[Pramāṇa](https://indike.org/pramana/) › [Indian literature](https://indike.org/pramana/in) › [Buddhist Literature](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha) › [Taishō Tripiṭaka (Chinese Buddhist canon)](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho) › [瑜伽論記](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1828) › 20.6 # 瑜伽論記 20.6 瑜伽論記 20.6 - **Language:** Classical Chinese ### [20.6](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1828.20.6) 景云：今此論云：初自性五法不攝，第二自性攝於四法，第三自性唯攝真如。舊行佛性論第二亦云：第一性五法并不攝，以無體故，第二性攝四法，第三性唯攝如如。又三無性論第一卷亦云：第一性無有體相，非五藏所攝，若法是有不出五藏。問若爾何故楞伽云：相名是第一性，分別是第二性，正智如如是第三性。又中邊論第一性攝名，第二性攝相及分別，第三性攝真如及正智，如此等文云：何會釋，解云：文雖有異義，不相違，所以者何，楞伽經說第一性攝名相者，據執定性名相畢竟無體，與第一性無體義同，故得相攝，因緣名相從心而生，不離心故，總名分別，故云分別攝依他性，中邊論中相及分別據因緣法攝依他性，名據橫計無體義同，攝第一性，正智一種依此論及佛性論等，即依他，以是有為依因緣故，以體變異非圓成實。楞伽及中邊論如如正智俱攝第三性者，同據不顛倒義，屬圓成實。又依下攝擇分，正智亦屬圓成實性，若解向來所辨通塞，世人不應輒起難詞，云瑜伽論正智一種唯屬依他，遍計所執無體為過。又復新譯無性世親所解攝論皆言，如如正智屬圓成實。彼邪見者破云：新譯經論說彼正智一向屬依他者，即有可壞虛妄過者，豈猛浪疎失者哉。又云：依五法不攝第一性者，即五法攝法不盡，此義不然，遍計所執但是倒情搆畫畢竟無法，為此說五法不攝，云何得言如此五法攝法不盡過耶？是故說云：如世美菓多繩附，智深妙義多招誹謗。 > Jing says: Now this treatise states that the first intrinsic nature is not subsumed under the five dharmas, the second intrinsic nature subsumes four dharmas, and the third intrinsic nature subsumes only tathatā. Fascicle Two of the older translation of the Buddha-Nature Treatise also states: The first nature is not subsumed under the five dharmas at all, because it is devoid of substance; the second nature subsumes four dharmas; the third nature subsumes only suchness. Also, Fascicle One of the Treatise on the Three Types of Naturelessness states: The first nature has no substantial mark and is not subsumed under the five receptacles; if a dharma exists, it does not exceed the five receptacles. Question: If so, why does the Laṅkāvatāra state: Marks and names are the first nature; discrimination is the second nature; correct cognition and suchness are the third nature? Furthermore, the Madhyāntavibhāga states that the first nature subsumes names, the second nature subsumes marks and discrimination, and the third nature subsumes tathatā and correct cognition. How are such texts reconciled? Solution: Although the texts differ, their meanings are not contradictory. Why is this? When the Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra states that the first nature subsumes names and marks, it is based on grasping at definitive natures in names and marks as ultimately devoid of substance, which accords with the meaning of the first nature being devoid of substance, and thus they mutually subsume each other. Conditioned names and marks arise from the mind and are not separate from the mind, so they are generally called discrimination; therefore it says that discrimination subsumes the paratantra nature. In the Madhyāntavibhāga, marks and discrimination, based on conditioned dharmas, subsume the paratantra nature; names, based on the meaning of being devoid of substance through erroneous conceptualization, subsume the first nature. The single item of correct cognition, according to this treatise, the Buddha-Nature Treatise, and others, is precisely paratantra, because being conditioned, it relies on causes and conditions, and because its substance undergoes modification, it is not pariniṣpanna. The Laṅkāvatāra and Madhyāntavibhāga subsume both suchness and correct cognition under the third nature based together on the meaning of non-perversion, belonging to pariniṣpanna. Furthermore, according to the Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī below, correct cognition also belongs to the pariniṣpanna nature. If one understands the reconciliations and distinctions expounded hitherto, people of the world should not recklessly raise difficult objections, saying that the Yogācārabhūmiśāstra makes the single item of correct cognition belong solely to paratantra and takes the parikalpita nature as devoid of substance to be an error. Moreover, the newly translated commentaries on the Mahāyānasaṃgraha by Asvabhāva and Vasubandhu both state that suchness and correct cognition belong to pariniṣpanna. That heterodox critic refutes them, saying: 'The newly translated sūtras and treatises explain that correct cognition belongs purely to paratantra, which entails the fault of being destructible and false'—how could this not be a reckless and careless mistake? Furthermore, he says: 'If based on the five dharmas not subsuming the first nature, then the five dharmas do not exhaustively subsume dharmas.' This meaning is incorrect. The parikalpita nature is merely the fabrication of inverted consciousness, an ultimately non-existent dharma; for this reason it is said that the five dharmas do not subsume it. How could one say that there is the fault of these five dharmas not exhaustively subsuming dharmas? Therefore it is said: Just as delicious fruit in the world attracts many flies, so profound and wondrous wisdom often invites slander. > — English (machine translation) (machine translation) - [Previous: 20.5](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1828.20.5) - [Next: 20.7](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1828.20.7) - [Up: 20](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1828.20) ## Translations (1) - [English (machine translation)](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1828~en-mt.20.6) — English, machine translation --- Source: [https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1828.20.6](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1828.20.6) · Pramāṇa