[Pramāṇa](https://indike.org/pramana/) › [Indian literature](https://indike.org/pramana/in) › [Buddhist Literature](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha) › [Taishō Tripiṭaka (Chinese Buddhist canon)](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho) › [中觀論疏](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1824) › 5.41 # 中觀論疏 5.41 中觀論疏 5.41 - **Language:** Classical Chinese ### [5.41](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1824.5.41) 「復次生住滅不成」下，此品第二結破。上來第一破三相，今第二破法體。生起如品初也。上半明能相無故無所相，下半有為無故無無為，即畢竟空。能相無故所相無，有四義：即法辨相，相無法即無。異法辨相，相無故無所待，亦無法。三者以法例相，求相無從，法亦爾也。四者初六品求法無，今求相無也。下半有為無故無為亦無。亦即法異法若為無、為二體，即相待門破之。若言無有為三相，即是無無為。如《成實》所說，相即門破之，有為無故無為即無。三者無為例有為，求有為既無，求無為亦爾。四上已明無無為，如〈六種品〉，今明無有為也。此偈釋經中有為空無為空，易見也。長行云「以理推求」者，方廣盛談一切法無生滅，此是邪見謂無生滅也；今是正觀求之不得，故言以理也。「如前說無有無相法」者，此〈六種品〉中第二偈，是無相之法一切處無也。所以作此語者，恐外人言雖復無有三相，何妨明法體耶？是故今明無有無相法。上既破相，即知無法體也。「問曰若生住滅畢竟無者」，云何論中得有名字？第二大段上來破有三相，今一偈破無三相。又上破法體、今破名字，合名體畢竟空。前問、次答。此不引經，亦非毘曇、成實之論。上並引已竟，破之又訖。今云若為無為一切無者，云何口中言論有此名字耶？若都無，應無所論；既有所論，不應無也。答如夢者口中亦說夢幻名字，豈可言有耶？二者上來明論中求三相非有，今明三相非無、如幻化而有，豈可言無？前破有見，今破無見。前破五百部立三相是有，今破方廣及諸邪見言無三相，即是顯中道義也。又上是中道，即假前中；今是假名，即中後假。名中道者，求定性生滅畢竟不可得，故言無生無滅，故名中道。無生無滅假名生滅，故是假名。要先破性生滅，然後始得辨假名生滅也。又上來是性空義，求此性生滅不可得，故是性空，即世諦中道。今明如幻化生滅，即是因緣空。即此幻化有無所有，名因緣空，即真諦中道。又上來是破病，今是會經。若論中一向破無所有者，經中云何說有三相耶？是故釋云：論破著有，是故言無。而經中明有者，必如幻化有也。問：何故就此品明破申耶？答：一周觀行既竟，故明破申。自從〈破因緣〉竟〈三相〉末已來是破，今一偈略明申也。將此例前，三相既如幻夢，乃至四緣、去來、六情、五陰等皆同十喻也。又正意上來顯實，今是開權。顯實者，明十方三世佛皆為顯一道清淨，亦名畢竟空，亦名如、法性、實際等。今宜作畢竟空，以大小內外皆是有所得，故須以畢竟空洗之。今言開權者，經中說有三相、四緣等，皆是隨緣方便說有此耳。又上來明無者，只明有者無所有，故是有不有義；今明有者，只無所有有，即不有有義。此中明幻夢，舉幻引眾生覺中虛事，引夢引眾生夢中虛事。乾城喻者，小乘鈍根但有芭蕉等喻，今為大乘利根人故說顯其畢竟空，以乾城喻能成之因、所成之果皆是空也。所以舉三喻者，為喻三相故也。問：他亦云世諦三假同於幻化，與今何異？答：眾生信覺中所見是實、夢中所見為虛，今欲借其所信之虛喻其所信之實，令其所信之實同其所信之虛。而實既非實，復有何虛？故羅什師《十喻讚》云「十喻以悟空，空必待此喻。借言以會意，意盡無會處。既得出長羅，住此無所住」也。長行為二：初玄答上問；「如幻」下，釋偈文。初又二：前雙標得失；「賢聖人」下，說三相意。前又二：初雙標得失。「三相無決定」者，標得也。「凡夫」下，標失也。謂有別體，定有為定無為、前後一時等，皆由決定有三相，於有上更起諍論也。「諸賢聖」下，釋得失也，即答上問。上問云：三相既無所有，何故論中得說三相名字耶？是故云：為欲止常倒故說三，常倒若息三亦不留。此亦是止三故說三，非是說三便有三也。如《智度論》云「以聲遮聲，非求聲也。」「言語同」者，同說三相也。「其心異」者，凡夫說三聞三作三解，不知不三三，亦不知三不三。不知不三三，故無實慧方便；不知三不三，故無方便實慧。既無二慧，豈有自然無師四智耶？是故凡夫但有無明，不見佛性無常樂我淨。聖人明三，知是不三三亦識三不三，具四智、無復無明，故見佛性有常樂我淨也。所以云語同心異。今聖人同其語者，亦令凡夫知不三三、三不三，具四智，入佛知見得成佛也。三相既爾，四緣乃至三論一切佛經一切論皆須作此識之也。又一種方言，聖心在四絕，言同凡夫說三。所以同凡說三者，令悟四絕。四絕者，本不曾有三，何有不三？如是四句也。「不應有難」者，汝向不應難言：若無三，何故說三耶？「如幻」下，釋偈三喻，即三也。「凡夫分別」下，第二通結得失也。又近結乾城，日出即有、少時便滅，合云「如凡夫分別為有，智者求之有即無」，正以分別應別如日出也。 > From "Furthermore, arising, abiding, and cessation are not established" downwards is the second \[section\] of this chapter, the concluding refutation. Above, the first \[part\] refuted the three characteristics; now the second refutes the entities of phenomena. The sequence of emergence is as at the beginning of the chapter. The first half clarifies that because the qualifying characteristics do not exist, there are no things qualified; the second half clarifies that because the conditioned does not exist, there is no unconditioned, which is ultimate emptiness. > > That there are no things qualified because there are no qualifying characteristics has four meanings: > 1. Defining the characteristic as identical to the phenomenon: when the characteristic is non-existent, the phenomenon is non-existent. > 2. Defining the characteristic as distinct from the phenomenon: because the characteristic is non-existent, there is nothing to be depended upon, and thus no phenomenon either. > 3. Analogizing the phenomenon to the characteristic: seeking the characteristic yields no origin, and the phenomenon is also like this. > 4. In the first six chapters, the phenomenon was sought and found non-existent; now the characteristic is sought and found non-existent. > > The second half clarifies that because the conditioned does not exist, the unconditioned also does not exist: > 1. If identical to the phenomenon or distinct from the phenomenon, if conditioned and unconditioned are two entities, they are refuted by the gateway of mutual dependence. > 2. If it is said that the absence of the three conditioned characteristics is precisely the unconditioned—as explained in the \*Tattvasiddhi\*—it is refuted by the gateway of mutual identity: because the conditioned is non-existent, the unconditioned is thereby non-existent. > 3. Analogizing the unconditioned to the conditioned: since seeking the conditioned reveals it to be non-existent, seeking the unconditioned is likewise. > 4. Above, it was already explained that the unconditioned does not exist, as in the "Chapter on the Six Elements"; now it is explained that the conditioned does not exist. > This verse explains the emptiness of the conditioned and the emptiness of the unconditioned in the sūtras, and is easy to see. > > When the prose says "investigating by principle": the Fangguang \[Vaitulya\] expounded at length that all phenomena are without arising and cessation, but this is the wrong view that posits non-arising and non-cessation; here, it is correct contemplation that seeks them and finds them unobtainable, hence it says "by principle." > "As previously stated, there is no phenomenon without characteristics": this is the second verse in the "Chapter on the Six Elements," meaning that a phenomenon without characteristics exists nowhere. Why make this statement? Fearing that the heterodox opponent might say, "Although there are no three characteristics, what prevents the entity of the phenomenon from existing?" Therefore, it is now clarified that there is no phenomenon without characteristics. Since the characteristics have been refuted above, one thereby knows that there is no entity of phenomena. > > "Question: If arising, abiding, and cessation are ultimately non-existent," how can there be names for them in the treatise? This is the second major section: above, the existence of the three characteristics was refuted; now, one verse refutes the non-existence of the three characteristics. Furthermore, above the entity of phenomena was refuted, and now names are refuted; combined, names and entities are ultimately empty. First the question, then the answer. This does not cite sūtras, nor is it the treatises of the Abhidharma or \*Tattvasiddhi\*. Above, they were all cited completely and their refutations concluded. Now it is said: if the conditioned and unconditioned are entirely non-existent, how can these names exist in spoken discourse? If they were totally non-existent, there should be nothing to discuss; since there is discussion, they should not be non-existent. > > The answer: "Like a dream": in speech one also speaks the names of dreams and illusions; can they be said to exist? > Second: above, it was clarified that seeking the three characteristics in the treatise proves they are not existent; now, it is clarified that the three characteristics are not non-existent, but exist like illusions and transformations; how could they be said to be non-existent? Previously the view of existence was refuted; now the view of non-existence is refuted. Previously the five hundred schools positing that the three characteristics exist were refuted; now the Fangguang and various wrong views claiming there are no three characteristics are refuted, which reveals the meaning of the middle way. > > Furthermore, what came before is the middle way, which is the middle prior to the provisional; what is here is provisional designation, which is the provisional subsequent to the middle. It is called the middle way because seeking a definitive nature of arising and cessation is ultimately unobtainable, hence called non-arising and non-cessation, and therefore named the middle way. Non-arising and non-cessation provisionally designate arising and cessation, hence it is provisional designation. One must first refute intrinsic arising and cessation before one can distinguish provisional arising and cessation. > > Furthermore, what came before is the meaning of emptiness of intrinsic nature: seeking this intrinsic arising and cessation is unobtainable, hence it is emptiness of intrinsic nature, which is the middle way of conventional truth. Now, clarifying that arising and cessation are like illusions and transformations is emptiness of dependent origination. That these illusions and transformations are devoid of existence is called the emptiness of dependent origination, which is the middle way of ultimate truth. > > Furthermore, what came before was refuting errors; here it is harmonizing with the sūtras. If the treatise merely refuted them into nothingness, why do the sūtras state that there are three characteristics? Therefore, it is explained: the treatise refutes attachment to existence, and therefore speaks of non-existence. But that the sūtras explain existence means it is necessarily existence like illusions and transformations. > > Question: Why is refuting and elucidating explained in this chapter? > Answer: Because one full cycle of contemplation has ended, refuting and elucidating are explained. From the "Refutation of Causes and Conditions" to the end of the "Three Characteristics" has been refutation; now one verse briefly presents elucidation. By analogizing this to what preceded: since the three characteristics are like illusions and dreams, even up to the four conditions, going and coming, the six sense faculties, and the five aggregates, all are identical to the ten similes. > > Furthermore, the primary intent above was revealing the real; now it is disclosing the expedient. Revealing the real explains that the Buddhas of the ten directions and the three periods of time all act to reveal the purity of the single path, also named ultimate emptiness, also named suchness, Dharma-nature, the limit of reality, and so on. Here it should be treated as ultimate emptiness, because both Great and Small, inner and outer, are all clinging to attainment, and thus need to be cleansed with ultimate emptiness. Now, disclosing the expedient means that the sūtras speaking of the existence of the three characteristics, the four conditions, and so forth, are merely speaking of their existence as expedients in accordance with conditions. > > Furthermore, above, clarifying non-existence merely clarified that what exists is devoid of existence, which is the meaning of existence being non-existence; here, clarifying existence merely means the existence of what is devoid of existence, which is the meaning of non-existence being existence. > > Here, in clarifying illusions and dreams, adducing illusion cites unreal occurrences during sentient beings' waking state; citing dreams cites unreal occurrences during sentient beings' dream state. As for the simile of the city of the gandharvas: for the dull-rooted of the Hīnayāna there were only similes like the plantain tree; now, for the sharp-rooted people of the Mahāyāna, it is spoken to reveal ultimate emptiness, using the city of the gandharvas to show that both the producing causes and the produced effects are empty. The reason three similes are adduced is to illustrate the three characteristics. > > Question: Others also say that the three provisional designations of conventional truth are identical to illusions and transformations; how does this differ from the present view? > Answer: Sentient beings believe that what is seen in the waking state is real, and what is seen in a dream is unreal; now, one wishes to borrow the unreality they believe in to illustrate the reality they believe in, so that the reality they believe in becomes identical to the unreality they believe in. But since reality is not real, what unreality could there still be? Therefore, Master Kumārajīva's \*Praise of the Ten Similes\* says: "The ten similes are used to awaken to emptiness, / But emptiness must rely on these similes. / Words are borrowed to convey the intent; / When the intent is exhausted, there is no place to convey. / Having escaped the long net, / Abide here with nowhere to abide." > > The prose has two parts: first, a profound answer to the question above; from "Like an illusion" downwards, it explains the text of the verse. The first also has two: first, an paired presentation of correctness and error; from "The wise and holy" downwards, the intent of teaching the three characteristics. The first also has two: first, an paired presentation of correctness and error. "The three characteristics are not definitive" marks correctness. From "Ordinary people" downwards marks error. Believing that there are distinct entities, definitive conditioned or definitive unconditioned phenomena, distinct or simultaneous times, and so on, all stem from definitively positing the three characteristics, generating further disputes over existence. > > From "The wise and holy" downwards explains correctness and error, which answers the above question. The above question asked: Since the three characteristics are devoid of existence, why can the names of the three characteristics be spoken in the treatise? Therefore, it is said: in order to stop the inversion of permanence, three are taught; if the inversion of permanence ceases, the three are not retained either. This is also teaching three to stop three, not that teaching three implies that three exist. As the \*Mahāprajñāpāramitopadeśa\* says: "Using sound to block sound is not seeking sound." > > "The words are the same": both speak of the three characteristics. "Their minds differ": when ordinary people speak of three and hear of three, they form an understanding of three, not knowing that not-three is three, nor knowing that three is not-three. Not knowing that not-three is three, they lack the expedients of real wisdom; not knowing that three is not-three, they lack the real wisdom of expedients. Lacking both wisdoms, how could they have the four unassisted, teacherless knowledges? Therefore, ordinary people only have ignorance, not seeing Buddha-nature as permanence, bliss, self, and purity. The holy person clarifies three, knowing that it is not-three that is three, and also recognizing that three is not-three; possessing the four knowledges, they no longer have ignorance, and thus see Buddha-nature as possessing permanence, bliss, self, and purity. Therefore, it is said that the words are the same while their minds differ. Now, that the holy person uses the same words is also to make ordinary people know that not-three is three, and three is not-three, so that possessing the four knowledges, they enter the Buddha's knowledge and vision and attain Buddhahood. > > The three characteristics being so, the four conditions, and even the three treatises, all Buddhist sūtras, and all treatises must be understood in this way. > > Furthermore, as another expression: the holy mind rests in the four negations, yet words follow ordinary people in speaking of three. Why follow the ordinary in speaking of three? To lead them to awaken to the four negations. The four negations are: originally there never were three, so how could there be not-three? And so forth for the four propositions. > > "There should be no objection": you should not have objected earlier, saying, "If there are no three, why speak of three?" > From "Like an illusion" downwards explains the three similes of the verse, which correspond to the three \[characteristics\]. > From "Ordinary people discriminate" downwards secondly concludes comprehensively with correctness and error. Furthermore, closely concluding with the city of the gandharvas: when the sun rises it appears, and after a short while it vanishes; this matches "Like ordinary people discriminating it as existent, / When the wise seek it, existence is non-existence," precisely because discrimination corresponds to distinction like the rising of the sun. > — English (machine translation) (machine translation) - [Previous: 5.40](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1824.5.40) - [Next: 5.42](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1824.5.42) - [Up: 5](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1824.5) ## Translations (1) - [English (machine translation)](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1824~en-mt.5.41) — English, machine translation --- Source: [https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1824.5.41](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1824.5.41) · Pramāṇa