[Pramāṇa](https://indike.org/pramana/) › [Indian literature](https://indike.org/pramana/in) › [Buddhist Literature](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha) › [Taishō Tripiṭaka (Chinese Buddhist canon)](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho) › [中觀論疏](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1824) › 3.20.2 # 中觀論疏 3.20.2 中觀論疏 3.20.2 - **Language:** Classical Chinese ### [3.20.2](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1824.3.20.2) 無因生者，惑者既聞眾生不從自體生，復不假五陰他生，若爾則是無因而有眾生。 是亦不然，尚不從此二因生，豈得無因有眾生耶？ 以四處求眾生不得，故名眾生無生。 悟眾生無生，名眾生忍。 諸法無生者，今略據二法：一因成法，如四微成柱，類上四句責之，不煩作也。 二相待法，如長不自長，待短故長。 長非自生，短中亦無長，故不從他生。 若短中有長，則不名短。 若自他共有長者，具前二過：一有自待長之過、二短中有長之過。 而長不自長，又不因短，不可無因有長，故非無因生義。 如長短既爾，生死涅槃等一切法，皆以四門求之不得。 以四處求法生不得，即是諸法無生，悟法無生名為法忍。 問：論主何以但云諸法不生，不云人不生？ 答：法難破，人易破。 又法為人本。 又此論正破內人，內人多計有法。 又是略示一途。 問：若執有生，四門求之不得； 計有無生，云何破耶？ 答：破有多門。 一者還用生破。 若四門有生，可有無生，四門生義不成，云何有無生乃至亦生無生、非生無生？ 五句自崩。 如此了悟，方是無生。 故《智度論》釋無生忍云「不生不滅、非共非不共，是名無生法忍。 」二者既以四門求生不得，還以四門求無生亦不得。 若自無生，應不待生，以待生說無生，故知非自無生。 若待生說無生，便是從他無生； 而生無生本無二體，豈是他耶？ 共則有二過：無生不自因，復不因於生，云何有無生？ 以四門求無生不得，亦生無生、非生無生諸句壞，故於一切法心無愛著，則悟無生忍。 就此長行唯釋破四句生，未解第四句結無生，至後偈長行方乃釋之。 破四句生即成四別。 就破四句生，有離有合。 離為四難，合成二關。 四難者，一理奪破、二二體破、三失因緣破、四無窮破。 合為二難者，前一為奪、後三縱關。 「無有從自體生」者，佛法大小乘無有從自體生。 小乘云：至竟無能生用，離等侶故。 大乘云：未曾有一法不從因緣生。 今既大小不攝，故直撥之。 「必待眾因」者，上標奪，今釋奪也。 又上明無自，今借不自以破於自也。 問：何故言必待眾因耶？ 答：外人但謂從己體一因生，今奪之，萬化藉於眾因，豈獨從自己一因生耶？ 所言眾因者，一切諸法有三種因：一正因，謂穀子； 二緣因，謂水土； 三者生相因。 既必待三因方乃得生者，豈從自體生耶？ 「若從自體生」者，第二縱破。 縱汝從自體生，則有自體可從。 有物從之，便成因果不同、能所兩別，何得稱自？ 問：今但轉性牙成事牙，寧有兩體？ 答：若爾，如隱名佛性、顯名法身，但是一體，則不得稱從自體生。 故得一體，則失其能從所從，不成生義； 若有能生所生，則生義得成，而失其一體。 「若離餘因」，此第三失因緣破。 此文若從自體生者，前責其一體成二體。 今復破其二體，責能生之體，為更有所從、為無所從？ 若更有所從，則從從無窮墮第四難。 若無所從，即墮無因第三難。 所生亦爾，若更能生他，即生生無窮； 若不能生，則所生亦爾。 此文若逈生者，初難明無有自生，必待眾因； 今明若不待因而自生者則失因緣。 所言餘因者，如牙自從牙體而生，則牙體以外悉名為餘。 穀則是其因，水土為緣，並不從此因緣生也。 「若生更有生是則無窮」，第四無窮難。 無窮有五種：一遍從無窮，如穀內無牙能生牙者，一切物亦無牙亦應遍從眾物生。 二遍生無窮，穀內無牙能生牙者，亦無眾物應遍生眾物。 三逆推無窮，牙既從穀，穀復從他。 四順推無窮，穀既生牙復生物，是則無窮。 五常生無窮，以自體常在，生無息時。 此中無有遍生、遍從二種無窮。 若望更責二體，則有逆推、順推兩無窮，逆推是因無窮、順推是果無窮。 若就自體常有，則是常生無窮。 既本有自體而能生一牙者，此自體應更能生無窮牙也。 > Regarding origination without causes: the confused person, having heard that sentient beings are not produced from their own essence, and furthermore do not depend upon the other, the five aggregates, to be produced, thinks that if so, then sentient beings exist without causes. This too is not so: since they are not produced even from these two causes, how could sentient beings exist without causes? Because sentient beings cannot be found when sought in the four alternatives, this is called the unoriginatedness of sentient beings. Awakening to the unoriginatedness of sentient beings is called the patience regarding sentient beings. As for the unoriginatedness of phenomena: we now briefly rely on two types of phenomena. First, phenomena formed by causes, like the four subtle atoms forming a pillar; this is to be questioned analogously to the four propositions above, so there is no need to repeat it. Second, mutually dependent phenomena, like long not being long of itself, but being long by depending on short. Long does not originate from itself, nor does long exist within short, so it is not produced from another. If long existed within short, then it would not be called short. If long existed from both self and other together, it would have the two previous faults: first, the fault of long depending on itself; second, the fault of long existing within short. Furthermore, long is not long of itself, nor is it caused by short, and it is impossible for long to exist without cause; therefore it is not the case that it originates without causes. Since this is so for long and short, so too are all phenomena such as saṃsāra and nirvāṇa unfound when sought through the four gates. Since the origination of phenomena cannot be found when seeking through the four positions, this is the unoriginatedness of phenomena; awakening to the unoriginatedness of phenomena is called the patience regarding phenomena. Question: Why does the author of the treatise only say that phenomena do not originate, and not say that persons do not originate? Answer: Phenomena are difficult to refute, whereas persons are easy to refute. Furthermore, phenomena are the basis of persons. Moreover, this treatise specifically refutes Buddhists, and Buddhists mostly posit the existence of phenomena. In addition, this is to briefly indicate one path. Question: If one clings to origination, it cannot be found when sought through the four gates; if one conceives of unoriginatedness, how is that refuted? Answer: The refutation has many gates. First, one also uses origination to refute it. If there were origination through the four gates, there could be unoriginatedness; but since the thesis of origination through the four gates is unestablished, how could there be unoriginatedness, or even both origination and unoriginatedness, or neither origination nor unoriginatedness? The five propositions collapse of themselves. Only when one has thoroughly realized this is it truly unoriginatedness. Therefore, the \*Mahāprajñāpāramitopadeśa\*, in explaining the patience of the unoriginatedness of dharmas, says: 'Neither origination nor cessation, neither shared nor unshared—this is called the patience of the unoriginatedness of dharmas.' Second, since origination cannot be found when sought through the four gates, unoriginatedness likewise cannot be found when sought through the four gates. If unoriginatedness were from itself, it should not depend on origination; since unoriginatedness is spoken of in dependence on origination, we know it is not unoriginated of itself. If unoriginatedness is spoken of in dependence on origination, then it is unoriginated from another; yet origination and unoriginatedness fundamentally do not have two separate substances, so how could it be another? Origination from both involves two faults: unoriginatedness is not caused by itself, nor is it caused by origination; how could there be unoriginatedness? Since unoriginatedness cannot be found when sought through the four gates, all propositions such as both origination and unoriginatedness, and neither origination nor unoriginatedness, are ruined; thus, when the mind has no affectionate attachment to any phenomenon, one awakens to the patience of the unoriginatedness of dharmas. Within this prose, it only explains the refutation of origination in the four propositions, and does not yet explain the fourth proposition's conclusion of unoriginatedness; only in the prose following the subsequent verse is it explained. Refuting origination in the four propositions consists of four distinct points. Regarding the refutation of origination in the four propositions, there is separation and combination. Separated, they form four objections; combined, they form two junctures. As for the four objections: first, refutation by deprivation of principle; second, refutation by two substances; third, refutation by loss of causes and conditions; fourth, refutation by infinite regress. As for combining them into two objections: the former one is the deprivation, and the latter three are conceded junctures. Regarding 'There is no origination from self-essence': in the Buddha-Dharma, whether Mahāyāna or Hīnayāna, there is no origination from self-essence. The Hīnayāna says: ultimately there is no function capable of producing, because it is separated from its companions. The Mahāyāna says: there has never been a single phenomenon that does not originate from causes and conditions. Now, since it is not accepted in either the Mahāyāna or Hīnayāna, he directly rejects it. Regarding 'It must depend on multiple causes': the above formulated the deprivation, and this now explains the deprivation. Furthermore, the above clarified the absence of self, and this now borrows the non-self to refute the self. Question: Why does he say 'must depend on multiple causes'? Answer: The outsider merely thinks it is produced from the single cause of its own essence; now, depriving him of this, the myriad transformations depend on multiple causes—how could it be produced solely from the single cause of oneself? As for the 'multiple causes' mentioned: all phenomena have three kinds of causes: first, the primary cause, namely the grain seed; second, the conditional cause, namely water and earth; third, the cause of the characteristic of origination. Since it must depend on these three causes before it can be produced, how could it be produced from its own essence? Regarding 'If it were produced from its own essence': this is the second refutation by concession. Conceding that you are produced from your own essence, then there is an essence of oneself from which to proceed. If there is a thing from which it proceeds, then cause and effect become dissimilar, and that which is capable \[of producing\] and that which is \[produced\] become two distinct entities; how could it be called 'self'? Question: Now, we merely transform the sprout's nature into the actual sprout; how could there be two substances? Answer: If so, just as when hidden it is called Buddha-nature and when manifest it is called the Dharmakāya, it is only one substance, and thus cannot be called 'produced from its own essence.' Therefore, if you maintain one substance, you lose that which can proceed and that from which it proceeds, and the meaning of origination is unestablished; if there are that which produces and that which is produced, then the meaning of origination can be established, but its single substance is lost. Regarding 'If it is apart from other causes': this is the third refutation by loss of causes and conditions. In this text, regarding 'if it is produced from its own essence': previously he questioned that one substance becomes two substances. Now he again refutes its two substances, questioning the substance that produces: does it further proceed from something, or does it proceed from nothing? If it further proceeds from something, then proceeding from proceeding would be infinite regress, falling into the fourth objection. If it proceeds from nothing, then it falls into the third objection of being causeless. What is produced is also like this: if it can further produce another, then producing and producing would be infinite regress; if it cannot produce, then what is produced is also like this. In this text, if it originates independently: the initial objection explained that there is no self-origination, as it must depend on multiple causes; now he explains that if it originates of itself without depending on causes, then causes and conditions are lost. As for the 'other causes' mentioned: if a sprout originates from the substance of the sprout itself, then everything outside the substance of the sprout is called 'other.' The grain is its cause, and water and earth are conditions; none of these would be causes and conditions from which it originates. Regarding 'If an origination further has origination, this would be infinite regress': this is the fourth objection of infinite regress. There are five kinds of infinite regress: first, the infinite regress of proceeding universally from all: if there is no sprout inside the grain and yet it can produce a sprout, then all things also lack a sprout and a sprout should universally proceed from all things. Second, the infinite regress of producing universally: if there is no sprout inside the grain and yet it can produce a sprout, then it also lacks all things and should universally produce all things. Third, regressive infinite regress: since the sprout proceeds from the grain, the grain further proceeds from something else. Fourth, progressive infinite regress: since the grain produces the sprout, it further produces things, and this is infinite regress. Fifth, the infinite regress of constant origination: because the self-essence is ever-present, origination never ceases. Here, there are no two infinite regresses of universal producing and universal proceeding. If viewed in terms of further questioning the two substances, then there are the two infinite regresses, regressive and progressive: regressive is the infinite regress of causes, and progressive is the infinite regress of effects. If taken in terms of the self-essence being ever-present, then it is the infinite regress of constant origination. Since it fundamentally possesses a self-essence and can produce one sprout, this self-essence should further be able to produce an infinite number of sprouts. > — English (machine translation) (machine translation) - [Previous: 3.20.1](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1824.3.20.1) - [Next: 3.20.3](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1824.3.20.3) - [Up: 3.20](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1824.3.20) ## Translations (1) - [English (machine translation)](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1824~en-mt.3.20.2) — English, machine translation --- Source: [https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1824.3.20.2](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1824.3.20.2) · Pramāṇa