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# 中觀論疏 2.19

中觀論疏 2.19

- **Language:** Classical Chinese

### [2.19](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1824.2.19)

淺深門第五。問：他亦云有為世諦、空為真諦。與今何異？答：須初章語簡之。他云有有可有則有無可無，故有不由無，即無不由有，有是自有，無是自無。今無有可有，即無無可無。無有可有，由無故有；無無可無，由有故無。由無故有，有不自有；由有故無，無不自無。有不自有故非有、無不自無故非無，非有非無假說有無。故與他為異。問：非有非無假說有無，是中假義不？答：非也，此明有無義耳。良由有不自有故非有、無不自無故非無，非有非無假說有無，即有無始成也。故是始明有無義耳，不言非有非無是中。有無即是假，得意密取此語名為中假，亦無所妨。問：初章與中假何異？答：若總詺此一章，為初學之章門皆是初章。一切法不離中假，故皆是中假，而師分之。一往異初章者，他有有可有，即有無可無。今無有可有，即無無可無。他有有可有，不由無故有；有無可無，不由有故無。今無有可有，由無故有；無無可無，由有故無。他不由無故有，有是自有；不由有故無，無是自無。今由無故有，有不自有；由有故無，無不自無。他有是自有，名有故有；無是自無，名無故無。今有不自有，名不有有；無不自無，名不無無。此四節語為初章也。不有有則非有、不無無即非無，非有非無假說有無，此是中假義也。問：初章中假明何物義耶？答：初章是伏，中假是斷。初明假有無，是伏性有無；次明假有無，入非有非無，即性有無永斷也。故初章中假為破性病，性病若去此語亦不留。若守初章中假者，是中假師耳。又云：「初章是動執生疑，謂動性有無之執，令疑性有無。中假即破性執釋疑，中破性執、假為釋疑，明假說有無，何失有無義耶？」二者他但以有為世諦、空為真諦。今明若有若空皆是世諦，非空非有始名真諦。三者空有為二，非空非有為不二。二與不二皆是世諦，非二非不二方名為真諦。四者此三種二諦皆是教門，說此三門為令悟不三，無所依得，始名為理也。問：以前三皆是世諦，不三為真諦以不？答：得如此也。問：若爾，與理教何異？答：自有二諦為教、不二為理。若以二為世諦、不二為第一義，世諦是教、第一義為理，皆是轉側適緣無所妨也。問：何故作此四重二諦耶？答：利根聞初即悟正道，不須後二；中根聞初不悟，聞第二方得入道；下根轉至第三，始得領解也。又為釋於經論。經論之中或言，有是世諦、空為第一義。如《大品》云「菩薩住二諦中，為眾生說法。為著有者說空，為著空者說有。」即初重意。《大品》又云「若有若無，世諦故說；非有非無，第一義諦。」即第二重意。《華嚴》云「不著不二法，以無一二故。」即第三重意。《華嚴》又云「諦了分別諸法時，無有自性假名說，悉欲分別世諦義，菩薩因此初發心。一切諸法語言斷，心行寂滅如虛空，悉欲分別真諦義，菩薩因此初發心。」此以一切言說為世諦、言妄慮絕為第一義諦，即第四重意也。又為對由來但有一重二諦，故今明此四重意。又為破四病故說四門：初明於凡夫是有，名為世諦；於聖人是空，名第一義諦。次明為破有故言空耳，諸法未曾是有，亦未曾是空。空有並出兩情，故皆是世諦耳。知未曾空有，名為真諦。次明為破空有，故言非空有耳。竟未曾是空是有，何曾是非空非有？故空有非空有、二不二皆是世諦，非空非有、非不空非不有方是真諦。次明說四句為俗，非四句方乃是真。問：此四重二諦云何釋八不耶？答：初以生滅為俗、不生滅為真。次生滅不生滅皆俗、非生滅非不生滅為真。第三生滅為二、不生滅為不二，二不二皆俗、非二非不二為真。次明此三皆俗、不三為真。問：但應釋八不，云何乃云非生非不生？何名釋八不耶？答：真俗既通四重，不生亦具四種。一者初開生無生為二。次則生無生皆是生、非生無生始是無生。三則生無生二、非生無生不二，二與不二皆生、非二不二始是無生。四者此之三種皆是名言並悉是生、言妄慮息方是無生。故八不之言其旨深遠也。問：此出何文？答：《智度論》釋無生法忍云「不生不滅、不不生不不滅、不共非不共，是名無生法忍。」此明生無生四句畢竟不生始是無生忍，故知無生通此四句。問：攝山大師何故以二諦為教也？答：須深得此意。正道未曾真俗，為眾生故作真俗名說，故以真俗為教。此是望正道為言也。二者拔由來二諦之見，故明二諦為教。由來理二諦根深，言二諦有兩理，故成畫石二見，二心不可除。睿公云：「道俗之不夷、二際之不泯，菩薩之憂也。」大師無生內充、慈風外扇，為拔二理之見，故言真之與俗皆是教也。至道未曾真俗，即末學者遂守二諦是教，還是投語作解。由來二諦是理為理見，今二諦為教復成教見。若得意者，境之與教皆無妨也。以真俗通理，故名為教；真俗生智，即名為境。如來說二諦，故二諦為教；如來照二諦，即二諦為境。然二諦未曾境教，適時而用之。

> Fifth, the section on depth and shallowness. Question: Others also say that existence is conventional truth and emptiness is ultimate truth. How does this differ from the present \[teaching\]? Answer: One must distinguish them using the words of the introductory chapter. Others say that there is an existence that can be existent, and therefore there is a non-existence that can be non-existent; thus existence does not depend on non-existence, and non-existence does not depend on existence; existence is self-existent, and non-existence is self-non-existent. Now, \[in our teaching,\] there is no existence that can be existent, and so there is no non-existence that can be non-existent. Because there is no existence that can be existent, it is through non-existence that there is existence; because there is no non-existence that can be non-existent, it is through existence that there is non-existence. Because it is through non-existence that there is existence, existence is not self-existent; because it is through existence that there is non-existence, non-existence is not self-non-existent. Because existence is not self-existent, it is not existent; because non-existence is not self-non-existent, it is not non-existent. Being neither existent nor non-existent, existence and non-existence are provisionally designated. Therefore it differs from others. Question: Is 'neither existent nor non-existent, existence and non-existence are provisionally designated' the meaning of 'middle and provisional'? Answer: No; this merely clarifies the meaning of existence and non-existence. Indeed, because existence is not self-existent it is not existent, and because non-existence is not self-non-existent it is not non-existent; being neither existent nor non-existent, existence and non-existence are provisionally designated, which is precisely how existence and non-existence are first established. Thus it merely first clarifies the meaning of existence and non-existence; it does not say that 'neither existent nor non-existent' is the middle, and that 'existence and non-existence' is precisely the provisional. If one grasps the intent and implicitly takes these words to be called 'middle and provisional', there is also no objection. Question: What is the difference between the introductory chapter and 'middle and provisional'? Answer: If one designates this whole section in general, as a chapter for beginners, all of it is the introductory chapter. All phenomena are not separate from the middle and provisional, so all are the middle and provisional; yet the masters distinguish them. If we distinguish it preliminarily from the introductory chapter: for others, there is an existence that can be existent, and thus there is a non-existence that can be non-existent. Now, there is no existence that can be existent, and thus there is no non-existence that can be non-existent. For others, having an existence that can be existent, it does not exist on account of non-existence; having a non-existence that can be non-existent, it is not non-existent on account of existence. Now, there being no existence that can be existent, it exists on account of non-existence; there being no non-existence that can be non-existent, it is non-existent on account of existence. For others, because it does not exist on account of non-existence, existence is self-existent; because it is not non-existent on account of existence, non-existence is self-non-existent. Now, because it exists on account of non-existence, existence is not self-existent; because it is non-existent on account of existence, non-existence is not self-non-existent. For others, existence is self-existent, which is called 'existing because of existence'; non-existence is self-non-existent, which is called 'being non-existent because of non-existence'. Now, existence is not self-existent, which is called 'not an existent existence'; non-existence is not self-non-existent, which is called 'not a non-existent non-existence'. These four clauses constitute the introductory chapter. 'Not an existent existence' is precisely non-existence; 'not a non-existent non-existence' is precisely not non-existence; being neither existent nor non-existent, existence and non-existence are provisionally designated—this is the meaning of 'middle and provisional'. Question: What meanings do the introductory chapter and 'middle and provisional' clarify? Answer: The introductory chapter is subduing; the middle and provisional is severing. First clarifying provisional existence and non-existence subdues \[the attachment to\] intrinsic existence and non-existence; next clarifying that provisional existence and non-existence enter into neither existence nor non-existence permanently severs \[the attachment to\] intrinsic existence and non-existence. Thus, the introductory chapter and the middle and provisional are meant to refute the illness of intrinsic nature; if the illness of intrinsic nature is eliminated, these words are also not retained. If one clings to the introductory chapter and the middle and provisional, one is merely a master of the middle and provisional. Furthermore, it is said: 'The introductory chapter stirs attachment and generates doubt—that is, it stirs the attachment to intrinsic existence and non-existence and causes doubt concerning intrinsic existence and non-existence. The middle and provisional then refutes the attachment to intrinsic nature and resolves the doubt: the middle refutes attachment to intrinsic nature, and the provisional resolves doubt, clarifying that existence and non-existence are provisionally designated, so how could the meaning of existence and non-existence be lost?' Second: others merely take existence to be conventional truth and emptiness to be ultimate truth. Now it is clarified that both existence and emptiness are conventional truth; only neither emptiness nor existence is first called ultimate truth. Third: emptiness and existence constitute duality, while neither emptiness nor existence constitutes non-duality. Both duality and non-duality are conventional truth; only neither duality nor non-duality is called ultimate truth. Fourth: these three kinds of two truths are all pedagogical approaches. These three approaches are taught in order to bring about awakening to non-triplicity, with nowhere to rely or grasp—this is first called principle. Question: Can the preceding three all be conventional truth, and non-triplicity be ultimate truth? Answer: It may be taken this way. Question: If so, how does this differ from principle and teaching? Answer: There is a formulation where the two truths are the teaching and non-duality is the principle. If duality is taken as conventional truth and non-duality as the supreme truth, conventional truth is the teaching and the supreme truth is the principle; these are all shifts adapted to conditions, with no objection. Question: Why is this fourfold two truths formulated? Answer: Those of sharp faculties awaken to the correct path upon hearing the first, and have no need for the latter two; those of middling faculties do not awaken upon hearing the first, but upon hearing the second are able to enter the path; those of dull faculties progress to the third before they are able to understand. Furthermore, it is to explain the sūtras and treatises. Among sūtras and treatises, it is sometimes said that existence is conventional truth and emptiness is the supreme truth. As the Pañcaviṃśati states: 'Bodhisattvas dwell in the two truths and preach the Dharma for sentient beings. For those attached to existence, they teach emptiness; for those attached to emptiness, they teach existence.' This is the intent of the first tier. The Pañcaviṃśati also says: 'Both existence and non-existence are spoken of on account of conventional truth; neither existence nor non-existence is the supreme truth.' This is the intent of the second tier. The Avataṃsaka says: 'Not clinging to non-dual phenomena, because there is neither one nor two.' This is the intent of the third tier. The Avataṃsaka also says: 'When thoroughly understanding and discerning all phenomena, there is no intrinsic nature, yet they are spoken of by provisional designation; wishing to fully discern the meaning of conventional truth, bodhisattvas therefore first produce the mind \[of awakening\]. In all phenomena, language is cut off, the activities of mind are stilled and extinguished like empty space; wishing to fully discern the meaning of ultimate truth, bodhisattvas therefore first produce the mind \[of awakening\].' This takes all verbal discourse as conventional truth, and words being false and thoughts extinguished as the supreme truth, which is the intent of the fourth tier. Furthermore, to counter the traditional \[view\] of having only a single tier of two truths, we now clarify the intent of these four tiers. Furthermore, to refute four illnesses, four approaches are taught: first, it is clarified that what is existent for ordinary persons is called conventional truth, and what is empty for noble ones is called the supreme truth. Next, it is clarified that emptiness is spoken of merely to refute existence; phenomena have never been existent, nor have they ever been empty. Emptiness and existence both arise from the two sentiments, so both are merely conventional truth. Knowing that they have never been empty or existent is called ultimate truth. Next, it is clarified that 'neither empty nor existent' is spoken of merely to refute emptiness and existence. Ultimately, how could they ever have been empty or existent, and how could they ever have been neither empty nor existent? Therefore, empty and existent, neither empty nor existent, duality and non-duality are all conventional truth; only neither empty nor existent, nor not-empty nor not-existent is ultimate truth. Next, it is clarified that speaking of the four propositions is conventional, and only what is not the four propositions is ultimate. Question: How does this fourfold two truths explain the eight negations? Answer: First, production and cessation are taken as conventional, and non-production and non-cessation as ultimate. Next, both production-cessation and non-production-cessation are conventional, and neither production-cessation nor non-production-cessation is ultimate. Third, production-cessation is duality, and non-production-cessation is non-duality; both duality and non-duality are conventional, and neither duality nor non-duality is ultimate. Next, it is clarified that these three are all conventional, and non-triplicity is ultimate. Question: One should only explain the eight negations; why go so far as to speak of 'neither production nor non-production'? How is this called explaining the eight negations? Answer: Since ultimate and conventional apply through four tiers, non-production also possesses four kinds. First, opening production and non-production into duality. Next, production and non-production are both production; only neither production nor non-production is non-production. Third, production and non-production are duality, and neither production nor non-production is non-duality; both duality and non-duality are production; only neither duality nor non-duality is non-production. Fourth, these three kinds are all names and words, and are all entirely production; only when words are false and thoughts cease is there non-production. Therefore, the purport of the words of the eight negations is profound and far-reaching. Question: From what text does this come? Answer: The Mahāprajñāpāramitopadeśa, in explaining the anutpattika-dharma-kṣānti, says: 'Neither production nor cessation, neither non-production nor non-cessation, neither combined nor uncombined—this is called anutpattika-dharma-kṣānti.' This clarifies that when the four propositions of production and non-production are ultimately not produced, only then is it the patience of non-production; thus we know that non-production applies to these four propositions. Question: Why did the Great Master of Mount She take the two truths to be the teaching? Answer: One must deeply grasp this meaning. The correct path has never been ultimate or conventional; for the sake of sentient beings, the designations 'ultimate' and 'conventional' are made and spoken, and therefore the ultimate and conventional are taken as the teaching. This is said with respect to the correct path. Second, to uproot the traditional view of the two truths, it is therefore clarified that the two truths are the teaching. Traditionally, \[the view that\] the two truths are principles had deep roots, saying that the two truths have two principles; thus it formed the two views of drawing on stone, and the two minds could not be eliminated. Master Sengrui said: 'That the path and the worldly are not leveled, and that the two limits are not obliterated, is the sorrow of the bodhisattva.' The Great Master, inwardly filled with non-production and outwardly fanning the wind of compassion, in order to uproot the view of two principles, therefore said that both ultimate and conventional are the teaching. As the ultimate path has never been ultimate or conventional, latter-day students then clung to the two truths being the teaching, which was still taking refuge in words to construct interpretations. Previously, 'the two truths are principles' was the view of principle; now, 'the two truths are the teaching' again became the view of teaching. If one grasps the intent, there is no objection to either object or teaching. Because the ultimate and conventional communicate the principle, they are called the teaching; because the ultimate and conventional generate wisdom, they are called the object. Because the Tathāgata speaks the two truths, the two truths are the teaching; because the Tathāgata illuminates the two truths, the two truths are the object. However, the two truths have never been object or teaching; they are employed in accordance with the occasion.  
> — English (machine translation) (machine translation)

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## Translations (1)

- [English (machine translation)](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1824~en-mt.2.19) — English, machine translation

## Linked texts (1)

- [大智度論](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.sanskrit.prajnaparamita.pancavimsatisahasrika!mahaprajnaparamitopadesa*zh-kumarajiva.27.317) — Classical Chinese

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Source: [https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1824.2.19](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1824.2.19) · Pramāṇa
