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# 俱舍論疏 10.83

俱舍論疏 10.83

- **Language:** Classical Chinese

### [10.83](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1822.10.83)

論「許故非失至亦互為果」，有部答也。我宗許二互為因果。今詳此答與本文不順，本諍觸生受義，此即不是二互相生，與俱有因義意有別。何因有部作此釋耶？今釋此疑。雖本問觸生受義，而今我便別諍同時因果。有部許有，經部不許，故有部以俱有因答。

> On the Śāstra's statement: "Because it is accepted, there is no fallacy ... they are also mutually effects": this is the Sarvāstivādin's reply. Our school accepts that the two mutually serve as cause and effect. Now, examining this reply carefully, it does not accord with the root text: the original dispute was over the principle of contact producing feeling, which does not mean the two mutually producing each other, and differs in sense from co-existent cause. Why did the Sarvāstivādin offer this explanation? We now resolve this doubt: although the original question was about contact producing feeling, now the debate has shifted to simultaneous cause and effect. The Sarvāstivāda accepts it, whereas the Sautrāntika does not; therefore the Sarvāstivādin answered by means of the co-existent cause.  
> — English (machine translation) (machine translation)

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## Translations (1)

- [English (machine translation)](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1822~en-mt.10.83) — English, machine translation

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Source: [https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1822.10.83](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1822.10.83) · Pramāṇa
