<!-- Pramāṇa, a library of Indian primary sources · https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1824.3.21 -->

[Pramāṇa](https://indike.org/pramana/) › [Indian literature](https://indike.org/pramana/in) › [Buddhist Literature](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha) › [Taishō Tripiṭaka (Chinese Buddhist canon)](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho) › [中觀論疏](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1824) › 3.21

# 中觀論疏 3.21

中觀論疏 3.21

- **Language:** Classical Chinese

### [3.21](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1824.3.21)

長行為三：第一釋偈本、第二顯偈意、第三追釋前一句。就釋偈中，前解上半、次釋下半。「諸法自性不在眾緣中」者，如人體不在陰中、柱體不在微中也。「但眾緣和合故有名字」者，此有二：一為釋疑故來。若五陰中無人體者，何故五眾和合有人名、四微和合有柱名？既有別名，則知別有自性在眾緣中，是故釋云但眾緣和合故有名字耳，眾緣中實無體也。二者此是借名以彈四家義：一外道計五陰中有實人；二犢子計我在五陰中、眼法在四大中；三毘曇人木中有火性；四莊嚴云：眾緣和合別有假體用。是故破云：眾緣和合但有名字，無體用也。在體既無，名無所附。若破開善義，云：汝五陰未合時未有人用，亦合即有人用。此用屬眾緣，何得離五別有人用？若別有用則是自性也。「自性即自體」者，此句釋前章彈異計。前章破自體，今文破性，恐人不解，復會之。偈中言自性者，此是體性之性，非是理性之性。復有人執體而避性、復有避性而執理，今明性、體、理乃猶是異名耳。「自性無故」下，釋下半。有二意：一待自說他，無自故無他；二者他即是自，無自即無他。「若破自性他性」下，第二顯偈意。應有問云：章門偈既具標四，後偈何故唯釋自他、不釋共與無因？答此問云：破自他即是破共，不須釋共。有因尚可破，何況無因，故不須釋無因也。又無因不無無，但無於因，故名無因。竟不見有因，何所無因耶？破莊子自然義云：汝因不自然得自然，則是相因不自，何名自然？又問：汝有不自然，則自然理不遍；若無不自然，云何有自然？若言實是自然，但妄執成不自者，是亦不然。即此妄執亦是自然，云何有不自然？「於四句求生不可得」，此第三追解初偈「是故知無生」。以前未結撮，故未得釋之，今標釋都竟始得解也。又欲發下救端，以四句無生則生義盡矣。

> The prose commentary has three parts: first, explaining the verse text; second, revealing the meaning of the verse; third, retroactively explaining the preceding line. In explaining the verse, he first explains the first half and next explains the second half. As for "the intrinsic nature of phenomena is not in the conditions," it is like the substance of a person not being in the aggregates, or the substance of a pillar not being in the subtle atoms. As for "there are only names because of the coming together of conditions," this has two \[purposes\]: First, it comes to resolve doubt. If there is no person-substance in the five aggregates, why is there the name 'person' when the five aggregates come together, and why is there the name 'pillar' when the four subtle atoms come together? Since there is a distinct name, one would know that there is separately an intrinsic nature within the conditions; therefore, he explains that there are only names because of the coming together of conditions, but in truth there is no substance within the conditions. Second, this uses \[the concept of\] name to criticize the positions of four schools: first, non-Buddhists who hypothesize a real person in the five aggregates; second, the Vātsīputrīyas who hypothesize that the self is in the five aggregates and the visual faculty is in the four great elements; third, the Abhidharmikas \[who claim\] there is the nature of fire in wood; fourth, Zhuangyan who says: when conditions come together, there is separately a provisional substance and function. Therefore, he refutes \[them\] by saying: when conditions come together there is only a name, without substance or function. Since substance does not exist, name has nothing to attach to. If refuting the position of Kaishan, one says: before your five aggregates came together, there was not yet the function of a person; as soon as they came together, there was the function of a person. This function belongs to the conditions; how can there be a function of a person separate from the five \[aggregates\]? If there were a distinct function, it would be intrinsic nature. As for "intrinsic nature is self-substance," this line explains the preceding chapter's criticism of heterodox views. The preceding chapter refuted self-substance, and the present text refutes \[intrinsic\] nature; fearing people might not understand, he synthesizes them again. What the verse calls 'intrinsic nature' (zixing) is nature in the sense of substantial nature (tixing), not nature in the sense of principle-nature (lixing). Moreover, some cling to substance while avoiding nature, and others avoid nature while clinging to principle; here it is explained that nature, substance, and principle are still just different names. As for "because there is no intrinsic nature..." and below, this explains the second half. There are two meanings: first, \[the term\] 'other' is stated in dependence on 'self'; because there is no self, there is no other; second, other is itself self; because there is no self, there is no other. As for "if intrinsic nature and other-nature are refuted..." and below, this is the second \[part\], revealing the meaning of the verse. There should be a question: Since the thematic verse fully stated all four, why does the subsequent verse only explain self and other, and not explain both \[co-production\] and uncaused? In answer to this question, he says: refuting self and other is itself refuting both \[co-production\], so it is not necessary to explain both. If \[a cause\] with causes can still be refuted, how much more so uncaused; hence it is not necessary to explain uncaused. Furthermore, uncaused does not mean absence of non-existence; it only means absence of a cause, hence it is called uncaused. Since one ultimately does not see any cause, what is there to lack a cause? Refuting Zhuangzi's notion of spontaneity (ziran), one says: you obtain spontaneity by cause of what is not spontaneous, which means depending on a cause and not self-\[originating\]; how can it be called spontaneous? Furthermore, one asks: if you have what is not spontaneous, then the principle of spontaneity is not all-pervasive; if there is no non-spontaneous, how can there be spontaneity? If you say it is truly spontaneous, and it is only erroneous clinging that makes it non-spontaneous, this is also not so. This erroneous clinging is itself spontaneous; how could there be anything non-spontaneous? "In the four propositions, seeking arising cannot be attained": this is the third \[part\], retroactively explaining the initial verse's "therefore know there is no arising." Because it was not previously summarized, it could not yet be explained; now that both the enunciations and the explanations are complete, it can finally be explained. Furthermore, it intends to bring forth the point of the subsequent rescue, because through the lack of arising in the four propositions, the meaning of arising is exhausted.  
> — English (machine translation) (machine translation)

- [Previous: 3.20.4](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1824.3.20.4)
- [Next: 3.22](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1824.3.22)
- [Up: 3](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1824.3)

## Translations (1)

- [English (machine translation)](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1824~en-mt.3.21) — English, machine translation

---
Source: [https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1824.3.21](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1824.3.21) · Pramāṇa
