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# 中觀論疏 2.20

中觀論疏 2.20

- **Language:** Classical Chinese

### [2.20](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1824.2.20)

同異門第六。什師未至長安，本有三家義：一者釋道安明本無義，謂無在萬化之前、空為眾形之始，夫人之所滯，滯在未有；若詫心本無，則異想便息。睿法師云：「格義迂而乖本，六家偏而未即。」師云：「安和上鑿荒途以開轍，標玄旨於性空。以爐冶之功驗之，唯性空之宗最得其實。」詳此意，安公明本無者，一切諸法本性空寂，故云本無。此與方等經論、什肇山門義無異也。次琛法師云：「本無者，未有色法先有於無，故從無出有，即無在有先、有在無後，故稱本無。」此釋為肇公《不真空論》之所破，亦經論之所未明也。若無在有前則非有，本性是無，即前無後有，從有還無。經云「若法前有後無，即諸佛菩薩便有過罪。若前無後有，亦有過罪。」故不同此義也。第二即色義，但即色有二家：一者關內即色義，明即色是空者，此明色無自性，故言即色是空，不言即色是本性空也。此義為肇公所呵。肇公云「此乃悟色而不自色，未領色非色也。」次支道林著《即色遊玄論》，明即色是空，故言即色遊玄論。此猶是不壞假名而說實相，與安師本性空故無異也。第三溫法師用心無義。心無者，無心於萬物，萬物未甞無。此釋意云：經中說諸法空者，欲令心體虛妄不執，故言無耳。不空外物，即萬物之境不空。肇師詳云：「此得在於神靜，而失在於物虛。」破意云：乃知心空而猶存物有，此計有得有失也。此四師即晉世所立矣。爰至宗大莊嚴寺曇濟法師著《七宗論》，還述前四以為四宗，第五于法開立識含義。三界為長夜之宅，心識為大夢之主。今之所見群有，皆於夢中所見。其於大夢既覺，長夜獲曉，即倒惑識滅，三界都空，是時無所從生而靡所不生。難曰：若爾，大覺之時便不見萬物，即失世諦，如來五眼何所見耶？第六壹法師云：世諦之法皆如幻化。是故經云「從本已來未始有也。」難曰：經稱幻化所作無有罪福。若一切法全同幻化者，實人化人竟何異耶？又經借虛以破實，實去而封虛。未得經意也。第七于道邃明緣會故有名為世諦，緣散故即無稱第一義諦。難云：經「不壞假名而說實相」，豈待推散方是真無？推散方無，蓋是俗中之事無耳。次齊隱士周顒著《三宗論》。一不空假名、二空假名、三假名空。不空假名者，經云「色空者，此是空無性實，故言空耳。不空於假色也。以空無性實故名為空，即真諦；不空於假，故名世諦。」晚人名此為鼠樓栗義。難云：論云「諸法後異故，知皆是無性。無性法亦無，一切法空故。」即性無性一切皆空，豈但空性而不空假？此與前即色義不異也。空假名者，一切諸法眾緣所成，是故有體，名為世諦。折緣求之，都不可得，名為真諦。晚人名之為安苽二諦，苽沈為真、苽浮為俗。難曰：前有假法然後空之，還同緣會，故有推散即無之過也。第三假名空者，即周氏所用。大意云：假名宛然即是空也。尋周氏假名空，原出僧肇《不真空論》。論云「雖有而無，雖無而有。雖有而無，所謂非有；雖無而有，所謂非無。如此即非無物也，物非真物也。物非真物，於何而物。」肇公云：以物非真物故是假物，假物故即是空。大朗法師關內得此義授周氏，周氏因著《三宗論》也。今總詳之，然若封執，上來有所得皆須破之。若心無所寄無所得，適緣取悟皆得用之，亦但府經論者。釋道安本無、支公即色、周氏假名空、肇公不真空，其原猶一，但方言為異，斯可用之。

> Sixth: Section on identity and difference. Before Master Kumārajīva arrived in Chang'an, there were originally three schools of doctrine. The first was Shi Dao'an's explanation of original non-existence (benwu). He maintained that non-existence precedes the ten thousand transformations, and emptiness is the beginning of all forms. What mortals cling to is clinging to non-being; if one relies on the mind of original non-existence, then divergent thoughts will cease. Master Sengrui said: 'Categorising concepts (geyi) is circuitous and contradicts the original \[meaning\], while the six schools are biased and do not attain \[the truth\].' Master \[Sengrui\] also said: 'The Upādhyāya \[Dao\]an cleared a path through the wilderness to open up a track, marking the profound purport upon the emptiness of intrinsic nature. Testing it by the work of the furnace, only the school of the emptiness of intrinsic nature most truly attained the reality.' Examining this meaning, Dao'an's explanation of original non-existence means that all phenomena are originally empty and tranquil in their intrinsic nature; hence he calls it original non-existence. This is not different from the Mahāvaipulya sūtras and śāstras or the doctrines of the mountain school of Kumārajīva and Sengzhao. Next, Master Fa-chen said: 'Original non-existence means that before material phenomena (rūpa) existed, there was first non-existence. Therefore, existence emerged from non-existence; that is, non-existence preceded existence, and existence followed non-existence. Hence it is called original non-existence.' This interpretation was refuted by Master Sengzhao's 'Treatise on the Emptiness of the Non-Absolute' (Buzhenkong lun), and is also something not taught in the sūtras and śāstras. If non-existence precedes existence, it would not be existence; its original nature would be non-existence, meaning prior non-existence and subsequent existence, returning from existence to non-existence. A sūtra says: 'If phenomena are prior existence and subsequent non-existence, then all Buddhas and bodhisattvas would incur fault. If they are prior non-existence and subsequent existence, they would also incur fault.' Therefore, \[our teaching\] does not agree with this doctrine. Second is the doctrine of matter-as-such (ji se). But there are two schools of matter-as-such: First, the Guannei \[school of\] matter-as-such clarifies that matter as such is empty. This clarifies that matter has no intrinsic nature, and therefore says that matter as such is empty; it does not say that matter as such is originally empty in its intrinsic nature. This doctrine was rebuked by Master Sengzhao. Master Sengzhao said: 'This is merely understanding that matter is not self-existent matter, but failing to comprehend that matter is non-matter.' Next, Zhi Daolin composed the 'Treatise on Wandering in the Profound through Matter-as-Such' (Jise youxuan lun), clarifying that matter as such is empty; hence it is called 'Wandering in the Profound through Matter-as-Such'. This is still explaining the true nature without destroying provisional designations, and thus is not different from Master Dao'an's emptiness of intrinsic nature. Third is Master Fayun's use of the doctrine of the mind's non-existence (xinwu). 'Mind's non-existence' means having no mind toward the myriad things, while the myriad things have never been non-existent. The purport of this interpretation is: when the sūtras say that all phenomena are empty, they wish to make the mental substance empty and free from grasping, and hence speak of non-existence. They do not empty external things; that is, the objects of the myriad things are not empty. Master Sengzhao examined this, saying: 'Its gain lies in the stillness of the spirit, but its loss lies in \[denying\] the emptiness of things.' The refutation means: it only knows that the mind is empty, but still maintains that things exist; this theory has both gain and loss. These four masters were established during the Jin dynasty. Coming down to Master Tanyi of the Da Zhuangyan Monastery, who composed the 'Treatise on the Seven Schools' (Qizong lun), he recounted the previous four as four schools, and fifth, Yu Fakai established the doctrine that consciousness contains \[all things\] (shihan). The three realms are a dwelling of the long night; the conscious mind is the master of the great dream. What are seen now as the myriad existences are all seen within the dream. When one awakens from the great dream and dawn breaks over the long night, then the inverted, deluded consciousness is extinguished, and the three realms are entirely empty. At that time, there is nothing from which things arise, yet there is nowhere they do not arise. An objection says: If so, at the time of great awakening one would not see the myriad things, and thus conventional truth would be lost. What would the five eyes of the Tathāgata see? Sixth, Master Zhu Fayi said: The phenomena of conventional truth are all like illusions and transformations. Therefore, the sūtras say: 'From the beginning they have never existed.' An objection says: Sūtras state that what is done by illusions and transformations produces neither demerit nor merit. If all phenomena are completely identical to illusions and transformations, what difference would there be between a real person and an illusory person? Furthermore, sūtras borrow emptiness to refute substantiality, but here one clings to emptiness after substantiality is gone. This fails to grasp the intention of the sūtras. Seventh, Yu Daosui clarified that the coming together of conditions brings about existence, which is called conventional truth, while the dispersal of conditions brings about non-existence, which is called ultimate truth. An objection says: The sūtras say 'without destroying provisional designations, one explains the true nature.' How could it depend on analyzing and dispersing \[conditions\] before it is true non-existence? Non-existence only upon analyzing and dispersing is merely the non-existence of items within conventional \[truth\]. Next, the Qi hermit Zhou Yong composed the 'Treatise on the Three Schools' (Sanzong lun): 1. Non-emptiness of provisional designations; 2. Emptiness of provisional designations; 3. Emptiness as provisional designation. As for 'non-emptiness of provisional designations': The sūtras say: 'Matter is empty.' This means that it is empty of intrinsic nature and substantiality, and therefore it is called empty. It does not empty provisional matter. Because it is empty of intrinsic nature and substantiality, it is called empty, which is the ultimate truth; because it does not empty the provisional, it is called conventional truth. Later people called this the 'rat-in-the-chestnut' doctrine. An objection says: The treatise says: 'Because phenomena later become different, know that they are all without intrinsic nature. That which is without intrinsic nature is also non-existent, because all phenomena are empty.' Thus, both nature and non-nature are entirely empty; how could one merely empty nature without emptying the provisional? This does not differ from the aforementioned doctrine of matter-as-such. As for 'emptiness of provisional designations': All phenomena are formed by a confluence of conditions, and therefore they have substantiality, which is called conventional truth. Seeking them by dismantling the conditions, they are completely unattainable, which is called ultimate truth. Later people called this the 'two truths of the melon', where the sunken melon is the ultimate and the floating melon is the conventional. An objection says: Positing a provisional phenomenon first and then emptying it still amounts to existence through the confluence of conditions, incurring the error of non-existence only upon analyzing and dispersing. As for the third, 'emptiness as provisional designation': This is what Mr. Zhou adopted. The general meaning is: provisional designations as they are are just emptiness. Tracing Mr. Zhou's 'emptiness as provisional designation', its origin comes from Sengzhao's 'Treatise on the Emptiness of the Non-Absolute'. That treatise says: 'Although existent, it is non-existent; although non-existent, it is existent. Although existent, it is non-existent: this is what is called non-existence. Although non-existent, it is existent: this is what is called non-non-existence. As such, it is not that things are non-existent, but that things are not real things. Since things are not real things, how can they be things?' Master Sengzhao said: Because things are not real things, they are provisional things; because they are provisional things, they are empty. Master Dalang obtained this doctrine within the Pass and transmitted it to Mr. Zhou, who subsequently composed the 'Treatise on the Three Schools'. Now, examining them comprehensively: if one clings and grasps, all the aforementioned views involving attainment must be refuted. If the mind relies on nothing and has no attainment, adapting to conditions to attain awakening, all of them may be employed, so long as they tally with the sūtras and śāstras. Shi Dao'an's original non-existence, Zhi Daolin's matter-as-such, Mr. Zhou's emptiness as provisional designation, and Master Sengzhao's non-absolute emptiness: their source is indeed one, differing only in their modes of expression; these may be adopted.  
> — English (machine translation) (machine translation)

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## Translations (1)

- [English (machine translation)](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1824~en-mt.2.20) — English, machine translation

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Source: [https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1824.2.20](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1824.2.20) · Pramāṇa
