[Pramāṇa](https://indike.org/pramana/) › [Indian literature](https://indike.org/pramana/in) › [Buddhist Literature](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha) › [Taishō Tripiṭaka (Chinese Buddhist canon)](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho) › [十二門論宗致義記](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1826) › 2.3 # 十二門論宗致義記 2.3 十二門論宗致義記 2.3 - **Language:** Classical Chinese ### [2.3](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1826.2.3) 釋此門，略作四句：一、釋名者，諸門名皆有三義：一、舉觀智為能觀；二、舉所遣託為門，則所觀有果無果是也；三、入門見真則下文真空，是皆從初二義題章。二、來意者，有二義：一、前品總破因緣及果皆空，今此別剋因中有無以顯無生，故次來也；二、前以因緣及果自他形奪以顯無生，今則以因中有無徵辨無生，令前真空轉極明了故、令執有無者心轉無寄故，是故來也。三、宗趣者，先敘所破：一、外道，謂僧佉計因中有果，衛世計因中無果，尼揵計因中亦有果亦無果，若提計因中非有果非無果。二、小乘，薩婆多計因中有果性，經部計因中無果體。又大眾部計過未是無，則是中無果也。犢子部計亦有亦無，以無事而有性故，義準法相大乘說非有非無，以待緣故不有，為因故不無。如是等文皆是所破。二、所顯宗，謂只由此四句為所由故，俱不得生。不待生處，是所入宗也。四、釋文中四：一、總標；二、別釋；三、結宗；四、類遣。初中二：先標宗生起，後舉頌立宗，此可知。二、別釋中二：初舉頌立三章門，二、「何以故」下釋。釋中三：先釋因中有果不生，次釋無，後釋俱。釋有不成生中有十五番，初一恒生不生破，於中四：初、出過；二、牒計破；三、遮救破；四、結成破。前二縱破，謂將已生同未生則應恒生；後二奪破，將未生同已生則應恒不生。前中第二牒計破中，量云：因應生果已更生，以因中常有果故，如未生果因，以未生與生因位不改故。又以已生之果不異未生時故，是故因中恒有常生也。從是有邊復應更生者，謂此果法，在因、出因俱是有故，在因既生，出因何得不生？是故生已更生是則無窮，此是重生無窮。三、遮救破，亦是恒不生破。於中先牒外救云：已生是事成，事成不須生；未生是性有，性有故須生。後正破云：無生理者，既已生是有而不更生，未生亦有應亦不生，故云終無生理。亦有量云：未生因應不生果，以因中有果無生理故，如已生果因，此是常不生過。若以已同未，則應常生；若以未同已，則應常不生。由具斯失，是故第四總結無生。第二、俱有不齊破。破意云：若已未俱有，遂得一生一不生，亦可已生與未生，一有一不有。若言未是性有故有生，已是事有故不生。亦可生亦有二生：一、是性生故；二、是事生故。不生文中，初牒執，後正破，可知。第三、已未相違破，此中先正破，後釋成。初者，生與未生既是相違，未生是有，生已應無，以相違故，如明闇等。釋中二作亦相違者，未生以有作相，生已亦以有作相，已未既其相反，作相那不相違？故令不齊也。亦可此是易位失體破，謂未生既是有後作，生已應失自體，以失未生位故。第四、已未無別破，謂汝若不受相違之患，則墮無差之咎。量云：未生應即是已生，以體俱有無別故，猶如已生前，以已未徵自體，自體不得一。今以自體徵已未，已未不得殊。文中三，謂標、釋、結，可知。第五、先成無用破，謂果已先有，因無生用，如果在器，器無生果之用，故云作已不作等也。文中三：初、正破；二、舉例；三、結非，可知。第六、已有應見破。先正破，謂果若有而不見者，更以何法知此有耶？量云：有是不有，以不見故，猶如無物。二、破救，救以未變無相，是故不見。破意：泥中既未變而無缾相者，與泥中亦無馬相，是二有何別？泥中無馬相，亦則無馬體，泥中無缾相，豈得有缾體？量可知，結可知。又泥中無馬相，無由知有馬，泥中亦無缾相，以何知有缾？亦有量，可知。此後亦是徵果以相破。第七、窮變失果破，於中二：先正破，後破救。前中三：初以變同果破，果有變亦有者，今應可見，此縱破也。「而實」下，就理結非，則奪破也。二、「若謂未變」下，以果同變破，變無果亦無，則失於果法。以變初無，後畢不有，以彼宗中果若先無，後終不生故，是故變終不得有變，終不得有故，果則永無也。三、有無不定破，乖本計故、違自言故，文可見。二、破救中四：一、外救；二、正破；三、重救；四、重破。初外救意，引世八緣證變是有，而無示現，是故上來諸難無不雪也。文中三：初一句標自宗；二、「凡物」下，引自類；三、「汝說因中」下，結破非。引類中四：一、標；二、列；三、釋；四、結，並可知。外意取第八為量耳。二、正破中三：初、總揀不同；二、次第別揀；三、別破第八。謂始終一故俱定有，故不得改也。比量，可知。三、重救，可知。四、重破中三：一、以果同麁失果破，謂汝言未生時細，則麁果先無，乖汝自宗。二、「又因中」下，以細奪麁失果破，謂汝若言生已轉麁則細，非果不得言果，細故不可得也。麁細並撿，果體本無。三、「如是」下，結呵情計。第八、自壞因果破中，初、牒計標壞；二、「何以故」下，釋顯壞相。此中先釋因壞，以因無因但是果法所寄住處故，如器中果器非果因故，縷等是法、器等為喻，比量可知。二、「若因壞」下，釋果壞。初相待破，次釋破，可知。第九、失法虛求破，於中三：先標不作故壞於果，謂果若先有，先有故則非所作，非所作故不得名果，則失果也。二、「何以故」下，釋不作故壞於因，謂終不以果於中住，故說因有能作，是故無能作故，則無因也。三、「如是」下，結虛求，謂因果既俱無，何須妄求於有無？又前門則因壞故果壞，此門果壞又失因。因以生果為能作，果以從生為所作。果既先有，則因失能作之功，果壞從生之義，是故俱失也。第十、相無體失破，此與前責泥中缾相何別者，前徵體相，此責標相，故異也。文中三：初、縱有徵相；二、舉例指事；三、「如是」下，正奪情執。並可知。第十一、責果無從破，於中三：先牒果不從因；二、「若因不」下，撿果正無從；三、「若果無」下，結俱無，可知。第十二、自壞二聚破，於中四：初、標執示過量，云果應是常，以無從作故，如涅槃性。二、「若果」下，壞失有為。三、「若一切」下，壞失無為。四、結非呵止。並可知。第十三、因因無窮破，於中二：先正破，後破救。初中三：先牒執示過；二、「如㲲」下，引類，亦是約情縱有，謂因中有果，此果復為餘因，於中復有餘果，如是則無窮。依《涅槃經》，如牛中先有乳，此乳有酪，乃至醍醐，是故牛中五味已具。又云：明當服酥，今已患嗅，乃至食中應有等。又賣草馬應取駒，中復有駒，如是一馬，應則是一群，此之謂也。三、「而實」下，就理奪無，謂既因中果內異，果是無，不與作因，因中之果是則不有也。二、破救中四：初、牒執總非；二、「何以故」下，釋非顯破。破意云：若如地香，要待緣發者，未發之時不名為果。汝以可了為果故，水是能了，香是可了，了是作故可名果。缾等既先有，非是作故，不是果也。三、重釋，四、結非，並可知。第十四、同了失生破，謂汝以水發地香，但是了因缾等爾者，應兼成餘，如燈照缾亦照餘故。又汝為以作為果？為以了為果？果若是作，缾等先有，非作不名果；果若是了，泥等了缾，何不亦兼生餘物耶？文中四：初、法；二、喻；三、合；四、結。並可知。第十五，二作不成破，謂以果先有故，何者今作？何者當作？彼宗計有二作異，故失自執也。文中先責後結，可知。上來釋先有不生章訖。 > In explaining this gate, there are briefly four points: First, explaining the name: all gate names have three meanings: 1. adducing the contemplative wisdom as the observing agent; 2. adducing what is eliminated and relied upon as the gate, which is the observed 'existence of the effect or nonexistence of the effect'; 3. entering the gate and seeing the truth, which is the 'true emptiness' below; all chapters are titled in accordance with the first two meanings. Second, the intention of its occurrence: there are two meanings: 1. the preceding chapter generally refuted causes, conditions, and effects as all being empty; now this \[chapter\] specifically investigates existence and nonexistence in the cause to reveal unarisenness, and hence it follows next; 2. previously, mutual elimination between self and other regarding causes, conditions, and effects was used to reveal unarisenness; now, inquiry and discernment into existence and nonexistence in the cause are used to reveal unarisenness, so as to make the preceding true emptiness exceedingly clear and to leave the minds of those clinging to existence or nonexistence with nothing to abide in; therefore it follows. Third, the doctrinal purport: first, stating what is refuted: 1. non-Buddhists: the Sāṃkhyas posit that there is an effect in the cause; the Vaiśeṣikas posit that there is no effect in the cause; the Nirgranthas posit that there is both an effect and no effect in the cause; the Jñātṛputras posit that there is neither an effect nor no effect in the cause. 2. Hīnayāna: the Sarvāstivādins posit that the nature of the effect exists in the cause; the Sautrāntikas posit that the substance of the effect does not exist in the cause. Furthermore, the Mahāsāṃghikas posit that the past and future are nonexistent, which means there is no effect in them. The Vātsīputrīyas posit both existence and nonexistence, because there is no concrete thing (vastu) yet there is intrinsic nature. By analogy, the Mahāyāna of Dharma Characteristics states neither existence nor nonexistence, because depending on conditions it is not existent, yet serving as a cause it is not nonexistent. Passages such as these are all what is refuted. 2. What is revealed as the core doctrine: namely, solely because of these four propositions as reasons, in all \[cases\] production is impossible. The state that does not depend on production is the doctrine entered into. Fourth, in explaining the text, there are four \[sections\]: 1. general statement; 2. specific explanation; 3. conclusion on the doctrine; 4. analogical elimination. In the first, there are two: first stating the core doctrine and origin, and then quoting the verse to establish the doctrine; this is understandable. In the second, the specific explanation, there are two: first, quoting the verse to set up the three chapter-sections; second, explaining from 'For what reason' onward. In the explanation, there are three: first, explaining that an existing effect in the cause is not produced; next, explaining nonexistence; finally, explaining both. In explaining that existence cannot accomplish production, there are fifteen refutations. The first is the refutation of eternal production and non-production. Within this, there are four: 1. presenting the fault; 2. taking up their doctrine and refuting it; 3. precluding their defense and refuting it; 4. concluding the refutation. The first two are concessions to refute, meaning that assimilating what is already produced to what is not yet produced entails that it should be eternally produced; the latter two are direct eliminations, assimilating what is not yet produced to what is already produced entails that it should be eternally unproduced. In the second of the former \[two\], taking up their doctrine and refuting it, the formal inference (anumāna) is: The cause ought to produce the effect again after it has already been produced, because the effect always exists in the cause, like the cause whose effect is not yet produced, because the state of the cause does not alter between being unproduced and produced. Furthermore, because the already produced effect is not different from the time when it was not yet produced, therefore it always exists in the cause and is constantly produced. 'From this existent aspect it ought to be produced again' means: because this dharma of the effect is existent both while in the cause and when emerging from the cause, since it is already produced while in the cause, why should it not be produced when emerging from the cause? Therefore, being produced again after having been produced leads to infinite regress; this is the infinite regress of repeated production. 3. Precluding their defense and refuting it is also the refutation of eternal non-production. Within it, first taking up the opponent's defense: What is already produced is accomplished as an actual thing; once accomplished as an actual thing, it does not need to be produced. What is not yet produced exists in nature; because it exists in nature, it must be produced. Later, directly refuting it, \[the text\] says: As for there being no principle of production, since what is already produced is existent and not produced again, what is not yet produced is also existent and should likewise not be produced; therefore it says there is ultimately no principle of production. There is also an inference: The cause not yet produced ought not to produce an effect, because there is no principle of production for an effect existing in the cause, like the cause whose effect is already produced; this is the fault of eternal non-production. If assimilating what is already produced to what is not yet produced, there would be eternal production; if assimilating what is not yet produced to what is already produced, there would be eternal non-production. Possessing these faults, the fourth therefore concludes with unarisenness. The second is the refutation of the disparity between both being existent. The intent of the refutation is: If both the already produced and the not yet produced are existent, and yet one is produced and one is not produced, it could also be that between the already produced and the not yet produced, one is existent and one is not existent. If you say that the not yet produced is existent in nature and therefore has production, while the already produced is existent as an actual thing and therefore has no production, then production could also have two kinds of production: 1. production of nature; 2. production of actual things. In the text on non-production, first taking up the attachment, and later directly refuting it, can be understood. The third is the refutation of the mutual contradiction between the already produced and the not yet produced. Here, first directly refuting, and later explaining to establish it. In the first, since being produced and not yet being produced are mutually contradictory, if the not yet produced is existent, what is already produced should be nonexistent, because of their mutual contradiction, like light and darkness. In the explanation, 'two actions are also contradictory' means: the not yet produced takes existence as its action-characteristic, and what is already produced also takes existence as its action-characteristic; since the already produced and not yet produced are opposite, how could their action-characteristics not be contradictory? Therefore it causes disparity. It can also be that this is the refutation of losing identity through switching positions, meaning: since the not yet produced is an existent that subsequently acts, when already produced it should lose its own nature, because it has lost the position of not yet being produced. The fourth is the refutation of there being no distinction between the already produced and the not yet produced, meaning that if you do not accept the fault of contradiction, you fall into the error of having no distinction. The inference is: The not yet produced ought to be identical with the already produced, because they are both existent in substance and have no distinction, just like what is already produced. Previously, using the already produced and not yet produced to interrogate their own substances, the substances could not be one. Now, using their own substances to interrogate the already produced and not yet produced, the already produced and not yet produced cannot be distinct. In the text there are three: stating, explaining, and concluding, which can be understood. The fifth is the refutation of prior accomplishment rendering \[the cause\] useless, meaning that if the effect already exists beforehand, the cause has no productive efficacy, just as when fruit is in a vessel, the vessel has no efficacy in producing the fruit; hence it says 'having been made, it is not made,' and so forth. In the text there are three: 1. direct refutation; 2. adducing an analogy; 3. concluding the error, which can be understood. The sixth is the refutation that what already exists ought to be seen. First directly refuting, meaning: if the effect exists and yet is not seen, by what further dharma is this known to exist? The inference is: The existent is nonexistent, because it is not seen, just like a nonexistent thing. Second, refuting the defense: the defense argues that because it has not transformed, it has no characteristics, and therefore is not seen. The intent of the refutation is: since in the clay it has not transformed and lacks the characteristics of a jar, what difference is there between this and the clay also lacking the characteristics of a horse? If the clay lacks the characteristics of a horse, it also lacks the substance of a horse; if the clay lacks the characteristics of a jar, how could it have the substance of a jar? The inference and the conclusion can be understood. Furthermore, if the clay lacks the characteristics of a horse, there is no way to know there is a horse; if the clay also lacks the characteristics of a jar, by what is it known that there is a jar? There is also an inference, which can be understood. This later part is also refuting by interrogating the effect through its characteristics. The seventh is the refutation of losing the effect by exhausting transformation. Within it, there are two: first directly refuting, and later refuting the defense. In the first, there are three: 1. refutation by assimilating transformation to the effect: if the effect exists, transformation also exists, so now it ought to be visible; this is a concession to refute. From 'yet in reality' onward, concluding the error according to principle, which is a direct elimination. 2. From 'if it is said that before transformation' onward, refutation by assimilating the effect to transformation: if transformation is nonexistent, the effect is also nonexistent, which entails losing the dharma of the effect. Since transformation is initially nonexistent, it is ultimately nonexistent later, because in their school, if an effect is nonexistent beforehand, it is ultimately not produced later; therefore, transformation can ultimately never exist, and because it can ultimately never exist, the effect is permanently nonexistent. 3. Refutation of the indeterminacy of existence and nonexistence: because it contradicts their original doctrine and contravenes their own words; the text can be seen. Second, in refuting the defense, there are four: 1. the opponent's defense; 2. direct refutation; 3. repeated defense; 4. repeated refutation. First, the intent of the opponent's defense is to cite the eight worldly conditions to prove that transformation exists, yet lacks manifestation; therefore, all the preceding objections are thoroughly cleared. In the text there are three: 1. one phrase stating their own school; 2. from 'all things' onward, citing their own kind; 3. from 'what you say of the cause' onward, concluding the refutation of the error. In citing the kinds, there are four: 1. stating; 2. enumerating; 3. explaining; 4. concluding; all can be understood. The opponent's intent merely takes the eighth as an inference. Second, in the direct refutation, there are three: 1. general differentiation of difference; 2. sequential specific differentiation; 3. specifically refuting the eighth. That is, because beginning and end are one, both are definitely existent, and therefore cannot change. The formal inference can be understood. Third, the repeated defense can be understood. Fourth, in the repeated refutation, there are three: 1. refutation of losing the effect by assimilating the effect to coarseness, meaning that your claim that it is subtle when not yet produced entails that the coarse effect is nonexistent beforehand, contradicting your own school. 2. From 'furthermore, in the cause' onward, refutation of losing the effect by using subtlety to eliminate coarseness, meaning that if you say that after being produced it turns coarse, then the subtle is not an effect and cannot be called an effect; being subtle, it is ungraspable. Investigating both coarseness and subtlety, the substance of the effect is fundamentally nonexistent. 3. From 'thus' onward, concluding with a rebuke of their emotional clinging. In the eighth, the refutation of self-destruction of cause and effect: first, taking up the doctrine and stating the destruction; second, from 'For what reason' onward, explaining and revealing the characteristics of destruction. Here, first explaining the destruction of the cause: because the cause lacks a cause and is merely the place where the dharma of the effect resides, just as with fruit in a vessel the vessel is not the cause of the fruit; threads and the like are the subject, the vessel and the like are the analogy; the formal inference can be understood. Second, from 'if the cause is destroyed' onward, explaining the destruction of the effect. First is refutation by mutual dependence, next is explaining the refutation; they can be understood. In the ninth, the refutation of losing dharmas through vain pursuit, there are three: first, stating that because of non-action, the effect is destroyed, meaning that if the effect already exists beforehand, because it exists beforehand it is not that which is produced; not being that which is produced, it cannot be called an effect, which is the loss of the effect. Second, from 'For what reason' onward, explaining that because of non-action, the cause is destroyed, meaning that one never speaks of a cause as having productive capacity merely because an effect resides in it; therefore, lacking productive capacity, there is no cause. Third, from 'thus' onward, concluding with vain pursuit, meaning that since both cause and effect are nonexistent, why futilely pursue existence or nonexistence? Furthermore, in the previous gate, because the cause is destroyed, the effect is destroyed; in this gate, the effect is destroyed and the cause is also lost. The cause takes producing the effect as its productive capacity, and the effect takes arising from \[the cause\] as what is produced. Since the effect already exists beforehand, the cause loses the function of productive capacity, and the effect destroys the meaning of arising from \[the cause\]; therefore both are lost. The tenth is the refutation that without characteristics, the substance is lost. How does this differ from the previous inquiry about the characteristics of a jar in the clay? The previous one inquired into substance and characteristics, whereas this one interrogates indicative characteristics; hence they differ. In the text there are three: 1. conceding existence to interrogate characteristics; 2. adducing analogies to point to matters; 3. from 'thus' onward, directly eliminating emotional clinging. All can be understood. In the eleventh, the refutation of demanding whence the effect comes, there are three: first, taking up that the effect does not come from the cause; second, from 'if the cause does not' onward, precisely investigating that the effect has no source; third, from 'if the effect has no' onward, concluding that both are nonexistent; this can be understood. In the twelfth, the refutation of self-destruction of the two categories, there are four: first, stating the attachment and showing the fault through an inference: the effect ought to be permanent, because it is not made from anything, like the nature of nirvāṇa. Second, from 'if the effect' onward, destruction of the conditioned. Third, from 'if all' onward, destruction of the unconditioned. Fourth, concluding the error and rebuking it to cease. All can be understood. In the thirteenth, the refutation of the infinite regress of causes of causes, there are two: first directly refuting, and later refuting the defense. In the first, there are three: first, taking up the attachment and showing the fault; second, from 'like fine cloth' onward, citing analogies, which is also conceding existence based on their attachment, meaning that there is an effect in the cause, and this effect again becomes another cause, in which there is again another effect, and thus it is infinite. Relying on the Nirvāṇa Sūtra: just as milk already exists in a cow, and in this milk there is curd, up to clarified butter, therefore the five flavors are already complete in the cow; and it also says: tomorrow one should take ghee, but today one already suffers from its smell, up to \[butter\] ought to exist in food, and so forth. Furthermore, selling a mare entails taking a foal, and within it is yet another foal, so that a single horse would be an entire herd; this is what it means. Third, from 'yet in reality' onward, directly eliminating based on principle: since the effect inside the cause is distinct, the effect is nonexistent and does not serve as a cause, so the effect in the cause does not exist. Second, in refuting the defense, there are four: 1. taking up the attachment and generally denying it; 2. from 'For what reason' onward, explaining the denial and revealing the refutation. The intent of the refutation is: if it is like the fragrance of the earth, which must await conditions to manifest, before it manifests it is not called an effect. Because you take what can be manifested as an effect, water is the manifesting agent and fragrance is what is manifested; since manifesting is an action, it can be called an effect. Jars and the like already exist beforehand, and not being an action, they are not effects. 3. Re-explaining; 4. concluding the error; both can be understood. The fourteenth is the refutation that being identical to manifestation entails losing production, meaning: if you hold that water manifesting the fragrance of the earth is merely a manifesting cause (jñāpaka-hetu) for jars and the like, it should concurrently accomplish other things, just as a lamp illuminating a jar also illuminates other things. Furthermore, do you take action as the effect, or do you take manifestation as the effect? If the effect is an action, jars and the like exist beforehand; not being actions, they are not called effects. If the effect is manifestation, since clay and the like manifest a jar, why do they not also concurrently produce other things? In the text there are four: 1. dharma; 2. analogy; 3. application; 4. conclusion. All can be understood. The fifteenth is the refutation that two actions cannot be established, meaning that because the effect already exists beforehand, which is made now and which will be made in the future? Because that school posits two different actions, it loses its own doctrine. In the text, first interrogating and then concluding can be understood. The above finishes explaining the section on the non-production of prior existence. > — English (machine translation) (machine translation) - [Previous: 2.2](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1826.2.2) - [Next: 2.4](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1826.2.4) - [Up: 2](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1826.2) ## Translations (1) - [English (machine translation)](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1826~en-mt.2.3) — English, machine translation --- Source: [https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1826.2.3](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1826.2.3) · Pramāṇa