[Pramāṇa](https://indike.org/pramana/) › [Indian literature](https://indike.org/pramana/in) › [Buddhist Literature](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha) › [Taishō Tripiṭaka (Chinese Buddhist canon)](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho) › [中觀論疏](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1824) › 8.7 # 中觀論疏 8.7 中觀論疏 8.7 - **Language:** Classical Chinese ### [8.7](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1824.8.7) 「此性則無記」者，第二釋二章門。前二偈半釋不失法，有五門：一三性門、二繫不繫門、三斷不斷門、四釋名門、五破異門。問：何故獨破無記不失法，不破通三性得繩耶？答：二義。一者通三性得亦能感果，屬上業門破；無記不感果，上未破，今破也。二者得通三性，此但小乘義耳，不足破。無記通大小，正量是小乘，阿梨耶不失法是大乘。阿梨耶翻為無沒識，無是不之異名，沒是失之別目，故梨耶猶是不失法。又梨耶體是果報無記，能持一切善惡種子，正是今外人義。又所以前明三性門者，為對二部：一有券部、二無券部。有券部如薩婆多人，亦有四種，謂假名眾生如財主，作善惡業如負財人，別有得繩得善惡業令果不失如券，業感果如還債人。無券部者，佛陀提婆人、譬喻、成實等，但明三種無別得繩為券，但言眾生為能成就、善惡業為所成就也。若即以此為不失法則無別財主，故但有三也。曇無德明心為能成就，亦無有別法為券也。正量部前對有券義，故就三性分別。所以然者，薩婆多明得繩通三性。若爾，得繩既是善惡，還復感報則與業同，並是負財之人，何名為券？是故今明善惡業自感報，而不失法是無記不感報。如世間負財人自還債耳，而券不還債，是故立不失法為無記。問：數人得繩感何報？答：《婆沙》云「但逐業感受報耳，不能感生。又但是報因感果，故不作業感果。四相亦爾。」問：何故不同無券部？答：經中說有券義，如《智度論》引《集法經》諸羅漢說偈「病老死券已裂破」，此明羅漢還過去報債竟，不復更取未來債，則不失法券便滅，名為裂破。而佛陀訶梨既無別不失法，則無別有券，但有負財人，故不與經相應，所以不同無券部也。問：與有券部幾種異耶？答：一常無常異。薩婆多得繩是無常，念念生滅；正量是功用常，無念念滅，但有大期滅。二薩婆多券通善惡故感報，正量明但無記故券不感報。三薩婆多明感報故券義不成，正量明不感報券義得成。四薩婆多正明斷得繩而惑自去；正量得是無記，不斷無記，正斷不善惑也。但同明非色非心，與薩婆多不異也。釋此性無記不同，有人言：此猶是數義，數義得繩乃通三性。今但釋上券譬，數人明卷但是無記，如金石價殊而券無貴賤，故但是無記，若解法說則通三性。有人言：此非數義，乃是佛陀、譬喻、成實以眾生為能成就。故《婆沙》云「佛陀提婆說曰：眾生不離是法，名為成就。眾生不當善惡，故是無記。」有人言：曇無德部辨心為能成就，心不當善惡名為無記，為能成就善惡。又依正量部義，正量本是律學，佛滅後三百年中從犢子部出，辨不失法體是無記。《明了論》是覺護法師造，而依正量部義。論云「正量部有二種：一至得、二不失法。不失法但善惡有之，外法則無。又但是自性無記。又待果起方滅。若是至得，逐法通三性，通內外法皆有。果未起時，若懺悔，則至得便滅。而不失法，雖懺悔，罪不滅，要須更待果起方滅也。」始終有五部：一薩婆多通三性，餘四部皆無記，一佛陀人、二曇無德、三正量、四《攝論》並是無記。此四所以同是無記者，彼深有所以，善惡業自感報耳；此持業法不感，報故是無記。如世間負債人自還債耳，券不還債。 > "Its nature is indeterminate": this is the second part, explaining the two chapter-headings. The preceding two and a half stanzas explain the inexhaustible dharma, through five gates: 1. the gate of the three natures; 2. the gate of bound and unbound; 3. the gate of abandoned and unabandoned; 4. the gate of explaining the name; and 5. the gate of refuting rival views. Question: Why is the indeterminate inexhaustible dharma specifically refuted, rather than refuting the cord of attainment (prāpti) that runs through the three natures? Answer: For two reasons. First, attainment that runs through the three natures can also produce retribution, so it belongs under the gate of karma above and was already refuted; the indeterminate does not produce retribution, and not having been refuted above, it is refuted now. Second, attainment running through the three natures is merely a Hīnayāna doctrine and not worth refuting. The indeterminate runs through both the Mahāyāna and the Hīnayāna: the Sāṃmitīyas are Hīnayāna, while the inexhaustible dharma of the ālayavijñāna is Mahāyāna. Ālaya is translated as "non-loss consciousness" (wumei shi): wu is an alternative word for "not" (bu), and mei is another term for "loss" (shi); hence ālaya is still the inexhaustible dharma (bu shi fa). Furthermore, the essence of the ālaya is indeterminate retribution, capable of retaining all good and evil seeds, which precisely matches the present opponent's view. Moreover, the reason the gate of the three natures is explained first is to address two schools: first, the school with promissory contracts; second, the school without promissory contracts. The school with promissory contracts, such as the Sarvāstivādins, also has four elements: the nominal sentient being is like the creditor; performing good and evil karma is like the debtor; there is a separate cord of attainment that obtains good and evil karma and prevents the fruit from being lost, which is like the contract; and the karma producing retribution is like the debtor repaying the debt. The school without promissory contracts—the followers of Buddhadeva, the Dārṣṭāntikas, the Tattvasiddhi\[-śāstra\], and so forth—only explains three elements and has no separate cord of attainment serving as a contract; they merely say that the sentient being is the one that achieves (sādhaka), and good and evil karma are what is achieved. If one takes this as the inexhaustible dharma, there is no separate creditor, so there are only three elements. The Dharmaguptakas explain that the mind is what achieves, and likewise there is no separate entity serving as a contract. The Sāṃmitīya school previously addressed the position of having a contract, and thus distinguished it according to the three natures. Why is this? The Sarvāstivādins explain that the cord of attainment runs through the three natures. If so, since the cord of attainment is good or evil, it would in turn induce retribution and thus be identical with karma, both being debtors; how then could it be called a contract? Therefore it is now explained that good and evil karma produce retribution of themselves, whereas the inexhaustible dharma is indeterminate and does not produce retribution. It is like how in worldly matters the debtor himself repays the debt, while the contract does not repay the debt; hence the inexhaustible dharma is established as indeterminate. Question: What retribution does the cord of attainment of the Abhidharmikas induce? Answer: The Vibhāṣā says: "It merely tracks karma in receiving retribution; it cannot induce rebirth. Furthermore, it is merely retribution as cause producing its fruit, so it does not produce retribution by creating karma. The four characteristics are likewise." Question: Why does it differ from the school without promissory contracts? Answer: Sūtras speak of the meaning of having a contract, as when the Mahāprajñāpāramitopadeśa cites a stanza spoken by the arhats in the Samyuktasaṅgīti-sūtra: "The contract of illness, old age, and death has already been torn to pieces." This explains that once an arhat has completely repaid his past debt of retribution and takes no further future debt, the contract of the inexhaustible dharma is destroyed, which is called "torn to pieces." But since Buddhavarman has no separate inexhaustible dharma, there is no separate contract, only the debtor; thus it does not accord with the sūtras, which is why it does not agree with the school without promissory contracts. Question: In how many ways does it differ from the school with promissory contracts? Answer: First, the difference between permanent and impermanent: the Sarvāstivādin cord of attainment is impermanent, arising and ceasing moment by moment; the Sāṃmitīya is functional permanence (gongyong chang), which does not cease moment by moment, but ceases only at the end of its grand period. Second, the Sarvāstivādin contract runs through good and evil and therefore induces retribution; the Sāṃmitīyas explain that it is purely indeterminate, so the contract does not induce retribution. Third, because the Sarvāstivādins hold that it induces retribution, the meaning of a contract is not established; because the Sāṃmitīyas hold that it does not induce retribution, the meaning of a contract is established. Fourth, the Sarvāstivādins explicitly hold that the cord of attainment is severed and the afflictions depart of themselves; for the Sāṃmitīyas, attainment is indeterminate and does not sever the indeterminate, but directly severs unwholesome afflictions. However, in both holding it to be neither form nor mind, it does not differ from the Sarvāstivādins. The explanations of "its nature is indeterminate" differ. Some say: this is still the Abhidharma doctrine, where the cord of attainment actually runs through the three natures. Here, it merely explains the metaphor of the contract above; the Abhidharmikas explain that the contract itself is purely indeterminate—just as the prices of gold and stone differ but the contract itself has no high or low value, so it is purely indeterminate—whereas if interpreted according to the doctrine, it runs through the three natures. Some say: this is not the Abhidharma doctrine, but rather that of Buddhadeva, the Dārṣṭāntikas, and the Tattvasiddhi\[-śāstra\], which take the sentient being as the one that achieves. Thus the Vibhāṣā says: "Buddhadeva said: That a sentient being is not separated from this dharma is called 'achievement'. Sentient beings do not correspond to good or evil, and are therefore indeterminate." Some say: the Dharmaguptaka school explains the mind as that which achieves; the mind does not correspond to good or evil, so it is called indeterminate, being capable of achieving good and evil. Furthermore, according to the doctrine of the Sāṃmitīya school: the Sāṃmitīyas originally belonged to Vinaya scholarship and arose from the Vātsīputrīyas three hundred years after the Buddha's parinirvāṇa; they explain the essence of the inexhaustible dharma as indeterminate. The Mingliao lun (Saṃmatīya-śāstra / Prātimokṣa-sūtra-vibhāṣā) was composed by Master Buddhatrāta, based on the doctrine of the Sāṃmitīya school. The treatise says: "The Sāṃmitīya school has two kinds: first, attainment (prāpti); second, the inexhaustible dharma. The inexhaustible dharma exists only in good and evil, not in external dharmas. Furthermore, it is only intrinsically indeterminate. Moreover, it ceases only when it awaits the arising of the fruit. As for attainment, it tracks dharmas through the three natures and exists in both internal and external dharmas. Before the fruit arises, if one repents, attainment is destroyed. But with the inexhaustible dharma, even if one repents, the sin is not destroyed; it must wait for the fruit to arise before it is destroyed." In all, there are five schools: 1. the Sarvāstivādins, running through the three natures; the remaining four schools are all indeterminate: 1. the followers of Buddhadeva, 2. the Dharmaguptakas, 3. the Sāṃmitīyas, and 4. the Mahāyānasaṃgraha—all are indeterminate. The reason these four agree in being indeterminate has a profound justification: good and evil karma induce retribution of themselves; this dharma that holds karma does not induce retribution, hence it is indeterminate. It is like how in worldly matters the debtor himself repays the debt, while the contract does not repay the debt. > — English (machine translation) (machine translation) - [Previous: 8.6](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1824.8.6) - [Next: 8.8](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1824.8.8) - [Up: 8](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1824.8) ## Translations (1) - [English (machine translation)](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1824~en-mt.8.7) — English, machine translation --- Source: [https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1824.8.7](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1824.8.7) · Pramāṇa