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# 瑜伽論記 13.61

瑜伽論記 13.61

- **Language:** Classical Chinese

### [13.61](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1828.13.61)

前總破六識訖，下因別疏牒破，且疏善不善性心破，故第二因。又六識身善不善等性可得，是第二因者，既欲破之，且遮別法有非執受方為同喻，而能遮彼善不善等，設有計云：涅槃能持有漏依止。今量云：二種涅槃定非執受（宗），是無為故（因），猶如虛空（喻）。此義既成轉破道諦，設有別計道諦能持。應立量云：無漏善心不能執受有漏諸根（宗）。此言為簡順彼世間大圓鏡智能執持身，若但總言無漏善心，不能執受即有不定過，為如涅槃是無漏故，無漏善心不能執受，為如大圓鏡智是無漏故而能執受，避斯過故，故作此言：是無漏故（因），猶如涅槃（喻），此義既成，應須轉破有漏善心。應立量云：有漏善心不應執受有漏諸根（宗），以是善故（因），如無漏善（喻），善既被破，不善須除。別立量云：諸不善心應非執受（宗），有記性故（因），如彼善品（喻），雖破記性，無記之中有四無記，且除異熟在第三因，變化等三今應別破。量云：三無記心應非執受（宗），以間斷故（因），猶如聲電（喻），或同喻云非異熟性故善惡心，此因亦善，前因有異熟生心為不定過。今論云：善不善性不言無記，既有等字明別有破。雖復疏牒其六識中無記報心，此中有計以為執持，應破彼計，故第三因即遮此計。

> The general refutation of the six consciousnesses having ended above, below, relying on distinct citations, the treatise refutes them individually. First, it refutes \[them\] by citing minds of wholesome and unwholesome nature; hence the second reason. As for "Furthermore, groups of six consciousnesses of wholesome and unwholesome natures are observed" being the second reason: wishing to refute them, one first excludes distinct dharmas that lack being appropriated to serve as homogeneous examples (sādharmya-dṛṣṭānta) that can exclude those wholesome and unwholesome \[minds\]. Suppose it is posited that nirvāṇa can sustain the defiled support; now one formulates the syllogism: 'The two kinds of nirvāṇa definitely are not appropriated (thesis), because they are unconditioned (reason), just like space (example).' This point having been established, one turns to refute the truth of the path (mārgasatya). Suppose it is separately posited that the truth of the path can sustain \[it\]; one should formulate the syllogism: 'The taintless wholesome mind cannot appropriate defiled sense-faculties (thesis).' This phrasing is to exclude the Great Mirror Wisdom conforming to that worldly realm which can sustain the body. If one merely spoke generally of the taintless wholesome mind being unable to appropriate, there would be the fault of inconclusiveness (anaikāntika): would it be that just as nirvāṇa is taintless, so the taintless wholesome mind cannot appropriate, or would it be that just as the Great Mirror Wisdom is taintless, it can appropriate? To avoid this fault, one therefore makes this statement: 'because it is taintless (reason), just like nirvāṇa (example).' This point having been established, one must turn to refute the defiled wholesome mind. One should formulate the syllogism: 'The defiled wholesome mind should not appropriate defiled sense-faculties (thesis), because it is wholesome (reason), like taintless wholesome \[mind\] (example).' Wholesomeness having been refuted, unwholesomeness must be eliminated. One separately formulates the syllogism: 'Unwholesome minds should not appropriate (thesis), because they are morally determined (reason), like that class of wholesome \[minds\] (example).' Although moral determination has been refuted, among indeterminate \[minds\] there are four kinds of indeterminate \[mind\]. Setting aside maturation (vipāka) in the third reason, the other three, such as \[minds of\] magical apparition, should now be refuted separately. The syllogism is: 'The three indeterminate minds should not appropriate (thesis), because they are interrupted (reason), just like sound and lightning (example).' Alternatively, the homogeneous example states: 'because of not being of a maturation nature, like wholesome and unwholesome minds'—this reason is also good, whereas the previous reason suffered the fault of inconclusiveness due to minds arisen from maturation. Now the treatise states: 'wholesome and unwholesome nature' and does not mention indeterminacy; since there is the word 'etc.', it is clear that there are distinct refutations. Although it also distinctly cites the indeterminate retributive mind among the six consciousnesses, here some posit it as the sustainer, and that posited view must be refuted; hence the third reason excludes this posited view.  
> — English (machine translation) (machine translation)

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## Translations (1)

- [English (machine translation)](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1828~en-mt.13.61) — English, machine translation

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Source: [https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1828.13.61](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1828.13.61) · Pramāṇa
