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# 瑜伽師地論略纂 1.51

瑜伽師地論略纂 1.51

- **Language:** Classical Chinese

### [1.51](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1829.1.51)

「有行相」者，謂行解相狀。唯有為緣，非無為緣，無分別智無相狀故。如識自影，有二行相：一、影像相分取本質境行解相故；二、即見分取親相分行解相分。若取通義，行境體相名為行相，通無為緣，理無妨矣。有為緣中，准前有二，并自證分等，各望所緣，思准應悉。若影像名行相，即本質為所緣，體一名同；行相體別，故名不同。若見分名行相，即親相分，體雖各別，相似名同；一見分體解各各異故，名為不同。如《唯識》第二、第三疏解。

> Regarding "having cognitive representations" (sākāra): this refers to the appearance of cognitive apprehension. It pertains solely to conditions with conditioned dharmas, not conditions with unconditioned dharmas, because non-conceptual wisdom is devoid of appearances. Like the consciousness's own shadow, it has two cognitive representations: first, the objective aspect (nimittabhāga) as a reflection, because it grasps the original substance of the object as the appearance of cognitive apprehension; second, the cognitive aspect (darśanabhāga) itself, which grasps the direct objective aspect as the representation of cognitive apprehension. If taking the general meaning, the intrinsic characteristic of cognitive activity directed toward an object is called "cognitive representation," which universally applies to conditions with unconditioned dharmas, and there is no logical impediment. Among conditions with conditioned dharmas, following the previous explanation there are two; together with the self-authenticating aspect (svasaṃvittibhāga) and so on, each in relation to its object of cognition, one should understand this by reflection. If the reflection is called the cognitive representation, then the original substance is the object of cognition, its substance is one and its name is the same; but the substances of the cognitive representations differ, hence they are called "not the same." If the cognitive aspect is called the cognitive representation, then taking the direct objective aspect, although their substances are distinct, their similarity is called "the same"; but because the single substance of the cognitive aspect understands each individually, they are called "not the same." This is explained as in the commentaries on the second and third fascicles of the \*Cheng weishi lun\*.  
> — English (machine translation) (machine translation)

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## Translations (1)

- [English (machine translation)](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1829~en-mt.1.51) — English, machine translation

## Linked texts (1)

- [瑜伽論記](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1828.1.236) — Classical Chinese

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Source: [https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1829.1.51](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1829.1.51) · Pramāṇa
