[Pramāṇa](https://indike.org/pramana/) › [Indian literature](https://indike.org/pramana/in) › [Buddhist Literature](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha) › [Taishō Tripiṭaka (Chinese Buddhist canon)](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho) › [中觀論疏](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1824) › 2.8 # 中觀論疏 2.8 中觀論疏 2.8 - **Language:** Classical Chinese ### [2.8](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1824.2.8) 正宗門第四。問：前言二諦由八不而正，請為陳之。答：由八不故世諦成中道，即世諦義正；由八不故真諦成中道，即真諦義正；由八不故二諦合成中道，即二諦合正。以三種正故十二部經八萬法藏一切教正，以一切教正故即發生正觀戲論皆滅即便得道。以斯義要，故八不在初，是以論主因八不定佛法偏正也。問：何故三種正而一切正耶？答：三世十方諸佛所說法皆依二諦，以二諦總攝一切佛法。二諦既正，豈非一切正耶？問：論主何故以八不正佛教耶？答：為三種人學於二諦皆墮偏邪。一者如五百部等執定性有，即世諦墮性有，故成偏邪。二者方廣執定性空，即真諦墮在偏邪。為破此二偏，故申因緣空有為二諦，即二諦始正。三者即世所行，亦云有三種中道：世諦明不常不斷中道、真諦明不生不滅中道、二諦合辨非真非俗中道。但考責三中，皆不成中、墮在偏邪，故今對此偏邪明八不，正於二諦成三種中道，故三中得正。問：八不即是二諦，云何以八不正於二諦？答：八不雖即是二諦，但說有無以為二諦，不言八不；而稟教之流聞有無二邊墮斷常，故不成中道。若言二諦不生不滅不常不斷，即知二諦便是中道，故將八不釋成二諦。問：云何將八不釋成世諦中道，世諦義正耶？答：一師語多對他而起。他有有可有，即有空可空。有有可有，不由空故有，若有空可空，不由有故空。今無有可有，即無空可空。無有可有，由空故有，無空可空，由有故空。故以空有為世諦，有空為真諦。空有為世諦，世諦即是因緣假有，因緣假有即是因緣假生、因緣假滅，因緣假生不可定生、因緣假滅不可定滅，不可定生故無性實之生、不可定滅故無性實之滅，故不生不滅為世諦中道。問：師云假生不生、假滅不滅，不生不滅名世諦中道。此乃是不於假生，云何不性生耶？答：師云假生不生，此有三意。若明二諦俱無生義者，即假生不生，此明無有性實之生義耳，非是不於假生也。二者自有假生不生，即不於假生，為世諦中道，此用真諦之假為世諦之中，具如上釋也。三者明此假生即是不生，若安不生置於真諦生自在世諦，此乃是真俗二見耳。問：世諦無性實生滅，云何是中道耶？答：世諦若是性實生滅，即墮偏邪，不成中道；以世諦遠離性實偏邪，故成中道。問：性實生滅云何名偏邪？答：以生定生，即生是常生；滅若實滅，故滅成斷滅。故性實生滅即是偏邪。問：離性生滅但成世諦中道，亦成世諦假名耶？答：即一性實之執具於二義，以性實是偏義，故障於中道；以自性義，故障於假名。能障一惑既具二義，所障世諦中假亦然。以有不自有，故有是假有，即此假有遠離二邊，故稱中道。問：若爾，中假何別？答：論云「亦為是假名，亦是中道義。」故更無二體，約義不同耳。問：若爾，攝山大師云何非有非無名為中道，而有而無稱為假名。即體稱為中、用即是假。云何無別？答：此是一往開於體用，故體稱為中、用名為假。問：大師何故作是說？答：論文如此，故大師用之。〈四諦品〉云「眾因緣生法，我說即是空，亦為最假名，亦是中道義。」長行釋云「以遠離二邊故名中道，為眾生故以假名說。中道為體，不可說其有無；用是有無，故可得假說。」故以非有非無為中、而有而無為假，蓋是一途論耳。若辨三中三假，即中假常通，後當具說也。問：何等是性實生滅？答：略明四種人計。一者世間所說，但就耳目所見地水和合即外物生，父母和合有內法起，以其決定有內外法生，故名性實。二者諸外道所計無因邪因決定有生，亦名性實。三者小乘之人執未來定有性生，從於未來起來現在，故名為生，亦是性實。四者有所得大乘學人雖言諸法是假，決定有生可生，即生不因滅故，生成自性。如此四種性生，並障如來因緣世諦。論主出世，破此四人性實之執，申明世諦是因緣假名，故世諦始成中道也。問：世諦破此性實生滅，是性空義以不？答：即是性空也。以如是等性畢竟空寂，五眼不見，故名性空。問：為是本性空、為是破性空？答：具二義也。此性本來空寂，非破故空，名本性空。如謂炎為水，水本性空，若據妄謂之情名為性執，就其求此性執不可得，名破性空也。問：既是性空，云何稱中道耶？答：空無二邊，故稱中道。問：即此亦得明非有非無中道以不？答：以空無性實，故不可為有；有因緣假名，故不可為無。此即合中與假皆是中道。問：此出何處？答：《涅槃經》云「亦有亦無名為中道」，即是其事。又《涅槃》云「無生死，不可為有；有常樂我淨，不可為無。」如此之類其義非一。問：云何用此以為中道？答：中是正義，明無性實、有於假名，在義始正，故稱為中。問：性空有幾種？答：論性空有四種，一者計有空性，名為性空，此從所執立名；二者破外人性實，故名性空；三者此性執本自空，名本性空；四者因緣本性自空，名為性空。此性空即是佛性、波若、實相之異名耳。二乘人不見性空者，不見此性空，此以體為性，非性執之性。問：二諦俱不生、俱不說，俱如俱絕、俱性俱空，性、空何異？答：猶一義耳。無性假兩生，故俱不生。世諦不說性生、真諦不說假生，名俱不說。二諦絕假實兩生，名為俱絕。絕即是如，故云俱如。問：何故初就不生不滅明中道耶？答：隨寄一門冀得諸悟，不應苟責所由。必欲尋之，非無深致。世諦雖具萬化，但因果相生是眾義大宗、立信之根本，因果若成即一切皆成、因果若壞即一切皆壞。今欲正世諦因果相生之義，是故命初就不生不滅論世諦中道。問：何以知欲破邪偏因果正世諦因果耶？答：青目釋不生，即出內外論師九種因果皆悉不成，故知就因果以明世諦中道。問：何故不言不因不果，如涅槃十不耶？答：今欲以無生滅正世諦因果，故不得發旨即明非因非果。問：既說不生不滅便足，何故復說六事？答：利根者聞初即悟，不須更說。所以然者，以世諦無性實生滅即病無不破，了因緣假名生滅即正無不顯，故不須更說六事。但為鈍根未悟，宜轉勢演之。又根性不同、受悟非一，自有聞不生不滅不悟，聽不常不斷便了，故更趣異緣宜開別教。如《淨名》三十餘菩薩說不二法門，又如曇無蝎菩薩說六百萬億波若之門。問：已知更說異門，今何故次不生不滅明不常不斷？答：略有三義。一者成前世諦破性生滅義。所以世諦破性實生滅者，良由實生即墮常、實滅即墮斷，是故世諦破實生滅也。二者顯成世諦中道義。所以世諦假生假滅是中道者，良由假生非定生故不常、假滅非定滅故不斷，不斷不常故名中道，故舉不常不斷釋成世諦中道也。問：不常不斷既是中道，不生不滅亦是中道，云何以中道顯中道？答：就不生不滅明世諦中道義即不顯，若就不常不斷明於中道在義易彰。所以然者，以經論之中多就不常不斷明中道。《涅槃．師子吼品》云「眾生見起凡有二種：一斷、二常。如是二見不名中道，無常無斷乃名中道。」此論〈業品〉云「此論所說義離於斷常，以經論多就不常不斷明中道，其義顯彰、其言易信。」故舉不常不斷釋成中道。三者上雖言世諦因果相生是假生滅、非實生滅，此乃離性實之過，猶未勉因中有果無果之失。所以然者，既稱假生，或可謂因中有果故假生、或是因中無果故假生。故今明假名因果相生，不得有無。若如僧佉計因中有果故生，即是常義。如《百論》云「種種果生時，種種因不失。」不失者，常是有，不可失滅，故名為常。衛世師執因中無果，故名為斷。以因中無果，因滅於前、果生於後，故名為斷。佛法內薩婆多明三世有，即是本果性在未來，從未來至現在，從現在謝過去。三世常有，故名為常。僧祇部二世無義，以本無今有、已有還無，故是斷滅。今明因緣因果不可定有、不可定無，故是不斷不常，名為中道。具如《涅槃．師子吼品》說也。 > Fourth: Section on the True Teaching (zhengzong men). > > Question: Earlier you said that the two truths are rectified by the eight negations. Please explain this. > > Answer: Because of the eight negations, conventional truth becomes the middle way, and thus the meaning of conventional truth is rectified. Because of the eight negations, ultimate truth becomes the middle way, and thus the meaning of ultimate truth is rectified. Because of the eight negations, the synthesis of the two truths becomes the middle way, and thus the synthesis of the two truths is rectified. Because these three types are rectified, the twelve divisions of the canon, the eighty thousand treasuries of Dharma, and all teachings are rectified. Because all teachings are rectified, correct contemplation arises, all prapañca is extinguished, and one immediately attains the Way. Because this meaning is essential, the eight negations are placed at the beginning; therefore, the author of the treatise, by means of the eight negations, determines the bias or correctness of the Buddha's teachings. > > Question: Why is it that when these three are rectified, all are rectified? > > Answer: The teachings spoken by all Buddhas of the three times and ten directions are all based on the two truths, for the two truths completely subsume all the Buddha's teachings. Once the two truths are rectified, how could all not be rectified? > > Question: Why did the author of the treatise rectify the Buddha's teachings by means of the eight negations? > > Answer: Because three types of people, when studying the two truths, all fall into biased and erroneous views. First, those like the five hundred sects cling to fixed, inherent existence; thus conventional truth falls into inherent existence, thereby becoming biased and erroneous. Second, the Fangguang (Vaitulya) cling to fixed, inherent emptiness; thus ultimate truth falls into bias and error. To refute these two biases, he elucidates dependent origination, emptiness, and existence as the two truths, and only then are the two truths rectified. Third, what is practiced in the world also asserts that there are three types of middle way: conventional truth clarifies the middle way of neither permanence nor annihilation; ultimate truth clarifies the middle way of neither arising nor ceasing; and the synthesis of the two truths distinguishes the middle way of neither ultimate nor conventional. Yet when critically examining these three middles, none of them constitutes the middle, and all fall into bias and error. Therefore, now confronting these biases and errors, he clarifies the eight negations, rectifying the two truths into the three types of middle way; thus the three middles attain correctness. > > Question: The eight negations are themselves the two truths. Why use the eight negations to rectify the two truths? > > Answer: Although the eight negations are themselves the two truths, people merely speak of existence and non-existence as the two truths without mentioning the eight negations; and students receiving the teaching, upon hearing the two extremes of existence and non-existence, fall into annihilation and permanence, and thus do not attain the middle way. If one states that the two truths are neither arising nor ceasing, neither permanent nor annihilated, one immediately realizes that the two truths are precisely the middle way. Therefore, the eight negations are employed to explain and complete the two truths. > > Question: How are the eight negations used to explain and complete the middle way of conventional truth so that the meaning of conventional truth is rectified? > > Answer: A master's words mostly arise in response to others. The other holds that there is an existence that can exist, and thus there is an emptiness that can be empty. If there is an existence that can exist, it does not exist by relying on emptiness; if there is an emptiness that can be empty, it is not empty by relying on existence. Now, there is no existence that can exist, and thus no emptiness that can be empty. Since there is no existence that can exist, it exists by relying on emptiness; since there is no emptiness that can be empty, it is empty by relying on existence. Therefore, emptiness-existence is conventional truth, and existence-emptiness is ultimate truth. When emptiness-existence is conventional truth, conventional truth is provisionally designated existence through causes and conditions; provisional existence through causes and conditions is provisional arising through causes and conditions and provisional ceasing through causes and conditions. Provisional arising through causes and conditions cannot be a fixed arising; provisional ceasing through causes and conditions cannot be a fixed ceasing. Because it cannot be fixed arising, there is no arising of substantial intrinsic nature; because it cannot be fixed ceasing, there is no ceasing of substantial intrinsic nature. Therefore, neither arising nor ceasing is the middle way of conventional truth. > > Question: The master says that provisional arising does not arise, and provisional ceasing does not cease, and that neither arising nor ceasing is called the middle way of conventional truth. This would mean not arising as provisional arising; how does it mean not arising by intrinsic nature? > > Answer: When the master says provisional arising does not arise, there are three meanings. First, if clarifying that both truths lack arising, then provisional arising does not arise means only that there is no arising of substantial intrinsic nature, not that there is no provisional arising. Second, provisional arising naturally does not arise; that is, the absence of provisional arising serves as the middle way of conventional truth. This takes the provisionality of ultimate truth as the middle of conventional truth, fully as explained above. Third, it clarifies that this provisional arising is itself non-arising; if one locates non-arising in ultimate truth and arising in conventional truth, these are merely the two views of ultimate and conventional. > > Question: If conventional truth lacks substantial arising and ceasing of intrinsic nature, how is it the middle way? > > Answer: If conventional truth were substantial arising and ceasing of intrinsic nature, it would fall into bias and error and not constitute the middle way. Because conventional truth is far removed from the bias and error of substantial intrinsic nature, it constitutes the middle way. > > Question: Why is substantial arising and ceasing of intrinsic nature called biased and erroneous? > > Answer: If arising is fixed arising, then arising is permanent arising; if ceasing is real ceasing, then ceasing becomes annihilating ceasing. Therefore, substantial arising and ceasing of intrinsic nature is precisely biased and erroneous. > > Question: Does departure from arising and ceasing of intrinsic nature only establish the middle way of conventional truth, or does it also establish the provisional designation of conventional truth? > > Answer: The single clinging to substantial intrinsic nature possesses two aspects: because substantial intrinsic nature is biased, it obstructs the middle way; because of the notion of inherent nature, it obstructs provisional designation. Since the single delusion that obstructs possesses two aspects, the middle and the provisional of conventional truth that are obstructed are also likewise. Because existence does not exist of itself, existence is provisional existence; and because this provisional existence is far removed from the two extremes, it is called the middle way. > > Question: If so, what is the difference between the middle and the provisional? > > Answer: The treatise states: 'It is also a provisional designation, and also the meaning of the middle way.' Therefore, there are not two different substances; they are distinguished merely according to meaning. > > Question: If so, why did the Great Master of Sheshan (Sengquan) say that neither existence nor non-existence is called the middle way, whereas both existence and non-existence are called provisional designation—that substance is called the middle, while function is the provisional? How can they have no difference? > > Answer: This was provisionally distinguishing substance and function for the moment; hence substance was called the middle, and function was called the provisional. > > Question: Why did the Great Master speak like that? > > Answer: The text of the treatise is like this, so the Great Master adopted it. The 'Examination of the Four Truths' chapter states: 'Whatever phenomena arise from causes and conditions, I declare to be emptiness; it is also a provisional designation, and also the meaning of the middle way.' The prose commentary explains: 'Because it is far removed from the two extremes, it is called the middle way; for the sake of sentient beings, it is spoken of as provisional designation. The middle way is the substance, of which existence and non-existence cannot be predicated; function is existence and non-existence, and therefore can be provisionally spoken of.' Thus, taking neither existence nor non-existence as the middle and both existence and non-existence as the provisional is merely one way of discussing it. If one distinguishes the three middles and three provisionals, then the middle and provisional are constantly unified, as will be fully explained later. > > Question: What is substantial arising and ceasing of intrinsic nature? > > Answer: Briefly, four kinds of views held by people can be clarified: First, what worldly people speak of: merely based on what eyes and ears perceive, the coming together of earth and water gives rise to external things, and the coming together of parents gives rise to internal phenomena. Clinging to the idea that there is definitely an arising of internal and external phenomena is called substantial intrinsic nature. Second, the views of various non-Buddhists who hold that uncaused or falsely caused arising definitely exists; this is also called substantial intrinsic nature. Third, Hīnayāna practitioners who cling to the idea that in the future there definitely exists an arising of intrinsic nature, which comes forth from the future into the present and is therefore called arising; this is also substantial intrinsic nature. Fourth, Mahāyāna practitioners who grasp at attainments: although they say phenomena are provisional, they hold that there is definitely an arising that can arise; that is, arising does not depend on ceasing, so arising forms its own nature. Arising of intrinsic nature of these four types all obstructs the Tathāgata's conventional truth of causes and conditions. When the author of the treatise appeared in the world, he refuted these four kinds of people's clinging to substantial intrinsic nature, and elucidated that conventional truth is provisional designation through causes and conditions; thus conventional truth first became the middle way. > > Question: In conventional truth, is the refutation of this substantial arising and ceasing of intrinsic nature the meaning of emptiness of intrinsic nature, or not? > > Answer: It is precisely emptiness of intrinsic nature. Because such intrinsic natures are ultimately empty and tranquil, unseen by the five eyes, it is called emptiness of intrinsic nature. > > Question: Is it original emptiness of intrinsic nature, or emptiness through the refutation of intrinsic nature? > > Answer: It has both meanings. This nature is originally empty and tranquil, not empty because of being refuted; hence it is called original emptiness of intrinsic nature. It is like taking a mirage to be water: water is originally empty of intrinsic nature; if considered from the standpoint of the deluded emotional attachment, it is called clinging to intrinsic nature; when one seeks this clung-to intrinsic nature and it cannot be found, it is called emptiness through refutation of intrinsic nature. > > Question: Since it is emptiness of intrinsic nature, why is it called the middle way? > > Answer: Because emptiness is free from the two extremes, it is called the middle way. > > Question: Can this also clarify the middle way of neither existence nor non-existence, or not? > > Answer: Because it is empty of substantial intrinsic nature, it cannot be considered existence; because there is provisional designation through causes and conditions, it cannot be considered non-existence. This combines the middle and the provisional, both being the middle way. > > Question: Where does this come from? > > Answer: The Nirvāṇa Sūtra says: 'Both existence and non-existence are called the middle way'; this is precisely that matter. Again, the Nirvāṇa says: 'Having no birth-and-death, it cannot be considered existence; having permanence, bliss, self, and purity, it cannot be considered non-existence.' Cases like this are not just one. > > Question: Why is this used as the middle way? > > Answer: The middle means correct meaning. Clarifying that there is no substantial intrinsic nature while there is provisional designation is only then correct in meaning; hence it is called the middle. > > Question: How many kinds of emptiness of intrinsic nature are there? > > Answer: Discussing emptiness of intrinsic nature, there are four kinds: First, calculating an empty nature is called emptiness of intrinsic nature; this takes its name from what is clung to. Second, refuting the substantial intrinsic nature of outsiders is called emptiness of intrinsic nature. Third, this clung-to nature is originally empty of itself, called original emptiness of intrinsic nature. Fourth, causes and conditions are originally empty of their own nature, called emptiness of intrinsic nature. This emptiness of intrinsic nature is merely another name for Buddha-nature, prajñā, and true reality. When people of the two vehicles do not see emptiness of intrinsic nature, it is this emptiness of intrinsic nature that they do not see; this takes the fundamental substance as nature, not the nature of clinging to intrinsic nature. > > Question: The two truths are both non-arising, both unsaid, both thusness, both severed, both nature, and both empty. What is the difference between nature and emptiness? > > Answer: They are still of one meaning. Free from the two arisings of intrinsic nature and provisionality, they are therefore both non-arising. Conventional truth does not speak of arising of intrinsic nature, and ultimate truth does not speak of provisional arising, so they are called both unsaid. The two truths sever both provisional and substantial arisings, so they are called both severed. Severance is precisely thusness, so they are said to be both thusness. > > Question: Why clarify the middle way first in terms of neither arising nor ceasing? > > Answer: One may provisionally rely on any single gateway in the hope that diverse awakenings will be attained; one should not stubbornly interrogate the reason. Yet if one must trace it out, it is not without profound significance. Although conventional truth encompasses the myriad transformations, cause and effect generating each other is the primary tenet among all doctrines, the foundation for establishing faith. If cause and effect are established, all are established; if cause and effect are ruined, all are ruined. Now, desiring to rectify the meaning of mutual generation of cause and effect in conventional truth, he therefore first discusses the middle way of conventional truth in terms of neither arising nor ceasing. > > Question: How do we know that he desires to refute biased and erroneous causes and effects and rectify the causes and effects of conventional truth? > > Answer: When Piṅgala explains non-arising, he brings forth nine kinds of cause and effect from Buddhist and non-Buddhist treatise masters, all of which are unestablished; hence we know that he clarifies the middle way of conventional truth in terms of cause and effect. > > Question: Why does he not say neither cause nor effect, as in the ten negations of the Nirvāṇa? > > Answer: Because he now wishes to rectify the cause and effect of conventional truth by means of non-arising and non-ceasing, he cannot, upon launching the topic, immediately clarify neither cause nor effect. > > Question: Since speaking of neither arising nor ceasing is already sufficient, why does he additionally speak of the six matters? > > Answer: Those of sharp faculties awaken upon hearing the first, and there is no need for further exposition. Why? Because when conventional truth lacks substantial arising and ceasing of intrinsic nature, no illness is not refuted; and when one understands the arising and ceasing of provisional designations through causes and conditions, no correctness is not revealed; hence there is no need to further speak of the six matters. But for the sake of those of dull faculties who have not yet awakened, it is appropriate to shift the angle and elaborate. Furthermore, faculties and temperaments differ, and receptivity and awakening are not uniform: some do not awaken upon hearing neither arising nor ceasing, yet comprehend upon listening to neither permanence nor annihilation. Therefore, adapting to different conditions, it is fitting to open distinct teachings. For example, in the Vimalakīrti-nirdeśa over thirty bodhisattvas speak on the gateway of non-duality; or again, Dharmodgata Bodhisattva speaks on six hundred myriad kotis of prajñā gateways. > > Question: Having understood that different gateways are further expounded, why clarify neither permanence nor annihilation next after neither arising nor ceasing? > > Answer: There are briefly three meanings: First, to complete the preceding meaning of conventional truth refuting arising and ceasing of intrinsic nature. The reason conventional truth refutes substantial arising and ceasing of intrinsic nature is precisely because real arising falls into permanence, and real ceasing falls into annihilation; therefore conventional truth refutes real arising and ceasing. Second, to reveal and establish the meaning of the middle way of conventional truth. The reason provisional arising and provisional ceasing of conventional truth is the middle way is precisely because provisional arising is not fixed arising and thus not permanent, and provisional ceasing is not fixed ceasing and thus not annihilated; being neither annihilated nor permanent, it is called the middle way. Hence, adducing neither permanence nor annihilation explains and completes the middle way of conventional truth. Question: Since neither permanence nor annihilation is the middle way, and neither arising nor ceasing is also the middle way, how does one middle way reveal another middle way? Answer: If clarifying the middle way of conventional truth in terms of neither arising nor ceasing, the meaning is not obvious; if clarifying the middle way in terms of neither permanence nor annihilation, the meaning is easily manifested. Why? Because in sūtras and treatises, the middle way is mostly clarified in terms of neither permanence nor annihilation. The 'Lion's Roar' chapter of the Nirvāṇa Sūtra says: 'Sentient beings' arising of views has generally two kinds: first, annihilation; second, permanence. Such two views are not called the middle way; absence of permanence and absence of annihilation is called the middle way.' The 'Examination of Karma' chapter of this treatise states: 'The meaning expounded in this treatise is free from annihilation and permanence.' Because sūtras and treatises mostly clarify the middle way in terms of neither permanence nor annihilation, its meaning is prominent and clear, and its words are easily trusted; hence he adduces neither permanence nor annihilation to explain and complete the middle way. Third, although it was stated above that the mutual generation of cause and effect in conventional truth is provisional arising and ceasing, not real arising and ceasing, this merely avoids the fault of substantial intrinsic nature, but has not yet escaped the error of the effect existing or not existing within the cause. Why? Because since it is called provisional arising, one might claim that because the effect exists in the cause it provisionally arises, or that because the effect does not exist in the cause it provisionally arises. Therefore, now clarifying that the mutual generation of cause and effect of provisional designation cannot be defined as existence or non-existence: If, like the Sāṃkhya, one calculates that because the effect exists in the cause it arises, this is the meaning of permanence. As the Śata-śāstra states: 'When various effects arise, various causes are not lost.' Not lost means permanently existing, unable to be lost or destroyed; hence it is called permanence. The Vaiśeṣika clings to the non-existence of the effect in the cause, which is called annihilation. Because the effect does not exist in the cause, the cause ceases beforehand and the effect arises afterward; hence it is called annihilation. Within the Buddha's Dharma, the Sarvāstivādins clarify that the three times exist; that is, the fundamental nature of the effect resides in the future, comes from the future to the present, and passes from the present into the past. Constantly existing throughout the three times, it is called permanence. The Mahāsāṃghika school's doctrine that two times do not exist holds that non-existence originally now exists, and having existed it returns to non-existence; hence it is annihilation. Now clarifying that cause and effect of causes and conditions cannot be determined as existing or determined as non-existing, it is therefore neither annihilated nor permanent, called the middle way. This is fully expounded in the 'Lion's Roar' chapter of the Nirvāṇa Sūtra. > — English (machine translation) (machine translation) - [Previous: 2.7](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1824.2.7) - [Next: 2.9](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1824.2.9) - [Up: 2](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1824.2) ## Translations (1) - [English (machine translation)](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1824~en-mt.2.8) — English, machine translation --- Source: [https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1824.2.8](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1824.2.8) · Pramāṇa