[Pramāṇa](https://indike.org/pramana/) › [Indian literature](https://indike.org/pramana/in) › [Buddhist Literature](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha) › [Taishō Tripiṭaka (Chinese Buddhist canon)](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho) › [十二門論宗致義記](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1826) › 1.20 # 十二門論宗致義記 1.20 十二門論宗致義記 1.20 - **Language:** Classical Chinese ### [1.20](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1826.1.20) 問：若據前門以真空滅幻有令不有者，此則斷滅俗諦、壞業果，故是惡取空。又此性空既由幻有，若令幻有亦不有者，幻有無故，依何得立彼性空宗？是則亦失自真空義。又前非異門中明不壞幻有，此門復壞，豈不二說自相違耶？又若據後義，以有奪空令空不空者，此則實有、非是幻有，乖真空故，是情執有。又此緣有既由性空，若此亦無，緣有亦壞，則失緣有義。又前非異門中明不損真空，此門復壞，豈不相違？答：釋此諸難，明真俗空有、與奪存壞，有二門四句：一、唯真空，有四義：一、由此空故不壞緣有，以性若有者，非從緣有故。二、由是空故壞盡緣有，以空必害緣有，故有若不盡，非真空故。三、由空故亦壞真空，以此性空既由緣有，緣有存故則無真空，無真空者由真空也。四、由空故不壞真空，以壞於緣有、盡彼空相，方是真空故。二、唯幻有，亦有四義：一、由緣有故不害性空，以從緣之有必是性空，定無性故。二、由緣有故必乖性空，以緣有不無故。三、由緣有故則壞緣有，以從緣之有必是性空，性空現故必害緣有，害緣有者由緣有也。四由緣有故不壞緣有，以從緣之有必害空盡有方為緣有也，非是無故。如是緣有性空，或相奪全盡、或相與全存、或自壞自存，無有障礙。是故若就相與門，則不壞有之空與彼不壞空之有理不雜，故是非一門也。二若就相奪門，則此壞有之空與盡空之有全奪，故非一也。三、若就各自存門，則不相是，故非一也。四、若就各自壞門，則無一可一，故非一也。以存壞無礙、二理不雜，不墮邊故、不失中道，是謂二諦中道也。 > Question: If, according to the former gate, true emptiness extinguishes illusory existence to make it non-existent, this annihilates the conventional truth and destroys karmic cause and effect, which is an evil grasping at emptiness. Furthermore, since this emptiness of intrinsic nature derives from illusory existence, if one also makes illusory existence non-existent, then because illusory existence is absent, based on what could that doctrine of emptiness of intrinsic nature be established? Then it would also lose its own meaning of true emptiness. Moreover, the previous gate of non-difference clarified that it does not destroy illusory existence; now this gate destroys it again—how are the two statements not mutually contradictory? Furthermore, if according to the latter meaning existence deprives emptiness and makes emptiness non-empty, this would be real existence and not illusory existence, and by violating true emptiness, it would be conceptualized existence. Furthermore, since this conditioned existence derives from the emptiness of intrinsic nature, if this is also absent, conditioned existence is also destroyed, and the meaning of conditioned existence is lost. Moreover, the previous gate of non-difference clarified that it does not impair true emptiness; now this gate destroys it again—how is this not contradictory? Answer: In resolving these objections, clarifying the granting and depriving, preserving and destroying, of the ultimate and conventional, emptiness and existence, there are two gates with four propositions each. First, regarding true emptiness alone, there are four meanings: 1. By virtue of this emptiness, it does not destroy conditioned existence, because if intrinsic nature existed, it would not exist through conditions. 2. By virtue of being emptiness, it thoroughly destroys conditioned existence, because emptiness must negate conditioned existence, and if existence were not exhausted, it would not be true emptiness. 3. By virtue of emptiness, it also destroys true emptiness, because since this emptiness of intrinsic nature derives from conditioned existence, when conditioned existence is preserved there is no true emptiness; and this absence of true emptiness is due to true emptiness. 4. By virtue of emptiness, it does not destroy true emptiness, because it is only by destroying conditioned existence and exhausting that mark of emptiness that it is true emptiness. Second, regarding illusory existence alone, there are also four meanings: 1. By virtue of conditioned existence, it does not impair the emptiness of intrinsic nature, because existence proceeding from conditions must be empty of intrinsic nature, definitively lacking intrinsic nature. 2. By virtue of conditioned existence, it must contradict the emptiness of intrinsic nature, because conditioned existence is not non-existent. 3. By virtue of conditioned existence, it destroys conditioned existence, because existence proceeding from conditions must be empty of intrinsic nature, and when the emptiness of intrinsic nature manifests it must negate conditioned existence; that which negates conditioned existence is due to conditioned existence. 4. By virtue of conditioned existence, it does not destroy conditioned existence, because existence proceeding from conditions must negate emptiness and exhaust existence before it can constitute conditioned existence, as it is not non-existent. In this way, conditioned existence and the emptiness of intrinsic nature either mutually deprive and are completely exhausted, or mutually grant and are completely preserved, or self-destroy and self-preserve, without obstruction. Therefore, if viewed from the gate of mutual granting, the emptiness that does not destroy existence and the existence that does not destroy emptiness are not conflated in principle; hence it is the gate of non-identity. Second, if viewed from the gate of mutual depriving, this emptiness that destroys existence and this existence that exhausts emptiness completely deprive each other; hence they are not identical. Third, if viewed from the gate of individual self-preservation, they do not affirm each other; hence they are not identical. Fourth, if viewed from the gate of individual self-destruction, there is no unity that can be unified; hence they are not identical. Because preservation and destruction are unobstructed and the two principles are not conflated, neither falling into extremes nor losing the middle way, this is called the middle way of the two truths. > — English (machine translation) (machine translation) - [Previous: 1.19](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1826.1.19) - [Next: 1.21](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1826.1.21) - [Up: 1](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1826.1) ## Translations (1) - [English (machine translation)](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1826~en-mt.1.20) — English, machine translation --- Source: [https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1826.1.20](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1826.1.20) · Pramāṇa