[Pramāṇa](https://indike.org/pramana/) › [Indian literature](https://indike.org/pramana/in) › [Buddhist Literature](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha) › [Taishō Tripiṭaka (Chinese Buddhist canon)](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho) › [瑜伽師地論略纂](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1829) › 13.11 # 瑜伽師地論略纂 13.11 瑜伽師地論略纂 13.11 - **Language:** Classical Chinese ### [13.11](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1829.13.11) 論云「復次，嗢拕南曰」下，答第二問。此中有二：初、舉頌總顯八義；二、長行廣解。初文可知。就長行中，初、列八名，屬當於頌；二、次第解釋嗢拕南。而與鄔馱南自說經何別？就次第別解中，有八不同，即為八段。初段中有二：初問、次解。問可知。答中，五因不同，即為五段。其初因意者，諸小乘等中不立本識，如經部師以六識持身。今意非此，謂從先業生者，能執持身；從現在緣生者，不能執持。此約長理，不約六識於一剎那或起異熟心。破，如文可知。此中應立量云：眼等轉識非能執後（宗），現緣發故（因），如聲等起（喻）。又若有轉救之，云：我眼等中亦有異熟心，從先業生，能執持，汝何故云眼等轉識非能執持，而總遮我？「今應破之」下，第三因比量。若爾，下第三因應不異破，此已救已為破故。後既有破，明知此中但約長理相續道理破之，如前解釋。此第一因也。因言所以，即宗因等之因也，從此為名，故言五因。前總破六識訖，下因別疏牒破。且疏善、不善性心破，故第二因。又六識身善、不善等性可得，是第二因者，即欲破之，且遮別法有非執受方為同喻，而能遮彼善、不善等。設有解云涅槃體能持有漏依止，今量云：二種涅槃定非執受，宗也；是無為故，因也；由如虛空，喻也。此義既成，轉破道諦。　設有別計道諦能持，應立量云：無漏善心不能執受有漏諸根（宗）。此言為簡大圓鏡智能執自身，若但總言無漏善心不能執受，即有不定過。為如涅槃是無漏故，無漏善心不能執受，為如大圓鏡智是無漏故，而能執受？避斯過故，故作此言：是無漏故因，由如涅槃喻。此義既成，應須轉破有漏善心。應立量云：有漏善心應不執受有漏諸根（宗），以是善故（因），如無漏善（喻）。善既被破，不善須除。別立量云：諸不善心應非執受（宗），有記性故（因），如彼善品（喻）。雖破記性，無記之中有四無記，且除異熟在第三因，變化等三今應別破。量云：三無記心應非執受（宗），以間斷故（因），由如聲電（喻）；或因、喻云：非異熟性故，如善惡心。此因亦善，前因有異熟生心，為不定過。今論云「雖云善、不善性，不言無記」，既有等字，明別有破。雖復疏牒其六識中無記報心，此中有計以為執持，應破彼計，故第三因即遮此計。 > Where the treatise states: "Furthermore, the summary verse (udāna) says:" and below, this answers the second question. Herein there are two \[parts\]: first, reciting the verse to comprehensively reveal the eight meanings; second, the prose that explains them in detail. The initial text is clear. Within the prose, first, it lists the eight designations, corresponding them to the verse; second, it sequentially explains the summary verse (udāna). How does this differ from the udāna of the Udāna-sūtra? Within the sequential distinct explanation, there are eight differences, constituting eight sections. Within the first section, there are two parts: first the question, next the explanation. The question is clear. In the answer, because the five reasons are different, it forms five sections. Regarding the import of the first reason: in the various Hīnayāna schools and the like, the mūlavijñāna is not posited, as when the Sautrāntikas hold that the six consciousnesses sustain the body. The present intention is not this; it holds that what is produced from prior karma can appropriate and sustain the body, whereas what is produced from present conditions cannot sustain it. This is based on the enduring principle, not on the six consciousnesses occasionally producing a maturational mind (vipāka-citta) in a single moment. The refutation is evident from the text. Here, a formal inference (prayoga) should be established: 'The sensory evolving consciousnesses (pravṛtti-vijñāna) such as the visual consciousness are not capable of sustaining what comes after (thesis), because they are generated from present conditions (reason), like the arising of sound and the like (example).' Furthermore, if someone were to rescue \[their position\] by shifting, saying: 'Among our visual and other \[consciousnesses\], there is also a maturational mind produced from prior karma that is able to sustain; why do you say that the sensory evolving consciousnesses such as the visual consciousness cannot sustain, thus refuting us completely?'—the inference under the third reason below refutes this. If so, the third reason below would not be different in its refutation, for here it has already rescued and refutation has been made. Since there is a refutation later, one clearly knows that here it refutes solely based on the enduring principle and the logic of continuity, as explained previously. This is the first reason. 'Reason' (hetu) means cause or justification, that is, the hetu in thesis, reason, and so forth; it takes its name from this, hence it is said 'five reasons.' Having comprehensively refuted the six consciousnesses above, the reasons below singly cite and refute them in detail. First, the mind of wholesome and unwholesome natures is cited and refuted; hence this is the second reason. Furthermore, that the six collections of consciousness are observed to have wholesome, unwholesome, and other natures is the second reason: that is, wishing to refute this, one first excludes other phenomena that lack appropriation to serve as a concordant example (sādharmya-dṛṣṭānta) capable of excluding those wholesome, unwholesome, and other \[minds\]. Supposing someone explains that the substance of nirvāṇa can sustain the defiled support, an inference is now formulated: 'The two kinds of nirvāṇa are definitively not appropriated (thesis), because they are unconditioned (reason), just like empty space (example).' This point having been established, one turns to refute the Path-truth. Supposing someone separately posits that the Path-truth can sustain, one should formulate the inference: 'An uncontaminated wholesome mind cannot appropriate the contaminated sense-faculties (thesis).' This phrasing is used to exclude the Great Mirror Wisdom, which can sustain its own body; if one merely spoke generally of an uncontaminated wholesome mind being unable to appropriate, there would be the fallacy of indeterminacy (anaikāntika). For would it be like nirvāṇa, which, being uncontaminated, an uncontaminated wholesome mind cannot appropriate; or would it be like the Great Mirror Wisdom, which, being uncontaminated, is able to appropriate? To avoid this fallacy, this statement is made: 'because it is uncontaminated' is the reason; 'just like nirvāṇa' is the example. This point having been established, one must turn to refute the contaminated wholesome mind. One should establish the inference: 'The contaminated wholesome mind must not appropriate the contaminated sense-faculties (thesis), because it is wholesome (reason), like uncontaminated wholesomeness (example).' Wholesomeness having been refuted, the unwholesome must be eliminated. One separately establishes the inference: 'All unwholesome minds must be non-appropriating (thesis), because they have a determinate nature (reason), like those wholesome categories (example).' Although the determinate nature has been refuted, among the indeterminate there are four kinds of indeterminate: putting aside vipāka which belongs to the third reason, the remaining three such as the transformational \[indeterminate\] must now be refuted separately. The inference states: 'The three kinds of indeterminate minds must be non-appropriating (thesis), because they are intermittent (reason), like sound and lightning (example)'; or the reason and example may state: 'because they are not of the nature of vipāka, like wholesome and evil minds.' This reason is also sound; the previous reason incurred the fallacy of indeterminacy due to minds produced from vipāka (vipākaja). Now the treatise says: 'Although it speaks of wholesome and unwholesome natures, it does not mention the indeterminate'; yet since the word 'etc.' is present, it is clear that there is a separate refutation. Although it again cites the indeterminate retributive mind among the six consciousnesses, some here hold that it performs the sustaining; that view must be refuted, and thus the third reason excludes this assertion. > — English (machine translation) (machine translation) - [Previous: 13.10](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1829.13.10) - [Next: 13.12](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1829.13.12) - [Up: 13](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1829.13) ## Translations (1) - [English (machine translation)](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1829~en-mt.13.11) — English, machine translation --- Source: [https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1829.13.11](https://indike.org/pramana/in.bauddha.taisho.1829.13.11) · Pramāṇa