中觀論疏 1.25

From "Question: For what reason was this treatise composed?" onward is the second [section], clarifying the intention behind composing the treatise. When Nāgārjuna composed the treatise, there was only the verse text; the prose below is entirely the commentary by Piṅgala. In terms of the text, there are two parts: first, the question; second, the answer. The question is of two kinds: first, arising from what precedes; second, arising independently. As for arising from what precedes: above it says, "He who is able to teach this dependent origination / Excellently puts an end to all prapañca." Since it praises the Buddha as being able to reveal the middle way and excellently put an end to all prapañca, if so, the Buddha had already revealed the middle way and already put an end to prapañca—why now should you compose a treatise again? If you compose a treatise again, then the Buddha had not yet revealed the middle way and not yet put an end to prapañca. As for the second, the independently arising question, it has eight points: First, since the Buddhist sūtras are already immeasurable, and sentient beings still cannot exhaust them by reading and investigating them, why now do you compose a treatise again? If you compose yet another, will this not set aside the Buddhist sūtras and display your own treatise? Second, the Buddha's words are skillful and his wisdom profound, yet sentient beings still cannot understand them by reading and investigating them. Your words do not equal the Buddha's words, and your wisdom is shallower than the Buddha's wisdom; how could they attain awakening by reading and investigating your treatise? If they were to attain understanding by reading and investigating your treatise, then your words and wisdom would surpass the Buddha's. Third, as stated in the "Establishing Treatises Chapter" of the *Tattvasiddhi-śāstra*: "Question: One should not compose a treatise to discuss the Buddha's words. Why is this so? The intent of an omniscient person is difficult to understand. If the Buddha himself discusses it, it can be called a treatise; if the Buddha does not discuss it, other people cannot discuss it." Since Nāgārjuna has not yet equaled the Buddha, how can he discuss the Buddha's intent? Fourth, all Buddhas clearly see the future capacities of beings, and while in the world preaching the sūtras, they preemptively block their confusion and proactively open up their understanding; this matter was already sufficient. Why now do you compose a treatise again? Fifth, Aśvaghoṣa and others have already composed treatises; why now do you compose a treatise again? Sixth, you have already composed the *Akutobhayā-śāstra*, extensively explaining the middle and real and extensively putting an end to prapañca, and the *Mādhyamika* is already contained within it. Why now do you compose it again? Seventh, whoever composes a treatise generally has many faults, exposing others' shortcomings and displaying their own strengths. Even if internally there is no right and wrong, to external observation there are many faults; therefore one should not compose a treatise. Eighth, Nāgārjuna's appearing in the world was like the Buddha flourishing once again; outsiders would not dare obstruct the composing of a treatise, but having not understood the reason for composing the treatise, they therefore request that he state his intention; hence this question. From "Answer:" onward, the second part, since the text of the treatise is long, now answers them in advance. Answering the first question: The Buddhist sūtras already revealed the middle and real and already put an end to prapañca, but this only benefited and converted those at that time. Sentient beings of the latter age also give rise to prapañca again and obscure the middle way; therefore I now must compose a treatise again. Answering the second question: It is precisely because the texts and words of the Buddhist sūtras are vast and extensive, difficult to investigate thoroughly, that I now briefly summarize the core of the vaipulya [sūtras] and the essential contemplations of all Buddhas, calling them the eight negations, so that it will be easy for sentient beings to awaken to them. Hence the text below says: "Although dharmas are immeasurable, briefly speaking of eight things thoroughly refutes everything as empty of all dharmas." Furthermore, when the Buddha was in the world, sentient beings were of sharp faculties; hearing the Buddha speak briefly, they awakened. After the Buddha's extinction, sentient beings were of dull faculties, depending on the treatise master to explain extensively before they understand. For example, the Buddha directly spoke of non-arising, while Nāgārjuna explains non-arising through various approaches. Furthermore, the Buddha spoke in a dispersed manner according to capacities, while the treatise master speaks in a summarized manner according to the meaning; due to these causes and conditions, it is necessary to compose a treatise. Answering the third question: Although the Buddha's wisdom was profound and his words skillful, the capacities and conditions of the latter age belong to me. Therefore a sūtra says: "If conditions do not belong to the Buddha, the Buddha cannot deliver them." Now the conditions belong to the four reliances, so the four reliances deliver them, as the sūtra recounts the matter of Ānanda delivering Subhadra. Answering the fourth question: Although Nāgārjuna has not yet equaled the Buddha, he has seen a little of the Buddha's intent and explains according to his ability; therefore there is no fault. Thus the *Tattvasiddhi-śāstra* says: "Those who understand compose treatises; those who do not understand cease." Answering the fifth question: As a sūtra says: "Those who should be delivered have all already been delivered; for the remaining who have not yet been delivered, causes and conditions for attaining deliverance have been created." Thus, delivering in the future precisely resides with the four reliances and is not what the Buddha converts; therefore it is necessary to compose a treatise. Answering the sixth question: Aśvaghoṣa composing a treatise was for Aśvaghoṣa's own conditions; Nāgārjuna composing a treatise is for Nāgārjuna's own conditions; one should not reproach this. Answering the seventh question: The breadth of the *Akutobhayā* was for conditions suited to breadth; the brevity of this treatise is for conditions suited to brevity; one should not challenge this. Answering the eighth question: The present composition of the treatise is not to refute others and display oneself, but out of compassion one composes the treatise; just as a sighted person seeing a blind person entering a realm of deep water and fire, if he does not awaken him, he is not a bodhisattva. The intention of composing this treatise to refute the heterodox and reveal the correct is also like this. Answering the ninth question: When the Tathāgata was in the world, preaching sūtras was beneficial; my composing the treatise now also has profound benefit. Answering the preceding independently arising [questions] and the one arising from what precedes, there are thus nine questions and answers. In terms of the answer, it is opened into two sections: first, introducing the intention of the Buddha's appearing in the world to preach the sūtras; from "After the Buddha's extinction" onward, second, introducing the intention of Nāgārjuna's appearing in the world to make the treatise. Question: The outsider only asked about composing the treatise and did not ask about preaching the sūtras; now one should only answer regarding composing the treatise, so why answer regarding preaching the sūtras? Answer: The explanation has five meanings. First, it clarifies that although he answers regarding preaching the sūtras, this is precisely explaining the reason for composing the treatise. Since the sūtra is what is commented on (the object of treatise) and the treatise is what comments (the agent of treatise), if there were no object of treatise, there would be no agent of treatise; only when what comments and what is commented on are complete is it called a treatise. Second, first introducing the intention of the Buddha preaching the sūtras is precisely the Buddha preaching the middle sūtra; later clarifying the intention of composing the treatise is precisely clarifying the treatise's middle meaning; therefore it is called the *Madhyamaka-śāstra*. This is commenting on the middle sūtra, hence it is called the *Madhyamaka-śāstra*. Third, the treatise master adduces the Buddha preaching the sūtras to counter the outsider's question: If you obstruct me and do not permit me to compose a treatise, you should also obstruct the Buddha and not permit him to preach sūtras. Why is this so? Where there is a Buddha, there must be a bodhisattva; where there is a sūtra, there must be a treatise. Just as when the white sun conceals its light, the bright moon takes up the radiance; when the Tathāgata withdraws his shadow, the bodhisattva spreads his brilliance. Therefore, one should not obstruct the composition of a treatise. Fourth, earlier introducing the intention of preaching the sūtras is the sūtra giving rise to the treatise; later introducing the intention of composing the treatise is the treatise giving rise to the sūtra. As for the sūtra giving rise to the treatise: Nāgārjuna received from the Buddha's sūtras and gave rise to the two wisdoms; having the two wisdoms, he could then make the treatise. Therefore a sūtra says: "Born from the Buddha's mouth, transformed and born from the True Dharma"—this is precisely that matter. How does the treatise give rise to the sūtra? After the Buddha's extinction, heterodox doctrines obstructed the sūtras and caused them not to appear again; now refuting errors and elucidating the sūtras is precisely the treatise giving rise to the sūtra. Fifth, first introducing the intention of preaching the sūtras clarifies that which sentient beings are confused about; later introducing the intention of composing the treatise distinguishes refuting that which can confuse.

If one does not identify the sūtras as that about which [sentient beings] are deluded, then one cannot explain that which is capable of delusion; and since one cannot explain that which is capable of delusion, one cannot identify that which is capable of refuting it, and thus there would be no treatise. Within the first section, prefacing the intention behind the Buddha's preaching of the sūtras, there are again two parts: first, explaining the intention behind the Buddha's preaching of the Hīnayāna sūtras; second, explaining the intention behind the Buddha's preaching of the Mahāyāna sūtras. Yet the ultimate Way has never been great or small; it is only because [the Buddha] responds to the two capacities of great and small that he expounds the two teachings of great and small. Now, by means of these [teachings of] great and small, one awakens to that which is neither great nor small. The reason Hīnayāna comes first and Mahāyāna comes later is to demonstrate a single sequential path. In terms of the three wheels [of the Dharma], he first expounds the great teaching, next sets forth the small, and finally gathers the small into the great. Here, wishing to show [the progression] from shallow to deep, he proceeds from the small to the great. Question: The previous explanation stated that the opening section prefaces the Buddha's preaching of the middle sūtras, and the subsequent section explains the intention behind composing the treatise. If so, he should only explain the Mahāyāna sūtras; why does he set forth the Hīnayāna? Answer: There are two reasons. First, he wishes to present the small in contrast to the great, just as the Lotus Sūtra, when about to praise the present great [teaching], first explains the past small teaching, hence saying: 'Distinguishing and explaining the origination and cessation of the five aggregates of all phenomena.' In the Pañcaviṃśatisāhasrikā-prajñāpāramitā-sūtra one sees the second turning of the wheel of the Dharma, and the Mahāparinirvāṇa-sūtra in thirteen fascicles explains both the present and past turnings of the wheel of the Dharma—both present the small in contrast to the great. Second, this treatise fully elucidates both the great and the small; therefore it mentions both the great and the small preached by the Buddha. Within the preaching of the Hīnayāna, it is again divided into two: first, identifying the arising of heterodoxy; second, explaining the preaching of the correct. The former is also the stimulus; the latter is also called the response. Within the arising of heterodoxy, there are two parts: first, separately listing the eight views; second, summarizing the faults and perils. Question: The various views are not single; why does he only list eight views? Answer: There are five reasons. First, although there are ninety-six kinds, he briefly states eight views; just as although the [Hīnayāna] schools are twenty, he briefly explains five schools. Second, these eight views are the major ones among the various views; by listing the major ones, the minor ones may be known. Third, among the eight views, the first two posit a person, while the latter six grasp at phenomena; by bringing up phenomena and person, everything is subsumed. Fourth, the former posits what was taught by the two gods, while the latter six posit what was taught by humans; humans and gods encompass all the diverse [views]. Fifth, among the eight views, seven are 'with a cause' and one is 'without a cause'; 'with a cause' and 'without a cause' fully subsume all myriads of attachments. Question: Why do the eight errors exclusively list assertions of production? Answer: There are two reasons. First, production is the root of the myriad transformations; if one fells the root, the branches and twigs will collapse of themselves. Second, above, listing the eight negations explained the medicine; here, recounting the eight productions in turn sets forth the illness. If there were no illness of the eight productions, there would be no medicine of the eight negations; in truth, all phenomena have never been produced or unproduced. Question: If he only refutes production to explain non-production, then there is only refuting intrinsic nature to explain emptiness, but no intrinsic emptiness of original nature. Answer: It is in order to refute the idea that nature is originally not empty that one speaks of 'intrinsic emptiness of original nature.' Thoroughly investigating the reality of phenomena, it is neither empty nor non-empty; what is there to refute or not refute? Furthermore, the reason he explains the eight views of production is that, because [people] lose [sight of] the non-production of all phenomena, they arbitrarily posit eight productions. Above, marking the eight negations gave the title to what they had lost; here, recounting the eight productions directly sets forth their error. Question: The passage below refutes the eight views of production and sets forth production through the twelve links of dependent origination; this is refuting production to speak of production—how does it pertain to refuting production to explain non-production? Answer: His subsequent speaking of production through causes and conditions has three meanings. First, when refuting the non-Buddhists' production, one ought to speak to them of the Mahāyāna original nature as unproduced. However, because their inverted sentiments are heavy, they cannot bear to hear the Mahāyāna teaching that [phenomena] are originally unproduced; therefore he expediently speaks of the Hīnayāna doctrine of production through causes and conditions. This is using a lighter inversion to remove a heavier inversion, using a wedge to knock out a wedge. Second, he wishes to show that non-Buddhists possess two delusions: first, they are deluded about the Mahāyāna [teaching] that [phenomena] are originally unproduced; second, they are deluded about the Hīnayāna doctrine of production through causes and conditions. Third, it shows that non-Buddhists also have two delusions: first, they are deluded about the ultimate truth as originally unproduced; second, they are deluded about the conventional truth as provisionally produced through causes and conditions. Regarding 'produced by the Lord Īśvara': here, listing the view fully includes the Three Jewels. 'Some say' is the Saṅgha jewel. 'The Lord Īśvara' refers to the Buddha jewel. 'The myriad things are produced from the Lord Īśvara'—making this statement is the Dharma jewel. Question: What is the difference between the two gods listed in the three treatises? Answer: What is listed here is the condition refuted by the Buddha; what is listed in the Śata-śāstra is the condition refuted by Āryadeva; what is listed in the Dvādaśamukha-śāstra is the condition refuted by Hīnayāna followers after the Buddha's nirvāṇa; therefore they are different. Moreover, what is listed in this Madhyamaka-śāstra is to clarify the doctrine of phenomena; what is listed in the Śata-śāstra is to clarify the doctrine of the person; what is listed in the Dvādaśamukha-śāstra broadly clarifies both the doctrines of the person and phenomena. Because the Lord Īśvara can create the myriad things, he is the agent, which is called the doctrine of the person; the sufferings of the six destinies are created by the Lord Īśvara, which is called the doctrine of phenomena. Therefore, the chapter refuting the agent in the Dvādaśamukha-śāstra completely refutes both person and phenomena. Question: How is it called 'produced from the Lord Īśvara'? Answer: As explained in the Dvādaśamukha-śāstra: the Lord Īśvara transforms and creates all phenomena; when all phenomena cease, they return again to that god. The Lord Īśvara practiced three grades of asceticism: lower-grade asceticism produced belly-crawling insects, middle-grade asceticism produced flying birds, and upper-grade asceticism produced humans and gods; thus, producing the six destinies, there were three kinds of asceticism. This god has three eyes on his face, rides a white ox, and holds a white fly-whisk in his hand. It is also said that he wears the sun and moon on his head and holds a human skull in his hand, both appearing in other sūtras. The Mahāparinirvāṇa-sūtra explains the fifth, Kakuda [Kātyāyana], who posited the doctrine of production from the Lord Īśvara. Regarding 'Viṣṇu': Master Tanying said: 'The previous god is the summit of the form realm; this god is the utmost of the desire realm.' Question: The Lord Īśvara practiced three grades of asceticism to produce the six destinies; now how does [Viṣṇu] produce them? Answer: At the beginning of the kalpa, all was empty. There was a great mass of water. Winds arose from the ten directions, causing wave after wave to follow one another and wind after wind to support one another. Upon the water there was a person with a thousand heads and two thousand hands and feet, miraculously born from the water, named the god Viṣṇu. In the navel of this god there was a thousand-petaled lotus flower, radiating light like ten thousand suns shining together. A Brahmā king was born from this flower, also emitting light like ten thousand suns shining together. The Brahmā king thought: 'Why is this place empty and devoid of sentient beings?' When he had this thought, those sons of the Ābhāsvara gods whose lifespans had ended were destined to be born in this land, and eight gods were spontaneously born at once. These eight gods thought in their minds: 'We are born from the Brahmā king.' The Brahmā king also thought: 'I gave birth to these eight gods.' From the eight gods were born heaven, earth, human beings, and the myriad things. The eight gods are the fathers of sentient beings, the Brahmā king is the father of the eight gods, and Viṣṇu is the father of the Brahmā king.

Viṣṇu holds a disc and a trident in his hands and possesses great power; therefore, it is said that all things are born from him. Question: The Mahāprajñāpāramitopadeśa lists three devas, the two devas as listed above, and the third named Kumāra-deva. As for 'Kumāra', here it is translated as the Youthful Deva (Tongzi Tian), because he is the Brahmā king of the first dhyāna and his countenance is like a youth, hence he is so named. He is also Nārāyaṇa-deva; 'Nārāyaṇa' is translated here as 'origin of birth', because he is the origin of sentient beings. Why do the two treatises, the Madhyamaka-śāstra and the Śata-śāstra, list only two devas? Answer: There are two meanings. First, the non-Buddhists explain that there are three devas, which correspond to the three bodies of their school: Īśvara is the root, like the internal dharmakāya Buddha; his response is Viṣṇu, like the internal sambhogakāya/nirmāṇakāya Buddha; and from Viṣṇu's navel Brahmā is transformed, like the internal nirmāṇakāya Buddha. Because the Mahāprajñāpāramitopadeśa fully explains the meaning of the three bodies, it lists three devas. Their school also has the doctrine of the two bodies, the real and the responsive; hence the Madhyamaka-śāstra and Śata-śāstra list only two devas. Second, listing two devas encompasses all three devas, because Brahmā is already present within Viṣṇu's navel, so there is no need to list the third deva. Regarding '[born] from combination', there are four meanings: First, that person investigates and concludes that phenomena should not be born from two devas. Why so? If all things are born from two devas, from whom are the two devas in turn born? Therefore, one presently sees that external things are born from the combination of the four great elements, and sentient beings are born from the combination of parents. The reason why this grasp is said to be an error is that it sees only the auxiliary cause (pratyaya-hetu) and does not recognize the direct cause. The direct cause refers to having its distant origin in karmic activity; this is merely seeing what is near and not seeing what is distant, hence it is an error. Second, phenomena are born from many causes and conditions; there is no sense of being born from a single cause. The previous assertion of being born from the two devas was being born from a single cause, hence it is not the same as the previous explanation. Third, phenomena are born from equal causes. An 'equal cause' means that a cause can produce an effect, and the cause in turn derives from a cause; hence it is called equal. Īśvara and the others can only produce others and are not produced from others; therefore, they are not equal causes. Fourth, in Āryadeva's treatise it is explained that a non-Buddhist posited: before heaven and earth existed, there were originally one man and one woman, and from this man and woman all people and things were born; hence it is called 'born from combination'. Regarding 'born from time', the Mahāprajñāpāramitopadeśa explains that there are two kinds of time: First, the substance of time is permanent, and it only serves as an illuminating cause (jñāpaka-hetu) for the myriad phenomena, not as a productive cause (kāraka-hetu); therefore this time is called an unchanging cause. An unchanging cause refers to an invariable, concomitant cause. Second, it is held that there is a separate substance of time that can generate all things, and thus it acts as the cause of generation and destruction for all things. As the verse says: 'When time arrives, sentient beings mature; / When time departs, they decay and rot. / Time turns like a chariot wheel; / Therefore, time is the cause.' Kaishan held that the three characteristics are time and can generate all phenomena. This is largely the same. Regarding 'born from primal nature' (prakṛti), this refers to the non-Buddhists of the primordial darkness. By supernormal powers they see the events of eighty thousand kalpas, but before that they are in obscurity and know nothing; they regard this single darkness as the beginning of phenomena, hence it is called 'primordial darkness'. Regarding it as the fundamental nature of the entire world, it is called 'world-nature' (prakṛti). The Tattvasiddhi masters' analysis of the flowing forth of ignorance, and the Dilun masters' assertion of departing from reality to produce delusion, are similar to this. Regarding 'born from transformation', transformation has four kinds: 1. Transformation through supernormal powers, like turning stone into jade. 2. Self-transformation of nature, like the young turning into the old. 3. Transformation upon encountering conditions, like water turning into ice when encountering cold. 4. Non-Buddhists hold that there is a distinct dharma of transformation that can transform and generate all phenomena, just as the Abhidharma posits 'category' (nikāya-sabhāga) to categorize sentient beings. Holding that a tiger transforms into a human, or a deer transforms into a Buddha, also belongs to this kind of assertion. However, if one uses this to challenge the non-Buddhists, the Sarvāstivādins are also challenged: Why do sentient beings of the six destinies have a distinct 'category' while the myriad phenomena do not? Furthermore, if sentient beings have a distinct 'category' and the myriad phenomena do not, then sentient beings also having a distinct dharma of origination would imply that the myriad phenomena should lack origination. Furthermore, sentient beings inherently possess the dharma of alteration and do not need a dharma of transformation to transform them; likewise, they should inherently possess origination and do not need a distinct dharma of origination to originate them. If they reply: 'Among the four characteristics there is already the characteristic of alteration (sthity-anyathātva), and this characteristic is precisely the dharma of transformation', how is this different from the non-Buddhists positing a distinct dharma of transformation that transforms all things? Regarding 'born from spontaneity' (svabhāva/yadṛcchā), non-Buddhists investigate and find that the meaning of a cause for phenomena cannot be established, so they hold that all phenomena are born spontaneously. But there are two traditions interpreting spontaneity: If it is as discussed by Zhuang Zhou, he explains that what exists has already been born, so it does not need to be born; what does not exist has not yet been born, so how could it be born? Now when we speak of 'birth', it is simply spontaneously so. It is merely that not knowing why it is so is called 'spontaneity' (ziran); this explains that spontaneity has a cause or that spontaneity is causeless. Second, non-Buddhists hold that phenomena are born without a cause, which is called spontaneity. Therefore a sūtra says: 'The tip of the water-chestnut is naturally sharp; flying birds have different colors. Who made them? They are simply naturally so.' The Tattvasiddhi masters hold that ignorance, the primary defilement, is born relying on emptiness; these all belong to the category of causelessness. Regarding 'born from subtle atoms' (paramāṇu), non-Buddhists hold that the most subtle matter is round and permanent; when aggregated it forms bodies, and when dispersed it returns to the origin; devas, humans, and the six destinies all arise from them without exception. The Sarvāstivāda masters say: coarse matter is formed from fine matter, and the atom adjacent to empty space (paramāṇu) is the smallest. This is largely the same as that assertion. Master Kumārajīva said: 'The Buddha did not teach that there are ultimate atoms (paramāṇu). If one speaks of ultimate atoms, one falls into extreme views. He only taught that all matter, whether coarse or fine, is impermanent, suffering, empty, and non-self, enabling people to attain the path; it is only the masters of the treatises who themselves spoke of ultimate atomic matter.'