[Pramāṇa](https://indike.org/pramana/) › [Indian literature](https://indike.org/pramana/in) › [Buddhist Literature](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha) › [Taishō Tripiṭaka (Chinese Buddhist canon)](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho) › [中觀論疏](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1824) › 9.7 # 中觀論疏 9.7 中觀論疏 9.7 - **Language:** Classical Chinese ### [9.7](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1824.9.7) 「問曰因滅變為果」下，第四番因滅變因滅不變一雙。立義云：因滅變為果者，觀外人義只詺滅即為變，故因滅即變作果。答中上半作因至果破、下半重生破。初句牒、次句破。破云：既因變作果，則因體不滅，因體不滅故因至於果也。下半重生破者，為因之時是一生，至果時復是一生，故是重生。此直令其一物重生，所以成過。又破他義云：若因變作果者，則果不異因，還是前因作於後果。如東方張人至於西方，張人猶是張人。若因異果者，則因自滅前，非因作果。又問：若因變作果，因則異果；如其不異，則應不變。又如變昔鹿王至佛，佛應是鹿；若非復鹿，則果異於因，則因滅無果之前則是無因，無因云何有果？又問：為滅變不滅變耶？若滅則無可為變，若不滅則不變。又生已復生者，如開善云：作因時是一生，後成就來現在復是一生。墮重生義。長行為二：初釋偈本、次破異義。前生因、共生因者，前生因是相生因果，因在前生、果在後生，故名前生因。共生因者相緣因果，如梁柱與舍一時而有，名共生因。此二種因總攝一切。又詳文，相生因果自有二種：一者同時，如大小生；二前後，如報因因果。今欲破前生因，故簡除共生，明前生之因墮重生過。問：何故不釋上半耶？答：因至於果猶是外義，故不須釋之。「若謂是因即變」下，第二重破異義。凡破兩家：初破即變。外救云：因即變為果，唯有一生，無有重生。故今破云：既言其即，不得稱變；若言其變，不得稱即。如眼即目，不得名變也。「問曰因不盡滅」下，第二救云：名滅而體常存，體存故雖變而即，名滅故雖即而變。他云：昔日鹿王我身是也，鹿神明與佛神明不異，但鹿名滅、佛名生。人天神明亦不異，但名失名生耳。又僧祇義，心性本淨是非因非果，在因名因，始終是一心，故言體一；名字有異，則名失名生。又如外道，從細至麁、從麁至細，義亦如是。又攝論師云：梨耶體無生滅，名用生滅，亦是此義。又此義違《楞伽》。《楞伽》明八證滅義也。「答曰泥團前滅而後瓶生不名為變」者，然以名名體、以體應名，在名既滅，體亦復滅，是則前滅後生，豈是變耶？「又泥團不獨生」者，此句明不但名生，在體亦生；對前句，不但名滅，體亦滅也。又外人有二義：一者因體不滅、二者因中有果。前破體不滅，今破其有義也。又是破其泥團體定不滅，既合兩物則體不定也。「若但有名」者，此一句云：汝若但云名滅名生者，則應但有名，則無有體，何物變耶？「變名如乳變為酪」者，此句證名滅體亦滅、名生體亦生。如《百論》形、時、力、知、名等五事異，故俱滅俱生也。破他義云：汝一泥未作瓶，具有諸物理。汝言泥作瓶時，餘理非數緣滅者，亦應有瓶差理、瓶成理。答：亦有瓶差理。如一泥隨作一物，餘物悉差。問：既不得一時竝成，亦不得一時竝差。答：成物在一，事難故不得一時竝成。問：諸理既竝，事亦竝有。答：事相妨礙，故不得一時竝有；理不相妨礙，故得一時竝有。問：理有事有則應理礙事礙，理若不礙，理亦不有。「問曰因雖滅失」下，第二破滅不變。前滅而後變既墮二生，是故今云：但因滅前而果生後，無重生過。答中上半破，因失則無因，誰生果耶？下半明因不失，即因在果，云何生果？如米失則無可為飯，不失則米在亦無飯。所以重破其不失者，外人立因果唯有失不失二，若破不失則便立失、若破失便立不失，故進退破之。問：此與前偈破何異？答：上與其重生破，今集令不生。又如《成論》等一義之中具失不失，實法則失、相續不失，故具破之，實法失則無因生果，相續不失則因應在果。又此文開感應義。今問：當生善感者，此善為是有耶？為是無耶？若是有者，何須感耶？若謂理善感而事應者，則理因感事果。汝義不有眾生而已，有眾生則有一切善理，一切眾生常能感聖，則不須修事善以感事果。又問：未有事善已應者，亦應未有應已有事善。又問感義：若未有事不得感果，亦應未有事善不得感聖。又問：汝感應義何不相對，理應機理、事應機事？而理機感事，亦應事機感理。次問：過去現在二世善能感者，在善已有，何須感耶？若言為增長生善是故感者，若爾，未有善則不應感，云何得初生一念善耶？若一念善自生不須聖應者，後亦應自生不須應也。又問莊嚴：二世既是無義，那得成就過去？既成就過去，云何言無？若過去因感未來果，亦應過去解應斷未來惑。若惑無不可斷，亦應果無不可感。又問光宅成就義：經云「有為無常」，而汝言起一念善惡是功用常，豈不違經？又是無常中有常，常中有無常過也。 > From "The question says: the cause perishes and transforms into the fruit" downwards is the fourth pair: the cause perishing and transforming \[versus\] the cause perishing without transforming. The proponent's position states: that the cause perishes and transforms into the fruit means, upon examining the opponent's view, they merely call perishing "transforming"; hence, the cause's perishing is itself transforming into the fruit. In the reply, the first half refutes it by showing the cause reaching the fruit, and the second half refutes it through repeated arising. The first line quotes the opponent's thesis, and the second line refutes it. The refutation says: since the cause transforms into the fruit, the substance of the cause does not perish; because the substance of the cause does not perish, the cause reaches into the fruit. The refutation by repeated arising in the second half means: when it is a cause, that is one arising, and upon reaching the fruit, that is another arising; hence, it is a repeated arising. This simply makes a single entity arise repeatedly, which is why an error is incurred. Furthermore, refuting another view, it says: if the cause transforms into the fruit, then the fruit is not distinct from the cause, and it is still the earlier cause acting as the later fruit. Just as a man named Zhang in the east, when arriving in the west, is still the same man named Zhang. If the cause is distinct from the fruit, then the cause perishes by itself beforehand, and it is not the cause that becomes the fruit. Moreover, we ask: if the cause transforms into the fruit, the cause must be distinct from the fruit; if it were not distinct, it should not transform. Furthermore, as with the transformation of the former Deer King reaching to the Buddha: the Buddha would have to be a deer; if he is no longer a deer, then the fruit is distinct from the cause, and before the cause perishes and there is no fruit, there would be no cause—with no cause, how could there be a fruit? Moreover, we ask: does it transform when perished, or transform when not perished? If it has perished, there is nothing that can transform; if it has not perished, it does not transform. Furthermore, concerning "having arisen, it arises again": as Kaishan states, when acting as a cause, that is one arising, and subsequently, upon attainment arriving in the present, that is another arising. This falls into the error of repeated arising. The prose consists of two parts: first, explaining the root verse; second, refuting alternative views. Regarding "prior-arising cause" and "co-arising cause": a prior-arising cause is a mutually generating cause and effect, where the cause arises prior and the fruit arises later, hence named a prior-arising cause. A co-arising cause is a mutually conditioning cause and effect, like beams and pillars existing simultaneously with the house, named a co-arising cause. These two kinds of causes encompass all instances. Further examining the text, mutually generating causes and effects themselves are of two kinds: first, simultaneous, like major and minor arising; second, sequential, like the retribution cause and effect. Now, intending to refute the prior-arising cause, the co-arising cause is set aside to clarify that the prior-arising cause falls into the fault of repeated arising. Question: Why is the first half of the verse not explained? Answer: Because the cause reaching into the fruit is still the opponent's thesis, it does not need to be explained. From "If it is claimed that the cause immediately transforms" downwards is the second part, which again refutes alternative views. It refutes two schools altogether: first, refuting "immediate transformation". The opponent defends: the cause immediately transforms into the fruit; there is only a single arising, without repeated arising. Hence the refutation now says: since you speak of "immediately", it cannot be called "transformation"; if you speak of "transformation", it cannot be called "immediately". Just as the physical eye (yan) is immediately the eye (mu), it cannot be called a transformation. From "The question says: the cause does not completely perish" downwards is the second defense, which states: the designation perishes while the substance remains constantly; because the substance remains, though transformed, it is immediate; because the designation perishes, though immediate, it transforms. Another says: the former Deer King was my very body; the spiritual awareness of the deer and the spiritual awareness of the Buddha are not distinct; it is merely that the designation of "deer" perished and the designation of "Buddha" arose. The spiritual awareness of humans and gods is also not distinct; it is merely that one designation is lost and another designation arises. Furthermore, according to the Mahāsāṃghika doctrine, the inherently pure mind-nature is neither cause nor fruit; when in the state of cause it is called cause; from beginning to end it is one mind, hence its substance is called one; names differ, so one name is lost and another name arises. Furthermore, like the non-Buddhists, from subtle to coarse, and from coarse to subtle, the meaning is also like this. Furthermore, the She-lun masters say: the substance of the ālaya has neither arising nor perishing, while its names and functions have arising and perishing; this is also of the same meaning. Furthermore, this doctrine contradicts the Laṅkāvatāra-sūtra, which clarifies the meaning of eight consciousnesses perishing. Regarding "The answer says: the lump of clay perishing prior and the pot subsequently arising is not called transformation": since a designation designates a substance, and a substance corresponds to a designation, when the designation has already perished, the substance must also perish; this being so, with earlier perishing and later arising, how could it be a transformation? Regarding "Moreover, the lump of clay does not arise alone": this phrase clarifies that not only does the designation arise, but in terms of substance it also arises; contrasting with the previous phrase, not only does the designation perish, but the substance also perishes. Furthermore, the opponent holds two tenets: first, that the substance of the cause does not perish; second, that the fruit exists within the cause. The former refutes that the substance does not perish; now this refutes the tenet of its existence. Moreover, it refutes the notion that the substance of the lump of clay is definitely imperishable; since two entities are combined, the substance is not fixed. Regarding "If there were only a designation": this phrase states, if you only claim that designations perish and designations arise, then there would only be designations and no substance; what entity would transform? Regarding "Transformation is named as milk transforming into curds": this phrase proves that when designations perish, substances also perish, and when designations arise, substances also arise. As in the Śata-śāstra, the five factors of shape, time, power, cognition, and name differ, hence they perish together and arise together. Refuting another view, it says: before your single lump of clay is made into a pot, it fully possesses the principles of all objects. When you say that when clay becomes a pot, the other principles undergo apratisaṃkhyā-nirodha, there should also be a principle of the pot failing and a principle of the pot succeeding. Answer: There is also a principle of the pot failing. Just as when a single lump of clay is made into whatever one object, the other objects all fail. Question: Since they cannot all succeed simultaneously, they also cannot all fail simultaneously. Answer: Accomplishing an object lies in one; because concrete matters are difficult, they cannot succeed simultaneously. Question: Since the various principles are co-present, the concrete matters should also be co-present. Answer: Concrete matters obstruct one another, so they cannot exist simultaneously; principles do not obstruct one another, so they can exist simultaneously. Question: If when principles exist, concrete matters exist, then principles obstructing should mean concrete matters obstructing; if principles do not obstruct, principles also do not exist. From "The question says: although the cause perishes and is lost" downwards is the second part, refuting perishing without transforming. Since earlier perishing and later transforming falls into two arisings, they now say: it is merely that the cause perishes beforehand and the fruit arises afterward, without the fault of repeated arising. In the reply, the first half refutes: if the cause is lost, there is no cause; what would produce the fruit? The second half clarifies: if the cause is not lost, the cause would reside in the fruit; how could it produce the fruit? Just as if the rice is lost, there is nothing to make into cooked rice; if it is not lost, the raw rice remains and there is no cooked rice either. The reason for repeatedly refuting its not being lost is that the opponent posits cause and effect as only having two options, lost or not lost; if one refutes not being lost, they posit being lost; if one refutes being lost, they posit not being lost; therefore, one refutes them in their advance and retreat. Question: How does this differ from the refutation in the previous verse? Answer: Above, it was refuted through repeated arising; here, it is gathered together to show non-arising. Furthermore, as in the Tattvasiddhi-śāstra and others, a single doctrine contains both lost and not lost: real dharmas are lost, while the continuum is not lost; therefore both are refuted: if real dharmas are lost, there is no cause to produce the fruit; if the continuum is not lost, the cause should reside in the fruit. Furthermore, this passage opens up the doctrine of stimulus and response (ganying). Now we ask: regarding the goodness that is to arise which stimulates, is this goodness existent, or is it non-existent? If it is existent, why must it stimulate? If it is claimed that the goodness of principle stimulates and the concrete response occurs, then the cause of principle stimulates the concrete fruit. Unless your doctrine holds that there are no sentient beings, if there are sentient beings, then all principles of goodness exist, and all sentient beings can constantly stimulate the sages, so there would be no need to cultivate concrete goodness to stimulate concrete fruits. Furthermore, we ask: if there is already a response before concrete goodness exists, there should also already be concrete goodness before a response exists. Furthermore, we ask about the meaning of stimulation: if without concrete action one cannot stimulate the fruit, then without concrete goodness one should also not be able to stimulate the sages. Furthermore, we ask: why does your doctrine of stimulus and response not correlate, with principle responding to the capacity of principle, and concrete action responding to the capacity of concrete action? If the capacity of principle stimulates concrete action, the capacity of concrete action should also stimulate principle. Next, we ask: if goodness of the two realms of past and present can stimulate, since goodness already exists, why must it stimulate? If it is said that it stimulates in order to increase and generate goodness, if so, then before goodness exists it should not stimulate; how could the first single thought of goodness arise? If a single thought of goodness arises of itself without needing the sage's response, subsequent ones should also arise of themselves without needing a response. Furthermore, asking Zhuangyan: since the two periods are non-existent, how can one achieve the past? Having achieved the past, how can you say it is non-existent? If a past cause stimulates a future fruit, past understanding should also sever future afflictions. If afflictions, being non-existent, cannot be severed, then the fruit, being non-existent, should also not be stimulated. Furthermore, asking Guangzhai about the doctrine of attainment: the sūtra says that conditioned phenomena are impermanent, yet you claim that the arising of a single thought of good or evil is permanent in function—does this not contradict the sūtra? Moreover, this incurs the faults of permanence within impermanence, and impermanence within permanence. > — English (machine translation) (machine translation) - [Previous: 9.6](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1824.9.6) - [Next: 9.8](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1824.9.8) - [Up: 9](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1824.9) ## Translations (1) - [English (machine translation)](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1824~en-mt.9.7) — English, machine translation --- Source: [https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1824.9.7](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1824.9.7) · Pramāṇa