[Pramāṇa](https://indike.org/pramana/) › [Indian literature](https://indike.org/pramana/in) › [Buddhist Literature](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha) › [Taishō Tripiṭaka (Chinese Buddhist canon)](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho) › [中觀論疏](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1824) › 9.38 # 中觀論疏 9.38 中觀論疏 9.38 - **Language:** Classical Chinese ### [9.38](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1824.9.38) 初章又二：第一前破煩惱顛倒；「如是顛倒滅」下，第二結破意。結破意者，能如此品正觀，則煩惱顛倒畢竟永滅；異斯觀者則是邪觀，非但故惑不除，新倒更起。就初又二：初破煩惱、次破顛倒。所以破此二者，破煩惱則破在家起愛眾生，破顛倒則破出家起見外道。又天魔起煩惱，外道起顛倒。又鈍根眾故起於煩惱，利根眾生起於顛倒。又凡夫起於煩惱，二乘起於顛倒。問：何故前破煩惱、後破顛倒？答：前有在家起愛，後有出家起見，故火宅中前明毒蟲、後辨惡鬼。欲出火宅者，當依此品而觀察之。又依《法華》意凡有四人：一鈍根起愛眾生，不知厭、不知出。二顛倒外道，知厭而不知出。三二乘人，知厭知出，但是曲出。四菩薩之人，依此品如實正觀，知厭知出，名為直出。就初破煩惱，開為四別：一立、二破、三救、四破救。「憶想分別」者，立三毒因也。「生於貪恚癡」，所生三毒果也。「淨不淨顛倒」者，釋上從因生果，以計淨不淨顛倒生於三毒。「皆從因緣生」者，此明二種相生：一從憶想分別生顛倒、二從淨不淨倒生於三毒，故云皆從眾緣生。故《淨名》云「貪欲以顛倒為本，顛倒以想分別為本，想分別以無住為本。」答中五偈，即為五別：初無自性門破、二以人例法破、三無屬破、四五求破、五以因況果破。初二：上半牒、下半破。煩惱若有自體，不應從因而生；若從因而生則無自性，為自性煩惱則空。經中明煩惱從因緣生，外人便謂有煩惱。論主申經意，若從因緣即是空也。第二偈以人例法破者，上偈將因顯果，此以果破果。以我見與三毒皆是煩惱，故皆是果也。所以將我例煩惱者，《大品》多舉我例法。龍樹云：「佛弟子多知無我，故佛舉我為類。」上半舉我有以無，下半類法亦無。「我法有以無」者，我是有是無，前以破竟。問：何處品中破我是無？答：處處有文。即〈如來品〉四句求如來不可得，如來即是我也。又〈法品〉中破我如虛空，亦是破無。下半類法者，我是利惑。此既是無，煩惱為鈍使云何得有？又我是根本既無，煩惱為末，以本無故末無也。又煩惱為我所，在我既無，何有我所？又我能起惑，既無我，誰起惑耶？問：云何是煩惱有無？答：執三毒是有是無皆名煩惱。又現起煩惱名之為有，過未煩惱名之為無。亦作此計，即是煩惱也。「何以故」下，生第三偈無屬破。上半求起煩惱人不得、下半正作無屬破。上半破起煩惱人，謂世間外道、犢子及假有體用之流也。下半正作無屬破者，上半舉所依破能依，下半明有所依故有能依，所依既無能依亦無。又人是能起，惑是所起，能起既無，所起亦無。犢子、佛陀、成實、譬喻並云：人為能成就，故煩惱屬人。既其無人，何所屬耶？「若謂雖無我」下，生第四偈五求破。前破煩惱不屬人，破一切有我部。今五求破，明煩惱不屬心，破一切無我部，如曇無德、僧祇、毘曇等義。令此二人並成佛。又前偈破我，令外道知無我無煩惱，即悟人法二無生，令外道人聞論主語得成佛。後破屬心，令一切小乘人及有所得大乘人悟法無生得成佛。以此論是大乘論，令一切人並乘大乘以至佛也。問：何等大乘人言煩惱屬心耶？答：如攝論師，一切煩惱皆依本識是也。問：《攝論》是大乘，今云何破之？答：《攝論》明本識是依他性，即是從因緣生，因緣生無自性，即是寂滅。而攝論師云：依他性有假體。豈是解《攝論》耶？上半舉身見五求不得，下半類心及與煩惱。五陰名身，於中起見名為身見。若身見與五陰，一陰五身見，則五陰與身見一。身見唯在行陰，則五陰皆在行陰。若身見與陰異，則非陰所攝，應是無為。餘三並皆是異。同異門破也。下半有二種五求：一者就垢心中五種求煩惱，即是就本求末；二就煩惱求垢心，即是就末求本。此欲明無有煩惱亦無垢心，即釋《淨名經》明心空罪亦空。又即大乘人皆執經中云「三界一心作」，或云一貪心作、或云一梨耶心作。就垢心五種求煩惱者，若即垢心有煩惱者，便無能屬所屬。既是一物，若是能屬便無所屬、若是所屬便無能屬，不爾非能屬亦非所屬。起義亦爾。又垢心與煩惱一，斷煩惱即斷心，聖人便應無心。若不斷心，亦不斷煩惱，聖人有心應有煩惱。若垢心與煩惱異，離心應別有煩惱，則煩惱不惱心，亦不與心共生。又心自是心，煩惱應非心法。餘三並是異，同異中破也。次就煩惱五種求垢心者，垢心與煩惱一，煩惱既是行陰攝，則四心皆是行陰，無復四心。若垢心與煩惱異，煩惱自垢，心應不垢，便煩惱不染心。餘三同異破。「淨不淨顛倒」下，第五段以因況果破。偈上半明無因自性、下半辨無有果。外謂因淨起貪、因不淨起嗔，故淨不淨是三毒因。淨不淨既稱顛倒，則非實有，若是實有不名顛倒。今猶無倒因，寧有煩惱之果？「問曰」下，第三救。此救來意有二：一者六塵是淨不淨本，淨不淨是三毒本。既有六塵，寧無三毒及淨不淨？二近生者，論主上以本況末，倒本無故貪瞋之末亦無。外人乘此破亦將本望末，以本有故末即有也。「答曰」下，第四破。又開三別：第一破其六塵；第二破淨不淨倒；第三破其三毒還破外救，救中從本至末三事也。兩偈為二：初偈明六塵體空、第二偈明六塵之中無淨不淨。兩偈並上半法說、下半舉譬。取其大意者，若言對眼便是有者，如炎中水，炎中實無水，癡狩謂炎中有水，復謂水有淨不淨，因淨不淨生貪瞋，貪瞋生業，業故有苦。今猶無水，云何有淨不淨乃至煩惱業苦耶？釋境空有三家：一莊周，明境無定，如美色於人為美，鳥見之高飛。二譬喻部，明人不成境不成。三《攝論》，明境亦空。而彼論文云「若經文中明空無所有者，此辨分別性空，即是無境。若明幻化，此明依他性，以世諦中不無此法也。」今明此是一往破境耳。今論正將幻化喻境，故明心境俱是幻化有，俱是第一義空也。長行云「未與心和合時空無所有」者，法之有無不假於心，而今未合既無，合豈有耶？此大意。觀此論及《楞伽經》有二種意：一者從此想心謂有前境，實非有也；二者以從妄心生前境，故前境復誑惑於心。此二即是心生境、境生心。但原本從妄心生，實無前境也。想心謂有前境，實非有也。「不因於淨相」下，第二兩偈破淨不淨，並就無自性門破之。初偈破不淨、次偈破淨也。「若無有淨者」下，第三一偈次破三毒。 > The first section also has two parts: first, refuting defilements and distortions; second, from 'If such distortions are extinguished' onward, concluding with the intent of the refutation. Regarding concluding with the intent of the refutation: if one can cultivate correct contemplation in this manner as in this chapter, then defilements and distortions will be extinguished forever ultimately; if one departs from this contemplation, it is an erroneous contemplation, wherein not only are old delusions not removed, but new distortions also arise. Within the first part, there are again two: first, refuting defilements; next, refuting distortions. Why are both refuted? Refuting defilements refutes householders who give rise to craving; refuting distortions refutes renouncers and non-Buddhists who give rise to views. Furthermore, heavenly Māras give rise to defilements, while non-Buddhists give rise to distortions. Furthermore, beings of dull faculties give rise to defilements, while beings of sharp faculties give rise to distortions. Furthermore, ordinary people give rise to defilements, while the two vehicles give rise to distortions. Question: Why refute defilements first and distortions afterward? Answer: First there are householders giving rise to craving, and afterward there are renouncers giving rise to views; hence, in the burning house \[parable\], poisonous insects are explained first, and evil demons are distinguished afterward. Those who wish to leave the burning house should contemplate according to this chapter. Furthermore, according to the meaning of the Lotus Sūtra, there are four kinds of persons in all: first, beings of dull faculties who give rise to craving, who neither know disgust nor know escape; second, distorted non-Buddhists, who know disgust but do not know escape; third, people of the two vehicles, who know disgust and know escape, but theirs is a crooked escape; fourth, bodhisattvas, who, relying on the true and correct contemplation of this chapter, know disgust and know escape, which is called a direct escape. Regarding the first \[part\], refuting defilements, it is divided into four: first, positing; second, refuting; third, rescue; fourth, refuting the rescue. 'Memories, notions, and conceptual discrimination' posits the causes of the three poisons. 'Give rise to greed, hatred, and delusion' refers to the fruits of the three poisons that are produced. 'The distortions of the pure and the impure' explains the production of fruits from causes above, because grasping the distortions of the pure and the impure produces the three poisons. 'All arise from causes and conditions' explains two kinds of mutual production: first, conceptual discrimination produces distortions; second, the distortions of the pure and the impure produce the three poisons; hence it is said that all arise from conditions. Thus the Vimalakīrtinirdeśa states: 'Desire has distortion as its root; distortion has notions and conceptual discrimination as its root; notions and conceptual discrimination have non-abiding as their root.' In the response, the five verses form five distinct points: first, refutation through the gateway of no intrinsic nature; second, refutation by analogizing phenomena to the person; third, refutation through having no locus of belonging; fourth, refutation through the fivefold search; fifth, refutation by comparing fruit through cause. In the first verse, there are two parts: the first half takes up \[the opponent's claim\], and the second half refutes it. If defilements had an intrinsic entity, they should not arise from causes; if they arise from causes, they have no intrinsic nature, and without intrinsic nature, defilements are empty. The sūtras explain that defilements arise from causes and conditions, so outsiders immediately claim that defilements exist. The treatise master elucidates the sūtra's intent: if they arise from causes and conditions, they are empty. Regarding the second verse, refutation by analogizing phenomena to the person: the verse above revealed the fruit by means of the cause, while this one refutes the fruit by means of the fruit. Because the view of self and the three poisons are all defilements, they are all fruits. Why analogize defilements to the self? The Prajñāpāramitā sūtras frequently bring up the self to analogize phenomena. Nāgārjuna said: 'The Buddha's disciples mostly know there is no self, so the Buddha brought up the self as a comparison.' The first half brings up whether the self exists or does not exist, and the second half analogizes phenomena as likewise non-existent. 'Whether the self and phenomena exist or do not exist': whether the self exists or does not exist has already been refuted previously. Question: In which chapter is it refuted that the self does not exist? Answer: There are passages everywhere. That is, in Chapter \[22\] on the Tathāgata, searching for the Tathāgata through the four propositions yields nothing, and the Tathāgata is indeed the self. Also, in Chapter \[18\] on Phenomena, refuting the self as being like empty space is also refuting non-existence. Regarding the second half analogizing phenomena: the self is a sharp delusion. Since this is already non-existent, how could defilements, being dull fetters, exist? Furthermore, the self is the root; since it is absent, defilements are the branches—because the root is absent, the branches are absent. Furthermore, defilements belong to the self; since the self does not exist, how could what belongs to the self exist? Furthermore, the self can give rise to delusions; since there is no self, who gives rise to delusions? Question: What is the existence and non-existence of defilements? Answer: Grasping the three poisons as existing or not existing are both called defilements. Furthermore, presently arising defilements are called existing, while past and future defilements are called non-existing. Making such an assumption is itself defilement. From 'For what reason?' onward, the third verse, refutation through having no locus of belonging, arises. The first half searches for the person who gives rise to defilements and does not find them; the second half directly performs the refutation through having no locus of belonging. The first half refutes the person who gives rise to defilements, referring to worldly non-Buddhists, the Vātsīputrīyas, and those who posit nominal existence with entity and function. The second half directly performs the refutation through having no locus of belonging: the first half raises the locus of reliance to refute that which relies upon it; the second half clarifies that only because there is a locus of reliance is there that which relies upon it—since the locus of reliance is absent, that which relies upon it is also absent. Furthermore, the person is that which gives rise \[to them\], and delusion is that which is given rise to; since that which gives rise \[to them\] is absent, that which is given rise to is also absent. The Vātsīputrīyas, Buddhadeva, the Tattvasiddhi, and the Dṛṣṭāntikas all say: the person is that which accomplishes them, so defilements belong to the person. Since there is no person, to whom would they belong? From 'If it is claimed that although there is no self' onward, the fourth verse, refutation through the fivefold search, arises. Previously, it was refuted that defilements do not belong to the person, which refuted all schools asserting a self. Now, refutation through the fivefold search clarifies that defilements do not belong to the mind, which refutes all schools asserting selflessness, such as the positions of the Dharmaguptakas, Mahāsāṃghikas, and Abhidharma. It causes both of these \[groups of\] people to attain buddhahood. Furthermore, the previous verse refuted the self, causing non-Buddhists to know there is no self and no defilements, immediately awakening to the non-arising of both persons and phenomena, causing non-Buddhists to attain buddhahood upon hearing the treatise master's words. The subsequent \[verse\] refutes belonging to the mind, causing all Hīnayāna followers and Mahāyāna followers with conceptual grasping to awaken to the non-arising of phenomena and attain buddhahood. Because this treatise is a Mahāyāna treatise, it causes all persons to ride the Mahāyāna together to reach buddhahood. Question: Which Mahāyāna practitioners say that defilements belong to the mind? Answer: For instance, the Masters of the Mahāyānasaṃgraha hold that all defilements rely on the fundamental consciousness; this is it. Question: The Mahāyānasaṃgraha is Mahāyāna; why refute it now? Answer: The Mahāyānasaṃgraha clarifies that the fundamental consciousness is dependent nature (paratantra-svabhāva), which means it arises from causes and conditions; what arises from causes and conditions lacks intrinsic nature, which is quiescence. Yet the Masters of the Mahāyānasaṃgraha say: dependent nature has a provisional entity. How could that be an understanding of the Mahāyānasaṃgraha? The first half brings up the fivefold search for the view of self and finds nothing; the second half analogizes the mind and defilements. The five aggregates are called the body, and giving rise to views therein is called the view of self. If the view of self and the five aggregates are identical, \[or if\] one aggregate has five views of self, then the five aggregates and the view of self are one. If the view of self were only in the saṃskāra-aggregate, then all five aggregates would be in the saṃskāra-aggregate. If the view of self were different from the aggregates, it would not be subsumed under the aggregates and should be unconditioned. The other three \[searches\] are likewise difference. This is a refutation through the gateway of identity and difference. The second half contains two kinds of fivefold search: first, searching for defilements within the defiled mind in five ways, which is searching for the branch in the root; second, searching for the defiled mind in defilements, which is searching for the root in the branch. This is intended to clarify that there are neither defilements nor a defiled mind, which explains the Vimalakīrtinirdeśa's clarification that when the mind is empty, sin is also empty. Furthermore, Mahāyāna practitioners all grasp the sūtra passage stating: 'The three realms are created by the mind alone,' or say they are created by a single mind of greed, or say they are created by a single ālaya-mind. Regarding searching for defilements within the defiled mind in five ways: if defilements existed precisely within the defiled mind, there would be neither that to which they belong nor that which belongs. Since it is one thing, if it were that to which they belong, there would be nothing that belongs; if it were that which belongs, there would be nothing to which it belongs; if not so, it would neither be that to which they belong nor that which belongs. The same applies to the sense of arising. Furthermore, if the defiled mind and defilements were one, terminating defilements would terminate the mind, so an ārya would have no mind. If the mind were not terminated, defilements would not be terminated either, so an ārya having a mind should have defilements. If the defiled mind and defilements were different, there should be defilements apart from the mind; then defilements would not afflict the mind, nor would they co-arise with the mind. Furthermore, the mind is naturally mind, and defilements should not be mental factors. The other three are likewise difference; this is refuted within identity and difference. Next, regarding searching for the defiled mind within defilements in five ways: if the defiled mind and defilements are one, since defilements are subsumed under the saṃskāra-aggregate, then all four \[other\] minds would be the saṃskāra-aggregate, and there would no longer be four minds. If the defiled mind and defilements are different, defilements would be defiled of themselves, and the mind should not be defiled; then defilements would not taint the mind. The other three are refuted through identity and difference. From 'The distortions of the pure and the impure' onward is the fifth section, refutation by comparing fruit through cause. The first half of the verse clarifies that the cause lacks intrinsic nature; the second half explains that the fruit does not exist. The outsider claims that greed arises due to the pure, and anger arises due to the impure; hence, the pure and impure are the causes of the three poisons. Since the pure and impure are called distortions, they are not real entities; if they were real entities, they would not be called distortions. Now, since even the distorted causes do not exist, how could there be the fruits of defilements? From 'Question:' onward is the third \[part\], the rescue. There are two reasons for this rescue to arise: first, the six sense objects are the root of the pure and impure, and the pure and impure are the root of the three poisons; since the six sense objects exist, how could the three poisons and the pure and impure not exist? Second, as an immediate response, the treatise master above compared the branch through the root, arguing that because the root of distortion does not exist, the branches of greed and anger also do not exist; the outsider takes advantage of this refutation to also look from root to branch, claiming that because the root exists, the branches also exist. From 'Answer:' onward is the fourth \[part\], the refutation. It is further divided into three: first, refuting their six sense objects; second, refuting the distortions of the pure and impure; third, refuting their three poisons, turning around to refute the external rescue, which consists of the three things from root to branch in the rescue. The two verses form two parts: the first verse clarifies that the substance of the six sense objects is empty; the second verse clarifies that within the six sense objects there is neither pure nor impure. Both verses use a doctrinal exposition in the first half and offer an analogy in the second half. To grasp their general meaning: if one claims that what faces the eye exists, it is like water in a mirage: there is actually no water in a mirage, but foolish beasts think there is water in the mirage, and further think that the water has pure and impure aspects, and due to the pure and impure give rise to greed and anger, greed and anger produce karma, and due to karma there is suffering. Now, since there is not even water, how could there be the pure and impure, down to defilements, karma, and suffering? Regarding explaining the emptiness of sensory objects, there are three schools: first, Zhuang Zhou, who clarifies that objects are not fixed, just as a beautiful woman is beautiful to humans, but birds fly high upon seeing her; second, the Dārṣṭāntika school, which clarifies that when the person is not established, the object is not established; third, the Mahāyānasaṃgraha, which clarifies that objects are also empty. That treatise states: 'Where sūtra passages clarify being empty and non-existent, this explains the emptiness of the imagined nature, which is the absence of objects. Where they clarify magical illusions, this explains the dependent nature, because in conventional truth these phenomena are not absent.' Now it is clarified that this is only a preliminary refutation of objects. The present treatise directly uses magical illusions as an analogy for objects; thus it clarifies that mind and objects are both illusory existences, and both are ultimate emptiness. When the prose states, 'when not yet combined with the mind, they are empty and non-existent,' whether phenomena exist or do not exist does not depend on the mind; if they do not exist when not yet combined, how could they exist when combined? This is the general meaning. Examining this treatise and the Laṅkāvatāra-sūtra, there are two intentions: first, from this conceptual mind one presumes external objects exist, but they do not truly exist; second, because external objects are produced from the false mind, external objects in turn deceive and delude the mind. These two are precisely mind producing objects, and objects producing mind. But originally they are produced from the false mind, and there are truly no external objects. The conceptual mind presumes external objects exist, but they do not truly exist. From 'Not depending on the characteristic of the pure' onward, the second pair of verses refutes the pure and impure, both refuting them through the gateway of no intrinsic nature. The first verse refutes the impure, and the next verse refutes the pure. From 'If there is no pure' onward, the third verse refutes the three poisons in turn. > — English (machine translation) (machine translation) - [Previous: 9.37](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1824.9.37) - [Next: 9.39](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1824.9.39) - [Up: 9](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1824.9) ## Translations (1) - [English (machine translation)](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1824~en-mt.9.38) — English, machine translation --- Source: [https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1824.9.38](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1824.9.38) · Pramāṇa