[Pramāṇa](https://indike.org/pramana/) › [Indian literature](https://indike.org/pramana/in) › [Buddhist Literature](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha) › [Taishō Tripiṭaka (Chinese Buddhist canon)](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho) › [中觀論疏](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1824) › 4.6 # 中觀論疏 4.6 中觀論疏 4.6 - **Language:** Classical Chinese ### [4.6](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1824.4.6) 品廣分為七，處中為四，略說二周。所言七者，初以三時門破去法、二以三時門破去者、三以三時門破初發、四以三時門破住住者、五以一異門破去去者、六以因緣門破去去者、七以定不定門破去去者。次明處中開四門者，從能破門為名者，第一三時門破、二者一異門破、三者因緣門破、四者有無門破。大意令眾生悟無去來，入於實相，發生正觀，滅諸煩惱。但受悟各異，故開多門。所以有此四門者，以計去來是起動之法，必墮三世故。前就三時門破，外云：三世若無，眼不應見，故就一異破眼所見。復謂因緣去來不可一異，故次破因緣。病乃無窮，觀門非一，今欲領其大要、散其所封，故次有無門也。次雖有四門，合之為二者，初周略破去來、後三廣破去來。又初周總破去住、後三別破於去。又初周直破去來、後三破眼所見。又初周但就有為門破、後周為無為一切破。今宜依四門。就初為二：第一破去去者、第二破住住者。雖有四儀，不出動靜，故略觀此二。就初又三：一破法去、二破人去、三破去因。就破法去開為四別：初長行立、次偈破、三救、四破救。「問曰世間眼見三時有作」者下，此立義也。上品求四緣生果畢竟無從，外人理屈辭窮舌不能救，故今舉眼所見以立義。外道、數論、譬喻之流同明時不可見，故今但云：見時中之法，不言見時。去來是舉下足色，為眼所見，故云眼見。問：上立四緣，今立去來，云何廣狹？答：上法廣人狹，四緣攝一切法，是故為廣；但內道所計，故云人狹。此品人廣法狹，大小內外同計去來，故是人廣；去來但是有為，故云法狹。問：三時有幾種耶？答：略有三種，一三劫、二三世、三三念，今就後立也。而言三時有作者，法墮三世流動起作，故稱為作。又作是業義，以去即是業，故云作也。「答曰已去無有去」下，第二論主破外人明三時有，論主即明三時無。然直觀此破未覺其精，望《淨名經》文殊答曰：「若來已更不來，去已更不去。」此是三時門明無去來。但文殊既至方丈，大眾則謂來已名來，是故今略舉三時中一謂來已不來。佛在世時眾生利根，聞一則解三，故不具舉也。瑠璃光至亦不來、不至亦不來，至即是已、不至是未，三時之中舉二門也。次《淨名》彌勒章具舉三時以責無一生記。是故此門可以窮凡屈聖，則望經精巧也。上半明已未二門無去，下半明去時無去。已是過去息滅，是中無去；未是未來，未有去法亦無去。下半破意者，上半令其受已未無去，已是曾去即時無去，未是當去即時亦無去。下半即云去時不離此二。既信此二無去，當知去時亦無去也。長行云「離去去業不可得」者，業是動之異名，已去則去息無復動義。若言已去有去者，此是離去而有動業耳。去法已滅猶有動業，無有是處也。「問曰動處即有去」下，第三救義。若作一人立義者，上立三時有去。二關已窮，今但救去時有去。若作二家立義者，上立三時有作，謂三世有部。今立二時無去、一時有去，即二世無部。就偈為二：上半立有時法、下半明於有無也。「動處即有去」者，立有去法也。所以立有去法者，由論主前偈下半中明去時中無去，今對無去故云動處有去也。而言動者，外人謂去麁而動細，去麁即墮已；而動細即非已，既稱為動亦非是未。欲簡除已未，故云動也。處有二義：一從所履處名之為處、二者即目舉足動以為處。由上明無去，外人云：即此動處有去，何故無耶？「此中有去時」，第二句立有時也。以其動必賴時，故將動以證時也。「非已去未去」者，下半明有無也。若作一人立義，上立三時有去既被破竟，今輸已未兩關也。若二人立義者，上半立現在是有，今非二世有義也。「是故去時」者，第二結去時有去也。又分此偈上半立有時，第三句輸已未二關，第四句正立去時去。此分好。長行云「隨有作業處」者，隨於四衢八達，動步即有去也。「答曰」下，第四破救也。問：此破與上何異？答：今觀四番，可為三類：初一問答是總立總破、後一問答是別立別破。初總明三時有去故是總立，總破三時有去故是總破；次但立去時有去故是別立，但破去時去故是別破。又初一問答是立三世有破三世有，次一問答立二世無破二世無義。三者前破去時去是奪破，明離已未之外無有去時，故是奪也；今縱離已未別有去時去，即開四關責之，故是縱破也。問：前何故將已未奪去時，今縱有去時耶？答：去麁而動細。去麁故，可得將已未分之；動細故，不得復就已未分之。故縱彼有動，求動無從。如人靜坐直是人耳，正動一足便名去者，因此之動稱為去法亦名去業。將步之前名為未去，足動所經名為已去，取其現動名為去時。取其初動目之為發，當步之動名之為是去，餘步形此名為異去，足之所履稱為去處。然即眾緣和合虛受其名，諦觀察之無一可得。而著相者謂有決定，是故論主就而求之也。所言四關者：第一無體破；二各體破，師又詺為失因破；三二法破；四兩人破，即是次第。初偈上半牒而不受、下半正破。「云何於去時」，此牒外義也。外人明已未二時無有去義，第三時中有於去法，故此去法賴時而去，是以牒之。「而當有去法」者，不受其時中有法而法賴時去也。下半正作無體破者，此明時無別體，故云無體破也。汝既稱去時，是即因去有時；即時無別體，若無別體，法何所賴而得去耶？此非用數論因法假名時、離法無別時以破外人，但外人自言去時有去，即時因於去，故時無別體，即法無所賴耳。又時無別體即是因緣時，因緣時無有自性，若無自性是即無時，既其無時法何所賴？問：此與數論有何異耶？答數論雖知因法假名時無有別時，未知因時假名法無有別法，是故異也。今責成論者云：法賴時去者，時復賴誰生耶？若言因法有假名時而無別時，亦應因時而假名法無有別法。無有別法，而法為時所生者，亦應無有別時，時為法所生也。又若時是無，無更有別法生時者，亦應法是無，無有別時生法者。又離時外實有法，法尚不生時；今離法外無別時，云何時生法耶？又並外人，若時非法、法非時而時法異者，亦時非法、法非時，時法應相離。若言理不相離而終異，亦應理不異而終離。然不異只是不離，不離只是不異耳。長行，前牒上半；「何以故」下，釋下半。初明時無別體，即是奪破；次明相離，謂縱關也。 > The chapter is broadly divided into seven \[sections\], moderately into four, and briefly stated into two cycles. As for the seven: first, refuting the act of going through the gate of the three times; second, refuting the goer through the gate of the three times; third, refuting the initial departure through the gate of the three times; fourth, refuting abiding and the abider through the gate of the three times; fifth, refuting going and the goer through the gate of identity and difference; sixth, refuting going and the goer through the gate of causes and conditions; seventh, refuting going and the goer through the gate of the determined and undetermined. Next, explaining the moderate opening into four gates, named after the refuting gates: the first is refutation by the gate of the three times; the second is refutation by the gate of identity and difference; the third is refutation by the gate of causes and conditions; the fourth is refutation by the gate of existence and non-existence. The general purpose is to cause sentient beings to awaken to the absence of coming and going, enter into the true nature of reality, generate right view, and extinguish all defilements. But because their receptive awakening varies, multiple gates are opened. The reason these four gates exist is that conceptualizing coming and going as active phenomena inevitably falls into the three times. Thus, the preceding refutation is through the gate of the three times. The opponent says: "If the three times did not exist, the eye should not see \[them\]"; therefore, what is seen by the eye is refuted through identity and difference. Furthermore, they consider coming and going through causes and conditions to be neither identical nor different; thus, causes and conditions are refuted next. Afflictions are endless, and the gates of contemplation are not just one; now, wishing to grasp their main points and disperse their attachments, the gate of existence and non-existence follows. Next, although there are four gates, combining them makes two: the first cycle briefly refutes coming and going; the latter three broadly refute coming and going. Furthermore, the first cycle generally refutes going and abiding; the latter three specifically refute going. Furthermore, the first cycle directly refutes coming and going; the latter three refute what is seen by the eye. Furthermore, the first cycle refutes solely through the gate of the conditioned; the latter cycle refutes all conditioned and unconditioned \[phenomena\]. Now we should rely on the four gates. Regarding the first, there are two \[parts\]: first, refuting going and the goer; second, refuting abiding and the abider. Although there are four bodily postures, they do not go beyond movement and stillness; hence these two are briefly examined. Regarding the first, there are again three: first, refuting the act of going; second, refuting the person who goes; third, refuting the cause of going. Regarding the refutation of the act of going, it opens into four distinctions: first, the prose establishing \[the thesis\]; next, the verse refuting it; third, the rescue; fourth, the refutation of the rescue. From "The question says: In the world, the eye sees action in the three times" onward, this establishes the thesis. In the preceding chapter, seeking the production of an effect by the four conditions was ultimately impossible; the opponent's reason was defeated, their words exhausted, and their tongue unable to rescue \[their thesis\]; hence they now cite what is seen by the eye to establish the thesis. Non-Buddhists, the Sāṃkhya, the Dārṣṭāntikas, and their like all explain that time cannot be seen; thus it only says now that one sees phenomena within time, not that one sees time. Coming and going are the physical forms of lifting and lowering the feet, which are seen by the eye; hence it is called "seen by the eye." Question: The previous \[chapter\] established the four conditions, while this one establishes coming and going; how do they compare in breadth and narrowness? Answer: Previously the phenomena were broad and the persons narrow: the four conditions encompass all phenomena, which is why it is broad; but it was conceptualized only by Buddhist schools, hence the persons were narrow. In this chapter, the persons are broad and the phenomena narrow: both the great and small \[vehicles\], both insiders and outsiders, alike conceptualize coming and going, hence the persons are broad; coming and going are merely conditioned phenomena, hence the phenomena are narrow. Question: How many kinds of three times are there? Answer: Briefly, there are three kinds: first, the three eons; second, the three time periods; third, the three thought-moments. Here it is established with reference to the last. And as for saying "action in the three times": phenomena falling into the three times flow, move, arise, and act; hence it is called "action." Furthermore, "action" has the sense of karma; since going is precisely karma, it is called "action." From "The answer says: In what has \[already\] gone there is no going" onward, secondly, the treatise master refutes the opponent's explanation that the three times exist; the treatise master then explains that the three times do not exist. However, looking directly at this refutation, one might not perceive its subtlety; comparing it to the Vimalakīrtinirdeśa-sūtra, Mañjuśrī answered: "If one has already come, one does not come again; if one has already gone, one does not go again." This is explaining the absence of coming and going through the gate of the three times. But when Mañjuśrī arrived at the ten-foot room, the assembly thought that having already come was called coming; therefore, here one of the three times is briefly cited, stating that having already come, one does not come. When the Buddha was in the world, sentient beings had sharp faculties; hearing one, they understood three; hence it was not fully cited. Vairocana's arriving also is not coming, and not arriving also is not coming: arriving is the already, and not arriving is the not yet; among the three times, two gates are cited. Next, the Maitreya chapter of the Vimalakīrti-sūtra fully cites the three times to reprove the absence of a prediction of one rebirth. Therefore, this gate can confound the ordinary and humble the noble, demonstrating its subtlety when compared to the sūtras. The first half of the verse clarifies that the two gates of the already and the not-yet have no going; the second half clarifies that in the present going there is no going. The already is the past, which has ceased and vanished; therein is no going. The not-yet is the future, where the phenomenon of going does not yet exist; it also has no going. The intent of the refutation in the second half: the first half causes them to accept that the already and the not-yet have no going—the already was gone in the past, so at the present moment there is no going; the not-yet is to go in the future, so at the present moment there is also no going. The second half immediately states that the present going is not separate from these two. Since they believe that these two have no going, they should know that the present going also has no going. The prose says, "Apart from going, an act of going cannot be found": "act" (karma) is an alternate name for movement; when going has already occurred, going has ceased, and there is no longer any sense of movement. If one says that in what has already gone there is going, this would mean that apart from going there is an act of movement. That the phenomenon of going has already ceased yet an act of movement still exists is impossible. From "The question says: Where there is movement, there is going" onward, thirdly, is the rescue of the thesis. If taken as one person establishing the thesis: previously they established that in the three times there is going. The two checkpoints having already been exhausted, they now merely rescue \[the claim that\] in the present going there is going. If taken as two schools establishing the thesis: previously, establishing that in the three times there is action referred to the Sarvāstivāda. Now, establishing that in two times there is no going and in one time there is going is the Sautrāntika (those who hold the non-existence of two times). The verse has two parts: the first half establishes the existence of the temporal phenomenon; the second half clarifies existence and non-existence. "Where there is movement, there is going" establishes the existence of the phenomenon of going. The reason it establishes the existence of the phenomenon of going is that the treatise master, in the second half of the preceding verse, explained that within the present going there is no going; now, in contrast to non-going, they say that where there is movement there is going. As for saying "movement": the opponent considers going to be coarse and movement to be subtle; coarse going falls into the "already," whereas subtle movement is not the "already"; and since it is called "movement," neither is it the "not-yet." Wishing to set aside the already and the not-yet, they therefore say "movement." "Where" (place) has two meanings: first, it is called "place" from the location trodden upon; second, it designates the very movement of lifting the foot as the "place." Because the above explained non-going, the opponent says: precisely in this place of movement there is going; why would there be none? "Herein there is the time of going": the second line establishes that time exists. Because movement necessarily depends on time, they take movement to prove time. "Neither what has gone nor what has not gone": the second half clarifies existence and non-existence. If taken as one person establishing the thesis, having already established that going exists in the three times and been refuted, they now yield the two checkpoints of the already and not-yet. If taken as two persons establishing the thesis, the first half establishes that the present exists, now negating the doctrine that the \[past and future\] two times exist. "Therefore, in the present going": the second concludes that in the present going there is going. Dividing this verse another way: the first half establishes the existence of time; the third line yields the two checkpoints of the already and not-yet; the fourth line directly establishes going in the present going. This division is good. The prose says, "Wherever there is an act": wherever there are thoroughfares extending in all directions, moving a step entails going. From "The answer says" onward, fourthly, is the refutation of the rescue. Question: How does this refutation differ from the above? Answer: Observing the four rounds now, they can be grouped into three kinds: the first question-and-answer is a general establishment and general refutation; the second question-and-answer is a specific establishment and specific refutation. First, broadly explaining that going exists in the three times is a general establishment; broadly refuting that going exists in the three times is a general refutation. Next, establishing only that going exists in the present going is a specific establishment; refuting only going in the present going is a specific refutation. Furthermore, the first question-and-answer establishes the existence of the three times to refute the existence of the three times; the second question-and-answer establishes the non-existence of the two times to refute the doctrine of the non-existence of the two times. Third, the earlier refutation of going in the present going was a refutation by deprivation, clarifying that apart from the already and the not-yet there is no time of going—hence it is deprivation; now, hypothetically conceding that apart from the already and the not-yet there is a distinct going in the present going, it opens four checkpoints to interrogate it—hence it is a refutation by concession. Question: Why previously did it use the already and not-yet to deprive the time of going, while now it concedes that the time of going exists? Answer: Going is coarse and movement is subtle. Because going is coarse, it was possible to divide it by the already and the not-yet; because movement is subtle, it cannot be divided further by the already and the not-yet. Therefore, hypothetically conceding that they have movement, seeking movement is impossible. For instance, when a person sits quietly, there is simply the person; when they just move one foot, they are called a goer; due to this movement, it is called the phenomenon of going and also called the act of going. Before taking a step, it is called not-yet-gone; what the moving foot has traversed is called already-gone; taking its present movement, it is called the time of going. Taking its initial movement, it is designated as departing; the movement of the step at hand is called this going; other steps compared to this are called different goings; what the foot treads upon is called the place of going. Yet these are merely nominal designations falsely received in the assemblage of conditions; examining them closely, not one can be found. But those who cling to characteristics claim they are determinate; therefore, the treatise master investigates them accordingly. As for the four checkpoints: first, refutation by lack of substance; second, refutation by separate substances, which the teacher also calls refutation by loss of cause; third, refutation by two phenomena; fourth, refutation by two persons—this is the sequence. In the first verse, the first half quotes without accepting; the second half directly refutes. "How in the time of going": this quotes the opponent's thesis. The opponent explains that the two times of the already and not-yet have no meaning of going, but within the third time there is the phenomenon of going; thus this phenomenon of going depends upon time to go; hence it quotes it. "Could there be a phenomenon of going?": this rejects that there is a phenomenon within time and that the phenomenon depends on time to go. The second half directly performs the refutation by lack of substance; this explains that time has no separate substance, hence it is called refutation by lack of substance. Since you speak of "the time of going," time therefore exists dependent on going; time then has no separate substance. If it has no separate substance, on what does the phenomenon depend so as to be able to go? This is not using the Sāṃkhya view that time is a provisional designation dependent on phenomena and that apart from phenomena there is no separate time to refute the opponent; rather, the opponent themselves says that in the time of going there is going, which means time is dependent on going; therefore, time has no separate substance, meaning the phenomenon has nothing to depend upon. Furthermore, that time has no separate substance means it is time through causes and conditions; time through causes and conditions has no intrinsic nature; if it has no intrinsic nature, then there is no time; since there is no time, on what can the phenomenon depend? Question: How does this differ from the Sāṃkhya? Answer: Although the Sāṃkhya knows that time is provisionally designated dependent on phenomena and there is no separate time, they do not know that phenomena are provisionally designated dependent on time and there are no separate phenomena; hence it is different. Now we question the master of the Tattvasiddhi: If phenomena depend on time to go, upon what does time depend to be produced? If you say that dependent on phenomena there is provisionally designated time and no separate time, then dependent on time there should also be provisionally designated phenomena and no separate phenomena. If there are no separate phenomena, and phenomena are produced by time, then there should also be no separate time, and time should be produced by phenomena. Furthermore, if time is non-existent, and there are no further separate phenomena that produce time, then phenomena should also be non-existent, and there should be no separate time that produces phenomena. Furthermore, if apart from time there are real phenomena, phenomena still do not produce time; now, if apart from phenomena there is no separate time, how could time produce phenomena? Furthermore, to challenge the opponent: if time is not phenomenon and phenomenon is not time, such that time and phenomenon are distinct, then since time is not phenomenon and phenomenon is not time, time and phenomenon should be separate from each other. If you say that in principle they are not separate yet ultimately distinct, then in principle they should also be not distinct yet ultimately separate. Yet being not distinct is just being not separate, and being not separate is just being not distinct. In the prose, the earlier \[part\] quotes the first half; from "Why?" onward, it explains the second half. First, explaining that time has no separate substance is the refutation by deprivation; next, explaining mutual separation is the checkpoint of concession. > — English (machine translation) (machine translation) - [Previous: 4.5](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1824.4.5) - [Next: 4.7](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1824.4.7) - [Up: 4](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1824.4) ## Translations (1) - [English (machine translation)](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1824~en-mt.4.6) — English, machine translation --- Source: [https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1824.4.6](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1824.4.6) · Pramāṇa