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# 俱舍論疏 4.185

俱舍論疏 4.185

- **Language:** Classical Chinese

### [4.185](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1822.4.185)

論「事平等者至各各亦爾」，逐難釋也。有人云：一、所依平等，謂必同所依根。意識及相應法有一種依，謂無間滅意根。五識及相應法各有二依，一同時依止根、二無間滅意根，隨應皆是所依平等。此文欲攝二種所依，故不別言同一所依。諸論中說心、心所法同一依者，且據別依，故說六識及相應法名同一依。又解：所依平等，此顯六識及相應法各同一依。故解相應因中云「此中同言顯所依一」，雖復五識亦依意根，此文且據同時依說。二、所緣平等，謂必同所緣。於所緣中，或時緣一或復緣多，隨應皆是所緣平等。諸論中說心、心所法同一緣者，且據別緣一法說也。若不爾者，如無我觀，除自相應、俱有，通緣一切，此豈同一所緣？又解：所緣平等，此顯六識及相應法各同一緣。故諸論中說心、心所法同一所緣。雖復亦有緣多境者，此文且據緣一境說。三、行相平等。心、心所法其體明淨，隨緣何境各起行相，或緣一法各一行相，或緣多法各多行相，若一若多行相皆別，隨應皆是行相平等。以多現時各有多相，故不言同一行相。諸論中說心、心所法同一行相者，且據緣一境相似義同，理實皆別。又解：行相平等，此顯心、心所法同緣一境名同一行相。故諸論說心、心所法同一行相，雖復行相各別不同，據相似同故言同一行相。雖復亦有緣多境時多行相現，各互相望而不相似，此中且約緣一境說。詳其此釋同一所依、同一所緣、同一行相，不得論意。論言同一所依者，非謂所依唯一根故名同一所依，是心、心所法雖多不同，共一所依，名同一所依。若一若二皆名同一，如何得說所依雖二且據一說？同一所緣者，謂心、心所雖復不同，若想緣青，受等亦緣青等，由此故說同一所緣。即心、心所法共緣無量百千多法雖復不同，所緣共故，皆名同一所緣。如何將無我觀難一所緣？即自解：云且據一說。同一行相者，心王起一青行相時，諸心所等亦同起此相；如心王緣多境時起多行相，心所亦爾，名同一行相。如何得言且據一說？

> Regarding the commentary statement, "Equality of substance... is also likewise for each": this explains by addressing objections. Someone said: First, equality of supporting basis means necessarily having the same supporting faculty. Mental consciousness and its concordant dharmas have one kind of supporting basis, namely, the immediately past mental faculty. The five consciousnesses and their concordant dharmas each have two supporting bases: one is the simultaneously active supporting faculty, and the two is the immediately past mental faculty; as appropriate, all are equality of supporting basis. This text wishes to subsume both kinds of supporting bases, so it does not specifically say "the same single supporting basis." Where various treatises say that mind and mental factors have the same supporting basis, this is merely based on their distinct supporting bases, so they say the six consciousnesses and their concordant dharmas are said to have the same single supporting basis. Another explanation: Equality of supporting basis shows that the six consciousnesses and their concordant dharmas each have the same single supporting basis. Therefore, in explaining the concordant cause, it says: "Here, the word 'same' shows that the supporting basis is one." Although the five consciousnesses also rely on the mental faculty, this text merely speaks based on the simultaneously active supporting basis. Second, equality of objective cognitive object means necessarily having the same objective cognitive object. Among objective cognitive objects, sometimes one is cognized, or sometimes many are cognized; as appropriate, all are equality of objective cognitive object. Where various treatises say that mind and mental factors have the same objective cognitive object, this merely speaks based on specifically cognizing a single dharma. If not so, as in the contemplation of nonself, excluding what is concordant with itself and what coexists with itself, it cognizes everything generally—could this be the same single objective cognitive object? Another explanation: Equality of objective cognitive object shows that the six consciousnesses and their concordant dharmas each have the same single objective cognitive object. Therefore, various treatises say that mind and mental factors have the same single objective cognitive object. Although there are also those that cognize multiple objects, this text merely speaks based on cognizing a single object. Third, equality of aspect. The substance of mind and mental factors is clear and pure; whatever object is cognized, each gives rise to an aspect—either cognizing a single dharma with each \[having\] a single aspect, or cognizing multiple dharmas with each \[having\] multiple aspects; whether one or multiple, the aspects are all distinct; as appropriate, all are equality of aspect. Because when multiple appear each has multiple aspects, it does not say "the same single aspect." Where various treatises say that mind and mental factors have the same single aspect, this merely refers to the similarity of meaning when cognizing a single object; in truth, they are all distinct. Another explanation: Equality of aspect shows that mind and mental factors cognizing the same object is called "the same single aspect." Therefore, various treatises say that mind and mental factors have the same single aspect; although their aspects are distinct and different, based on their being similar and identical they are said to have the same single aspect. Although there are also times when cognizing multiple objects where multiple aspects appear and do not resemble one another when viewed comparatively, here it is merely spoken with respect to cognizing a single object. Examining these explanations of having the same supporting basis, the same objective cognitive object, and the same aspect, they do not grasp the intent of the treatise. When the treatise says "the same supporting basis," it does not mean that because the supporting basis is only a single faculty it is called "the same supporting basis"; rather, although mind and mental factors are many and distinct, they share a single supporting basis, which is called "the same supporting basis." Whether one or two, all are called "the same"; how could one say that although the supporting bases are two, it is merely spoken based on one? "The same objective cognitive object" means that although mind and mental factors are distinct, if conception cognizes blue, feeling and the rest also cognize blue and so forth; because of this, they are said to have the same objective cognitive object. That is, although mind and mental factors collectively cognize immeasurable hundreds of thousands of multiple dharmas and are distinct, because their objective cognitive object is shared, they are all called "having the same objective cognitive object." How could one take the contemplation of nonself to object to a single objective cognitive object, and then explain it away oneself by saying it is merely spoken based on one? "The same aspect" means that when the primary mind gives rise to a single aspect of blue, the various mental factors and so forth also simultaneously give rise to this aspect; just as when the primary mind cognizes multiple objects it gives rise to multiple aspects, the mental factors are also like this, which is called "the same single aspect." How could one say it is merely spoken based on one?  
> — English (machine translation) (machine translation)

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## Translations (1)

- [English (machine translation)](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1822~en-mt.4.185) — English, machine translation

## Linked texts (1)

- [俱舍論記](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1821.4.176) — Classical Chinese

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Source: [https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1822.4.185](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1822.4.185) · Pramāṇa
