorptions phenomena equal and immediate to mind, yet not equal and immediate conditions of the mind? Answer: Because they are acquired and induced through the exertion, function, and effort of the mind, they are called phenomena equal and immediate to mind. But because they are contrary to the mind and obstruct and cut off the mind, they are not equal and immediate conditions of the mind. Some say: Because they are induced by the power of the mind, they are called phenomena equal and immediate to mind; but because they are non-associated, lack a support, lack mental aspects (ākāra), lack alertness, and lack cognitive objects, they are not equal and immediate conditions of the mind. Some say: Because through the power of the mind they attain increase and have activity, they are called phenomena equal and immediate to mind; but because they impair the mind and cause it not to produce activity, they are not equal and immediate conditions. Question: Why do the two mindless absorptions arise continuously, similar and unconfused before and after, yet the former is not the equal and immediate condition of the latter? Answer: Because they are induced by the power of the mind entering absorption, and not induced to arise by the power of the preceding moment; therefore, the former is not the equal and immediate condition of the latter. Question: If so, fruitional mind and mental factors are induced by the force of fruitional causes and operate spontaneously; the former should not be the equal and immediate condition of the latter. Answer: Mind and mental factors are associated and possess a support; they have mental aspects, alertness, and cognitive objects. The preceding moment has superior force with respect to the latter, inducing it and clearing the way; hence all are equal and immediate conditions of the latter. Formations non-associated \[with mind\] are contrary to this and cannot serve as an analogy." (Thus far the text of the treatise.) Question: Does the mind entering the two absorptions, as an equal and immediate condition, grasp its effect and give its effect at the same time, or at different times? Explanation: This is not fixed. Therefore, the Nyāyānusāra, fascicle nineteen, says: "When the mind entering absorption resides in the present state, it grasps the absorptions and the effect that is the emerging mind all at once, and it also gives the effect of the initial moment of absorption, then ceases and enters the past. Subsequently, as each of the absorptions and the emerging mind arises, it gives the effect, but does not grasp it, because it was already grasped before. Is it not so that all equal and immediate conditions never grasp the effect and give the effect at different times? This objection is unreasonable. Grasping the effect must be simultaneous, while giving the effect is gradual; thus there is no error. Furthermore, another explanation says: Those who maintain this say that only after the mind entering the two absorptions has ceased and entered the past can it gradually grasp the absorptions from the second moment onward and the emerging mind." The Nyāyānusāra refutes this: "That mind entering absorption should then not be past. For grasping the effect is another name for drawing forth the effect; all capacities to draw forth effects are the activity (kāritra) of conditioned phenomena, and it is based on the activity of conditioned phenomena that the distinction of the three times is established. If there were an activity that is not present, would that not ruin the basis for the distinction of the times?" Moreover, the purport of that treatise is: although the absorption and the emerging mind are both effects of the mind, because absorption is sought, absorption arises first. To arise simultaneously among absorptions would be useless, and the arising of one is sufficient to obstruct the mind. Question: Since the Nyāyānusāra says that it grasps the effects all at once, it is not known whether the grasped effects are certain to arise or not. If one says they are certain to arise, future phenomena would be confused; since what is grasped is manifold, how could they arise determinately? If one says it grasps only one, by what reason is it not the others? If one is designated first, the future would be ordered in sequence. If they do not arise determinately, this contradicts what has been said: that once the effect of an equal and immediate condition has been grasped, it must determinately arise, because no phenomenon can obstruct it so as to make it not arise. Explanation: The arising of the effect is not determinate, because what is grasped is manifold and what arises is few. Those who say that it determinately arises intend to show that once this condition has grasped its effects, among what is grasped there is determinately an effect that arises, but not that all arise. To speak truthfully, there are also some that do not arise. Or it is stated with reference to states with mind that they must arise. Question: In states with mind, why does it not grasp all at once and give gradually? Explanation: In the state with mind, the preceding arises and the subsequent mind is just arising, being necessarily intervened by a mind; therefore, it does not grasp all of them together. The mindless state is not like this, hence it grasps all at once. Another explanation: The mind entering absorption acts as an equal and immediate condition, grasping and giving simultaneously. In the initial moment, it grasps and gives in the present; from the second moment onward, it gradually grasps and gradually gives in the past. Therefore, the Vibhāṣā, fascicle one hundred ninety-six, in explaining the equal and immediate condition, says: "Here, some say: If the preceding phenomenon has not reached the already-arisen state, it does not act as equal and immediate to the subsequent phenomenon; if it has reached it, it does. If so, this is possible for states with mind; how can it be possible for mindless states? Answer: Here it speaks of states with mind, not of other states. Some say: Even if stated with reliance on mindless states, there is no error. Namely, when the mind entering absorption is present, it grasps the absorptions and the emerging mind as effects all at once, and also gives the effect of the initial moment of absorption. When subsequent moments and the mind emerging from absorption arise, it gives the effect, but does not grasp it, because it was already grasped before. Critical evaluation: They should not state it like this. Why? There is no equal and immediate condition that grasps the effect at one time and gives the effect at a different time. If it grasps the effect at this time, it gives the effect at this time." Question: Why does the Nyāyānusāra contradict the meaning of the Vibhāṣā's critical evaluator? Explanation: This is the fault of the Nyāyānusāra master, and has nothing to do with the master of the Kośa. Or it may be that the treatises have distinct intentions; why must the Nyāyānusāra take the Vibhāṣā's critical evaluator as the standard in every case? The intention of the Nyāyānusāra establishes the present time based on the activity of grasping the effect, whereas giving the effect is merely a capacity, so it does not speak of grasping the effect in the past. In the Vibhāṣā's intention, since the past can produce the function of giving an effect, why can it not produce the function of grasping an effect? The one that grasps the effect first is established as the present time, while the ones that grasp the effect later can also arise in the past. Now the intention of the Abhidharmakośa-śāstra agrees with the Vibhāṣā's critical evaluator, and differs from the Nyāyānusāra. > — English (machine translation) (machine translation) - [Previous: 7.36](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1821.7.36) - [Next: 7.38](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1821.7.38) - [Up: 7](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1821.7) ## Translations (1) - [English (machine translation)](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1821~en-mt.7.37) — English, machine translation ## Linked texts (2) - [俱舍論疏](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1822.7.45) — Classical Chinese - [阿毘達磨藏顯宗論](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.sanskrit.darsana.abhidharma.abhidharmakosa!abhidharmakosasastrakarikabhasya*zh-xuanzang.10.12) — Classical Chinese --- Source: [https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1821.7.37](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1821.7.37) · Pramāṇa