[Pramāṇa](https://indike.org/pramana/) › [Indian literature](https://indike.org/pramana/in) › [Buddhist Literature](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha) › [Taishō Tripiṭaka (Chinese Buddhist canon)](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho) › [中觀論疏](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1824) › 2.33 # 中觀論疏 2.33 中觀論疏 2.33 - **Language:** Classical Chinese ### [2.33](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1824.2.33) 料簡門第九。問：成實論師云無生無滅者此明真諦，此論二十七品皆明遣俗入真，故八不但是真諦。是事云何？答：若八不但是真諦，則一部外人立生滅斷常皆應是世諦。若然者，一論之中外人立邪義亦皆應是世諦，論主之破應是真諦。此則不然。夫論二諦皆是佛之正義，豈得以外立邪為俗、內明破為真？又成實師明有此真諦四絕之理，即成有見，若是有見便名為常，若無此理則便是斷。又絕四句即四句斷，名為斷見。有此真理即名為常，乃是斷常，何名八不？復有人言：不生不滅明真諦義，不常不斷等六明世諦義。今謂若得意者此亦無妨。然今八不通具二諦，如《瓔珞經》說之，故亦不同此釋。復有北主三論師釋此八不，凡有三義：一就空理釋，明畢竟空理非起非出，是故不生。非終非盡，所以無滅。非定有故不常，非定無故不斷。一相無相故不一，無差別故不異。前際空故不來，後際空故不去。第二就緣起事釋，緣合故生、緣離故滅，既生滅假緣，無有實性生滅，故云不生不滅。因緣起法即因壞果生，因壞故不常、果生故不斷，因果不同，不得言一；無有兩體，不得言異。不從外來故言不來，因內未有果故不從內出。第三就對執釋，對於二乘外道執也。薩婆多云：大生生八法，小生生一法；大滅滅八法，小滅滅一法。故云生滅。外道僧佉云：因中有果生。衛世師云：因中無果生。今對破二人生滅，故云不生不滅也。小乘人云：無為是常；得道入無餘涅槃，是時五陰都滅，故名斷。外道言：虛空、時、方、微塵等不從因生，故名為常。從因生法必當歸盡，故名為斷。或言：過去有故為常，未來無故為斷。此皆不然，故云不常不斷。小乘人云：諸法同皆無常是其相故一，諸法各自相故異。外道云：因果俱有故一，性別故異。此實不然，故云不一不異。小乘云：未來有法流入現在名來，後入過去名出。外道云：從微塵、世性、梵天等邊來故名來，復還歸本故云出。今破此病，故云不來不出。今明若得意用之則，義亦無失。以初是第一義門、次是世諦門，後破性實病，還是世諦性空義耳。但詳此釋意，謂空理無生滅，則有理存焉，還同《成實》真諦義。又若有理存焉，則心有所依，名有所得義。又空理無生滅者，即空理自然而有，若自然有則是無因見義。第二若云緣起故無生者，是亦不然。今請問：為本無今有釋生、已有還無解滅不耶？若言本無今有者，既是本無，今何得有？若本無今有，兔角龜毛亦是本無，今皆應有。彼釋云：兔角等無可生之理，故不得生；因中果有可生之理，是故得生。今問：此可生之理為異空、為未異空？如其異空，即是已有，此乃是本有今有為生，何得言本無今有為生耶？若不異空，則與兔角無異，兔角既不生，果亦應爾；果既得生，兔角亦應爾。故雖有緣起之言，義亦不成也。第三云對執釋者，此亦不然。此論無法不窮、無言不洗，何得止對外道及毘曇耶？故不同此釋。 > Ninth, the section on critical evaluation. Question: The masters of the Tattvasiddhi-śāstra say that "non-arising and non-ceasing" elucidates ultimate truth, and because all twenty-seven chapters of this treatise elucidate discarding the conventional to enter the real, the eight negations are solely the ultimate truth. How is this matter \[to be understood\]? Answer: If the eight negations were solely the ultimate truth, then across the entire text the external opponents' establishment of arising, ceasing, annihilation, and permanence should all be conventional truth. If so, throughout the treatise the erroneous doctrines established by external opponents should also all be conventional truth, while the treatise master's refutations should be ultimate truth. This is not the case. When discussing the two truths, both are the Buddha's correct doctrine; how could an external establishment of error be taken as conventional, and internal elucidation of refutation be taken as ultimate? Furthermore, when the Tattvasiddhi masters explain that this principle of the ultimate truth transcending the four extremes exists, this constitutes a view of existence; if it is a view of existence, it is termed permanence, and if this principle does not exist, it is termed annihilation. Moreover, cutting off the four propositions is the annihilation of the four propositions, which is termed a view of annihilation. The existence of this real principle is termed permanence; hence it is merely annihilation and permanence—how could it be called the eight negations? Again, some say: "Non-arising and non-ceasing" elucidates the meaning of ultimate truth; the remaining six, such as "non-permanence and non-annihilation," elucidate the meaning of conventional truth. We now say: if one grasps the intended meaning, this is also unobjectionable. However, the present eight negations comprehensively encompass both truths, as taught in the Yingluo jing; thus this does not agree with that explanation either. Furthermore, there are northern Sanlun masters who explain these eight negations according to three meanings in all. First, explaining them in terms of the principle of emptiness: they elucidate that the principle of ultimate emptiness does not arise and does not emerge, and is therefore not arising; it is not terminated and not exhausted, and is therefore unceasing; it is not definitively existent, hence not permanent; it is not definitively non-existent, hence not annihilated; having one mark that is markless, it is not one; having no distinction, it is not different; being empty of a prior limit, it does not come; being empty of a posterior limit, it does not go. Second, explaining them in terms of the events of dependent origination: through the conjunction of conditions there is arising, and through the separation of conditions there is ceasing; since arising and ceasing depend upon conditions and lack real intrinsic arising and ceasing, they are called "not arising and unceasing"; phenomena arising from causes and conditions entail the disintegration of the cause and the arising of the result: because the cause disintegrates it is not permanent, and because the result arises it is not annihilated; cause and result being distinct, they cannot be said to be one; lacking two separate substances, they cannot be said to be different; not coming from outside, it is said not to come; because the result does not yet exist within the cause, it does not emerge from within. Third, explaining them in terms of confronting attachments: this refers to confronting the attachments of the two vehicles and non-Buddhists. The Sarvāstivādins say: major arising gives rise to eight dharmas, and minor arising gives rise to one dharma; major ceasing ceases eight dharmas, and minor ceasing ceases one dharma; hence they speak of arising and ceasing. The non-Buddhist Sāṃkhyas say: the effect exists in the cause and arises. The Vaiśeṣikas say: the effect does not exist in the cause and arises. Now, in order to confront and refute the arising and ceasing of both, it is said to be "not arising and unceasing." Adherents of the Hīnayāna say: the unconditioned is permanent; upon attaining the path and entering nirvāṇa without remainder, all five aggregates are extinguished at that time, which is called annihilation. Non-Buddhists say: space, time, direction, subtle atoms, and the like do not arise from causes, and are therefore called permanent; phenomena arising from causes must inevitably return to exhaustion, and are therefore called annihilated; or they say: existence in the past is permanence, and non-existence in the future is annihilation. None of this is so, and therefore it is said to be "neither permanent nor annihilated." Adherents of the Hīnayāna say: all dharmas share the common mark of impermanence, which is their shared characteristic, and hence they are one; all dharmas have their own distinct individual characteristics, and hence they are different. Non-Buddhists say: because cause and effect both exist, they are one; because their natures differ, they are different. This is truly not so, and therefore it is said to be "neither one nor different." The Hīnayāna says: a phenomenon existing in the future flowing into the present is called coming; its subsequent entry into the past is called departing. Non-Buddhists say: coming forth from subtle atoms, primordial nature, Brahmā, and the like is called coming; returning back to the source is called departing. Now, to refute these defects, it is said to be "neither coming nor departing." We now clarify: if one grasps the intent and applies it, there is no flaw in its meaning either. For the first is the approach of ultimate meaning, the second is the approach of conventional truth, and the last refutes the defect of \[positing\] intrinsic reality, which is still merely the meaning of the conventional truth's emptiness of intrinsic nature. Yet when examining the intent of this explanation: positing that the principle of emptiness is without arising or ceasing implies that a principle persists therein, which is still the same as the Tattvasiddhi's meaning of ultimate truth. Moreover, if a principle persists therein, the mind has something to rely upon, which is called an acquired meaning. Furthermore, to say that the principle of emptiness is without arising and ceasing means that the principle of emptiness exists naturally; if it exists naturally, this is the doctrine of viewing things as uncaused. Second, if one says that because of dependent origination there is no arising, this is also not correct. We now ask: do you explain arising as 'originally non-existent, now existent', and understand ceasing as 'already existent, returning to non-existence', or not? If you say it is 'originally non-existent, now existent', since it was originally non-existent, how could it now exist? If it were 'originally non-existent, now existent', hare's horns and tortoise hair are also originally non-existent, so they should both exist now. If they explain: "Hare's horns and the like lack the principle capable of arising, and therefore cannot arise; within the cause the fruit has the principle capable of arising, and therefore can arise." We now ask: is this principle capable of arising different from emptiness, or not yet different from emptiness? If it differs from emptiness, then it is already existent; this would mean that arising is 'originally existent, now existent'—how could one say arising is 'originally non-existent, now existent'? If it does not differ from emptiness, then it does not differ from hare's horns: since hare's horns do not arise, the fruit should likewise not arise; and if the fruit can arise, hare's horns should likewise be able to arise. Therefore, although there is the phrase 'dependent origination', the meaning is not established. Third, regarding the explanation in terms of confronting attachments, this too is not correct. This treatise leaves no dharma unexhausted and no words unpurged; how could it be restricted merely to confronting non-Buddhists and the Abhidharma? Therefore, we do not follow this explanation. > — English (machine translation) (machine translation) - [Previous: 2.32](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1824.2.32) - [Next: 2.34](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1824.2.34) - [Up: 2](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1824.2) ## Translations (1) - [English (machine translation)](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1824~en-mt.2.33) — English, machine translation --- Source: [https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1824.2.33](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1824.2.33) · Pramāṇa