[Pramāṇa](https://indike.org/pramana/) › [Indian literature](https://indike.org/pramana/in) › [Buddhist Literature](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha) › [Taishō Tripiṭaka (Chinese Buddhist canon)](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho) › [中觀論疏](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1824) › 3.6 # 中觀論疏 3.6 中觀論疏 3.6 - **Language:** Classical Chinese ### [3.6](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1824.3.6) 「或謂因果一或謂因果異」者，第二別列九計。就此文雖正破是內迷，今具明內外所立，以此論正破內、傍破外故也。僧佉人謂因果一體；衛世人執因果異體；勒沙婆明亦一亦異，亦一猶是屬一、亦異猶是異；若提子明非一非異，非一猶是異、非異猶是一。故此中但列二家，則具含四執。佛法內根本二部：一大眾部謂因果一，故變種子為牙、轉少為老；二上座部明無轉變義，故種滅於前、牙生於後，少滅於前、老生於後，則是因果異義。毘曇同上座部義，成實同大眾部執也。「或謂因中有果或謂因中無果」者，僧佉明一，一猶是有；衛世辯異，異猶是無。上座明二世有，即是因中有果；大眾明二世無，即是因中無果。毘曇同上座，成實同僧祇。若言成實不同二世有無者，是義不然。《成實論》文唯有二世有無兩品，故知破有立無同僧祇義也。「或謂自體生他生共生」者，問：自他之外既有共生，一異有無何不爾耶？答：互文現意也。外道計自性能生眾生，眾生若滅還歸自性，自性即是世性，此是從眾生種類還生眾生，外物亦爾。佛法中如毘曇從性大生事大，成實從理大生事大，並是從自性生義也。他生者，《十二門論》云「有外道謂我自作五陰苦，名為自生；或云自在天作，名為他生。」毘曇人立所作因因果，一法生時萬法不障、萬法生時一法不障，亦是從他生義。《成實》云「學習頑境生於靈智」，亦是他生。又二世有義有果性，是自體生。二世無，無有果性，一向假緣，是他生義。共生者，外道尼揵子計：未有天地萬物前有一男女，共和合生於眾生。數人云：八相相扶共起，則展轉相生。成實云：四微和合有柱、五陰和合成人也。並共生義。「或謂有生無生」者，有人言：此是猶結上七計。七計不同，不出有無，故總結也。今謂不然。此文稱於或謂，則是別計，非結上也。次解云：有即是有因、無是無因，眾計既多不可具舉，是以最後以有因無因域之。亦不同此釋，破如前也。今明可有兩義：一者上七計明法體，此兩執辯生相。如薩婆多及毘婆闍婆提，計法體外別有生相，故言有生。無生者，僧祇及即法沙門部，明法體外無別有生相，故言無生也。又有生者，計生相是有為，如數論也。無生者，計生相是無為，如毘婆闍婆提也。二者上明果有無義，今明因有無。或謂因是有法，以有為因能生諸法；因是無法，以無為因能生諸法。故異有因無因。無因乃是無有於因，今明以無為因也。問：此是誰義？答：內外法中具有此執。外道中有二師，如服水外道計水能生一切萬物，即是從有生也。口力外道計太虛能生四大，四大能生藥草，藥草能生眾生，此從無生也。佛法中亦有此計，如琛法師計諸法本來是無，從無生有，即是無生也。地論人計本有佛性，從此能生萬物違順等用，謂從有生。又釋：以世諦為體、真諦為義也，即有生也。真諦為體、世諦為義，謂無生也。 > "Some claim that cause and effect are one, while some claim that cause and effect are different" is the second part, separately listing the nine positions. Although this text principally refutes internal delusions, it now fully elucidates what is established by both internal and external \[traditions\], because this treatise principally refutes internal \[Buddhist errors\] and secondarily refutes external \[non-Buddhist errors\]. Sāṃkhyas claim that cause and effect are of one substance; Vaiśeṣikas cling to cause and effect having different substances; Ulūka elucidates that they are both one and different—"both one" still belongs to oneness, and "both different" still belongs to difference; Nirgranthaputras elucidate that they are neither one nor different—"neither one" still belongs to difference, and "neither different" still belongs to oneness. Therefore, by only listing two schools here, all four attachments are fully included. Within the Buddhadharma, the two fundamental traditions are: first, the Mahāsāṃghika, which holds that cause and effect are one, so the seed transforms into the sprout and youth changes into old age; second, the Sthaviravāda, which clarifies that there is no transformation, so the seed ceases before and the sprout arises after, youth ceases before and old age arises after, which is the doctrine that cause and effect are different. The Abhidharma agrees with the Sthaviravāda view, while the Tattvasiddhi agrees with the Mahāsāṃghika attachment. "Some claim that the effect exists within the cause, while some claim that the effect does not exist within the cause": the Sāṃkhyas elucidate oneness, and oneness still implies existence; the Vaiśeṣikas clarify difference, and difference still implies non-existence. The Sthaviras clarify existence in the two periods of time \[past and future\], which is the effect existing within the cause; the Mahāsāṃghikas clarify non-existence in the two periods of time, which is the effect not existing within the cause. The Abhidharma agrees with the Sthaviras, and the Tattvasiddhi agrees with the Mahāsāṃghikas. If one says that the Tattvasiddhi does not agree with the existence and non-existence of the two periods of time, this meaning is incorrect. The text of the Tattvasiddhi-śāstra only has two chapters on the existence and non-existence of the two periods of time; therefore we know that its refutation of existence and establishment of non-existence agrees with the Mahāsāṃghika doctrine. "Some claim that it arises from its own nature, from another, or from both": Question: Since there is arising from both in addition to self and other, why is this not also the case for oneness/difference and existence/non-existence? Answer: The intent is manifested through complementary phrasing. The non-Buddhists posit that primordial nature (prakṛti) can produce sentient beings, and when sentient beings cease, they return back to primordial nature; primordial nature is the nature of the world. This is sentient beings being reproduced from the category of sentient beings, and external objects are also like this. Within the Buddhadharma, just as the Abhidharma derives gross elements from essential elements, and the Tattvasiddhi derives phenomenal elements from principle elements, both are of the meaning of arising from intrinsic nature. As for arising from another, the Dvādaśamukha-śāstra says: "There are non-Buddhists who claim: 'I myself made the suffering of the five aggregates,' which is called self-arising; or they say: 'Maheśvara made it,' which is called arising from another." Those of the Abhidharma establish the cause and effect of the acting cause (kāraṇa-hetu): when one phenomenon arises, myriad phenomena do not obstruct it; when myriad phenomena arise, one phenomenon does not obstruct them; this is also the meaning of arising from another. The Tattvasiddhi says: "Habituation to inert objects produces intelligent awareness," which is also arising from another. Furthermore, the doctrine of existence in the two periods of time holds that there is the nature of the effect, which is arising from its own nature. Non-existence in the two periods of time holds that there is no nature of the effect and it relies entirely on conditions, which is the meaning of arising from another. As for arising from both, the non-Buddhist Nirgrantha posits that before heaven, earth, and the myriad things existed, there was a man and a woman, who through conjunction produced sentient beings. The abhidharmikas say: the eight marks support each other and arise together, mutually generating one another in turn. The Tattvasiddhi says: the conjunction of the four subtle atoms makes a pillar, and the conjunction of the five aggregates makes a person. These are all the meaning of arising from both. "Some claim that there is arising or that there is no arising": Some say: this still summarizes the above seven positions. Although the seven positions are different, they do not go beyond existence and non-existence; hence they are summarized here. We now say this is not so. This text states "some claim," which indicates separate positions, not a summary of the above. Another explanation says: "existence" is having a cause, and "non-existence" is being without a cause; since the various positions are numerous and cannot be cited exhaustively, it ultimately demarcates them by having a cause and being without a cause. We also disagree with this explanation; the refutation is as before. We now clarify that there can be two meanings: First, the above seven positions elucidate the substance of phenomena, whereas these two attachments clarify the characteristic of arising. For instance, the Sarvāstivādins and the Vibhajyavādins posit that apart from the substance of phenomena, there is a separate characteristic of arising, and therefore say "there is arising." As for "no arising," the Mahāsāṃghikas and the Dharmaguptakas elucidate that apart from the substance of phenomena, there is no separate characteristic of arising, and therefore say "no arising." Furthermore, those who hold that "there is arising" posit that the characteristic of arising is conditioned, like the abhidharmikas; those who hold that "there is no arising" posit that the characteristic of arising is unconditioned, like the Vibhajyavādins. Second, the above elucidated the existence and non-existence of the effect; now it elucidates the existence and non-existence of the cause. Some claim that the cause is an existing phenomenon, taking existence as the cause capable of producing phenomena; \[or that\] the cause is a non-existent phenomenon, taking non-existence as the cause capable of producing phenomena. Therefore this differs from having a cause and being without a cause. "Being without a cause" means having no cause whatsoever; here it clarifies taking non-existence as the cause. Question: Whose doctrine is this? Answer: Both internal and external teachings have these attachments. Among the non-Buddhists there are two masters: for example, the water-consuming non-Buddhists posit that water can produce all the myriad things, which is arising from existence; the mouth-strength non-Buddhists posit that great space can produce the four great elements, the four great elements can produce medicinal herbs, and medicinal herbs can produce sentient beings, which is arising from non-existence. Within the Buddhadharma there are also these positions: for example, Dharma Master Chen posited that phenomena are originally non-existent, and from non-existence existence arises, which is \[arising from\] non-existence. The Dilun masters posit an originally existent Buddha-nature, from which can be produced the contrary and accordant functions of the myriad things, which they call arising from existence. Another explanation: taking conventional truth as the substance and ultimate truth as the meaning is "arising from existence"; taking ultimate truth as the substance and conventional truth as the meaning is "arising from non-existence." > — English (machine translation) (machine translation) - [Previous: 3.5](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1824.3.5) - [Next: 3.7](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1824.3.7) - [Up: 3](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1824.3) ## Translations (1) - [English (machine translation)](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1824~en-mt.3.6) — English, machine translation --- Source: [https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1824.3.6](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1824.3.6) · Pramāṇa