[Pramāṇa](https://indike.org/pramana/) › [Indian literature](https://indike.org/pramana/in) › [Buddhist Literature](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha) › [Taishō Tripiṭaka (Chinese Buddhist canon)](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho) › [俱舍論疏](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1822) › 2.11 # 俱舍論疏 2.11 俱舍論疏 2.11 - **Language:** Classical Chinese ### [2.11](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1822.2.11) 論「若於彼法至名為所緣」，答也。「若於彼法此有功能」者，《正理論》云「如人於彼有勝功能，便說彼為我之境界。」釋曰：有境之法，於自境上有見聞等遊履功能，名為境界。心、心所法執境而起，名為所緣。即心、心法二差別者，執境而起心，心所同，名為所緣。越彼彼境或餘境中此不轉故，名為有對。取像、印持功能差別，心、心法異，名為境界。越彼於餘境，此不轉故，名為有對。此謂差別。有人有四解。一云：境界有對，此約有能，非要起用，如彼同分眼名有對。所緣有對，執所緣境方起至現，謂起彼取果用，有緣即起、無緣不起，皆名有對。第二解：礙取境用，名境界有對。礙取果用，名所緣有對。第三解：礙體義邊，名所緣有對。礙用義邊，名境界有對。第四解：礙取境用，名境界有對。礙緣境用，名所緣有對。詳此四解，竝非論意。 > The treatise says: "If with respect to that phenomenon this \[phenomenon\] has functioning... it is called a cognitive object." This is the answer. As for "if with respect to that phenomenon this \[phenomenon\] has functioning," the Nyāyānusāra states: "Just as when a person has superior functioning with respect to something, one says that that is my sphere." The explanation states: Phenomena possessing an object have the functioning of ranging through seeing, hearing, and so forth, upon their own sphere, and are therefore called "objective spheres." Mind and mental concomitants arise by grasping the object, and are therefore called "cognitive objects." As for the distinction between these two, mind and mental concomitants: Arising by grasping the object is common to both mind and mental concomitants, and is termed "cognitive object." Because they do not operate beyond this or that object or within other objects, they are called "having opposition." The differing functions of taking up the image and determining/holding it differentiate mind and mental concomitants, and are termed "objective sphere." Because they do not operate beyond that with respect to other objects, they are called "having opposition." This is the distinction. A certain master has four explanations. The first says: Objective opposition is based on having capacity, not necessarily the actual arising of activity, just as the eye of the same class (sabhāga) is called having opposition. Cognitive opposition requires grasping the cognitive object for it to arise and present itself, meaning the arising of the activity of taking a fruit; having a cognitive condition it arises, lacking a cognitive condition it does not arise—all are called having opposition. The second explanation: Obstruction of the activity of taking an object is called objective opposition; obstruction of the activity of taking a fruit is called cognitive opposition. The third explanation: In terms of the sense of obstructing the substance, it is called cognitive opposition; in terms of the sense of obstructing the activity, it is called objective opposition. The fourth explanation: Obstruction of the activity of taking an object is called objective opposition; obstruction of the activity of cognizing an object is called cognitive opposition. Examining these four explanations, none of them accords with the treatise's intention. > — English (machine translation) (machine translation) - [Previous: 2.10](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1822.2.10) - [Next: 2.12](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1822.2.12) - [Up: 2](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1822.2) ## Translations (1) - [English (machine translation)](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1822~en-mt.2.11) — English, machine translation ## Linked texts (1) - [俱舍論記](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1821.2.11) — Classical Chinese --- Source: [https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1822.2.11](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1822.2.11) · Pramāṇa