[Pramāṇa](https://indike.org/pramana/) › [Indian literature](https://indike.org/pramana/in) › [Buddhist Literature](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha) › [Taishō Tripiṭaka (Chinese Buddhist canon)](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho) › [俱舍論疏](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1822) › 13.56 # 俱舍論疏 13.56 俱舍論疏 13.56 - **Language:** Classical Chinese ### [13.56](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1822.13.56) 論「然如依觸至能取於形」，論主釋無別形。然如依觸取長等相，而許但是多竪等積，無別長觸依顯取形，故知但是多顯色積，無別長等。《正理論》云「然經主言形非實有，乃至如是依顯能取於形。此理不然，了相別故。若一方面唯顯多生，了相於中應無差別。既有長、白二了相異，故於顯外別有形色。現見有觸，同根所取，了相異故，體有差別。如堅與冷、或煖與堅。如是白、長雖同根取，而了相異，故體應別。故知聚色分析漸漸，乃至於中可生形覺，必有少分形覺生因形色極微於中猶起。理必應爾，以色聚中有唯顯生形色不起，於中唯有顯覺非形。如見空中光、明等色。若即顯色說名為形，無分量顯中亦應起形覺，不相離故，如火界煖。彼火㷮喻，於證無能，餘處極成可假說故。謂於餘處有長、圓等所依實因，同時無間於多方所安布差別所成色聚長等極成。由是故於火㷮等色異時別處無間轉中，計度立為假長、圓等。未曾見有世俗、勝義俱不極成而可假立。應二根取難亦不成，長等但為意識境故。以諸假有唯是意識所緣境界，如前已辨。能成長等如種極微，如是安布說為形色，是無分別眼識所取，非身能取。如是形色，如依身根了堅、濕等，了長、短等不如是故。以非闇中了堅、濕等，即於彼位或次後時即能了知長、短等相。要於一面多觸生中，依身根門分別觸已方能比度。知觸俱行眼識所牽、意識所受，如是相狀差別形色，如見火色及嗅花香，能憶俱行火觸花色。現見眼識隨其所應，有於一時形、顯俱了。意識分別前、後無定，以顯與形是一眼識所緣境故，意識分別時差別故、了相異故，其體不同，形亦非觸。寧有身根能取形義？故不應難應二根取。」今詳兩論互有勝劣。俱舍論主言一形色應二根取積集顯色以成長等；而言長等眼能見者，其理少疎。正理論師以了相異證有別形，亦非決定生其形覺，為是眼識相應？為是意識相應？若眼識相應，容可證有別體。何理能證定是眼識同一剎那生白、長二覺？若意識相應，寧知不同行、輪等覺？蟻樹之外無別行、輪，如何定證別有形色？又於影等生長等覺，於中何故不許有形？又如書色，文有前後屈曲不同，生高、下覺。於中何不有高、下形？若言有者，即違自宗；若言無者，因何生覺？又云「故知聚色分折漸微，乃至於中可生形覺，必有少分形覺生因形色極微於中猶起。理必應爾。以色聚中有唯顯生形色不起，於中唯有顯覺非形，如見空中光、明等色。若即顯色說名為形，無分量顯中亦應起形覺，不相離故，如火界煖」者，此亦無理。有分量顯室中之光，生於形覺唯有顯故。又烟、雲等亦生形覺，如何自云形色有八、顯色十二？ > On the Śāstra's: "Yet just as, relying on touch ... grasps shape": The author of the Śāstra explains that there is no distinct shape. Just as, relying on touch, the characteristic of long and the like is grasped, yet it is acknowledged that this is only the accumulation of many verticals and the like, without a distinct "long touch"; relying on visible color to grasp shape, one therefore knows that it is only the accumulation of many visible colors, with no distinct long and the like. The Nyāyānusāra states: "However, the author of the Śāstra says that shape is not real, up to 'thus, relying on visible color, one grasps shape.' This reasoning is incorrect, because the grasped characteristics differ. If on one side only visible color arose in abundance, the grasped characteristic within it should have no difference. Since there are two distinct grasped characteristics, long and white, there is shape-color distinct from visible color. We directly see that touches, though grasped by the same sense faculty, have distinct substances because their grasped characteristics differ, such as solidity and cold, or warmth and solidity. Likewise, although white and long are grasped by the same sense faculty, their grasped characteristics differ, so their substances must be distinct. Therefore one knows that as an aggregate of matter is analyzed finer and finer, down to the point where the cognition of shape can arise within it, there must still arise within it some atomic particles of shape-color that are the cause of producing the cognition of shape. In principle it must be so, because within an aggregate of matter there are cases where only visible color arises while shape-color does not arise, wherein there is only the cognition of visible color and not shape, as when seeing light, clarity, and other colors in the sky. If visible color itself were called shape, then even within visible color devoid of measurement, the cognition of shape would also arise, because they would not be separated, like the warmth of the fire element. That simile of the firebrand is incapable of proving anything, because elsewhere it is fully established \[as real\], allowing metaphorical designation. That is, elsewhere there exist real causes upon which long, circular, and the like depend, simultaneously and without interval arranged in spatial distinctions, so that the resulting aggregates of matter are fully established as long and so on. Hence, with respect to the color of a firebrand and the like turning continuously at different times and places, one imputes and posits nominal long, circular, and the like. It has never been seen that what is unestablished in both the conventional and ultimate can be conventionally designated. The objection of 'graspable by two sense faculties' also fails, because long and the like are only objects of the mental consciousness. For all nominal existents are only cognitive objects of the mental consciousness, as previously explained. The atomic particles like seeds that can produce long and the like, arranged in this way, are called shape-color; they are grasped by non-conceptual visual consciousness, not graspable by the body. This shape-color is not like knowing solidity, wetness, and so on relying on the body faculty, for knowing long, short, and so on is not like that. For it is not the case that upon knowing solidity, wetness, and so on in the dark, at that very moment or immediately afterward one is able to know the characteristics of long, short, and so on. Only when multiple touches arise on one side, after discriminating the touch relying on the gateway of the body faculty, can one then infer. Knowing that the visual consciousness acting concurrently with touch draws it forth and mental consciousness receives it, such differentiated shape-color of distinct appearance is just like seeing the color of fire and smelling the fragrance of a flower being able to remember the concurrent touch of fire and color of the flower. We directly see that visual consciousness, as appropriate, sometimes grasps both shape and visible color at once. Mental consciousness discriminates earlier or later without fixed order; because visible color and shape are the cognitive objects of a single visual consciousness, while the time of mental discrimination differs and their grasped characteristics differ, their substances are not the same, nor is shape tactile. How could there be any sense in which the body faculty grasps shape? Therefore one should not raise the objection of being graspable by two sense faculties." Now, examining both treatises, each has merits and defects. The author of the Abhidharmakośa says that a single shape-color would be grasped by two sense faculties, and that an aggregation of visible colors forms long and the like; yet saying that the eye can see long and the like is somewhat loose in reasoning. The master of the Nyāyānusāra proves a distinct shape by difference of grasped characteristic, which is also not conclusive: Does the cognition of shape arise associated with visual consciousness, or associated with mental consciousness? If associated with visual consciousness, it could conceivably prove a distinct substance. What reasoning can prove that visual consciousness definitely produces both cognitions of white and long in a single moment? If associated with mental consciousness, how does one know it is not like the cognitions of a procession, a wheel, and the like? Outside of ants and trees, there is no distinct procession or wheel; how can one conclusively prove that there is distinct shape-color? Furthermore, cognitions of long and the like arise regarding shadows and the like: why is shape not admitted therein? Also, as with written characters, where the strokes have diverse twists and curves before and after, producing cognitions of high and low: why is there no high and low shape therein? If one says there is, that contradicts his own school; if one says there is not, on what basis does the cognition arise? Furthermore, saying: "Therefore one knows that as an aggregate of matter is analyzed finer and finer, down to the point where the cognition of shape can arise within it, there must still arise within it some atomic particles of shape-color that are the cause of producing the cognition of shape. In principle it must be so, because within an aggregate of matter there are cases where only visible color arises while shape-color does not arise, wherein there is only the cognition of visible color and not shape, as when seeing light, clarity, and other colors in the sky. If visible color itself were called shape, then even within visible color devoid of measurement, the cognition of shape would also arise, because they would not be separated, like the warmth of the fire element"—this is also without reason. In the light within a room, which has measurement, the cognition of shape arises, yet there is only visible color. Moreover, smoke, clouds, and the like also produce cognitions of shape: how can he himself say there are eight shape-colors and twelve visible colors? > — English (machine translation) (machine translation) - [Previous: 13.55](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1822.13.55) - [Next: 13.57](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1822.13.57) - [Up: 13](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1822.13) ## Translations (1) - [English (machine translation)](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1822~en-mt.13.56) — English, machine translation ## Linked texts (1) - [阿毘達磨順正理論](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.sanskrit.darsana.abhidharma.abhidharmakosa!nyayanusara*zh-xuanzang.34.4.2) — Classical Chinese --- Source: [https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1822.13.56](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1822.13.56) · Pramāṇa