[Pramāṇa](https://indike.org/pramana/) › [Indian literature](https://indike.org/pramana/in) › [Buddhist Literature](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha) › [Taishō Tripiṭaka (Chinese Buddhist canon)](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho) › [中觀論疏](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1824) › 10.3 # 中觀論疏 10.3 中觀論疏 10.3 - **Language:** Classical Chinese ### [10.3](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1824.10.3) 所以有此品來者，有所得心必有依著，前二十一品立世間人法，論主求之無從，仍舉出世如來證有世間；次求出世如來不得，便舉世間顛倒證有出世；上品求世間顛倒不得，外云：若爾，應都無世出世。今實有四諦，則應有世與出世，故苦集二諦則是世間，滅道二諦名出世間，是故不應無世出世。今觀四諦不可得，則成前非世出世義，既非世出世即是中道，故因中發觀，戲論此滅。二者外云：顛倒是如來所離，四諦是如來所證亦是如來所說，如來一期出世初後不同同明四諦，故初教轉四諦法輪，乃至涅槃明心喜之說。所以初後皆明四諦者，四諦是迷悟之本，迷之則六道紛然，悟之則有三乘賢聖，是故始終皆明四諦。若爾，不應無世出世。三近從〈顛倒品〉生者，顛倒是能迷之惑，四諦是所迷之境，以見四諦則破四倒，故前求能障無從，今責所迷不得，故有此品。但四諦有二種：一有量、二無量。三界苦果名苦諦，感三界苦業煩惱名集諦，無為涅槃名滅諦，治此煩惱名道諦。此有量也。釋有量四諦，諸小乘論師不同。《毘婆沙》云「毘曇者說：五盛陰苦名苦諦，有漏因是集諦，數滅是滅諦，學無學是道諦。譬喻部云：名色是苦諦，結業是集諦，結業滅是滅諦，止及觀是道諦。鞞婆闍婆提云：八苦是苦是苦諦，餘苦雖苦非苦諦。感當來愛是集諦，餘愛及餘有漏法雖是集非集諦。當來有愛盡是滅是滅諦，餘愛及餘有漏法盡非盡諦。八正是道是道諦，餘學法及一切無學法非道諦。」問：四諦攝法盡不？答：虛空及非數滅，此非四諦攝。欣厭立四諦，彼非厭故非苦集，非可欣故非滅道。又此二無漏故非苦集，是無記故非滅道。又因果立四諦，彼非因果故非諦。問：云何名諦？答二義：一者實是苦、二生不顛倒解故名諦。問：云何名聖諦？答：聖人所解，故名聖諦。又昔有凡夫與聖人諍諦，凡夫云：「有常樂我淨。」聖人云：「無。」共至佛所決之。佛云：「如聖人所知。」以聖人諍得此諦，故云聖諦。數論但解有量，而義不同。數明苦通三聚，成論但是心。論苦通漏無漏，數但有漏也。數集通三聚，成論但取業煩惱。數因集有緣，酬前是果、生後為因，但能生義屬集、所生是苦；成論即此能生亦是苦報，毒蛇之瞋即是報法，名苦諦也。數但取煩惱滅為滅諦，無漏法滅非滅諦；成論明無漏滅亦是滅諦也。數明方便道中永伏諸結是非數滅，成論明五方便中滅亦是滅諦也。數明一切無漏行是道諦，不取相似，成論明真似皆道諦也。數明無被導法義，成論明有被導之心。次無量四諦者，二生死為苦，五住為集，滅二死五住為滅，治此五住惑真解為道諦也。而量無量復名作無作者，有量之後猶有所作，如分段苦後更有變易苦可觀，名為有作；變易苦後無復餘苦可觀，故名無作。餘三亦爾。今言破四諦者，一破學大乘人謂四諦是無、二者破小乘人謂四諦是性有，此大小攝一切迷盡，今破此二人所解，故云破四諦。所以然者，大乘人撥無四諦，是壞佛四諦義；小乘人計性有，亦壞四諦。又有二人壞四諦義，一者謂論主執空故壞四諦、二者自執性有故壞四諦，此二並是小乘人，而謂有他破之與自立，故成二種。今破此二事，故云破四諦也。又顯此二人並不解佛大小義。小乘人不解佛因緣有成性有，大乘人不解佛大乘空成邪空，既迷大小俱惑二諦；論主明慧內充、慈風外扇，救濟此大小乘人，故破彼兩迷，明無如此空有，故云非空非有即是中實。中實者，實無如此有無也，即申佛因緣有無，方是假名。假名故有中道。如下云「亦是假名，亦是中道。」又破此大小，明無如此大小是中實，方是因緣假名大小。即是假名，因此大小令識道未曾大小也。又觀論始末意，從〈因緣品〉至〈四諦〉之前，外人執有難論主；此品初，外人執空難論主。初執有難，顯外人不識空；今執空難，明外人不識有，即迷二諦也。亦是初執小乘難論主，今執大乘難論主，顯外人不識大小。又初已來執性有難論主，顯外人不識因緣有；今執邪空難論主，顯外人不識正空。論主憐愍如此迷倒，是故破此空有，明畢竟無如此空有，後申因緣二諦空有也。又顯外人上來執有難論主，不依空難，難不成難；今執空難論主，取空相難，難亦不成難。執定性空有，難不成難；執定性空有，答不成答。問：何故就此品顯外人空有俱破四諦？答：自論初以來，單破世間或單破出世，但四諦既總攝世間出世間，為佛法大宗，故就此品顯外人空有俱破四諦。問：論主有四諦不耶？答：論主不曾有四，亦不曾無四、亦四不四、非四非不四，故〈法品〉云「諸法實相者，心行言語斷」也。問：論主既不曾有四不四，何故佛經說有四諦？答：雖非四不四，為眾生方便說四不四。故下偈云「諸佛依二諦，為眾生說法」。《大品》云「二諦中眾生雖不可得，菩薩住二諦中為眾生說法。」論釋云「為著有者說空，為著空者說有。」今亦爾，為著有四者說無有四、為著無四者明有四諦，至論諸法未曾四不四也。 > The reason this chapter follows is that a mind with grasping inevitably relies upon and clings to something. The preceding twenty-one chapters established the persons and phenomena of the mundane world; when the author of the treatise sought them and found them baseless, \[the opponent\] then adduced the supramundane Tathāgata to prove the existence of the mundane. Next, when seeking the supramundane Tathāgata he could not be found, \[the opponent\] then adduced mundane inversions to prove the existence of the supramundane. In the preceding chapter, when seeking mundane inversions they could not be found, the opponent said: "If so, there should be neither the mundane nor the supramundane at all. Now, since the Four Truths truly exist, there must be both the mundane and the supramundane. Thus the two truths of suffering and origination are the mundane, while the two truths of cessation and the path are called the supramundane; therefore there cannot be an absence of the mundane and supramundane." Now, contemplating the Four Truths as ungraspable accomplishes the earlier meaning of being neither mundane nor supramundane. Since they are neither mundane nor supramundane, they are the middle way; hence, on the basis of the middle, contemplation is aroused, and prapañca is extinguished here. > > Second, the opponent says: "Inversions are what the Tathāgata has abandoned, whereas the Four Truths are what the Tathāgata has realized and also what the Tathāgata has taught. The Tathāgata's single span of appearance in the world differed from beginning to end, yet uniformly elucidated the Four Truths. Hence in his initial teaching he turned the Dharma-wheel of the Four Truths, up until the Nirvāṇa \[Sūtra\] where he taught the joy of the mind. The reason why the Four Truths are elucidated from beginning to end is that the Four Truths are the root of delusion and awakening: if one is deluded about them, the six destinies proliferate in confusion; if one awakens to them, there are the worthy and noble ones of the three vehicles. Therefore, from beginning to end, the Four Truths are elucidated. If so, there cannot be an absence of the mundane and supramundane." > > Third, regarding its immediate emergence from the "Chapter on Inversions": inversions are the afflictions capable of deluding, while the Four Truths are the objective realm regarding which one is deluded. Because seeing the Four Truths destroys the four inversions, previously seeking that which can obstruct proved baseless, and now examining that regarding which one is deluded finds it ungraspable; hence this chapter exists. > > However, the Four Truths are of two kinds: first, bounded; second, boundless. The suffering fruit of the three realms is called the truth of suffering; the karma and afflictions that induce the suffering of the three realms are called the truth of origination; unconditioned nirvāṇa is called the truth of cessation; that which cures these afflictions is called the truth of the path. These are the bounded. > > In explaining the bounded Four Truths, the various Hīnayāna treatise masters differ. The \*Vibhāṣā\* states: "The Abhidharmikas say: 'The suffering of the five grasping aggregates is called the truth of suffering; contaminated causes are the truth of origination; analytical cessation is the truth of cessation; the trainee and beyond-training \[dharmas\] are the truth of the path.' The Dārṣṭāntikas say: 'Name-and-form is the truth of suffering; fettering karma is the truth of origination; the cessation of fettering karma is the truth of cessation; calm and insight are the truth of the path.' The Vibhajyavādins say: 'The eight sufferings are suffering and are the truth of suffering; other sufferings, though suffering, are not the truth of suffering. Craving that induces future \[existence\] is the truth of origination; other cravings and other contaminated dharmas, though origination, are not the truth of origination. The exhaustion of craving for future existence is cessation and is the truth of cessation; the exhaustion of other cravings and other contaminated dharmas is not the truth of exhaustion. The eightfold noble path is the path and is the truth of the path; other trainee dharmas and all beyond-training dharmas are not the truth of the path.'" > > Question: Do the Four Truths subsume all dharmas completely or not? > > Answer: Space and non-analytical cessation are not subsumed under the Four Truths. The Four Truths are established on the basis of seeking and revulsion: those \[two unconditioned dharmas\] are not reviled, hence they are not suffering or origination; they are not to be sought, hence they are not cessation or the path. Furthermore, because these two are uncontaminated, they are not suffering or origination; because they are indeterminate, they are not cessation or the path. Again, the Four Truths are established based on cause and effect: those are neither cause nor effect, hence they are not truths. > > Question: Why are they called "truths"? > > Answer: There are two meanings: first, they are truly suffering; second, they give rise to non-inverted understanding; hence they are called truths. > > Question: Why are they called "noble truths"? > > Answer: They are understood by noble persons, hence they are called noble truths. Moreover, in the past an ordinary person disputed with a noble person about the truths. The ordinary person said, "There is permanence, pleasure, self, and purity." The noble person said, "There is not." Together they went to the Buddha's place to resolve it. The Buddha said, "It is as the noble person knows." Because the noble person won this truth through dispute, they are called noble truths. > > The Abhidharmikas and the \*Tattvasiddhi-śāstra\* only explain the bounded, yet their meanings differ. The Abhidharmikas explain that suffering pervades the three groups; the \*Tattvasiddhi-śāstra\* holds it is mind alone. In the \*Tattvasiddhi-śāstra\*, suffering pervades the contaminated and uncontaminated; for the Abhidharmikas, it is contaminated only. For the Abhidharmikas, origination pervades the three groups; the \*Tattvasiddhi-śāstra\* takes only karma and afflictions. For the Abhidharmikas, cause and origination have conditions: recompensing what came before is the fruit, producing what comes after is the cause; but only the capacity to produce belongs to origination, whereas what is produced is suffering. In the \*Tattvasiddhi-śāstra\*, this very capacity to produce is also a suffering retribution—the wrath of a poisonous snake is itself a retributive dharma, called the truth of suffering. The Abhidharmikas take only the cessation of afflictions as the truth of cessation, while the cessation of uncontaminated dharmas is not the truth of cessation; the \*Tattvasiddhi-śāstra\* explains that the cessation of uncontaminated dharmas is also the truth of cessation. The Abhidharmikas explain that the permanent subduing of the fetters in the preparatory path is non-analytical cessation; the \*Tattvasiddhi-śāstra\* explains that cessation in the five preparatory stages is also the truth of cessation. The Abhidharmikas explain that all uncontaminated practices are the truth of the path, not taking the semblance \[path\]; the \*Tattvasiddhi-śāstra\* explains that both the genuine and semblance are the truth of the path. The Abhidharmikas explain that there is no principle of a dharma being guided; the \*Tattvasiddhi-śāstra\* explains that there is a mind that is guided. > > Next, regarding the boundless Four Truths: the two kinds of birth-and-death are suffering; the five entrenchments are origination; the cessation of the two kinds of birth-and-death and the five entrenchments is cessation; and the genuine understanding that cures the delusion of these five entrenchments is the truth of the path. Furthermore, the bounded and boundless are also termed "with-activity" and "without-activity": after the bounded, there is still activity to be done, just as after the suffering of fragmented \[samsāra\] there is still the suffering of transformational \[samsāra\] to be contemplated, hence termed "with-activity"; after the suffering of transformational \[samsāra\], there is no further suffering to be contemplated, hence termed "without-activity." The remaining three are also like this. > > Now, when speaking of "refuting the Four Truths": first, it refutes practitioners of the Mahāyāna who claim that the Four Truths are non-existent; second, it refutes Hīnayāna practitioners who claim that the Four Truths exist intrinsically. These \[two groups of\] Mahāyāna and Hīnayāna completely subsume all delusions; now, refuting what these two people understand is called refuting the Four Truths. Why is this so? A Mahāyāna person denies the Four Truths, which destroys the Buddha's meaning of the Four Truths; a Hīnayāna person posits intrinsic existence, which likewise destroys the Four Truths. Moreover, there are two kinds of people who destroy the meaning of the Four Truths: first, those who claim that because the author of the treatise clings to emptiness, he destroys the Four Truths; second, those who themselves cling to intrinsic existence and thereby destroy the Four Truths. Both of these are Hīnayāna persons, but because they posit another's refutation and their own establishment, they constitute two kinds. Now refuting these two matters is called refuting the Four Truths. > > Furthermore, this reveals that neither of these two people understands the Buddha's meaning of the Mahāyāna and Hīnayāna. The Hīnayāna person does not understand the Buddha's dependently arisen existence and turns it into intrinsic existence; the Mahāyāna person does not understand the Buddha's Mahāyāna emptiness and turns it into perverse emptiness. Having fallen into delusion about both the Mahāyāna and Hīnayāna, they are both confused about the two truths. The author of the treatise, with luminous wisdom abounding within and the breeze of compassion fanning outward, delivers these Mahāyāna and Hīnayāna persons; therefore, he refutes their two delusions and clarifies that there is no such emptiness or existence. Thus it is said that being neither empty nor existent is the middle reality. The "middle reality" means that in reality there is no such existence or non-existence; this then elucidates the Buddha's dependently arisen existence and non-existence, which only then is provisional designation. Because it is provisional designation, there is the middle way. As it says below: "It is also a provisional designation; it is also the middle way." Furthermore, refuting this Mahāyāna and Hīnayāna clarifies that the absence of such Mahāyāna and Hīnayāna is the middle reality, which only then is the dependently arisen provisional designation of Mahāyāna and Hīnayāna. That very provisional designation, through this Mahāyāna and Hīnayāna, enables one to realize that the Path has never been Mahāyāna or Hīnayāna. > > Moreover, examining the overall purport of the treatise from beginning to end: from the "Chapter on Causes and Conditions" up to before the "\[Chapter on\] Four Truths", the opponent clings to existence to challenge the author of the treatise; at the beginning of this chapter, the opponent clings to emptiness to challenge the author of the treatise. Initially clinging to existence to raise objections revealed that the opponent did not recognize emptiness; now clinging to emptiness to raise objections clarifies that the opponent does not recognize existence—which means being deluded about the two truths. It is also that initially he clung to the Hīnayāna to challenge the author of the treatise, whereas now he clings to the Mahāyāna to challenge the author of the treatise, revealing that the opponent recognizes neither the Mahāyāna nor the Hīnayāna. Again, from the beginning onward, clinging to intrinsic existence to challenge the author of the treatise revealed that the opponent did not recognize dependently arisen existence; now clinging to perverse emptiness to challenge the author of the treatise reveals that the opponent does not recognize correct emptiness. The author of the treatise takes pity on such deluded inversions; therefore, he refutes this emptiness and existence, clarifying that in the ultimate sense there is no such emptiness or existence, and subsequently elucidates the emptiness and existence of the two truths of dependent origination. > > Furthermore, it reveals that when the opponent previously clung to existence to challenge the author of the treatise, he did not rely on emptiness to challenge, so his objection failed to be an objection; now, clinging to emptiness to challenge the author of the treatise, he grasps the characteristic of emptiness to challenge, so his objection likewise fails to be an objection. Clinging to fixed intrinsic emptiness or existence, an objection fails to be an objection; clinging to fixed intrinsic emptiness or existence, an answer fails to be an answer. > > Question: Why is it precisely in this chapter that it is revealed that both the opponent's emptiness and existence refute the Four Truths? > > Answer: From the beginning of the treatise onward, there was only the refutation of the mundane alone or the refutation of the supramundane alone; but since the Four Truths comprehensively subsume both the mundane and supramundane and are the great central doctrine of the Buddha-Dharma, it is precisely in this chapter that it is revealed that both the opponent's emptiness and existence refute the Four Truths. > > Question: Does the author of the treatise possess the Four Truths or not? > > Answer: The author of the treatise has never maintained that there are four, nor has he ever maintained that there are not four, nor that there are both four and not-four, nor neither four nor not-four. Hence the "Chapter on Dharmas" states: "As for the true mark of all dharmas, the movements of the mind and paths of speech are severed." > > Question: Since the author of the treatise has never maintained that there are four or not-four, why do the Buddha's sūtras say that there are Four Truths? > > Answer: Although they are neither four nor not-four, for the sake of sentient beings he expediently speaks of four and not-four. Hence the verse below states: "The Buddhas rely on the two truths / To teach the Dharma to sentient beings." The \*Larger \[Prajñāpāramitā Sūtra\]\* states: "Although sentient beings are ungraspable within the two truths, the bodhisattva abides in the two truths to teach the Dharma to sentient beings." The commentary (\*Mahāprajñāpāramitopadeśa\*) explains: "For those attached to existence, he speaks of emptiness; for those attached to emptiness, he speaks of existence." Now it is also like this: for those attached to the existence of the four, he speaks of there not being four; for those attached to the non-existence of the four, he explains that there are Four Truths. When it comes to the ultimate discussion of all dharmas, they have never been four or not-four. > — English (machine translation) (machine translation) - [Previous: 10.2](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1824.10.2) - [Next: 10.4](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1824.10.4) - [Up: 10](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1824.10) ## Translations (1) - [English (machine translation)](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1824~en-mt.10.3) — English, machine translation --- Source: [https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1824.10.3](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1824.10.3) · Pramāṇa