[Pramāṇa](https://indike.org/pramana/) › [Indian literature](https://indike.org/pramana/in) › [Buddhist Literature](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha) › [Taishō Tripiṭaka (Chinese Buddhist canon)](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho) › [中觀論疏](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1824) › 3.18 # 中觀論疏 3.18 中觀論疏 3.18 - **Language:** Classical Chinese ### [3.18](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1824.3.18) 「世間眼見劫初穀不生」者，第二別標別釋，即是舉別釋總也。問：現見、眼見，此有何異？答：亦得言異，亦得不異。言不異者，現見如此，眼見如此，欲令分明故重說也。言異者，現見語總，眼見語別。又現見語𮚎，眼見語切。又現見舉境就心，眼見偏就於心。又現見簡因緣，故《成論》云「現見事中因緣無用」，現見諸法無生，不假因緣證據方無生也；眼見簡傳聞，眼親見無生，非傳聞所說。問：既言現見無生，只應眼見現穀無生，何故遠舉劫初？答：有二義。一欲窮生之本，本在劫初，本既不生，末豈生耶？二者欲顯諸法先來無生，非今始無生也。問：何故舉穀耶？答：世間共知。如云禾者，二月種、八月就，以調和時生就故也。季歲稔祀載，並就禾立之。如禾下于為年，以一年知禾故也。歲者穢也，一年必為禾所穢，故禾邊作之。一年念得禾為稔。一年得禾以為祀。一年載禾為載。又禾是資身本，顯無生是成法身本。「何以故離劫初穀今穀不可得」者，前總標無生，此別釋無生。又開三別：初明不離故不生、第二縱離即應生、第三明奪離故不生。此文難明，講者多加以私意，遂不釋文，致成紛謬。今直釋之，使煥然可領，不復得從諸異解也。此文正是釋劫初穀不生，而舉今穀者，將今穀顯劫初穀不生耳。離劫初穀今穀不可得者，此是因劫初穀有今穀耳，故不離，即是因義。既因劫初有今穀，則今穀有因，故今穀有生。則知劫初無因，故劫初不生。意正爾也。若劫初有因，則不名初；既其稱初，則無所因，無所因故不生也。問：云何釋眼見劫初不生耶？答：眼見今穀有因，故今穀有生。亦眼見劫初無因，故劫初無生。此零然可解。第二句縱離則應生者，離劫初穀，只是不因劫初耳。若今穀不因劫初而今穀得生者，亦劫初無所因而劫初應得生也，而實不爾。第三句奪離。眼見今穀不因劫初，而今穀畢定不生者；亦眼見劫初無所因，則劫初亦畢竟不生也。問：若爾，論主乃不許劫初生，許其今穀生耶？答：今因劫初，劫初尚不生，今豈得生耶？蓋是借今以破古，古既去、今亦不存耳，是故古今畢竟無生矣。論文正爾。今就文外汎破之。古為因今、為不因今？如其因，今既未有，今何所因耶？又待後有初，則後在初前、初在後後。若以古有今即是一時，何名今古？又當古時未稱為古，至今無復古，云何待耶？又若待今則應在今，若不在今則不待今。又古因於今，古無自性，無自性是則無古。又古更有古則無窮，無窮則無因。又古生今者，為滅已而生、為不滅生耶？滅則無古，誰生今耶？不滅則常。「問若無生應有滅」，有此一問者，可有四義：一者外人歷法而立，不必次第。第二無生對有滅，名㿲角並。三者本立有生，論主遂破生令不生，則生便滅壞，故應有滅也。四者生是法始、滅是法終，既有物終，寧無物始？故致問也。「答曰」，即答四問。若外人歷法而立，內亦歷法而破。若有無相對，此猶是生滅相對，無生故無滅可對，無有故無無可對也。生若前有生成，可壞生令滅；生本不成，何所滅耶？若有法始，可有物終；既無物始，何有物終？「問曰不滅應常」者，成論者許相續是常，但非是實常耳。然實常則是實病、假常則是假病，終是病耳。但此問有總有別。總者，上既明無生滅，即是常也。別者，若有滅，可非常；既不滅，則應常也。「答曰」，具詶總別。若有無常，可得有常；既無無常，則無復常也。別答者，應有四句：一以今難今、二以古難古、三以今難古、四以古難今，但文唯有二句。上兩番以今難古，此文以古難古。若是常者，種應不壞；現見種壞，則古穀不常。「問曰不常應斷」者，問亦具總別。總者，既無生滅無常，亦無不生滅常，豈非大斷？別者，若以種壞言不常者，此之種壞，豈非斷耶？總答意云：若有於常，可得言斷；竟無有常，何所斷耶？別答：若言斷者，牙不應續；以互續故，知不斷也。問：此與他實法不常、相續不斷者，有何異耶？答：此是他用今義，非今用他。如《百論》說「續故不斷，壞故不常。」問：若今他俱有，有何異耶？答：三義不同。一者此是兩彈，非是雙取。言其不常者，明其非是常，非謂是非常；斷亦爾。若他人明不斷則便是常，不常則便是斷也。二者此並是借外人義以破外人，借其種壞破其常見，借其互續彈其斷見；不如常人有假實道理。三者明不常不斷即是無生無滅，而汝謂不常不斷為世諦、不生不滅為真諦，故不同也。「問曰若爾萬物是一」，亦有總別。無生無滅無斷無常，豈非萬物渾然為一？別意：既相續不斷，便相續是一。「答曰」，有四意。一者穀若作牙則牙時無穀，如泥作瓶，瓶時無復泥。今現見牙時穀猶在，故知穀不作牙也。二者正破性義。穀守穀性，不復作牙；牙守牙性，不轉作穀。若不守性則無穀牙，以無性故則無法也。三者穀體若滅是則無穀，以何作牙？穀若不滅，常是常法，不得作牙。四者穀不作牙、牙不作穀，故云不作。作猶是也。「問曰若不一則應異」者，問有兩意：一者若不許穀牙相作，則穀牙有異；二者論主上借異破一，外便謂有異。「答」，四意：一者就名難之。牙名穀牙，何得異穀？穀亦爾也。二者牙若異穀名穀牙者，牙亦異樹應名樹牙。此是俱異難也。三者牙若異穀、牙從穀生；牙既異樹，應從樹生。此俱生難也。四者牙若異穀、牙能生穀，牙既異樹，應能生樹。又責其異。若言異者，牙在穀外則有東西之別。又若言異者應在穀內，如果在器；既不如此，何名為異？「問曰應有來」者，釋不來不出。異三論師云：來應對去，但義相兼，舉來兼去，顯出兼入。欲示破義無窮，故云來出也。今謂可具兩義：一者相兼，如上出者還去至本處，宜以來兼去也。二者外人雖聞六不，而終謂有穀牙，以世諦之法不可無故。是以最後兩不領其大要，必謂有牙，若不從外來，應從內出，是故次明不來不出。問：叵有計內出者不？答：外人見種生於牙，便謂內出；見假水土時節人功而生，故謂外來。又穀牙是眾生業行所感，為內出；復云是那羅延天所賜，故云外來，以諸外道事彼天者，謂世間好物及男女等皆是彼天所賜。今破此事，故云不來不出。又計外來是外道無因生義，計內出是內道有因生。如《十二門論》因果門，「果於因緣中，畢竟不可得」，是破內道計有因義。「亦不餘處來」，破外道無因生義。凡論有生不出斯二，是故最後兩不攝之。文易明也。初之二不偏就古穀明不生滅，次一不偏就今穀明不常，次一不偏就牙顯不斷，一異兩不總約牙穀，來出二不偏約牙辯。 > "\[In\] the world, it is seen by the eye that grain at the beginning of the kalpa does not arise": this is the second \[section\], which separately marks and separately explains, that is, adducing the specific to explain the general. Question: What is the difference between "manifestly seen" (xianjian) and "seen by the eye" (yanjian)? Answer: One can say they are different, and one can also say they are not different. Saying they are not different: manifestly seen is like this, seen by the eye is like this; it is stated redundantly to make it distinct and clear. Saying they are different: "manifestly seen" speaks generally, while "seen by the eye" speaks specifically. Furthermore, "manifestly seen" speaks broadly, while "seen by the eye" speaks pointedly. Furthermore, "manifestly seen" brings forward the object to approach the mind, while "seen by the eye" inclines exclusively to the mind. Furthermore, "manifestly seen" excludes causes and conditions—hence the Tattvasiddhi-śāstra states, "In matters manifestly seen, causes and conditions are of no use"; one manifestly sees that all dharmas are unarisen, not relying on the evidence of causes and conditions before being unarisen. "Seen by the eye" excludes hearsay; the eye personally sees unarising, it is not spoken by hearsay. Question: Since it says "manifestly seen to be unarisen", one should only see with the eye that present grain is unarisen; why does it adduce the distant beginning of the kalpa? Answer: There are two meanings. First, it wishes to exhaust the origin of arising: the origin is at the beginning of the kalpa; if the origin is already unarisen, how could the branch arise? Second, it wishes to reveal that all dharmas have originally been unarisen from the outset, not only beginning to be unarisen now. Question: Why adduce grain? Answer: It is commonly known to the world. As it is said, "he" (cereal crop) is sown in the second month and matures in the eighth month, arising and maturing because the seasons are harmonized. "Season" (ji), "year" (sui), "harvest/year" (ren), "sacrifice/year" (si), "record/year" (zai) are all established with reference to grain. For instance, "禾" (cereal) placed above "于" makes "年" (year), because one knows the cereal crop by one year. "歲" (sui, year) means filth (hui): in one year it is inevitably soiled by the cereal, hence it is written beside "禾". Longing for and obtaining the cereal in one year makes a "稔" (ren). Obtaining the cereal in one year to offer as sacrifice makes a "祀" (si). Transporting the cereal in one year makes a "載" (zai). Furthermore, grain is the basis for sustaining the \[physical\] body, revealing that non-arising is the basis for accomplishing the Dharma-body. "Why is this? Because apart from grain at the beginning of the kalpa, present grain cannot be obtained": the former generally marked non-arising, while this separately explains non-arising. Furthermore, three distinctions are unfolded: first, explaining that because it is not apart \[from it\], it does not arise; second, conceding that if it were apart \[from it\], it should arise; third, explaining that because being apart is refuted, it does not arise. This text is difficult to understand; lecturers often add their own personal views and consequently fail to interpret the text, leading to confusion and errors. Now I directly explain it, so that it becomes brilliantly comprehensible and one no longer follows various divergent interpretations. This text specifically explains that grain at the beginning of the kalpa does not arise; in adducing present grain, it uses present grain to reveal that grain at the beginning of the kalpa does not arise. "Apart from grain at the beginning of the kalpa, present grain cannot be obtained": this means that present grain exists because of grain at the beginning of the kalpa, so not being apart is precisely the meaning of cause. Since present grain exists because of the beginning of the kalpa, then present grain has a cause, and therefore present grain has arising. Then one knows that the beginning of the kalpa has no cause, and therefore the beginning of the kalpa does not arise. The intention is precisely this. If the beginning of the kalpa had a cause, it would not be called the beginning; since it is termed the beginning, it has nothing from which it is caused, and having nothing from which it is caused, it does not arise. Question: How does one explain that the beginning of the kalpa is seen by the eye not to arise? Answer: The eye sees that present grain has a cause, so present grain has arising. The eye also sees that the beginning of the kalpa has no cause, so the beginning of the kalpa has non-arising. This is readily understood. The second sentence, "conceding that if it were apart, it should arise": being apart from grain at the beginning of the kalpa simply means not being caused by the beginning of the kalpa. If present grain could arise without being caused by the beginning of the kalpa, then grain at the beginning of the kalpa should also be able to arise without having any cause, yet in reality it is not so. The third sentence refutes being apart: if it is seen by the eye that present grain is not caused by the beginning of the kalpa and present grain definitely does not arise, it is also seen by the eye that the beginning of the kalpa has nothing from which it is caused, and thus the beginning of the kalpa also ultimately does not arise. Question: If so, does the author of the treatise not grant the arising of the beginning of the kalpa, but grants the arising of present grain? Answer: The present is caused by the beginning of the kalpa; when even the beginning of the kalpa does not arise, how could the present arise? This is borrowing the present to refute the ancient: once the ancient is eliminated, the present also does not exist; therefore, both ancient and present are ultimately without arising. The treatise text is precisely thus. Now, looking outside the text, I broadly refute it: Is the ancient caused by the present, or is it not caused by the present? If it is caused \[by it\], since the present does not yet exist, what could it be caused by? Furthermore, if the beginning depends on the later to exist, then the later would precede the beginning, and the beginning would succeed the later. If the present exists because of the ancient, they would be simultaneous; how could they be called present and ancient? Furthermore, at the time of the ancient, it was not yet called ancient, and arriving at the present, the ancient no longer exists; how could they depend \[on each other\]? Furthermore, if it depends on the present, it should be in the present; if it is not in the present, it does not depend on the present. Furthermore, if the ancient is caused by the present, the ancient has no intrinsic nature; having no intrinsic nature, there is no ancient. Furthermore, if the ancient had a further ancient, there would be an infinite regress; an infinite regress would mean there is no cause. Furthermore, regarding the ancient giving rise to the present: does it give rise having ceased, or does it give rise without having ceased? If it has ceased, there is no ancient—what would give rise to the present? If it has not ceased, it is permanent. "Question: If there is no arising, there should be cessation." That there is this single question can have four meanings: First, the outsider establishes by going through the dharmas, not necessarily in sequence. Second, non-arising pairs with having cessation, termed a pairing like ox horns. Third, originally arising was established; the treatise author then refuted arising to make it non-arising, so arising is then destroyed, and therefore there should be cessation. Fourth, arising is the beginning of a dharma and cessation is the end of a dharma; since there is the end of a thing, how could there not be the beginning of a thing? Hence the question is posed. "Answer:" This responds to the four questions. If the outsider establishes by going through the dharmas, the internal \[Buddhist\] also refutes by going through the dharmas. If existence and non-existence pair with each other, this is still the pairing of arising and cessation: because there is no arising, there is no cessation to pair with; because there is no existence, there is no non-existence to pair with. If arising previously had an accomplished arising, one could destroy arising to make cessation; but arising is originally not established—what is there to cease? If there were a beginning of a dharma, there could be an end of a thing; since there is no beginning of a thing, how could there be an end of a thing? "Question: Not ceasing, it should be permanent." Those of the Tattvasiddhi school accept that continuity is permanent, only that it is not truly permanent. However, real permanence is a real ailment, and provisional permanence is a provisional ailment; in the end it is an ailment. But this question has both general and specific \[meanings\]. As for the general: since it was explained above that there is neither arising nor cessation, that is permanence. As for the specific: if there were cessation, it could be impermanent; since it does not cease, it should be permanent. "Answer:" This answers both the general and the specific. If there were impermanence, there could be permanence; since there is no impermanence, there is no longer permanence. As for the specific answer, there should be four propositions: first, challenging the present by means of the present; second, challenging the ancient by means of the ancient; third, challenging the ancient by means of the present; fourth, challenging the present by means of the ancient. But the text has only two propositions. The above two rounds challenged the ancient by means of the present; this text challenges the ancient by means of the ancient: if it were permanent, the seed should not disintegrate; it is manifestly seen that the seed disintegrates, so ancient grain is not permanent. "Question: Not permanent, it should be annihilated." The question also has both general and specific \[meanings\]. As for the general: since there is neither arising, cessation, nor impermanence, nor is there permanence without arising and cessation, is this not grand annihilation? As for the specific: if one says it is not permanent because the seed disintegrates, is not this disintegration of the seed annihilation? The general response intends: if there were permanence, one could speak of annihilation; there being no permanence at all, what is there to annihilate? The specific response: if one speaks of annihilation, the sprout should not continue; because they mutually continue, one knows it is not annihilated. Question: What difference is there between this and other schools' \[claim that\] real dharmas are impermanent while continuity is unannihilated? Answer: This is their adopting our meaning, not our adopting theirs. As the Śata-śāstra states: "Because of continuity it is not annihilated; because of disintegration it is not permanent." Question: If both this school and others possess this, what difference is there? Answer: Three meanings are different. First, these are two dismissals, not a dual adoption. Saying it is impermanent clarifies that it is not permanent, not that it is impermanence; the same applies to annihilation. If others explain non-annihilation, it is then permanence; if they explain impermanence, it is then annihilation. Second, these both borrow the outsider's doctrine to refute the outsider: borrowing their disintegration of the seed to refute their view of permanence, and borrowing their mutual continuity to dismiss their view of annihilation; it is unlike ordinary people who have principles of the provisional and real. Third, clarifying that impermanence and non-annihilation are precisely non-arising and non-cessation, whereas you regard impermanence and non-annihilation as conventional truth and non-arising and non-cessation as ultimate truth; therefore it is not the same. "Question: If so, all things are one." This also has general and specific \[meanings\]. General: without arising, cessation, annihilation, or permanence, are not all things blended into one? Specific intention: since continuity is unbroken, continuity is then identical as one. "Answer:" There are four points. First: if grain produces the sprout, then at the time of the sprout there would be no grain, like clay making a pot, where at the time of the pot there is no longer clay. Now it is manifestly seen that at the time of the sprout the grain still exists; therefore one knows grain does not produce the sprout. Second: directly refuting the concept of intrinsic nature. Grain maintains the nature of grain and does not further become the sprout; the sprout maintains the nature of sprout and does not turn into grain. If they did not maintain their natures, there would be neither grain nor sprout; because there is no intrinsic nature, there are no dharmas. Third: if the substance of the grain ceases, then there is no grain—with what could it produce the sprout? If the grain does not cease, it is always a permanent dharma and cannot produce the sprout. Fourth: grain does not produce the sprout, and the sprout does not produce grain; hence it says "does not produce". "Produce" is equivalent to "is". "Question: If they are not one, they should be different." The question has two intentions: First, if one does not grant that grain and sprout make each other, then grain and sprout are different. Second, above the treatise author borrowed difference to refute oneness, so the outsider thinks there is difference. "Answer:" Four points: First, challenging it through names. The sprout is named "grain sprout"; how could it be different from grain? The same applies to grain. Second: if the sprout is named "grain sprout" while being different from grain, the sprout is also different from a tree and should be named a "tree sprout". This is the challenge of both being different. Third: if the sprout is different from grain and the sprout arises from grain, since the sprout is different from a tree, it should arise from a tree. This is the challenge of both arising. Fourth: if the sprout is different from grain and the sprout can produce grain, since the sprout is different from a tree, it should be able to produce a tree. Furthermore, reproaching their difference: if one says they are different, the sprout being outside the grain would entail a distinction of east and west. Furthermore, if one says they are different, it should be inside the grain, like fruit in a vessel; since it is not like this, how can it be called different? "Question: There should be coming." This explains "no coming and no going out". A different Sanlun master said: "Coming" should pair with "going", but their meanings encompass each other; adducing "coming" encompasses "going", and revealing "going out" encompasses "entering". Wishing to show that the points of refutation are inexhaustible, it says "coming and going out". I now say it can possess two meanings: First, mutual encompassment: as above, that which goes out returns and goes to its original place, so it is appropriate to use coming to encompass going. Second, although the outsider has heard the six negations, they ultimately think that grain and sprout exist, because conventional phenomena cannot be absent. Therefore, the final two negations grasp their main essential: firmly believing that there is a sprout, if it does not come from outside, it should go out from inside; therefore next it explains "no coming and no going out". Question: Could anyone posit an emergence from within? Answer: When outsiders see the seed produce the sprout, they then claim it goes out from within; seeing it depend on water, earth, season, and human labor to arise, they therefore claim it comes from outside. Furthermore, the grain sprout being induced by sentient beings' karmic actions is "going out from within"; further saying that it is bestowed by Nārāyaṇa is "coming from outside", because various outsiders who serve that deity claim that good things in the world, men, women, and so on are all bestowed by that deity. Now refuting this matter, it therefore says "no coming and no going out". Furthermore, positing coming from outside is the outsiders' doctrine of uncaused arising, while positing going out from within is the internal \[Buddhist\] doctrine of caused arising. As the "Cause and Effect Chapter" of the Dvādaśamukha-śāstra says, "The effect in causes and conditions is ultimately unobtainable" refutes the internal doctrine of positing a cause. "Nor does it come from anywhere else" refutes the outsiders' doctrine of uncaused arising. All discussions of arising do not exceed these two; therefore the final two negations subsume them. The text is easy to understand. The first two negations exclusively address ancient grain to explain non-arising and non-cessation; the next one negation exclusively addresses present grain to explain impermanence; the next one negation exclusively addresses the sprout to reveal non-annihilation; the two negations of oneness and difference generally concern sprout and grain; the two negations of coming and going out exclusively concern the sprout. > — English (machine translation) (machine translation) - [Previous: 3.17](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1824.3.17) - [Next: 3.19](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1824.3.19) - [Up: 3](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1824.3) ## Translations (1) - [English (machine translation)](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1824~en-mt.3.18) — English, machine translation --- Source: [https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1824.3.18](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1824.3.18) · Pramāṇa