[Pramāṇa](https://indike.org/pramana/) › [Indian literature](https://indike.org/pramana/in) › [Buddhist Literature](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha) › [Taishō Tripiṭaka (Chinese Buddhist canon)](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho) › [中觀論疏](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1824) › 5.4 # 中觀論疏 5.4 中觀論疏 5.4 - **Language:** Classical Chinese ### [5.4](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1824.5.4) 品開為二：初立、次破。立有二：前明其相、次明法體。「定相」者，如地堅相不可令不堅，火熱相不可令冷也。「即有六種」者，既有其相即有法體，此是體相非標相，故有相即有體也。問：上諸品立與此立何異？答：從〈因緣〉至〈五陰〉立於有義，今明立相義也。上以立有，故論主破有明空解脫門；今立相，故破相明無相解脫門，即次第也。答中八偈為二：初七偈破相明無相門、第二一偈呵責門破，就理實明無，即呵其無而謂有。初又二：前六偈破虛空、次一偈類餘五種。破虛空為二：初五偈半破虛空之法、次半偈破知空之人。初有二：第一五偈破虛空是有、次半偈破虛空是無。破有中有五偈為四：初一偈半舉能相破所相、次一偈半舉所相破能相、第三一偈相可相相待破、第四一偈結束破。初一偈半為二：前偈正破、次半偈傳破。初偈上半明空若待相即墮無空、下半明空不待相便墮無相，進退失也。上半破云汝前言「六種各有定相」者，若爾，相有故虛空是有；相既無，虛空即無。問：何者為空相？答：空有二種相，一標相、二體相。如見柱有，知柱外即無。因有知無，有是無家標相。二者除柱故得柱無，柱無之處為空體相。然此二相俱由於柱，若爾，柱有故可得有空，若未有柱應未有空。又空與柱俱，柱既無常，空亦應爾也。問：上半明相無空即無，為是相待無、為是不相待無？答：具於兩義。若是標相，即相待故無；若是體相無，相即無體也。下半破法不與相俱。汝若言未有柱時已有空者，空則無相，汝上言六種各有定相，此言則失。問：虛空無何等相？答：未有標相而有於空，故是無相有空耳。若言未有體相者，無相即無空也。故無標相則墮失相過，若無體相則有二過：一墮無相、二墮無體也。長行但釋下半明空墮無相，不釋上半無法者，至第二偈方釋之。又一義：無相即無法，故復是釋上半也。「問曰」下生第二半偈傳破無相有空。問：外人初言六種各有定相，今何故改宗便謂無相有空耶？答：外義有本有末，據本而言空是常法、相是無常，則未有相時先已有空，故空無相。據末而言，後有色生，因滅色知空，故言虛空有相。初言有相，據其末也；今無相有空，約其本也。是故二言俱不相違。「答曰」下，破無相有空。「一切處無有」者，此中明無是體相無、非標相無，若無體相則無此物也。有二法攝一切法：一有為法、二無為法。有為法以生住滅為相，二無為法以無生住滅為相。此二既各有相，是故有法。虛空若無相，則非有為亦非無為，即無有法，故云一切處無有。何者？虛空是三無為中一，豈得非有為無為耶？又約毘曇有為空、無為空，今非有為非無為則無有法，故云一切處無有。下半屬第二一偈半舉所相破能相。又開二別：初半偈明無所相故，能相何所相？次一偈開二門重責能相。初半偈有二意：一者取意救於上半。空若畢竟無相，可得無法。先雖無相，後相來相之，是故有相，以有相故則復有法。今縱破之，若前無相後相來相之，相終不著。如常云「真諦無名」，以名詺真，去真彌遠矣。第二意云：若先無相即無有法，後相何所相耶？如柱以圓為相，若無圓相，即無有柱。何所相耶？空以無色為相，若無無色，則無虛空，何所相耶？長行「若謂先無相」下，釋下半，仍生第三偈也。 > The chapter opens into two parts: first the thesis is established, and next it is refuted. The establishment has two parts: first explaining its characteristics (lakṣaṇa), and next explaining the substantial entity of the dharma (dharma-svabhāva). 'Determinate characteristics' means, for example, that the characteristic of earth is solidity, which cannot be made non-solid, and the characteristic of fire is heat, which cannot be made cold. 'There are the six kinds' means that since there are their characteristics, there are their substantial entities; these are the essential characteristics of the entity, not indicative characteristics, and therefore having the characteristic implies having the entity. Question: How does the establishment in the preceding chapters differ from this establishment? Answer: From Chapter \[One\], 'Conditions', to \[Chapter Four\], 'The Five Aggregates', existence (bhāva) was established; here, characteristics (lakṣaṇa) are established. Above, because existence was established, the author of the treatise refuted existence to elucidate the door of liberation of emptiness (śūnyatā). Now, because characteristics are established, he refutes characteristics to elucidate the door of liberation of signlessness (animitta); thus there is a sequence. In the reply, the eight verses are divided into two parts: the first seven verses refute characteristics to elucidate the door of signlessness; the second, a single verse, refutes by way of rebuke, explaining non-existence based on ultimate reality, rebuking their claiming existence where there is none. The first part also has two sections: the first six verses refute space (ākāśa), and the following one verse analogously applies this to the remaining five kinds. The refutation of space has two parts: the first five and a half verses refute the dharma of space, and the next half verse refutes the person who cognizes space. The first has two parts: the first five verses refute space as being existent, and the next half verse refutes space as being non-existent. Within the refutation of existence, the five verses form four sections: the first verse and a half adduces the characterizing mark to refute the characterized; the next verse and a half adduces the characterized to refute the characterizing mark; the third, a single verse, refutes through mutual dependence of mark and characterized; the fourth, a single verse, concludes and refutes. The first verse and a half has two parts: the preceding verse directly refutes, and the next half verse progressively refutes. The first half of the first verse explains that if space depends on a mark, it falls into being without space; the second half explains that if space does not depend on a mark, it falls into being markless: both advancing and retreating result in error. The first half refutes as follows: as for your previous statement that 'the six kinds each have determinate characteristics,' if so, because the mark exists, space exists; but since the mark does not exist, space does not exist. Question: What is the mark of space? Answer: Space has two kinds of marks: first, an indicative mark; second, an essential mark of the entity. For instance, seeing that a pillar exists, one knows that outside the pillar there is non-existence. Dependent on existence one knows non-existence; existence is the indicative mark belonging to non-existence. Second, because the pillar is removed, the non-existence of the pillar is obtained; the locus of the pillar's non-existence is the essential mark of the entity of space. Yet both marks depend on the pillar; if so, because the pillar exists, space can be had; if there were not yet a pillar, there should not yet be space. Furthermore, space and the pillar are concurrent; since the pillar is impermanent, space should also be so. Question: The first half explains that when the mark is non-existent, space is non-existent; is this a relative non-existence through mutual dependence, or an absolute non-existence independent of relation? Answer: It possesses both meanings. If it is an indicative mark, it is non-existent because of mutual dependence; if it is the essential mark of the entity that is non-existent, then being without the mark entails being without the entity. The second half refutes the dharma not concurring with the mark. If you say that before the pillar existed, space already existed, then space would be without a mark; and your prior statement that the six kinds each have determinate characteristics would be invalidated. Question: Of what mark is space devoid? Answer: Space exists before having an indicative mark, so it is just a markless existence of space. If one says it lacks an essential mark of the entity, then being without a mark entails being without space. Therefore, lacking an indicative mark incurs the fault of losing the mark; while lacking an essential mark of the entity incurs two faults: first, falling into being markless; second, falling into being entityless. The prose commentary only explains the second half to show that space falls into being markless, and does not explain the first half regarding the absence of the dharma, which is only explained when reaching the second verse. Or in another sense: being markless is just being without the dharma, and so it also explains the first half. From 'Question' downward, the second half-verse is introduced to progressively refute a markless existent space. Question: The opponent initially said that the six kinds each have determinate characteristics; why now change their tenet to assert a markless existent space? Answer: The opponent's doctrine has a root and branches. Speaking from the root, space is an eternal dharma and the mark is impermanent; thus, before there is a mark, space already pre-exists, so space is markless. Speaking from the branches, form subsequently arises, and dependent on the destruction of form one knows space; hence they say space has a mark. The initial statement that it has a mark was based on its branches; now stating that there is a markless space concerns its root. Therefore, the two statements do not contradict each other. From 'Answer' downward, it refutes a markless existent space. 'Nowhere is there' means: the non-existence explained here is the non-existence of the essential mark of the entity, not the non-existence of the indicative mark; if it lacks the essential mark of the entity, then this thing does not exist. There are two dharmas that subsume all dharmas: first, conditioned dharmas; second, unconditioned dharmas. Conditioned dharmas have arising, abiding, and ceasing as their characteristics; second, unconditioned dharmas have the absence of arising, abiding, and ceasing as their characteristic. Since both have their respective characteristics, these dharmas exist. If space were markless, it would be neither conditioned nor unconditioned, and thus would not be an existent dharma; hence it says 'nowhere is there.' Why? Space is one among the three unconditioned dharmas; how could it be neither conditioned nor unconditioned? Moreover, according to the Abhidharma, there are conditioned space and unconditioned space; now, being neither conditioned nor unconditioned, there is no existent dharma, hence it says 'nowhere is there.' The second half belongs to the next verse and a half, which adduces the characterized to refute the characterizing mark. This further opens into two distinctions: the first half-verse explains that because there is no characterized, what does the characterizing mark characterize? The next single verse opens two approaches to re-examine and challenge the characterizing mark. The first half-verse has two intents: first, to take the idea \[of the opponent\] and rescue the first half. If space were ultimately markless, one could obtain the absence of the dharma; but though it was previously markless, a mark subsequently comes to characterize it, and therefore it has a mark; because it has a mark, it again has a dharma. Now, conceding this in order to refute it: if previously it were markless and subsequently a mark came to characterize it, the mark would never adhere. As is commonly said, 'the ultimate truth has no name'; if one uses names to designate the truth, one strays ever further from the truth. The second intent says: if it were previously markless, then there would be no dharma; what would the subsequent mark characterize? Just as a pillar has roundness as its mark, if there is no round mark, there is no pillar; what would be characterized? Space has the absence of form as its mark; if there is no absence of form, there is no space; what would be characterized? The prose commentary, from 'If you say that previously it was markless' downward, explains the second half, and further gives rise to the third verse. > — English (machine translation) (machine translation) - [Previous: 5.3](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1824.5.3) - [Next: 5.5](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1824.5.5) - [Up: 5](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1824.5) ## Translations (1) - [English (machine translation)](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1824~en-mt.5.4) — English, machine translation --- Source: [https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1824.5.4](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1824.5.4) · Pramāṇa