[Pramāṇa](https://indike.org/pramana/) › [Indian literature](https://indike.org/pramana/in) › [Buddhist Literature](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha) › [Taishō Tripiṭaka (Chinese Buddhist canon)](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho) › [俱舍論疏](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1822) › 13.66 # 俱舍論疏 13.66 俱舍論疏 13.66 - **Language:** Classical Chinese ### [13.66](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1822.13.66) 論「以闇遠中至唯知總聚」，論主釋，如文可解。《正理論》云「如何具壽許有極成顯色極微非形細分。如諸顯色，一一極微無獨起理。設有獨起，以極細故非眼所得，於積集時眼可得故，證知定有顯色極微。形色極微亦應如是，寧獨不許自相極成？諸有對色所積集處，皆決定有極微可得。既於聚色差別生中有形覺生不待於顯，如不待餘顯有餘顯覺生，是故定應別有，如種能成長等。」形色極微，今詳無理，後有分量，知前有種分量。種者即形極微，此亦非理，後有行、輪，豈樹、蟻外而許有別行、輪細分？又云「諸顯極微有質礙故，即應積集假立長等」，此亦非理，香等極微亦應積集為長等。故以彼香等所有極微亦有質礙，唯據處所不相容納名質礙故。若謂香等所有極微，非有見故，無同彼失。則諸顯色所有極微，亦非形故，豈成長等？如何知顯微體非形？如前已說，了相異故，不待顯色形覺生故。或有顯聚不見形故，非體是形，有多積集無障有眼可不見形。是故應知異於顯色有色處攝形色極微，由此集成長等假色，故形細分非不極成。准上論文，形微是實，長等是假。其長等微，或同、或異。如〈界品〉釋。然經部宗許長等色攬顯微成，是假非實，眼識所取，恐非應理，行、輪等假唯意境故。正理論師雖有多救，然以生覺證別有形，非為定證。無行、輪體有行、輪覺，故應顯色成長等時，此即顯色名為長等。眼見形體非見假形，此順釋宗妙扶至理。 > On the Śāstra's statement: "Because in the dark or at a distance \[... to ...\] one only knows the aggregate": The Śāstra master explains; it can be understood from the text. The Nyāyānusāra says: "How can the Venerable One accept that there are universally established atoms of visible color, but not subtle parts of shape? Just as with visible colors, there is no principle by which individual atoms arise in isolation, and even if they arose in isolation, because of their extreme subtlety they would not be apprehended by the eye, yet when aggregated they are apprehended by the eye, which proves that there definitely are atoms of visible color; shape-matter atoms should also be likewise—why exclusively refuse to accept their self-characteristic as universally established? Wherever obstructive color-matter is aggregated, atoms can definitely be apprehended. Since, when variations of aggregated color-matter arise, a cognition of shape arises without depending on visible color—just as without depending on other visible colors, a cognition of another visible color arises—therefore there definitely must be distinct \[atoms\], just as seeds can produce long and so forth." As for shape-matter atoms, when now examined, this is unreasonable: if later there is a dimension, one knows that prior to it there is a dimension of the seed; the "seed" would be the shape-atom, but this too is unreasonable. When later there is a line or a circle, could one concede, apart from trees or ants, distinct subtle parts of a line or a circle? It also says: "Because atoms of visible color have physical resistance, they should precisely aggregate and be provisionally designated as long and so forth." This too is unreasonable: atoms of fragrance and so forth should also aggregate into long and so forth, because those atoms of fragrance and so forth also have physical resistance, since physical resistance is named solely based on loci not accommodating one another. If it is said that the atoms of fragrance and so forth lack visible manifestation and therefore do not have that same fault, then the atoms of visible color are also not shape, so how could they form long and so forth? How does one know that the substance of visible-color atoms is not shape? As previously explained: because their apprehended characteristics differ, and because the cognition of shape arises without depending on visible color. Or, because in some aggregates of visible color one does not see shape, their substance is not shape, for when there is a large aggregation without obstruction, could an eye fail to see shape? Therefore, one should know that distinct from visible color there are shape-matter atoms subsumed under the visible-form base (rūpāyatana), and through their aggregation provisional color-forms such as "long" are formed; thus the subtle parts of shape are not without universal establishment. According to the above treatise passage, shape-atoms are real, and "long" and so forth are provisional. The atoms of "long" and so forth are either identical or different, as explained in the "Chapter on Dhātus". However, the Sautrāntika school maintains that color-forms such as "long" are constituted by gathering atoms of visible color, and are provisional, not real, being grasped by the eye-consciousness; this, we fear, is not reasonable, because provisionalities such as lines and circles are objects of the mental faculty alone. Although the master of the Nyāyānusāra offers many defenses, proving distinct shape by the arising of a cognition is not a definitive proof. In the absence of a substance of a line or a circle, there is a cognition of a line or a circle; therefore, when visible color forms "long" and so forth, this visible color itself is called "long" and so forth. The eye sees the substance of shape, not provisional shape; this conforms with the explanation of the school and wonderfully supports the ultimate principle. > — English (machine translation) (machine translation) - [Previous: 13.65](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1822.13.65) - [Next: 13.67](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1822.13.67) - [Up: 13](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1822.13) ## Translations (1) - [English (machine translation)](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1822~en-mt.13.66) — English, machine translation ## Linked texts (1) - [阿毘達磨順正理論](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.sanskrit.darsana.abhidharma.abhidharmakosa!nyayanusara*zh-xuanzang.34.4.3) — Classical Chinese --- Source: [https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1822.13.66](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1822.13.66) · Pramāṇa